Lahiri, J.:- This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for an order or writ of certiorari to remove into this Court a decision of the Assam Board of Revenue, the appellate authority constituted under the Assam Excise Act, for the purpose of quashing the impugned order dated 24.1. 1981 in Revenue Case No. 18 of 1981. 2. The spring board of attack against the impugned order is that the appellate authority has failed to grasp the precise and accurate meaning of the expressions "Benami transaction" contained in Rule 211 of the Assam Excise Rules, 1945. We extract Rule 211 here in below : "211. The Presiding Officer shall be on his guard against combination of tenders at the time of settlement. Benami transactions shall not be permitted. The Presiding Officer may also refuse to consider tenders submitted by undesi­rable persons." (Emphasis added) The subsidiary point taken by the petitioner is that the appellate authority has gone wrong in demanding reasons for settlement from the settling authority. According to the petitioner the primary authority (the settling authority) is not obliged to give reasons for making settlement in favour of a party, as the provisions of the Rules do not prescribe any such obligation. 3. A relevant diary of facts and dates will .help focus atten­tion of the primary legal question. The Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar invited public tenders for settlement of the Kokilamukh C.S. Shop No. 5 for the period 1.10.81 to 31.3.84. Eight persons filed tenders including the petitioner and respondent No. 2, who was the sitting lessee of "the shop." the term of the settlement was to expire on 30.9.81. The Dupty Commissioner in consul­tation with the Advisory Committee settled the shop with the petitioner but there is no stated reason why the petitioner was so chosen nor is there any reason why the other tenderness inclu­ding Respondent 2 were excluded. Against the said order Respondent No. 2, the sitting lessee, and one Shri Prafulla preferred appeals before the Board of Revenue. Later Shri Prafulla withdrew the appeal and the same was dismissed accordingly. The Appellate Authority found no reason in support of the order of settle­ment in favour of the petitioner. 4. Against the said order Respondent No. 2, the sitting lessee, and one Shri Prafulla preferred appeals before the Board of Revenue. Later Shri Prafulla withdrew the appeal and the same was dismissed accordingly. The Appellate Authority found no reason in support of the order of settle­ment in favour of the petitioner. 4. Before us the area of controversy between the parties .is limited and the conditions set forth below are admitted by the learned counsel for the parties; (i) The Board is a statutory authority having quasi-judicial function; (ii) The Board is amena­ble to writ jurisdiction of this Court; (iii) The power of the Board, the appellate authority is co-extensive with that of the primary authority; (iv) One of the grounds on which certiorari may issue is error of law apparent on the face of the record and not every error either of law or of fact, which may be corrected by a court of appeal or revision; (v) The error in appreciating the documentary evidence or affidavits or errors in drawing inferences, or omission to draw inference cannot be rectified by this court in a writ application. The errors alluded are not "errors of law apparent on the face of the record"; (vi) The appellate powers exercised by the Board, the highest authority for deciding question of settlement of liquor shops, are wide powers as ruled in Nagendra Nath Bora vs. Commissioner of Hills Division, Assam, AIR 1958 SC 398 . 5. All hands agree that certiorari could issue to correct an error of law, but it must be something more than a mere error of law, it must be manifest on the face of the record. A landmark case on the question of power to issue writ or order of certiorari is HEG vs. Bolt on (1641) 1 Q. B. 66-113 E. R. 1054. As late as in 1922 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in King. vs. Nat bell liquors ltd. (1922) 2 A. C. 128 : (1922) All E. R. (Repr) 335-91 UPC 146 referring to HEG. As late as in 1922 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in King. vs. Nat bell liquors ltd. (1922) 2 A. C. 128 : (1922) All E. R. (Repr) 335-91 UPC 146 referring to HEG. vs. Bolton (supra) observed "......undoubtedly is a landmark in the history of certiorari, for it summarizes in an impeccable form the principles of its application." In Rex vs. Northumberland Compensation (1952) 1 All & R. 268-1951 (1) K. B. 711 the powers to issue an order of certiorari, on the grounds of error law apparent on the face of the record, were much extended. It has been held that certiorari could be used to correct errors of law which appear on the face of the record even though they do not go to its jurisdiction. Advent of many new Tribunals and the imperative need for supervision called for this well tried means of control. In Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) vs. Bairstow, 1955 (3) All B.R. 48 (53) (H. L.) it has been held that if a Tribunal arrives at such a conclusion that no reasonable authority properly instructed in law could arrive at it or is erroneous because a wrong legal approach has been adopted, the error would amount to error of law apparent on the face of the record. Skipping over a number of other decisions we find the House of Lord's decision in Anosmatic Ltd. vs. Foreign Compensation Commission, 1969 (2) A. C. 147 : 1969 (1) All E. R. 208 which has inter alia held that in spite of "no certiorari" provision in the statute it cannot protect an order which is a nullity, and, the Court should exercise its jurisdiction. The meaning of the expressions "purported determination" and "real determination" was explained. It is now a settled law that although a Tri­bunal has jurisdiction to enter into an enquiry, if it does or fails to do decision to which it had given, a certiorari would issue to quash the decision. Other leading decisions are Ambika Mills vs. S. B. Bhatt : AIR 1961 SC 971, Kays Concern vs. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1525 : Collector of Customs vs. Pednekar AIR 1976 SC 1499; Shafi vs. Additional, D. & S. J., AIR 1977 SC 83. 6. Other leading decisions are Ambika Mills vs. S. B. Bhatt : AIR 1961 SC 971, Kays Concern vs. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1525 : Collector of Customs vs. Pednekar AIR 1976 SC 1499; Shafi vs. Additional, D. & S. J., AIR 1977 SC 83. 6. Skipping over a number of decisions we find the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Makunda Bora vs. Bangshidhar Buragohain, AIR 1980 SC 1524 . It deals with the power of the High Court to interfere with the findings of the Board of Revenue while dealing with the excise settlement under the Assam Excise Act and Rules framed there under. We extract the relevant observations of their lordships : "While on facts the order of the Board under appeal is not impeccable, we must remember that under Article 226 of the Constitution, a finding of fact of a domestic tribunal cannot be interfered with. The High Court in the exercise of its special jurisdiction does not act as a court of appeal. It interferes only when there is a jurisdictional error apparent on the face of the record committed by the domestic tribunal. Such is not the case here. It is true that a finding based on no evid­ence or purely on surmises and conjectures or which is manifestly against the basic principles of natural justice, may he said to suffer from an error of law. In the instant case, the finding of the Board that the appe­llant does not possess the necessary financial capacity, is largely a finding of fact." (Emphasis added) 7. In the instant case, the finding of the Board that the appe­llant does not possess the necessary financial capacity, is largely a finding of fact." (Emphasis added) 7. From the rules laid down by the Supreme Court we feel that a certiorari would lie-(a) if there is an error appa­rent on the face of the record committed by the authority; (b) if on the face of the order it appears to us that in law the grounds are not such as to warrant a decision; (c) if the autho­rity has failed to proceed in accordance with the essential requ­irements of law which it was meant to administer; (d) if there is a patent error of law founded on a clear disregard of the law or based on obvious wrong interpretation of a statutory provi­sion upon which the decision lay resulting in injustice; (e) if the material provision of law is overlooked by the appellate authority; which amounts to patent error of law; (f) if the impu­gned order is not a "real decision" but a "purported decision". 8. We are of the opinion that an error of fact based on material cannot be disturbed. The basic reason of the restrictive attitude is that a court exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution does not sit as an appellate court and its function is merely supervisory. Any finding of fact arrived at after appraisal of oral or documentary material cannot be touched "unless it is based on "no evidence" or "inadmissible evidence" or "is patently wrong", so much so that no instructed in law person could have arrived at the conclusion. We are also of the opinion that where the order of the authority refers to several grounds, some relevant and existent and others irrelevant or non­existent, the order would be sustainable if the court is satis­fied that the authority would have based the order on the basis of relevant and existing grounds, and deletion of the irrelevant or non-existent grounds could not have affected the ultimate deci­sion. We are of the view that if the conclusion reached by the Tribunal on appraisal of evidence can be supported by reasons other than those contained in the order, but the Tri­bunal has omitted to consider the relevant factors. We are of the view that if the conclusion reached by the Tribunal on appraisal of evidence can be supported by reasons other than those contained in the order, but the Tri­bunal has omitted to consider the relevant factors. Ordinarily the order of the Tribunal cannot be quashed, as the order of the authority can be supported by reasons other than those set forth in the order. Findings of fact reached by the appellate authority, on appreciation of evidence or an inference of fact drawn from material before it cannot be permitted to be re­opened in proceedings for certiorari on the score (1) that the evidence is insufficient, or (2) the appreciation of the evidence is wrong, or (3) that some materials were not duly considered. The propriety of the conclusion drawn from material on record cannot be interfered with, as it is the competent authority to draw inference or opinion from the material,-it would amount to exercise of appellate power which has not been conferred on us by or under the Constitution. However, the principles set forth in this para and the previous paragraph are not cast iron rules. The principles set forth are illustrative and in appropriate cases and on suitable occasions, to uphold the cause of justice, there may be departure from the rules. There may also be departure of the rules if special and ponder able causes exist. 9. In the appeal before the Board of Revenue the allegation of the petitioner was that the respondent No. 2 was a 'Benamdar'. The appellate authority has turned down the claim on scrutiny of the material at its disposal. The learned counsel has not questioned the sufficiency or propriety of the conclusions reached by the Board. However, the counsel submits that the Board has failed to grasp the precise meaning of the expression "Benami transaction". Rule 211 prohibits "benami transaction". Clause 11 of the statutory form prescribes a column, being column 11, wherein a tendered is to indicate the source of his finance. The term "Benami" is a Persian word,-a combination of words "be" and 'nam', that is, no name, nameless or fictitious. Rule 211 prohibits "benami transaction". Clause 11 of the statutory form prescribes a column, being column 11, wherein a tendered is to indicate the source of his finance. The term "Benami" is a Persian word,-a combination of words "be" and 'nam', that is, no name, nameless or fictitious. When a person purchases a property in the name of another who merely lends his name with no intention to make the latter the bene­ficiary or causes another to purchase the property providing the consideration money for the benefit of the ''real purchaser" (who provides the consideration money) with no intention to make the purchaser (the person who has lent his name), the beneficiary of the property, are some illustrations of Benami transactions. Purchase may be made in the name of non- existent or imaginary or existent but non-interested person. It is a case of providing a fictitious name of substitution of the name of one person instead of another, who is the real but hidden party to the transaction. The real author of the transaction, or the real owner remains in the back ground-he is "Benamdar' or "beneficiary". The person in whose name or whose name is used is "Benamidar". A Benamidar is a person who merely lends his name but actually he does not acquire any interest in the property, though he may possess it but in fact he does not possess in law. The onus is undoubtedly on the person who seeks to establish that "the transaction" is "benami". There must be material before the authority to conclude a transaction as "benami". In Gangadara Ayyar & ors, vs. Subramanta Astragal & ors. AIR 1949 F.C. 88(92) (Coram Kania C.J., Fazl AH. Patanjali Sastri, Mahajan and B.K. Mukherjee JJ.) the Federal Court explained the law as to onus of proof and the meaning of the expression "benami transaction". We cull the relevant portion hereunder : "It is settled law that the onus of establishing that a transaction is benami is on the plaintiff and it must be strictly made out. The decision of the Court cannot rest on mere suspicion but must rest on legal grounds and legal testimony. In the absence of evidence the apparent title must prevail. The decision of the Court cannot rest on mere suspicion but must rest on legal grounds and legal testimony. In the absence of evidence the apparent title must prevail. It is also well established that in a case where it is asserted that an assignment in the name of one person is in reality for the benefit of another, the real test is the source whence the conside­ration came and when it is not possible to obtain evidence which conclusively establishes or rebuts the allegation, the case must be dealt with on reasonable probabilities and legal inferences arising from proved or admitted facts." (Emphasis added) It has been held by lord Campbell, in Dharamdas vs. Shyama Sundari Devi 13 M.I.A.929 : 6 M.R. 53 (P.C.), that "We have heard from the highest authorities, from the authority of Sir Edward East, and Sir Edward Ryan, that the criterion in these cases in India is to be considered from what source the money comes with which the purc­hase money is paid'' (Emphasis by us) In Jaydayal Poddar vs Bibi Hazra, AIR 1974 SC 171 , the Supreme Court, in a civil action observed : "the essence of a benami is the intention of the party or parties concerned; and no uneaten such intention is shrouded in a thick veil which cannot be easily pierced through. .Though the question, whether a particular sale is benami or not, is largely one of fact, and for determi­ning this question, no absolute formulae or acid test, uniformly applicable in all situations, can be laid down, yet in weighing the probabilities and for gathering the relevant indicia, the courts are usually guided by these circumstances : (1) the source from which the purchase money came; (2) the nature of possession of the property, after the purchase; (3) motive, if any, for giving the transaction a benami colour; (4) the position of the parties and the relationship, if any, between the claimant and the alleged benamidar; (5) the custody of the title deeds after the sale and (6) the conduct of the parties concerned in dealing with the property after the sale. The above indicia are not exhaustive and their efficacy varies according to the facts of each case. Nevertheless No. 1. viz. The above indicia are not exhaustive and their efficacy varies according to the facts of each case. Nevertheless No. 1. viz. the source whence the purchase money came, is by far the most important test for determining whether the sale standing in the name of one person is in reality for the benefit of another". (Emphasis supplied) 10. The essence of benami transaction is to cover the real intention. Therefore, it is really difficult to pierce the veil. The source from which purchase money comes is by far the most important test to determine whether a transaction is or is not a banami one. Benami transaction can be established on the basis of "reasonable probability". 11. In the instant case there is no averment made by the petitioner before the appellate authority that Respondent No. 2 derived the fund from an unknown source. It has not been challenged that the financiers of Respondent No. 2 were not the real financiers but Shri Kula Dutta. The petitioner merely asser­ted that Shri Kula Dutta used to frequent the shop and Res­pondent No. 1 was never seen running the shop. There is no averment made by the petitioner in his affidavit marked Annexure 'D' that Kula Dutta financed the petitioner i.e. the source of finance indicated in Column 11 fictitious but really Sri Dutta was the financier. Similarly the other affidavit marked as Anne­xure 'E' sworn by Ajit Kardang has been rightly rejected. It is a omnibus statement that Sri Kula Dutta was the financier of Respondent No. 2. The deponent is a cultivator aged about 21 years and the allegations in the affidavit are vague and were rightly rejected by the appellate authority. The petitioner mis­erably failed to show that the source of purchase money came from Sri Kula Dutta. There is no material whatsoever to show that the money came from any unknown source or that it was furnished by Kula Dutta. The appellate authority has very rightly arrived at the conclusion that it was not a benami transaction. The inferences drawn are based on material, it is not open to review the finding unless it is "a make-believe one". The appe­llate authority has drawn inference which is reasonably correct. The appellate authority has very rightly arrived at the conclusion that it was not a benami transaction. The inferences drawn are based on material, it is not open to review the finding unless it is "a make-believe one". The appe­llate authority has drawn inference which is reasonably correct. We are, however, quite alive of the fact that a benami transac­tion may be established by "reasonable probability", and such transactions are ordinarily shrouded in a thick veil, which is not easily pierced through, the source whence the purchase money came is by far the most important test to determine whether a transaction is benami or not. Bearing in mind all the prin­ciples we have scrutinized the impugned order and find it to be impeccable. In Mukunda vs. Bangshidhar, AIR 1980 SC 1534 the Supreme Court, while dealing with the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226, held that the Court does not sit as an Appellate Court and when there is jurisdictional error apparent or a the face of the record the decision of the Tribunal can be interfered with, otherwise not. The finding of the Board are based on material, there is no violation of the principle of natural justice nor do we find any error, not to speak of error of law apparent on the face of the record. Therefore, the first contention fails. 12. The second contention of the 'petitioner is that the Board has committed an error in holding that reasons should be given by the primary authority. We hold that the finding did not adversely effect any of the parties as the appellate authority considered the respective cases of the parties and on scrutiny of the available material set aside the order and settled the shop in favour of Respondent No. 2, which was positively within the jurisdiction of the Board, an appellate authority having co-extensive powers with the settling authority. 13. In our opinion the observations of the learned Board of Revenue have strong force. It may be true that the settling authority is are administrative authority. However, the functions are quasi-judicial in nature, at least it decides who amongst the tenderers should be selected and why the claims of the other tenderers are to be rejected. 13. In our opinion the observations of the learned Board of Revenue have strong force. It may be true that the settling authority is are administrative authority. However, the functions are quasi-judicial in nature, at least it decides who amongst the tenderers should be selected and why the claims of the other tenderers are to be rejected. It is true that the settling authority is not to make a speaking order under the Rules but he is to submit a report to the Excise Commissioner about the result of “the sale". There are various qualifications and disqualifications set forth in the Rules. There are questions of giving preference to the parties. The settling authority performs a public duty, it is bound to consi­der each tender individually, the respective merit of the tenderers, and thereafter decide to settle shop in favour of a tenderer. Reasons for settling the shop are necessary as : (1) The order is expellable and the appellate authority must know why the settlement is made in favour of a particular tenderer or the reason why the other tenders were considered to be less suitable than the "successful tenderer". (2) Giving of reasons, however brief, dispel all doubts about arbitrariness of the autho­rity; (3) There is no provision in the Excise laws, which autho­rises the settling authority to withhold the reasons. Therefore, there is a general duty to give rea5ois by the settling authority; (4) If such authority is permitted to render order without reasons, apart from arbitrariness there will be a potent danger of non-consideration of the merits of the other tenderers and would encourage mechanical exercise of the power. Giving of reasons is just a 'safety valve' which is a protective shield to check arbitrary actions by the authority; (5) Observance of the principles of natural justice is implicit in "the rule of law". The rule of law itself commands a reasoned decision. The minimum that the rule of law requires is that one ought mot to be deprived of his right without the authority of law. The rule of law itself commands a reasoned decision. The minimum that the rule of law requires is that one ought mot to be deprived of his right without the authority of law. It has been held in Mahabir Prasad vs. Slate Of U. P., AIR 1970 SC 1302 (1304) that the duty to give reason is the mini­mum requirement of the rule of law; (6) "The giving of rea­sons" in the words of Lord Denning, in Breen vs. Amalgamated Engineering Union : 1971 (1) All E. R. 1148 "is one of the fundamentals of good administration". In fact in a Government of law there is nothing like unfettered discretion immune from judicial review ability; (7) In Manager, Govt. Press vs. D. B. Belliappa. AIR 1978 SC 429 , th3 Supreme Court ruled that "the executive, no less than judiciary is under genera 1 duty to act fairly". Indeed, fairness founded on reason is the essence of the guarantee epitomized in Article 14.."; (8) A party is entitled to know the reasons that deprived him of the settle­ment. It is a branch of the principles of natural justice, that a party deprived of a statutory claim must be furnished with reasons. Unless he knows the reason why the order to settlement is made in favour of a party or why his claim is turned down, he cannot prefer an appeal meeting the reasons and the appeal under the Excise Law is a statutory right; (9) The settling authorities are public servants and they' perform public duties; therefore, while making the settlements the authorities must state reasons for the decisions. Even discretionary power cou­pled with duty calls for reasons to be stated; (10) The primary authority is bound to determine the question of settlement "according to law", on the basis of legally relevant considera­tion, therefore, it is imperative for the authority to state the reasons for its decision. In our opinion, the primary authority is duty-bound to give reasons for its decisions. An authority which adjudges respective claims of the tenderers cannot disarm the appellate authority by taking refuge in silence. However, we hasten to add that failure to furnish reasons does not make the order void. It makes the task of the appellate authority onerous as the appellate authority is bound to exercise hard to discern the reasons and consider the merits of all the tenderers. However, we hasten to add that failure to furnish reasons does not make the order void. It makes the task of the appellate authority onerous as the appellate authority is bound to exercise hard to discern the reasons and consider the merits of all the tenderers. Further, it may give scope to the settling authority to furnish grounds to the appellate autho­rity which had never played in their minds at the time of making the settlement. It is high time that the settling autho­rity should give reasons for the decisions, howsoever brief it may be. Therefore, we are happy and glad that the appellate authority has justly evolved an empirical principle, which deserves appreciation at this end. We are extremely happy to note the worthy and valued judgment of the learned Members of the Board. The Board is very much justified in lamenting that its duties became onerous for the absence of reasons in the order of the settling authority. The findings are timely and timeless. 14. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the impugned order is unassailable and unimpeachable and the petition must be dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. 15. These were the reasons why we rejected the application on 8.2.1982 with a direction that a reasoned judgment would follow.