JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :–– The above Rule with the corresponding interim order was obtained on 30th October, 1978; against a show-cause notice dated 15th April, 1977, the order and demand dated 26th July, 1977 by the Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the said Corporation), the application dated 4th July, 1978 by the Deputy Regional Director of the said Corporation, notice of certificate dated 25th August, 1978 as issued by the Certificate Officer, 24-Parganas and the certificate proceedings as initiated and connected therewith. The particulars and the circumstances under which those orders were issued and the proceedings were initiated would be indicated hereinafter. 2. The petitioner, M/s. Prabatak Jute Mills Limited (hereinafter referred to as the said petitioner), is a public limited Company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913 and was an existing company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1956. The said petitioner has been stated to be carrying on the business of manufacturing jute products by employing a large number of employees in this factory and has stated that for the running of the concerned industry the said petitioner has to observe the different provisions of the said Act and the Rules and Regulations made thereunder (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules and Regulations respectively). It is also an admitted fact that the said Corporation is a body corporate and established under the said Act. 3. It was the case of the said petitioner that on or about 21st April, 1977, a notice dated 15th April, 1977, was received from the Regional Director of the said Corporation asking them to show cause why damages should not be recovered from them for default in making the payment of contributions being 'employers' share and employees' share, in accordance with the section 40 of the said Act which requires that principal employer to pay contributions in the first instance, within the stipulated time as provided for in Regulations 26 of the Employees' State Insurance (General) Regulations, 1950. The said Regulation 26 deals with contribution cards to be sent to appropriate office and lays down that (1) An employer, being in possession of a contribution card in respect of any person, shall send it by registered post or messenger, together with a return in duplicate in Form-6 to the appropriate office (a) within seven days or date on which he comes to know of the death of such person; (b) within seven days of the date on receipt of any requisition on that behalf from the appropriate office; (c) within 42 days of the termination of the contribution period to which it relates; (d) within 28 days from the date of permanent closure of the factory and (2) for purposes of section 77 of the Act the due date by which the evidence of contributions having been paid must reach the Corporation shall be the last of the days respectively specified in clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of sub-regulation (1). At this stage, I think the provisions of section 40 which has been referred to hereinbefore should be quoted :–– Section 40 (1) : The principal employer shall pay in respect of every employee, whether directly employed by him or by or through an immediate employer, both the employer's contribution and the employee's contribution. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment but subject to the provisions of this Act and the regulations, if any, made thereunder, the principal employer shall, in the case of an employee directly employed by him (not being an exempted employee), be entitled to recover from the employee the employee's contribution by deduction from his wages and not otherwise : Provided that no such deduction shall be made from any wages other than such as relate to the period or part of the period in respect of which the contribution is payable, or in excess of the sum representing the employee's contribution for the period. (3) Notwithstanding any contract to the contrary, neither the principal employer nor the immediate employer shall be entitled to deduct the employer's contribution from any wages payable to an employee or otherwise to recover it from him. (4) Any sum deducted by the principal employer from wages under this Act shall be deemed to have been entrusted to him by the employee for the purpose of paying the contribution in respect of which it was deducted. (4) Any sum deducted by the principal employer from wages under this Act shall be deemed to have been entrusted to him by the employee for the purpose of paying the contribution in respect of which it was deducted. (5) The principal employer shall bear the expenses of remitting the contribution to the Corporation. It was the case of the said petitioner that the delays of the damage proposed to be recovered under section 85B of the said Act which deals with power to recover damages and lays down (1) where an employer fails to pay the amount due in respect of any contribution or any other amount payable under this Act, the Corporation may recover from the employer such damages not exceeding the amount of arrears as it may think fit to impose :–– Provided that before recovering such damages, the employer shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard and (2) any damages recoverable under sub-section (1) may be recovered as an arrear of land revenue, was shown in a statement enclosed with the concerned notice which was so served on the petitioner. From a reference to the notices the demand as made would appear to be Rs. 1,17,919/-. The receipt of the notice, as referred to hereinbefore, was not in dispute and it was the case of the said petitioner that in reply to the said notice on 5th May, 1979, the Regional Director of the said Corporation was informed that the notice as issued and served, was not only misconceived but the same was in violation of Regulation 26 as mentioned hereinbefore, and would not in any event, attract the provisions of section 85B(1) of the said Act. It has further been claimed by the said petitioner that in the said reply it was also claimed that the concerned Regional Director should consider whether any proceeding under section 85B(1) of the said Act would lie or the same would be tenable in case of any violation of Regulation 26 of the said Regulations as mentioned hereinbefore. It should also appear that the respondent as mentioned above, was also requested to consider the other submissions of the said petitioner on merits and the said petitioner also asked for a personal hearing. 4. It should also appear that the respondent as mentioned above, was also requested to consider the other submissions of the said petitioner on merits and the said petitioner also asked for a personal hearing. 4. In fact, the Regional Director concerned on 19th May, 1977, issued a communication granting a personal hearing to the said petitioner on 26th June, 1977, and the said petitioner availed of such opportunities. In the said proceedings before the officer concerned, the stand of the said petitioner as mentioned hereinbefore, was reiterated and it was also stated by the said petitioner that payment of the due amount of contribution as mentioned in the notice, has been made but there was some delay in making such payment for reasons beyond the control of the said petitioner. In fact, it was pleaded that there was an extra ordinary critical situation in the factory causing a complete dead-lock in the normal works of the said company during 1975-76 and such situation further worsen due to abrupt strike held at the factory of the said petitioner which continued for about a month and completely dislocated the works of the accounts apart from, causing great hardship to the economic condition of the factory. It was pleaded that because of such abnormal situation, the said petitioner was constrained to be a little late in making payment of the contribution as required under section 40 of the said Act and it was submitted that provisions of section 85B(1) were not attracted in cases of such delay in making payment of contribution as those provisions clearly provides for recovery of damages only in cases where an employer fail or fails to pay the amount due in respect of any contribution or other amount payable under the said Act and not in case of delayed payment, which incidentally was the happenings in this case. It was contended that for non-payment of contribution the provisions of the said section 85B come into operation and the provision for damages and recovery thereof, as an arrear of land revenue would then arise. It was contended that for non-payment of contribution the provisions of the said section 85B come into operation and the provision for damages and recovery thereof, as an arrear of land revenue would then arise. It was also and further submitted that since in the present case, the payment of contribution was only delayed, for reasons beyond the control of the said petitioner and that was not a case of non-payment as ultimately payment was made, the actions as taken or initiation as made, were not proper and in any event, there having been a dispute raised which again was covered by section 75 of the said Act which deals with matters to be decided by Employees' Insurance Court and lays down. (1) If any question or dispute arises as to––(a) whether any person is an employee within the meaning of this Act or whether he is liable to pay the employees' contribution; or (b) the rate of wages or average daily wages of an employee for the purposes of this Act; or (c) the rate of contribution payable by a principal employer in respect of any employee; or (d) the person who is or was the principal employer in respect of any employee; or (e) the right or any person to any benefit and as to the amount and duration thereof; or (ee) any direction issued by the Corporation under section 55A on a review of any payment of dependants' benefits; or (f) Omitted; or (g) any other matter which is in dispute between a principal employer and the Corporation, or between a principal employer and an immediate employer or between a person and the Corporation or between an employee and a principal or immediate employer in respect of any contribution or benefit or other dues payable or recoverable under this Act, or any other matter required to be or which may be decided by the Employees' Insurance Court under this Act. (2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2A), the following claims shall be decided by the Employees' Insurance Court, namely (a) claim for the recovery of contributions from the principal employer; (b) claim by a principal employer to recover contributions from any immediate employer; (c) Omitted; (d) claim against a principal employer under section 68; (e) claim under section 70 for the recovery of the value or amount of the benefits received by a person when he is not lawfully entitled thereto, and (f) any claim for the recovery of any benefit admissible under this Act. (2A) If in any proceedings before the Employees' Insurance Court a disablement question arises and the decision of a medical board or a medical appeal tribunal has not been obtained on the same and the decision of such question is necessary for the determination of the claim or question before the Employees' Insurance Court, that Court shall direct the Corporation to have the question decided by this Act and shall thereafter proceed with the determination of the claim or question before it in accordance with the decision of the medical board or the medical appeal tribunal, as the case may, except where an appeal has been filed before the Employees' Insurance Court under sub-section (2) of section 54A in which case the Employees' Insurance Court may itself determine all the issues arising before it. (3) No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question or dispute as aforesaid or to adjudicate on any liability which by or under this Act is to be decided by a medical board, or by a medical appeal tribunal or by the Employees' Insurance Court, was required to be determined by the Employees' Insurance Court as established under section 74 of the said Act. 5. Thereafter, an order was passed on 26th July, 1977 by the Regional Director of the said Corporation, being a demand of damages under section 85B of the said Act and according to said petitioner that order contained dispute as raised about the demand of damages for delayed payment of contributions under section 85 as above. 5. Thereafter, an order was passed on 26th July, 1977 by the Regional Director of the said Corporation, being a demand of damages under section 85B of the said Act and according to said petitioner that order contained dispute as raised about the demand of damages for delayed payment of contributions under section 85 as above. This order was admittedly received by the said petitioner on 3rd August, 1977 and on receipt of the same the said petitioner raised the submissions as mentioned above, by the letter of 26th August 1977 and once again pointed out or reiterated the enormous difficulties arising out of the situation or troubles on which the said petitioner had no control and for which no payment of contribution in due time could be made. It has been alleged by the said petitioner that such representation was neither considered nor referred to the Employees' Insurance Court as set up by section 74 of the said Act. Section 74 deals with constitution of Employees' Insurance Court and lays down that (1) The State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute an Employees' Insurance Court of such local area as may be specified in the notification, (2) the Court shall consist of such number of Judges as the State Government may think fit. (3) Any person who is or has been a judicial officer or is a legal practitioner of five years' standing shall be qualified to be a Judge of the Employees' Insurance Court. (4) The State Government may appoint the same Court for two or more local areas or two or more Courts for the same local area and (5) where more than one Court has been appointed for the same local area, the State Government may, by general or special order regulate the distribution of business between them. 6. The said petitioner has stated that thereafter, on 4th July, 1978, the Deputy Regional Director of the said Corporation, made an application before the Collector, 24-Parganas, Alipore, under section 5 of the West Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act for initiating a certificate proceeding for realization of an ad hoc payment of Rs. 6. The said petitioner has stated that thereafter, on 4th July, 1978, the Deputy Regional Director of the said Corporation, made an application before the Collector, 24-Parganas, Alipore, under section 5 of the West Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act for initiating a certificate proceeding for realization of an ad hoc payment of Rs. 29,480/- as damages from the said petitioner for delayed payment of contributions under section 40 of the said Act and then the Certificate Officer, respond ant No. 5 issued to the said petitioner and its Manager, a notice of certificate dated 25th August, 1978 under section 7 of the West Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act together with a certificate of public demand for the amount as mentioned above, being damages on ad hoc basis in respect of the concerned delayed payment of contributions and such notice or certificate was received by the said petitioner on 15th September, 1977. It has now been alleged by the said petitioner that the Certificate Officer concerned is now threatening to execute the concerned certificate and since the requisite days has already been passed after the service of the notice, issued under section 77 as mentioned above, there is every possibility of the concerned certificate being made effective or executed. It was also the case of the said petitioner that appearance before the Certificate Officer concerned was entered and in the certificate proceedings, representations were made for time. In fact, such time was granted upto 6th November, 1978 to file the necessary objection. It was the specific averment of the said petitioner that the Certificate Officer in question, ignored the disputes involved in the proceedings and which according to said petitioner were wholesome. The said petitioner further claimed that the factory was manufacturing jute goods, there undertaking was seriously affected by the unprecedented flood causing damages worth more than 20 Lakhs of Rupees and such damages including raw jutes and both finished and unfinished products and if any order is made now for making the payments to satisfy the demand as raised, that would create unusual hardship and injury to the said petitioner. The said petitioner has further stated that the said Corporation has also issued a notice on 10th November, 1977 charging interest almost in all cases and on every amount which was the subject-matter of demand for damages under section 85B of the said Act and according to said petitioner that such demand as raised would show that the respondents have made or raised mixed demands asking for both the interest and the damages at the time in respect of amount alleged to be due and payable by the said petitioner. According to said petitioner that such mixed demands could not be due or payable as the same was not authorized by the said Act and more over Regulations 31A of the Employees' State Insurance (General) Regulations, 1950 which deals with interests on contributions due but not paid in time and lays down that an employee who fails to pay contribution within the period specified in Regulation 31 shall be liable to pay interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum in respect of each day of default or delay in payment or contributions provided that where the contribution is paid by affixing the contribution stamp, the employee shall deem to have not paid the contributions in time if he fails to submit the contributions card within the time prescribed under Regulation 26. On reliance to such provisions the said petitioner contended that when the said Regulation 31A specifically provided for payment of interest in respect of each day of delay in payment of contributions, as such, no damages under section 85B of the said Act was imposable in the instant case. 7. The only affidavit-in-opposition in the instant case was dated 9th January, 1979 and was filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3, through Shri Parichay Kumar Dutta, an Insurance Inspector in the office of the said Corporation. The deponent has stated that after consideration of the matter and the personal hearing as given and so also the fact and law as involved and urged, the Regional Director of the said Corporation, reduced the damages under section 85B of the said Act from Rs. 1,17,919/- to Rs. The deponent has stated that after consideration of the matter and the personal hearing as given and so also the fact and law as involved and urged, the Regional Director of the said Corporation, reduced the damages under section 85B of the said Act from Rs. 1,17,919/- to Rs. 29,480/- and if the said petitioner was aggrieved by such lawful demand as raised, then the Employees' Insurance Court should have been moved by the said petitioner, as such, dispute would be covered by the exclusive jurisdiction for adjudication by that Court under section 75(1)(g) of the said Act and more particularly any adjudication by Civil Court is barred under section 75(3) of the said Act. It has also been stated by the said deponent that the Collector, respondent No.4, was appropriately approached for recovery of the concerned amount as lawfully and finally imposed viz., the demand for damages of Rs. 29,480/- as involved in this case. It was also the case of the said deponent that action as taken by the Certificate Officer, was lawful and justified and in fact, there was no dispute raised by the said petitioner under section 75 of the said Act before the Employees' State Insurance Court and as such, it could not be claimed or contended that the Certificate Officer concerned had ignored any of the lawful demands or claims as raised by the said petitioner. The deponent has stated that the Certificate Officer concerned had right to exercise his power as an Executing Court under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913 and in the instant case, he has not done any wrong to perform his legal obligation by discharging his judicial functions appropriately. 8. The defence as taken or put forward by the said petitioner for delayed payment of the dues, and more particularly those in respect of the unprecedented flood in the last week of September, 1978, according to said Corporation, had no application in the instant case, as such happenings did not take place during the period for which the concerned lawful damages were imposed by the Regional Director of the said Corporation, by his order dated 26th July, 1977. It was the case of the said deponent that the interest charged from the petitioner by the respondents to the tune of Rs. 10,029.40P. It was the case of the said deponent that the interest charged from the petitioner by the respondents to the tune of Rs. 10,029.40P. under Regulation 31A of the Employees' State Insurance (General) Regulations, 1950 was different from the damages of Rs. 29,480/- as charged under section 85B of the said Act and it has been stated that a Labour Welfare Legislation like that of the said Act each of the provisions of law should be deemed to be valid and binding on or against a defaulting principal employer, here in this case, the said petitioner. 9. It has also been stated by the said deponent that the said petitioner, due to habitual default or non-compliance with the requirements of the said Act and the Regulations as mentioned above, during the periods prior to the flood as mentioned in the petition, was not entitled to any order from this Court and it was submitted, that to safeguard the Employees' State Insurance Fund as created under section 26 of the said Act and constituting, inter alia, of the contributions and all other money including those damages and interest, the hands of the answering respondents should not be fettered from discharging their statutory duties under the said Act, to recover the lawful demands. It was suggested by Mr. Mukherjee, who appeared for the answering respondents that the said Act was enacted to provide for certain benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity and "employment injury" and to make provisions for certain other matters in relation thereof and in fact, the said Act has made provisions for (i) medical benefit, (ii) sickness benefit, (iii) Maternity benefit, (v) disablement benefit and (vi) dependant benefit and in case any interference is made by this Court, such benevolent provisions of the said Act would be frustrated and the said Corporation would not be in a position to carry out the incidents of the said Act. 10. 10. It was also the case of the said deponent that if anyone was guilty of laches and negligence in the instant case, it was the said petitioner alone, who by their own failure and negligence to comply with the requirements of the said Act or in the matter of timely payment of the contributions, have exposed themselves to the rigors of the said Act and since such position has been created by the conduct of the said petitioner and no body else but the said petitioner should be blamed and should suffer. 11. It was also stated that as there have been specific alternative remedies provided in section 75 of the said Act, section 4 of the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890 and section 9 of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913; this proceeding should be held and deemed to be not maintainable, as those remedies, available in the statutes, have not been exhausted. That apart, it has been stated that all and every actions of the respondents, in the instant case, were and are lawful, justified and valid and as such, there has been no cause or any reason for making any interference by this Court at this stage. The petition has further been claimed to be mala fide, misleading and bad for suppression of material facts. 12. The Personnel Officer of the said petitioner, Shri Amiya Kumar Mukherjee, by the affidavit-in-reply dated 6th April, 1982, has denied the material allegations as contained in the return to the Rule as mentioned above. He, apart from reiterating the statements as made or contained in the petition of motion, claimed that the notices as issued and proceedings as initiated on the basis thereof, were misconceived and were not in terms of requirements of the said Act and mere particularly of section 85B(1) as mentioned hereinbefore. It was stated that the said petitioner having raised positive dispute before the respondents concerned, for the alleged demand of ad hoc amount for damages, the respondents, instead of sending the requisition of demand to the Collector concerned for recovery, should have referred the matter for adjudication and decision of the lis before the Employees' State Insurance Court and in fact, in not doing so they have failed, refused and neglected to act in terms of the requirements of the law and the obligations cast on them in law. It has further been claimed that the damage of Rs. 29,480/- was fixed or arrived at purely on ad hoc basis and not on due adjudication by the Employees' Insurance Court, constituted under the said Act. It was the case of the deponent that the respondents demanding the damages from the said petitioner were required and obliged to refer the dispute to the Employees' insurance Court, in terms of the provisions of law as mentioned hereinbefore. It was also stated that the mixed demand of damages and interest, as made by the respondents, were quite contrary to and inconsistent with the provisions of section 85B of the said Act and so also Regulation 31A of the (General) Regulations of 1950 as mentioned in the petition. The deponent has reiterated that the whole proceedings including the impugned recovery proceeding were illegal, without jurisdiction, invalid and are liable to set aside. He has further stated that the proceedings being wholly misconceived and inconsistent with the provisions of the said Act, they, including all steps taken on the basis thereof, should be quashed. 13. Mr. Banerjee, appearing in support of the Rule after placing the pleadings, claimed and contended that the demand of damages and interest for failure to make payments under or in terms of the scheme of the said Act, were improper, irregular, invalid, void and without jurisdiction, not only for abject non-application of mind and non-consideration of the defences as indicated hereinbefore, but such actions could not also be supported, as the authorities concerned did not also consider duly, the fact of non-availability of stamps, to be fixed. After placing Regulations 26, 31 and 31A and section 85B(1), Mr. Banerjee argued that imposition or levy of damages and consequent interest, was in case of non-payment and not in cases of delayed payment of contributions, which in fact was the case in this proceeding and had occasioned due to or for reasons and circumstances beyond the control of the said petitioner. As mentioned above, the failure to secure or the non-availability of stamps to be affixed, was also pleaded as a ground or the circumstances, for which payments could not be made in time and in fact they were delayed. Mr. As mentioned above, the failure to secure or the non-availability of stamps to be affixed, was also pleaded as a ground or the circumstances, for which payments could not be made in time and in fact they were delayed. Mr. Banerjee claimed that when payment of contributions, were really made, but out of time and for the reasons as indicated hereinbefore, the impugned steps and actions were unauthorised, improper and against the principles of natural justice and fundamentals of fair play, as the authorities concerned, did not realize or failed to consider the predicament in which the said petitioner was placed and for which, the default had occurred, which again, was not intentional. 14. The terms of sections 74 and 75 of the said Act, which are in Chapter VI of the said Act, dealing with adjudication of disputes and the claims have been indicated hereinbefore and so also Regulation 31A of the General Regulations, 1950. Regulation 31, as also indicated, deals with the time for payment of contributions and according to Mr. Banerjee those provisions of the said Act and the Regulations as mentioned hereinbefore, and more particularly those in Regulation 31, would have application in respect of violations in the matter of payment of damage and interest only and as mentioned above, not in case of delayed payment. In support of such submissions, reference was made to the determinations in the case of (1) Prajatantra Prachar Samity v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Orissa, 1979 (1) LLJ 136, which was a case under the Employees' Provident Fund and Family Pension Act, 1952 and dealt with the effect and incidents of default in making employees' contribution under section 14B. In that case, the petitioner Prajatantra Prachar Samity, had challenged the order directing recovery of Provident Fund contribution along with damages under the Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act. The quantum of contributions was not disputed, but the manner, in which damages were levied, were challenged and it has been held that damages under section 14B was intended to compensate the loss to the beneficiaries of the Provident Fund Scheme, but not anything more, as such recovery would amount to penalty and that would not be permitted under the section, apart from holding that levy of damage is not a must in every case, discretion seems to have been vested in the appropriate authority to recover damages along with the contribution. There may be cases where for good reasons, the authority may decide not to assess damages and once he decides to levy damages, it is in the discretion of the authority to quantify the damages within the upper limit depending upon the facts of the case and "Damage" is not defined in the Act and therefore, recourse can be had to dictionary meaning which says "pecuniary preparation due for loss or injury sustained by one person through the fault or negligence of another" and so it should be for the authority to quantify damages under the Act. In the case of (2) Murarka Paints & Varnish Works Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., (1978) 52 FJR 51, which was a case under the provisions of the Employees' Provident Funds and Family Pension Fund Act, 1952 and to which reference was made by Mr. Banerjee, there was some delay on the part of an employer in paying the contributions to the Employees' Provident Fund. The Authority under the Employees' Provident Funds and Family Pension Fund Act, 1952, acting under section 14B, passed an order levying damages for the belated payment. When the aggrieved employer sought to quash this order by a writ and the Court observed that (i) section 140 of the Act covered not only cases of failure to make payments in terms of the Act but also cases of delayed payments. The expression "amount of arrear" in that section did not mean arrear at the time of levying the damages; it merely fixed the limit or extent to which damages could be imposed. A default under the section is made whenever there is a default in payment of the contribution. The Act and the Scheme framed thereunder impose obligation on the employer to make the stipulated payments within the stipulated time. Failure to make the payments within the time stipulated results in default of payment of contribution as enjoined by the Act. Therefore, belated payment of contribution also amounted to a default and as such damages could be imposed under section 14B of the Act; (ii) there is no dual authority in section 14B of the Act––one for the imposition and the other for the recovery of damages. The Authority who imposes the damages could recover the same. Therefore, belated payment of contribution also amounted to a default and as such damages could be imposed under section 14B of the Act; (ii) there is no dual authority in section 14B of the Act––one for the imposition and the other for the recovery of damages. The Authority who imposes the damages could recover the same. Under the section, the Central Provident Fund Commissioner or such other officer as may be authorized by the Central Government may recover damages from the employer. It cannot be contended that the word "it" in the expression "as it may think fit to impose" in the section refers to the Central Government and it is only the Government that could impose the damages and the Provident Fund Commissioner was the only authority to recover the same; (iii) the power to recover damages from the employer is not the same as the power to impose penalties. Damages should have some correlation with the loss suffered as a result of the delayed payments. The Authority must apply its mind to this aspect of the matter and pass a speaking order; and (iv) the discretion exercised by the Authority under the Act could be interfered with by a writ when such discretion is not exercised properly in accordance with law and the resultant order is not a speaking order indicating application of its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. Mr. Banerjee claimed that since the provisions or the holdings and observations in respect of sections 14B of the Employees' Provident Funds and Family Pension Fund Act, 1952, are in the same line as those of the provisions regarding the recovery of damages in respect of default in payment of contributions under the said Act, so the determinations and the holding, and observations in the case as cited above, can also be applied in this case and since damages to be correlated to the loss suffered and herein, this case there was no legal evidence of such sufferance, so not only damages but also interest could not be claimed authoritatively. That apart, Mr. Banerjee claimed that the impugned order not being a speaking one, was also highly illegal, improper and void. While on the question of determination of damages, reliance was also placed by Me. Banerjee on the observations in the case of (3) The Commissioner of Coal Mines Provident Fund, Dhanbad & Ors. That apart, Mr. Banerjee claimed that the impugned order not being a speaking one, was also highly illegal, improper and void. While on the question of determination of damages, reliance was also placed by Me. Banerjee on the observations in the case of (3) The Commissioner of Coal Mines Provident Fund, Dhanbad & Ors. v. J. P. Lalla & Sons, AIR 1976 SC 676 , a case under the provisions of Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Schemes Act, 1948, and more particularly under section 10F thereof, dealing with how damages are to be determined. In that case, it has been observed that the Coal Mines Provident Commissioner is to hear an employer before making an order requiring him to pay damages; under section 10F and the words of importance in section 10F are "such damages not exceeding 25 per cent. of the amount of arrears as it may think fit to impose". Here the two important features; are these. First, the words of importance are "damages not exceeding 25 per cent.". These words show that the determination of damages is not an inflexible application of a rigid formula. Second, the words "as it may think fit to impose" show that the authorities are required to apply their mind to the facts and circumstances of the case, apart from holding that when a body or authority has to determine a matter involving rights judicially, the principle of natural justice is implied if the decision of that body or authority affects individual rights or interests. Again, in such cases having regard to the particular situation it would he unfair for the body or authority not to have allowed a reasonable opportunity to be heard. On such observations or the principles as laid down, Mr. Banerjee claimed that here in this case, before imposition and levy of damages, the said petitioner should have been given an opportunity of being heard and in the admitted absence of such opportunity, the entire act or action was vitiated. 15. The adjudication of dispute and claims under the said Act are covered by the provisions in Chapter VI and sections 74 and 75 as indicated above, respectively deal with the constitution of Employees' Insurance Court and matters to be decided by them. 15. The adjudication of dispute and claims under the said Act are covered by the provisions in Chapter VI and sections 74 and 75 as indicated above, respectively deal with the constitution of Employees' Insurance Court and matters to be decided by them. These Courts are in the nature of domestic tribunals and are not ordinary Civil Courts, but they are constituted for the purpose of dealing with matters and disputes coming or falling under or covered by section 75 of the said Act. In fact matters to be decided by such Courts are exhaustively dealt with in section 75 and sub-section (g) thereunder should be regarded as more or less an omnibus provision, as the same includes any other matter which is in dispute between the concerned parties. Disputes under the section would arise in case of dispute relating to the benefits and the section really postulates the existence of a dispute relating to deductions. Section 75 does not provide a machinery for obtaining permission for making the deductions and recourse to the section could only be had, when disputes are raised. When a person raises a dispute regarding the deduction made by the employer, section 75 should be resorted to. 16. Under section 44 of the said Act, the principal or immediate employer is under the obligation to (1) submit such returns and forms with such particulars as may be specified in the regulations, (2) submit such returns as required by the Corporation to decide, whether the provisions of the said Act apply to such establishment and factory and (3) to maintain such registers as may be required by regulation and section 45 makes provisions for Inspectors and their functions and duties. Section 45A deals with the power of the Corporation to determine the amount of contribution (i) in case of failure of any factory or establishment to file return and (ii) when an Inspector is obstructed and is unable to discharge his duties under section 45 of the said Act. The order, so required to be passed, would thus be a matter within the jurisdiction of the Employees' State Insurance Court and the amount as determined, can be realized as arrears of land revenue. The order, so required to be passed, would thus be a matter within the jurisdiction of the Employees' State Insurance Court and the amount as determined, can be realized as arrears of land revenue. The case of (4) Regional Director, E. S. I. Corporation v. M/s. Fibre Bangalore (P) Ltd., AIR 1980 Kant 86, is a Full Bench determination of the Karnataka High Court on sections 45A, 45B and 75 of the said Act. The question, which was referred for the opinion of the Full Bench was "whether in the case of a disputed demand for contribution under the E. S. I. Act by the E. S. I. Corporation the latter alone should raise a dispute before the Employees' State Insurance Court in accordance with sections 75 and 77 of the E. S. I. Act or any other provision therein, or whether it is the employer against whom it is disputed, who should raise such a dispute before the E. S. I. Court for adjudication ?" And the answer to such question was "where, in cases to which provisions of section 45A of the 'Act' are attracted the Corporation by an order made in accordance with that section determines the amount of contributions payable and if that claim is disputed by the employer, it would not be necessary for the Corporation to seek a resolution of that dispute before the Insurance Court. Such a claim is recoverable as arrears of land revenue. If the employer disputes the claim it is for him to move the Insurance Court for relief. In other cases, other than cases where determination of the amount of contributions under section 45A is made the Corporation, if its claim is disputed by the employer, should seek an adjudication of the dispute before the Insurance Court before enforcing recovery." In fact, Mr. Banerjee laid stress on the later portion of the observations viz., in other case i.e., other than cases where determinations of the amount of contribution is made, the Corporation, if its claim is disputed by the employer, should seek an adjudication of the dispute before the Insurance Court and that too before enforcing recovery. It was on such observations, Mr. Banerjee categorically claimed and contended that as there was such a dispute by the said petitioner, the same should have been referred for adjudication to or by the Insurance Court by the said Corporation. It was on such observations, Mr. Banerjee categorically claimed and contended that as there was such a dispute by the said petitioner, the same should have been referred for adjudication to or by the Insurance Court by the said Corporation. Such submissions and more particularly the submissions that when a dispute is raised, the matter should be referred to the Employees' State Insurance Court and such reference may be at the instance of anybody or party to the dispute, was also sought to be supported and supplemented by a reference to the determination in the case of (5) The Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Bhopal v. The Central Press, & Anr., AIR 1977 SC 1357 , where it has been observed that the Scheme of the Act after its amendment of the Act 44 of 1966 is that the Corporation itself should in a case where there is omission on the part of the employer to maintain records in accordance with section 44 of the Act, determine the amount of contributions on the strength of such information as it may collect can then make the demand under section 45A. If the employer refuses to comply with the demand so made, the matter can come up before the Employees' Insurance Court under section 75 of the Act. The Court should give the Corporation a direction to perform its duty where it considers that this should be performed by the Corporation. It cannot decline to perform its own duty because the Corporation has failed to discharge its function and also to the observations in the case of (6) M/s. Shriram Bearings Ltd. v. The Employees' State Insurance Corporation & Ors., 1977 (2) Lab IC 1482. In the later case it has also been observed that there is nothing in sub-section (2) from which it can be held that once there is a repudiation by the person concerned, it is obligatory on the Corporation to file an application for adjudication of its claim. The forum is available for the person who is said to be liable to pay, as well as to the Corporation who claims recovery of the contribution from such person and it is well-settled that even courts and tribunals which are constituted under different Acts, have inherent power to issue appropriate relief by way of injunction to the party before it and it can enforce its orders. To hold otherwise will amount to hold that such Court and tribunals have only to make declarations which are not meant to be obeyed. This can never be conceived, specially in cases of courts to which exclusive jurisdictions are vested and jurisdiction of Ordinary Civil Court is barred and ousted. 17. Mr. Debesh Chandra Mukherjee, appearing for respondent Nos. 1 to 3, placed the different provisions of the said Act and the Rules and Regulations framed thereunder, which also established the purposes of the incorporation of the said Act, the particulars whereof have been indicated hereinbefore. He, on such reference, as mentioned above claimed that the steps and actions under the said Act are automatic and like other statutes of similar nature, under the said Act, or the necessary compliance by a constituent, no further notice or intimation is necessary or is required to be given. In short, it was contended that the obligations as fastened or imposed on the said petitioner, were statutory obligations, duly indicated in the said Act and as such, it was the legal obligation and duty of the said petitioner, to deposit the contributions in time and in accordance with law. The notice to pay the contribution, in accordance with section 40 of the said Act, was dated 15 April, 1977 and is in Annexure 'A' to the petition. Annexure 'D' is the impugned order dated 26th July, 1977, issued under section 85B of the said Act. After referring to the same or the terms thereof, Mr. Mukherjee claimed that a hearing as asked for or on asking, was given and as such would be idle to contend that the said petitioner was not given appropriate opportunities or there was any violation of principles of natural justice. It was further contended by Mr. Mukherjee that the effect of delayed payment under the said Act and mare particularly when the requirements of the same were known to the said petitioner, would be, there was no payment of compensation in time or any timely compliance with the mandatory requirements of the same, as such, the initiation of proceedings and the consequent demand of damages and levy of interest were due, proper, legal and authorised. The order as impeached and referred to hereinbefore, would show that the said petitioner failed to submit the contribution cards within the time as specified under Regulation 26(1), as such the Regional Director concerned opined that contributions were not paid and hence damages were leviable under section 85B(1) of the said Act. It was contended by the said petitioner that occasional non-availability of blank contribution cards from local office or contribution stamps from the Branches of the State Bank of India as earmarked for that purpose, were really the reasons for the default or laches, if any and since on these reasons, the said petitioner had no control or concern, so the damages as imposed and the interest as sought to be realized, were improper. It was also sought to be contended by Mr. Banerjee which was denied by Mr. Mukherjee, that for the purpose of purchase of contribution stamps, specific Branches of the State Bank of India were and are earmarked and all intending purchasers, would not be entitled to purchase such stamps for Branches other than the Branch of the State Bank of India, as earmarked, in case such stamps are not available there. The Memorandum No. C/Insp/IR/39/55 dated 26th November, 1977, issued by the Deputy Regional Director of the said Corporation, was produced by Mr. Banerjee, for establishing that such stamps as mentioned above, were sometimes not available, in particular Branch or Branches of the State Bank of India and as such, on consideration of such cause, it was decided with the concurrence of the authorities of the State Bank of India, that such stamps could be purchased from any of the 28 Branches of the State Bank of India, as mentioned in the said record. This record no doubt established that necessary stamps were and are not always and readily available in all the Branches of the concerned Bank, as earmarked. That record also establishes that the necessary stamps can be purchased now, from any of the Branches of the concerned Bank as specified. The impugned order further showed that on consideration of the difficulties as put forward by the said petitioner, on the question of damages, a lenient view was taken and the amount of damages was considerably reduced. As mentioned above, the damages, on reduction, stood at Rs. 29,480/-, for the delayed payment of the amount of contributions. The impugned order further showed that on consideration of the difficulties as put forward by the said petitioner, on the question of damages, a lenient view was taken and the amount of damages was considerably reduced. As mentioned above, the damages, on reduction, stood at Rs. 29,480/-, for the delayed payment of the amount of contributions. Such damages related to the contribution periods ended on 27th September, 1975, 29th November, 1975, 31st January, 1976, 27th March, 1976, 29th May, 1976, 31st July, 1976 and 25th September, 1976. Even though, there was a direction to pay the damages within 30 days from the date of the said order i.e., 26th July, 1977, I am informed, the said Company has not paid the same. Mr. Mukherjee further stated that as stamps were available at the relevant time and may not be in 1977, the defence on non-availability of the stamps as put forward now, should not be considered and they were not genuine and bona fide. In any event, he claimed that even if the stamps were not available, the said petitioner had other ways and means to comply with the said Act viz., by deposit of the contribution cards with necessary notes or after affixing necessary stamps, obtained from other Branches of the State Bank of India, but they have not done so wilfully and intentionally and unauthorizedly too. On a reference to the representation by the said petitioner dated 26th August, 1977, which was made after the reduced demand was made, Mr. Mukherjee stated that really, no dispute was raised and what the said petitioner did, was that, they prayed for reconsideration of this case and in fact the said representation, which is in Annexure "E" to the petition, was nothing but a petition for mercy and even if, as mentioned above, time was allowed to make the reduced payment, they wasted the time. 18. 18. Regulation 26 of the General Regulations as indicated hereinbefore, lays down that within the various times as specified, the contribution cards as in possession of the employer, in respect of any person, should be sent by registered post or messenger together with a return in duplicate in Form-6, which is mentioned as return of contribution card and sub-regulation (2) thereunder, also lays down that for the purposes of section 77 of the said Act, which lays down how and when a proceeding should be commenced before an Employees' Insurance Court, the due date by which the evidence of contributions having been paid must reach the Corporation shall be the last of the days respectively as specified in clauses (a) to (b) of sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 26. Section 77 as mentioned above, not only deals with how the proceedings before the Employees' Insurance Court can be commenced but the same also lays down that the proceedings shall be commenced by an application in the form with such particulars, or fee, if any. Regulation 31A of the General Regulations have also been incorporated or indicated hereinbefore and Regulation 31 lays down the time for payment of contributions. Under the said Regulation 31 an employer who is liable to pay contribution in respect of an employee shall pay those contributions within the period of (a) 31 days of the last day of the wage period in which the contribution for dues; (b) 14 days of the termination of employment and (c) 21 days after the termination of the contribution period in respect of every employee, whichever period is earlier; provided that in case of an exempted employee the token stamp in respect of any work shall be affixed then such time as the contribution in respect of that work would have been payable if the provisions of Chapter VA of the Act had not been in force. The Regulation 31A was substituted with effect from 28th November, 1977 and on such it was specifically contended by Mr. Mukherjee, that as this case was before such substitution, so earlier provisions would apply. He also referred to Regulation 31B, which was inserted with effect from 27th April, 1972 and deals with recovery of interest. The said section lays down any interest payable under Regulation 31A may be recovered as an arrear of land revenue as indicated above. Mukherjee, that as this case was before such substitution, so earlier provisions would apply. He also referred to Regulation 31B, which was inserted with effect from 27th April, 1972 and deals with recovery of interest. The said section lays down any interest payable under Regulation 31A may be recovered as an arrear of land revenue as indicated above. Reference was also made to Regulation 35, which deals with reasons for non-payment of contribution and lay down where no contribution is payable in respect of week or weeks in any contribution period, the reasons for non-payment shall be clearly indicated in writing in the space provided for affixing stamp or recording contribution. It was claimed and contended by Mr. Mukherjee that the Regulations as mentioned above, do by down a complete provision or would be a complete code for making the deposit and for the manner in which such deposits are to be made. He reiterated that the provisions of Regulation 31A which was subsequently incorporated on 28th November, 1977, would have no application in the instant case and under Regulation 35 as indicated hereinbefore, it was the bounden duty and obligation of the said petitioner, to deposit even if the blank contribution cards, with the necessary remarks at the place relevant for affixation of stamp viz., why and how contribution stamp could not be affixed. In fact, it was specifically contended by Mr. Mukherjee on a reference to section 85B of the said Act that as there was admitted failure to pay contributions, so the power of recovery of damages under the provisions as mentioned above was available to the said Corporation and such power was appropriately recorded to. Mr. Mukherjee further claimed that since it was the statutory obligation of the said petitioner to deduct or even when they would not be in a position to deduct, to deposit the employer's and employees' share of contributions, they were guilty of breach of trust, which was reposed on them, on the basis of the different provisions of the said Act, which as mentioned above, was a beneficial statute and a Social Security Legislation. For construction of such beneficial statute or the manner for the same Mr. Mukherjee referred to Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes. In fact, nobody should entertain any dispute over such way and manner of construction. For construction of such beneficial statute or the manner for the same Mr. Mukherjee referred to Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes. In fact, nobody should entertain any dispute over such way and manner of construction. On the question of obligation of the employers to pay their as well as employees' contributions, after relying on section 40 of the said Act, Mr. Mukherjee referred to the determinations in the case of (7) Indrapuri Studio Private Limited & Anr. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, AIR 1961 Calcutta 38, where it ha, been observed that section 40 categorically imposes an obligation on the employer to pay both the contributions i.e., employer's contribution and employees' contribution, in the first instance, subject to a right of reimbursement from the employee or employees concerned in regard to his or their portion or portions of the same. That being so, even if the employer has not deducted the employees' contributions from their wages, he can be made liable to the same. He cannot certainly take advantage of his own negligence or omission. It is also no answer to say that the employer may not find it possible to recover the contribution or contributions in terms of the Act. 19. In the case of (8) Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Hyderabad v. M/s. Jaylakshmi Cotton and Oil Products (P) Limited etc., 1980 Lab IC 1078, it has been observed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court that the said Act is a social security legislation and was enacted to ameliorate the various lis and contingencies which the employees face by serving in the factory or establishment. It is thus intended to promote the general welfare of the worker. Therefore, the enactment demands an interpretation liberal enough to achieve the legislative purpose and object. This determination was referred to and relied on by Mr. Mukherjee in support of his submissions on the character of the said Act which according to him was a beneficial and Social Security Legislation, to augment such submissions. Mr. Mukherjee also referred to another observation of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of (9) K. Venkatswera Rao & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., 1980 Lab IC 178. In that case it has been observed that Employees' State Insurance Act is a welfare measure to provide certain benefits to the employees in the case of sickness, maternity and employment injury. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., 1980 Lab IC 178. In that case it has been observed that Employees' State Insurance Act is a welfare measure to provide certain benefits to the employees in the case of sickness, maternity and employment injury. Therefore, the Act must receive a liberal construction, so as to promote its object. 20. Mr. Mukherjee further referred to the pleadings in the petition and more particularly to the record in Annexure ''I'', which is an order dated 10th November, 1977, passed by the Deputy Regional Director of the said Corporation, informing the said petitioner that an interest amounting to Rs. 10,029.40P. would be payable by them for delayed payment of contributions in terms of Regulation 31A of the said (General) Regulations of 1950. He also referred to the prayers in the petition and contended that since such determinations as in Annexure "I", have not been challenged or any prayer has been made for having such determinations set aside or quashed, this Court should not make any determination in favour of the petitioner on that account. It is true that the said petitioner has neither prayed for......... withdrawal, cancellation or recession of the said determination in Annexure "I", nor they have prayed for quashing such determinations. It was further claimed by Mr. Mukherjee that since, because of the subsequent incorporation of Regulation 31A or more particularly when action in the instant case was taken or proposed before such incorporation, the said petitioner cannot put forward Regulation 31A as a plea for claiming, that damages under section 85 and interest under Regulation 31 cannot be claimed, and that apart, when there is no prayer for setting aside the order, levying interest through the record in Annexure "I" or the same has not been challenged, so also, no interference should be made by this Court. It was also claimed by Mr. Mukherjee that in any event, Regulation 31, as suggested by the said petitioner, is not in conflict with section 85B of the said Act. He mentioned several instances like Income Tax Act and Sales Tax Act amongst others, where there are such provisions for claiming damages and asking for an interest and where more than one type of punishment are imposable and on the analogy of the provision of those, Mr. He mentioned several instances like Income Tax Act and Sales Tax Act amongst others, where there are such provisions for claiming damages and asking for an interest and where more than one type of punishment are imposable and on the analogy of the provision of those, Mr. Mukherjee also wanted to sustain that Regulation 31A would not be inconsistent with section 85 of the said Act. This submission was made by him, as Mr. Banerjee, appearing in support of the Rule, claimed that Regulation 31A was inconsistent with the provisions of section 85. It was also claimed by Mr. Mukherjee that in a Social Security Legislation, as involved in or as expected to be made under the said Act, there may have several punishments for separate offences and such incorporation would not be bad or void or incompetent. 21. Section 54A of the said Act deals with references to Medical Boards and appeals to Medical Appeal Tribunals and Employees' Insurance Courts and sub-section (1) thereunder lays down that the case of any insured person for permanent disablement benefit shall be referred by the Corporation to a Medical Board for determination of the disablement question and if, on that or any subsequent reference, the extent of loss of earning capacity of the insured person is provisionally assessed, it shall again be so referred to the Medical Beard not later than the end of the period taken into account by the provisional assessment and sub-section (2) postulates that if the insured person or the Corporation is not satisfied with the decision of the Medical Board, the insured person or the Corporation may appeal in the prescribed manner and within the prescribed time to–– (i) Toe medical appeal tribunal constituted in accordance with the provisions of the regulations with a further right of appeal in the prescribed manner and within the prescribed time to the Employees' Insurance Court, or (ii) the Employees' Insurance Court directly. Mr. Mukherjee contended that in section 85B, there is no command for a reference to the Employees' State Insurance Court by the said Corporation and such fact would also be apparent, if the provisions of section 54A(1) & (2) and those of section 85B are read, construed and considered together and no interpretation as urged by the said petitioner now, would be possible and permissible. Mr. Mr. Mukherjee also pointed out that since section 85B has not laid down any period of limitation, so it is still open to the said Corporation to recover the damages as recoverable as an arrear of land revenue and since the said Act is a piece of Social Legislation, to the consideration of facts, such as delay or laches, would be of irrelevant consideration, the more so when, such claims as involved, relate to statutory obligations and there is no limitation prescribed. To support such submissions, reference was made firstly, to the observations in the case of (10) Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli & Ors., AIR 1969 SC 1335 and more particularly to the observations that when the Supreme Court held that all the articles in the third division to the schedule, including Article 181 of the Limitation Act of 1908 governed applications under the Code of Civil Procedure only, it clearly implied that the applications must be presented to a Court governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. At best, the amendments now made in the Act of 1963 enlarge the scope of the third division of the schedule so as also to include some applications presented to Courts governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. One factor at least remains constant and that is that the applications must be to Courts to be governed by the article in this division. The scope of the various articles in this division cannot he held to have been so enlarged as to include within them applications to bodies other than Courts, such as a quasi judicial tribunal, or even an executive authority. An Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court dealing with applications or references under the Act are not courts and they are in no way governed either by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure and secondly, to the determinations that whereas an industrial dispute is entertained on grounds of social justice and therefore a Tribunal would in such a case take into consideration factors such as delay or laches, such considerations are irrelevant to claims made under a statutory provision unless such provision lays down any period of limitation. There is no justification in inducting a period of limitation provided in the Limitation Act into the provisions of section 33C(2) which do not lay down any limitation and such a provision can only be made by Legislature if it thought fit and not by the Court on an analogy or any other such consideration. It is a matter of some significance that though the Legislature amended section 33C by Act 1963 and introduced limitation in the section, it did so by means of proviso only in respect of claims made under sub-section (1) but did not provide any limitation for claims under sub-section (2). Hence, applications made in 1962 though they related to claims for years commencing from 1948 onwards could not be held as barred by limitation or laches, as made in the case of (11) Chief Minning Engineer, M/s. East India Coal Co. Ltd. etc. v. Ramaeswara & Ors., AIR 1978 SC 218. Section 14B of the Employee's Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, also deals with erring employer as under the said Act and the High Court of Allahabad in the case of (12) The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh v. M/s. Allahabad Ganning Co., Banrauli, 1978 Lab IC 998, has observed that section 14B of the Act does not provide any limitation during which action against erring employer can be taken for delayed deposits under the Act. In the absence or any bar of limitation, there is no principle of law which debars the Provident Fund Commissioner from exercising the statutory powers available to him under section 14B of the Act and on the analogy of such determinations, Mr. Mukherjee further supported the action as taken, as no limitation, as mentioned above has been prescribed, while on the question and submissions as indicated above, reliance was also placed on the observations in the case of (13) The Bombay Gas Co. Mukherjee further supported the action as taken, as no limitation, as mentioned above has been prescribed, while on the question and submissions as indicated above, reliance was also placed on the observations in the case of (13) The Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 752 and more particularly to the observations that a claim under section 33C(2) is a claim for wages within the meaning of the Payment of Wages Act, it is no doubt, somewhat anomalous that a claim, which would be rejected as barred by time if made under the Payment of Wages Act, should be entertained under section 33C(2) of the Act; but this apparent anomaly does not justify the introduction of considerations of limitation in proceedings under section 33C(2). It is necessary to bear in mind that though the Legislature knew how the problem of recovery of wages had been treated by the Payment of Wages Act and how limitation had been prescribed in that behalf, it has omitted to make any provisions for limitation in enacting section 33C(2). The failure of the Legislature to make any provision for limitation cannot be deemed to be an accidental omission. In the circumstances, it would be legitimate to infer that Legislature deliberately did not provide for any limitation under section 33C(2). It may have been thought that the employees who are entitled to take the benefit of section 33C(2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it would not be right to put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the said provision. Besides, even if the analogy of execution proceedings is treated as relevant, it is well-known that a decree passed under the Code of Civil Procedure is capable of execution within 12 years, provided of course, it is kept alive by taking steps in aid of execution from time to time as required by Article 182 of the Limitation Act; so that the test of one year or six months limitation prescribed by the Payment of Wages Act cannot be treated as a uniform and universal test in respect of all kinds of execution claims. Where the Legislature has made no provision for limitation, it would not be open to the courts to introduce any such limitation on grounds of fairness or justice. Where the Legislature has made no provision for limitation, it would not be open to the courts to introduce any such limitation on grounds of fairness or justice. The words of section 33C(2) are plain and unambiguous and it would be the duty of the Labour Court to give effect to the said provision without any considerations of limitation. No doubt, such belated claims made on a large scale may cause considerable inconvenience to the employer, but that is a consideration which the Legislature, may take into account and if the Legislature feels that fair-play and justice require that some limitation should be prescribed, it may proceed to do so. In the absence of any provision, however, the Lahour Court cannot import any such consideration in dealing with the applications made under section 33C(2) and it is well-settled that Article 181, Limitation Act applies only to a applications which are made under the Code of Civil Procedure and so, its extension to applications made under section 33C(2) of the Act would not be justified. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the observations in the case of Regional Director, E. S. I. Corporation v. M/s. Fibre Bangalore (P) Ltd. (supra), as cited by Mr. Banerjee, were, on or under section 45A of the said Act, and not under section 85B and in any event, the evidence of payment of compensation, not being made available or the same being conspicuously absent and there having also been no remittance of the contribution, in terms of section 40(5) or there having no compliance in terms of section 43 of the said Act, which deals with method of payment or contribution and lays down that subject to the provisions of the Act, the Corporation may make regulations for any matter relating or incidental to the payment and collection of contributions payable under this Act and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power such regulations may provide for (a)......, (b) and more particularly of sub-section (bb) there under, which lays down that the date by which evidence of contributions having been paid is to be received by the Corporation, the mentioning of the other claims as made in the case as mentioned above, would not include claim under section 85B of the said Act and as such the said determination, would in fact support the said Corporation. 22. 22. A question arose on the pleadings as to who should approach the Employees' State Insurance Court for the determinations of the lis and Mr. Mukherjee, on a reference to the determinations by the Kerala High Court in the case of (14) Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Trichur v. M/s. Mannikar Engineers Ltd., Trichur, 1982 Lab IC 140 claimed that since the said petitioner did not accept the determinations as made by the said Corporation, so they should have the themselves approached the Employees' State Insurance Court. In the case as mentioned above, it has been held that where an order made under section 45A of the Act, requiring an establishment to pay contribution is not acceptable to the establishment, it is the duty of the establishment to refer the matter to the Insurance Court had merely for the reason that the establishment has objected to the correctness of the order no duty is cast upon the Employees' State Insurance Corporation to make reference to the Insurance Court to obtain its seal of approval, before taking steps for the realization of the amount by invoking sections 45A(2) and B of the Act and the provisions of section 75 agreement to give an opportunity to the Corporation or the employer, as the case may be, to have an adjudication where the particular party feels aggrieved by a decision or order. Essentially, therefore, it is the aggrieved party that has to approach the Insurance Court for its decision and not the party which wants to enforce the order or the decision. 23. Annexure 'B' to the petition shows the calculation of damages. Mr. Mukherjee also claimed and contended that in fact and effect, that the same or the calculation as disclosed therein or the method thereof, have not been challenged and the prayer as made was for remission only. In the case of (15) British Paints (India) Ltd. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation & Ors., 1981 Lab IC NOC 27 Cal, it has been indicated that the question whether persons in respect of whom impugned damages for contributions were made, were doing work in the Head Office and Sales Branch Offices and working in connection with work of factory being disputed, such question of fact cannot be decided in this jurisdiction and as such the petitioner Company was given liberty to raise their contentions against impugned demands before the Insurance Court. On such findings and observations Mr. Mukherjee contended, similar being practically the position in this case, the said Company, instead of being favoured or helped with an interference by this Court, should be asked to approach the Insurance Court for resolving the dispute. The scope of sections 44 and 45A of the said Act, were considered by the Delhi High Court in the case of (16) Employees' State Insurance Corporation, New Delhi v. M/s. Masco Private Ltd., Delhi, 1982 Lab IC 833 and there it has been observed that in either case of return not having been submitted or particulars having not been furnished or registers not having been maintained in accordance with the provisions of section 44, it would attract section 45A. In short the failure of either of these requirements would bring in section 45A of the Act. Each default is enough to attract section 45A reading the requirement of cumulativeness of all the three defaults at the same time is to misinterpret the meaning of section 45A and section 44 requires a principal employer to submit returns in such form and containing such particulars relating to persons employed by him as may be specified in the regulations in this behalf it evidently means that if a return does not comply with the requirements specified in regulations including Regulation 32 it will be a case of no return having been submitted. If that was not so then all that the employer could do would be to fill up some of the names of the employees as required by one of the requirements of Regulation 32 and not give their wage period, the salary due or the contribution and still claim that he had submitted the return. The argument proceeds on the erroneous assumption of law that a form of return submitted even in total violation of the requirements of regulations is a good return. That is, however, not correct, apart from holding that a full-fledged and detailed procedure for determination of contribution is provided in Chapter IV from section 38 onwards. Section 44 requires the employer to file returns; on his failure the Corporation may require persons to furnish particulars as it may consider necessary. It is only when no return of particulars or registers are submitted, furnished or maintained, as required by section 44 that a determination can be made under section 45A of the Act. Section 44 requires the employer to file returns; on his failure the Corporation may require persons to furnish particulars as it may consider necessary. It is only when no return of particulars or registers are submitted, furnished or maintained, as required by section 44 that a determination can be made under section 45A of the Act. Once that stage is reached and stubborn non-cooperativeness of the employer is writ large, there is no basis for invoking the principles of natural justice and requiring a hearing to be given for the purpose of deciding whether to act under section 45A and it is not as if a determination under section 45A is final. The Act gives a full protection and opportunity to an employer, so that even after determination under section 45A he can invoke the jurisdiction of the Court by moving under section 77 of the Act. Hence, there is no justification to hold that the requirement of a hearing before an order is passed under section 45A should be read into the statute. The said observations were also referred to and relied on by Mr. Mukherjee, in support of his contentions as abovementioned. 23. A Director of a company, in terms of the observations in the case of (17) Bidyut Kumar Sett & Anr. v. Satyesh Chandra Bagchi & Ors., 1978 CHN 444 , and to which reference was made by Mr. Mukherjee, can be brought within the word "occupier" as mentioned in section 2(17) of the said Act as according to section 2(n) of the Factories Act, occupier is a person, who like a Director has ultimate control over the affairs of the factory. Similarly, in the case of (18) M/s. Mahalderaeu Tea Estate Private Ltd & Ors v. D. N. Prodhan & Anr., 1978 CHN 336 , it has been observed that under section 14A of the Act, a company is made primarily liable for an offence committed under the Act. The liability may he extended to other persons vicariously only under the conditions laid down in the section. A Director of a Company may be concerned only with the policy to be followed and might not have any hand in the management of its day to day affairs. Such person must necessarily be immuned from such prosecution. The liability may he extended to other persons vicariously only under the conditions laid down in the section. A Director of a Company may be concerned only with the policy to be followed and might not have any hand in the management of its day to day affairs. Such person must necessarily be immuned from such prosecution. The distinction between the said Act and other similar Act on the question, if the Director is a principal employer of a factory, has been indicated in the case of (19) Arup Kumar Pal Chaudhury v. Satyesh Chandra Bagchi & Ors., 1979 (1) CHN 208 and it has been observed under the E. S. I. Act the company has not been made primarily liable, but under the Essential Commodities Act and similar other Acts, the company has been made primarily liable and the vicarious liability has been extended to the Directors and the others, who are concerned with day to day running of the company's business. While on the point, reference was also made by Mr. Mukherjee to the unreported judgment dated 31st July of (20) Sri M. G. Poddar etc. v. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, in Civil Rule No. 433 (W) of 1976 a determination by P. K. Banerjee, J., where His Lordship, on consideration of the pleadings, contentions and the provisions, has observed that a Solicitor's firm is an establishment within the meaning of section 1(3)(b) of the Employees' Provident Fund Act and as such discharged the Rule. 24. Mr. Faruque, appearing for other respondents, apart from accepting the arguments of Mr. Mukherjee, also contended that we shall have to find out whether the said company would be entitled to the reliefs as claimed, in view of their challenge in the petition. In fact, he posed a question as to which order has been challenged. He stated that on the basis of the communication dated 26th July, 1977, from the Regional Director of the said Corporation, a representation was made by the said petitioner on 27th August, 1977, on due consideration whereof, the Regional Director concerned legally asked the Collector to take steps, on which the Collector raised the demand on 21st August, 1978 and the said petitioner appeared in that proceeding on 7th October, 1978, but before any steps or actions could be taken on such initiation, they moved and obtained this Rule on 30th October, 1978. It was Mr. Faruque's contentions that no dispute either under section 75 and section 85B was ever raised. He further contended that the damages as imposable under the provisions of the said Act are penal in nature and such provisions are not unguided. In support of such submissions, he referred to the observations in the case of (21) Organo Chemical Industries & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 1803 , which was a case under section 14B of the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. It was Mr. Faruque's claim that those provisions of section 14B, dealing with damages and the determinations on them, would also apply in respect of recovery and imposition of damages under the said Act. In that case, it has also been laid down that the entire amount of damages awarded under section 14B except for the amount relatable to administrative charges, must necessarily be transferred to the Employees' Provident Fund and the Family Pension Fund. Such holdings no doubt establish the statute to be one for doing social justice or to be a benevolent one. Mr. Faruque claimed that similar observations should also be made in this case, as the said Act is also a beneficial statute or one for achieving social justice. 25. On the question if damage can or should be levied, the character of the same and whether damages can be levied, if there is delay and whether mere purchase and affixation of contribution stamps, would amount to payment of contribution, Mr. Faruque referred to and relied on the determinations in the case of (22) Rallis India Ltd., Madras v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, 1980 (56) FJR 430, where it has been observed, that under Regulation 31 of the Employees' State Insurance (General) Regulations, 1950, an employer is bound to pay the contributions under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, within 21 days after the termination of the respective contribution period. The payment is to be made by affixing contribution stamps on the contribution cards of the employees and cancellation of the stamps and such cards are to be sent to the Employees' State Insurance Corporation along with a return within 42 days of the termination of the contribution period. It cannot be contended that the mere purchase and affixation of the stamps on the contribution cards will constitute payment of the contribution. It cannot be contended that the mere purchase and affixation of the stamps on the contribution cards will constitute payment of the contribution. The stamps have to be cancelled to ensure that they are not misused and it is to ensure that the stamps have been so cancelled that the contribution cards have to be sent to the Corporation at the end of the contribution period. Where the employer is not able to establish that the stamps have been affixed and cancelled even though oPP0ftunity was offered by the Court to produce any documentary evidence, it would be proper to hold that he had contravened the provisions of Regulations 31 in the matter of payment of the contributions and merely because provision for payment of interest on the arrears of contribution has been made by Regulation 31A, it cannot be said that the Legislature has no power to levy a penalty by way of damages on the ground of failure to pay the contribution amount, under section 85B of the Act. Default or delay in the payment of contribution within the period mentioned in Regulation 31 would also be "failure to pay" the contribution within the meaning of section 85B, apart from holding that an employer who deducts the employees' contributions from the wages payable to the employee is deemed to be in the position of a trustee and if he makes default in payment of such contributions to the Corporation, he must be deemed to have dishonestly used the amount of the contributions in violation of direction of law. Therefore, in the context of section 85B, the word "damages" occurring therein has not been used in the sense ordinarily understood in the law of contract or tort. It is meant to be levied by way of penalty for delayed payment of the contribution amount by the employer. The object is to punish the employer and warn him not to commit a breach of the statutory provisions. Therefore, it cannot be contended that an order levying damages is vitiated because there is no correlation between the damages levied and the actual loss suffered by the beneficiaries under the Act, and also to the observations in the case of (23) Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Bangalore v. Tungabhadra Steel Products Ltd. & Ors., 1980 (57) FJR 77. 26. In his reply, Mr. 26. In his reply, Mr. Banerjee maintained that in the facts of this case section 85B of the said Act which as mentioned above deals with failure to make the payment of contributions will have no application as admittedly there was no failure of payment of the contributions but the payments were only delayed. He also claimed that since there was thus admitted delay in making the payment Regulation 31 would apply. Mr. Banerjee, on a reference to Regulation 29 which deals with Payment of Contribution by Stamps and lays that every contribution payable under the Act, shall except as otherwise provided herein, be paid by affixing contribution stamps on the Contribution Card of the employee in the space indicated for that purpose upon the Card. The contribution stamps shall be of such shape and design as the Corporation may, from time to time, determine and shall be sold in such manner and at such agencies as the Corporation may notify from time to time :–– Provided that in the case of an exempted employee in respect of whom contribution would have been payable if the provisions of Chapter VA of the Act had not been in force, the fact that such contribution would have been so payable shall be indicated by affixing a token stamp on the Contribution Card of that employee in the space provided for the purpose. Contribution stamps shall be purchased from any agency duly authorized by the Corporation and from no other source stamps once purchased from an authorized agency shall not be transferable thereafter. Contribution stamps purchased otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this regulation shall not be deemed to be contribution stamps for the purposes of these regulations, contended that since contribution stamps are required to be purchased from the Branch of the State Bank of India, as earmarked and such stamps were not available from the Branch, as earmarked, and which fact was also established from the subsequent decision of the State Bank of India authorities, the order as made overlooking the above admitted fact, was improper, irregular and void. In the case of (24) Regional Director, E. S. I. Corporation, Cuttack v. Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd, Hirakud, 1982 (1) LLJ 1982, to which reference was also made by Mr. In the case of (24) Regional Director, E. S. I. Corporation, Cuttack v. Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd, Hirakud, 1982 (1) LLJ 1982, to which reference was also made by Mr. Banerjee, the employer deposited contribution in time, but delayed in sending intimation card by 16 days in one case and 2 days in another and on a question being arisen on such facts as to whether the employer was liable for damages and the amendment of Regulation 31A in 1297, would cover contribution periods prior thereto, the Orissa High Court has held that the period for which the claims made relates to years 1975, and 1976 which means prior to the amendment by adding the proviso (to Regulation 31A) came into existence. It is clear from the proviso that it has no retrospective effect. Therefore, the present case is to be covered by the proviso, as it stood prior to the amendment of 1977 which means that if an employer fails to pay contribution within the time then he will be liable to pay interest. There was no proviso existing in 1975 or 1976 that if the contribution card is not sent within the specified period, it would be deemed that he has not paid the contribution and as the case was covered by the provisions of Regulation 31A prior to its amendment in 1977, no liability of the respondent will accrue under section 85 of the Act, apart from holding that the proviso, further, relates to deeming proviso of non-payment of contribution for the purpose of payment of interest. It cannot be stretched so as to cover the penal provision under section 85B. It was further claimed by Mr. Banerjee, if the provisions of sections 68 and 85 are read, considered and construed together, the total effect in the facts of this case would be that the said Corporation have not suffered any damages, as they have not paid anything to the employees and the loss of value or harm or sufferance amongst others being the criterion for damages, the claim for damage by the said Corporation, was not maintainable, the more so when, there was or has been no such or any evidence of damage suffered by the said petitioner in this case. 27. 27. In the case of (25) Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Bangalore v. M/s. Blue Star Ltd., 1982 Lab IC 859, on the question of recovery of damages under section 85B of the said Act, the Karnataka High Court, has observed that the order must be a speaking one and it has been held that one of the considerations that should enter the mind of the E. S. I. Corporation in fixing the liability by way of punitive damages is to see whether the firm has made profits by retaining the money and, if so, to what extent. Further, the said Corporation must be satisfied that the conduct of the Institution is punishable and it should so adjust the damages as to appear fit and proper to an average prudent man and by writing that he has applied his mind, the authority cannot get over the obligation of actually applying the mind. He must show that he has applied his mind by writing a speaking order. He must discuss as to the due date of contribution and the delay in the making the contribution and the reason shown for the delay and why he does not agree with the reason shown for the delay and further, he must consider the three factors narrated above, while fixing the damages. He has done nothing in the instant case. On the basis of such findings and observations, Mr. Banerjee claimed that the determinations as made in this case, also suffered the same defects. In fact on the question of the necessity for application of mind, the same view as above, has also been expressed under the provisions of Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and more particularly under section 14B (as it stood before Act 40 of 1973), by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, in the case of (26) H. R. Gandhi v. State of Haryana & Ors., 1982 Lab IC 71. Mr. Banerjee categorically reiterated that the dispute under section 75 of the said Act was duly raised and there is no limitation prescribed or involved. 28. It should also be noted that Mr. Banerjee contended on a reference to the records in Annexure 'B' and claimed that since there was or has been no uniformity about the proposed rates of damages and no basis was disclosed or indicated, the entire assessment of damage was void. 28. It should also be noted that Mr. Banerjee contended on a reference to the records in Annexure 'B' and claimed that since there was or has been no uniformity about the proposed rates of damages and no basis was disclosed or indicated, the entire assessment of damage was void. To contradict that, Mr. Mukherjee produced a Notification dated 15th December, 1979, as published in the Gazette of India which disclosed the standard table for the levy of damages, as issued under Regulation 10A (i) (b). Mr. Mukherjee also produced two office orders dated 3rd May, 1976 and 15th December, 1977. By the said first office order, the authorities as mentioned therein, have been given the power to levy damages on Factories Establishments within their Regions under section 85B(1) of the said Act. Similarly, such authority, has also been given by the said second office order to officers or authorities as mentioned therein. Let the copies of those records as produced, be kept in the records of this case. 29. On the basis of the records as produced subsequently and during the course of hearing and which records, I have directed to be kept in the records of this proceedings, it cannot be said or the submissions to the effect, that there was or has been no uniformity of the proposed rates of damages, cannot be upheld and as such, the damages as assessed, cannot be interfered with on that ground. The said Act being a complete code by itself and when in view of the character and manner of incorporation of the same or the provisions as contained therein, the employer is primarily fastened with the statutory obligation to deposit the contributions, through any of the forms as prescribed, the submissions of Mr. Banerjee, that as there is no legal evidence establishing that the said Corporation has been required to make any payment and for that they have suffered any damages, would be of immaterial consideration, as under the scheme of the said Act, it should not be possible to hold and observe that such claim for damages by the said Corporation, as made in this case would lie or would be available, only when the said Corporation suffers any damages and not otherwise. Since there has been no evidence of payment of compensation, the determinations in the case of Regional Director, E. S. I. Corporation v. M/s. Fibre Bangalore (P) Ltd. (supra), would not be applicable in this case. For the views as also indicated above, the observations in the cases of Prajatantra Prachar Samity v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Orissa (supra) and Murarka Paints and Varnish Works Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., (supra), would not also apply in this case. 30. On the question of damages, the determinations as made under section 14B of the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, dealing with damages or imposition of the same, on the self-same circumstances, can be applied and on such question, on consideration of the provisions of the said Act and the Regulations made thereunder and more particularly under Regulation 31, the said petitioner was bound to pay the contributions under the said Act, within the specified days after the termination of the respective contribution period. Such payment could be made by affixing contribution stamps on the contribution cards of the employees and cancellation of the stamps and such cards were to be sent to the said Corporation along with a return, within the specified days of the termination of the contribution periods. This was not admittedly done in this case and on facts. I feel that there would be no justification in considering the defence of the said petitioner, that they could not affix the necessary stamps for their non-availability. If stamps were not available really, the said petitioner had also no difficulty under the said Act and Regulation 35, as they had the right and opportunity to produce the blank contribution cards with the necessary remarks regarding such non-availability of contribution stamps, at the places mentioned for fixing such stamps. This was also not done and the explanation as given by the said petitioner, on this account, was far from being satisfactory. Thus, in this case, it can be observed that the said petitioner failed to establish the fact of purchase or affixation of contribution stamps or any case to justify their failure, and as such, it would be prudent to hold that they have contravened the provisions of Regulation 31 in the matter of payment of contribution and were also guilty of the breach of trust which is really in ...... in the said Act. in the said Act. It was really obligatory on the said petitioner to pay both the contributions (employers' and employees') first, subject to a right of reimbursement under section 40 of the said Act. Here in this case, the said petitioners have not complied with such obligation and they cannot certainly be allowed to claim advantage of their own omission and failure. In view of the above and also in view of the way and manner in which the orders have been passed it cannot be said that the said petitioner was not afforded with due opportunities. It was the contentions of the respondents that stamps were available at the relevant time. 31. It should also be held, following the determination in Rallis India Ltd., Madras v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation (supra), that merely because provisions for payment of interest on the arrears of contribution has been made by Regulation 31A, it cannot be said that the Legislature has no power to levy a penalty by way of damages, on the ground of failure to pay the contribution amount under section 85B of the said Act. In fact, default or delay in payment of contributions in terms of Regulation 31, would be failure to pay the contribution within the meaning of section 85B of said Act. It should be noted here that the submissions of Mr. Mukherjee that the demand for interest, as made through Annexure "I" to the petition, has not been challenged, was also of substance. Regulation 31 cannot also be said to be in conflict with the said section 85B and so also Regulation 31A is not inconsistent with the same. 32. The provisions of section 54A(1)(2) and those of section 85B, would make it clear that reference to the Employees' State Insurance Court by the said Corporation was not obligatory in the facts of this case. There is really no limitation prescribed for steps to be taken or initiated under section 85B and under the provisions of the said Act, the damages were and are thus recoverable as arrear of land revenue. While on the point of recovery as arrears of land revenue, it should be noted that Mr. There is really no limitation prescribed for steps to be taken or initiated under section 85B and under the provisions of the said Act, the damages were and are thus recoverable as arrear of land revenue. While on the point of recovery as arrears of land revenue, it should be noted that Mr. Mukherjee referred to the observations in the case of (27) T. V. R. Punj v. Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation & Ors., 1982 (2) CLJ 91 , where, it has indicated that the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 is a complete code and though the same has not become very popular amongst the employees for various reasons, the same has such intension or back-ground, which would be beneficial, if duly applied and acted upon. In view of the terms of the said 1948 Act, the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act of 1890 and so also those of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, would be applicable to recover the arrears as land revenue and as such all steps as taken and are impeached in the instant case, were not improper or without jurisdiction and under both the statutes, the petitioner had adequate remedies, which were equally efficacious or effective. Even though the employees of the petitioner are employed in different units, considering the incidents and effect of the statute, namely the 1948 Act the establishment/factory of the petitioner should be deemed to be one unit and the provisions of the 1948 Act would apply to the establishment as a whole. Since the establishment of the petitioner is a factory, the demand as raised was a public demand and so the rule of limitation as urged, was not applicable and that the dispute in the instant case, would be covered by the provisions of section 75(e) & (g) of the said 1948 Act. 33. As mentioned above, there is no limitation prescribed in the said Act, during which action against an erring employer can be taken, for delayed deposits and in the absence of such or any limitation, there would be nothing to debar the said Corporation or their authorities, from exercising the statutory power and such submissions of Mr. 33. As mentioned above, there is no limitation prescribed in the said Act, during which action against an erring employer can be taken, for delayed deposits and in the absence of such or any limitation, there would be nothing to debar the said Corporation or their authorities, from exercising the statutory power and such submissions of Mr. Mukherjee were appropriate and available on the analogy of the determinations relevant for provisions under section 14B of the Act as mentioned hereinbefore and more particularly, on the basis of the determinations amongst others, in the case of The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, U. P. v. M/s. Allahabad Canning Co., Banrculi (supra). As indicated hereinbefore, Regulation 31 is not in conflict with section 85B of the said Act and as in other statutes there are provisions for claiming damages in addition to the power to ask for interest and more than one type of punishment may be imposable, so Regulation 31A would not also be inconsistent with section 85B of the said Act. That being the position, determinations in the case of The Commissioner of Coal Mines Provident Fund, Dhanbad & Ors. v. J. P. Lall & Sons (supra), as cited at bar, would not also be applicable in this case. 34. Mr. Banerjee, stated that as the determination under section 14B of the Employee Provident Fund and Family Pension Fund Act, 1952 are in the same line of the said Act, in respect of recovery of damages arising out of default in payment of contributions, so on the basis of the determinations in the case of Prajatantra Prachar Samity v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Orissa (supra) and Murarka Paints & Varnish Works Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. (supra) and as there was no legal evidence of the actual sufferance of damages, so damages and interests could not be claimed. There is no doubt and as contended by Mr. Banerjee that sections 74 and 75 of the said Act, deal with the Constitution of Employees' Insurance Court and the matter to be dealt with and decided by them. Mr. Banerjee further claimed that the provisions in sub-section (g) of section 75 should be regarded as more or less an omnibus provision, as the same includes any other matter, which is in dispute between the parties. Mr. Banerjee further claimed that the provisions in sub-section (g) of section 75 should be regarded as more or less an omnibus provision, as the same includes any other matter, which is in dispute between the parties. It was further contended by him that disputes under the section would arise in case of disputes relating to benefits and the section really means the existence of any dispute relating to deductions. It was also contended by Mr. Banerjee that section 75 does net provide a machinery for obtaining permission for making the deductions and recourse to the same could only be taken when disputes are raised. It was specifically claimed that whenever dispute is raised regarding deductions made by the employer, section 75 should be resorted to. 35. It was Mr. Banerjee's specific contentions, on construction of the provisions of the said Act and the determinations in case of Regional Director, E. S. I. Corporation v. M/s Fibre Bangalore (P) Ltd. (supra), The Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Bhopal v. The Central Press & Anr. (supra), and M/s. Shriram Bearings Ltd. v. The Employees' State Insurance Corporation & Ors. (supra), that where the amount of contribution was disputed, the said Corporation should refer the dispute for adjudication before the Employees' State Insurance Corporation Court before enforcing any recovery and since there was such a dispute in this case, the same should have been referred for adjudication by the said Corporation. 36. The Regulations as indicated hereinbefore, lay down complete provisions for making the deposits, so also the manner in which they are to be made. The Regulations are consistent with the scheme of the said Act. As Regulation 31A was substituted on 28th November, 1977 and no prior date of the effect of the same has been mentioned, the said provision was contended to be not retrospective but the same would be perspective and so not applicable or available in this case. Such submissions of Mr. Mukherjee, on the basis of the rules for construction of statutes and the provisions of the General Clauses Act, appear to be of substance. 37. As there was, in my view, admitted non-compliance with the requirements of section 85B of the said Act viz. Such submissions of Mr. Mukherjee, on the basis of the rules for construction of statutes and the provisions of the General Clauses Act, appear to be of substance. 37. As there was, in my view, admitted non-compliance with the requirements of section 85B of the said Act viz. there was failure and neglect or laches in the matter of payment and deposit of contribution, so the power of recovery through the mode as involved in this case, was available to the said Corporation and since the said petitioner has not accepted the determination of damages and interest as made by the said Corporation, so following the observations in the case of Regional Director, E. S. I. Corporation, Trichur v. M/s. Manikkar Engineers Ltd., Trichur (supra), which view appeared to me to be more reasonable, should have themselves approached the Employees' Insurance Court and in such proceedings they can have the lis as raised duly and conveniently decided, adjudicated and settled. I am also of the view that delayed payment, which means untimely payment, would give rise to a breach of the obligations under the said Act and for such failure and omission, the employer would expose itself to the action for damage which incidentally was the case in this proceedings. Section 85B authorizes the said Corporation to impose damages, in default of payment of contribution or any money due under the said Act and such damages as imposed, can be realized as arrears of land revenue in terms of or under section 45B of the said Act. An order under section 85B, must be made after giving opportunity to the employer to show cause against the imposition of damages and as indicated hereinbefore, such contingency or requirement was satisfied in this case. 38. There cannot also be any doubt that the said Act is a beneficial statute and is meant to achieve social security and justice, for a class and poorer section of people. The other characteristics of the said Act have been indicated hereinbefore. I am, of the view, considering the character of the said Act or the incidents thereof, a construction which is beneficial to the class or classes of persons, for whom the same is primarily meant, should be given. The cases as cited by Mr. The other characteristics of the said Act have been indicated hereinbefore. I am, of the view, considering the character of the said Act or the incidents thereof, a construction which is beneficial to the class or classes of persons, for whom the same is primarily meant, should be given. The cases as cited by Mr. Mukherjee on the point do also establish that such beneficial, apart form liberal construction to a statute like the said Act, should be given or adopted. Under the said Act, it is the primary liability and obligation of the employer to pay the contribution unless they are prevented by just, sufficient and appropriate cause and in this case, the said petitioner, not having been able to establish any such cause, cannot be allowed to have any benefit for their own wrong or omission. In a Social Security Legislation, which the said Act is, there may be, as mentioned earlier, separate punishments for separate offences and steps to be taken by the employer under the said Act are automatic or as stated hereinbefore "in built" and as such, the defence as put forward now, on facts and law, cannot be sustained or accepted. 39. It cannot also be held that in this case, that no reasoned order has been passed and as such, there was a case for non-application of mind. The order as impeached, has really discussed the relevant and material factors, which were duly raised and in fact, on consideration of such facts and points, the said petitioner has been favoured with a reduction of the demand. Such fact itself, would be enough to justify the contentions of Mr. Mukherjee that mind was duly applied and so, the determinations in the case of Regional Director Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Bangalore v. M/s. Blue Star Ltd. (supra) and The Commissioner of Coal Mines Provident Fund, Dhanbad & Ors. v. J. P. Lall & Sons (supra), would not apply in this case. 40. For the reasons as indicated above, the submissions of Mr. Banerjee should fail, so also the Rule, and I order accordingly. The Rule is thus discharged. There will be no order for costs. v. J. P. Lall & Sons (supra), would not apply in this case. 40. For the reasons as indicated above, the submissions of Mr. Banerjee should fail, so also the Rule, and I order accordingly. The Rule is thus discharged. There will be no order for costs. The order as made would not prejudice the said petitioner, to approach the Employees' State Insurance Court, if they are so advised or if they so intend, and have the lis as raised in that proceedings, to be determined in accordance with law.