Research › Browse › Judgment

Calcutta High Court · body

1982 DIGILAW 324 (CAL)

RANJIT KUMAR GHOSH AND CHANDI CHARAN GHOSH v. PRANAB KUMAR BANDAPADHYA

1982-09-08

PRADYOT KUMAR BANERJEE

body1982
PRADYOT KUMAR BANERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal at the instance of the defendant No. 1 arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiffs, Sri Pronab Kumar Mukherjee and Sri Sukumar Banerjee, for specific performance of a contract for reconveyance of immovable property. The case made out in the plaint is that the plaintiffs are the sons of late Mohonanda Banerjee by his second wife, late Gayatri Debi. The pro-defendant no. 4, Sankari Debi, is the plaintiffs' step mother, being the first wife of late Mohonanda Banerjee and the pro-defendants nos. 2 and 3 are the plaintiffs' step-brothers. During the minority of the plaintiff no. 2 and the pro-defendants nos. 2 and 3, the plaintiff no. 1 for self and on behalf of the plaintiff no. 2 as the latter's guardian and the pro-defendant no. 4 for self and on behalf of the pro defendants nos. 2 and 3 as their guardian jointly sold the suit land to the principal defendant no. 1 by a registered Kobala dated 4. 11. 58 for a consideration of Rs. 1700/ -. On the same date, simultaneously with the sale, the principal defendantno. 1 executed and registered an Ekrarnama stipulating thereby a reconvey the self-same property in favour of the vendors for the same amount of consideration, if paid within Chaitra 1370 B. S. It is alleged that since the beginning of Chaitra 1370 B. S. the plaintiffs had been asking the pro-defendants nos. 2 to 4 to enforce the contract for reconveyance of the suit land and also the principal defendant no. 1 to execute and register necessary deed of reconveyance with respect to the same in term of the contract. It is alleged that the plaintiffs are not residing at their native village. The principal defendant no. 1 has managed to keep the pro-defendants nos. 2 to 4 away with false promise that after the expiry of the term of the Ekrarnama, i. e. Chaitra 1370 B. S. he would reconvey the suit property to them alone. As a result of the false promise the pro-defendants nos. 2 to 4 have been keeping away from joining with the plaintiff to claim reconveyance of the suit property. Finding no other way, the plaintiffs repeatedly requested the principal defendant no. As a result of the false promise the pro-defendants nos. 2 to 4 have been keeping away from joining with the plaintiff to claim reconveyance of the suit property. Finding no other way, the plaintiffs repeatedly requested the principal defendant no. 1 to execute and register necessary deed of reconveyance in respect of the suit property on accepting the stipulated amount entirely from them. On some pretext or other, the principal defendant no. 1 by a notice dated 6. 6. 64 to execute and register necessary deed of reconveyance at the Memari Sub-Registry Office on 27th Chaitra 1370 B. S. on accepting the stipulated amount from them. But the principal defendant no. 1 did not comply. Hence the plaintiffs filed the suit upon depositing the stipulated money in the Court. The pro-defendants nos. 2 to 4 have been impleaded as defendants as they have refused to join as plaintiffs. The principal defendant no. 1 contested the suit by filing a written statement, inter alia, starting that the suit was bad for defect of parties, inasmuch as, the pro-defendants nos. 2 to 4 had not joined as plaintiffs. The agreement in favour of the plaintiffs and the pro-defendants nos. 2 to 4 was one and indivisible and hence the plaintiffs alone could sue for specific performance thereof. It was further stated that the plaintiffs having sold away their subsisting rights in the suit land to one Panchugopal Ghose on 3. 4. 64,they cannot maintain the suit for specific performance and the suit was liable to be dismissed. The learned Munsif decreed the suit. The appeal having been dismissed, the defendant no. 1 preferred the present second appeal. Both the Courts below, inter alia, held that the plaintiffs alone had right to maintain the suit for specific performance of a contract though all the promises were not made parties to the suit for specific performance as plaintiffs. It was not necessary that the two contracting sides must be arranged as plaintiffs and defendants. It had also been held by the appellate Court below that a contract could be enforced by some of the promises and if the remaining do not want to join as plaintiff, they might be impleaded as party defendant and could stand in the way of maintainability of the suit for specific performance of contract, namely, reconveyance of the property in suit. Admittedly in this case, reconveyance was agreed upon by the defendant no. 1 with the plaintiffs and the pro-defendants nos. 2 to 4. It is further clear that the pro-defendants nos. 2 to 4 have not joined as plaintiffs in the suit for specific performance of contract for reconveyance of 1. 82 acres of agricultural land appertaining to plot no. 414 and 16. ? acres of agricultural land appertaining to plot no. 523 of Mouza Illampur, P. S. Jamalpur. From the facts as hereinbefore stated, it is clear that the reconveyance was agreed to by the defendant no. 1 in favour of the plaintiffs nos. 1 and 2 and also the pro-defendants nos. 2 to 4. ( 2 ) MR. Banerjee on behalf of the defendant-appellant contended that the suit was not maintainable at the instance of the plaintiffs only as the pro-defendants nos. 2 to 4 had not joined in the suit as plaintiffs. The right, if any, of reconveyance was joint and individual right in favour of all of them together and if some of the promises were left out and not joined as cases for my consideration, namely, (1) 24 ILR (Cal) 832 (Safiur Rahman v. Maharamunnessa), (2) 6 CLJ 558 and (3) AIR 1960 Cal. 187 (The State v. Abdul Sukur ). ( 3 ) MR. Ghosh on behalf of the respondent, however, contended that in view of the decisions reported in AIR 1937 Nag. 186 (Jagdeo Singh v. Bisambhar ). 75 CWN 391 (R. Kamila v. Kiran Bala Dasi) and AIR 1937 Mad 596 (Abdul Aziz v. Abdul Sammad) the suit as framed was maintainable. In so far as the second argument of Mr. Ghosh is concerned, it appears that in Panchugopal's deed, the Ka schedule property was included by mistake or accidental error. Panchugopal had filed a Nadabi Patra on 21. 6. 65 which was admitted into the evidence. In that view of the matter, there is no merit in the contention that the plaintiffs have no locus standi to institute a suit as the property was sold to the other by the parties. ( 4 ) IN so far as the second point of Mr. Banerjee is concerned, I am of the opinion that Mr. In that view of the matter, there is no merit in the contention that the plaintiffs have no locus standi to institute a suit as the property was sold to the other by the parties. ( 4 ) IN so far as the second point of Mr. Banerjee is concerned, I am of the opinion that Mr. Ghosh is correct in his submission that after the Nadabi Patra is filed by Panchugopal himself stating that he had no purchased the property in suit, there is no merit in the contention of Mr. Banerjee and that the contention of Mr. Banerjee must, therefore, fail. In so far as the maintainability of the suit is concerned, in my opinion, in view of the Division Bench decision reported in ILR 24 Cal. 832 (Safiur Rahman v. Maharamunnesa) and AIR 1960 Cal. 187 (The State v. Abdul Sukur) it appears to me that the suit as framed is not maintainable. In the case reported in ILR 24 Cal. 832 it has been held by the Division Bench of this Court as follows: -THE defendant No. 1, the appellant, made a joint contract with several persons that, ?on receipt of Rs. 500/- as profit in addition to the price paid by him for the property,? he would execute separate documents in favour of each persons. Some of the parties who entered into that contract with the defendant No. 1 claim specific performance of the contract, making the other, who refused to have the contract performed, defendants. The question, therefore, is, can some of the parties to a single contract enforce specific performance against their adversary and the other persons who are defendants? we think, on principle, that they cannot and that in a suit for the performance of a single contract the parties on each side must be marshalled as plaintiffs and defendants. We therefore decree the appeal, and dismiss the suit with costs in all the Courts?. ( 5 ) THIS case was followed by Mr. Justice B. N. Banerjee in a case reported in AIR 1960 Cal 187 (The State v. Abdul Sukur ). It had been held that one or more of the several heirs of the original promise, a single individual could not by himself or themselves institute a suit for specific performance of the contract of reconveyance by making the remaining heirs as parties defendants to the suit. It had been held that one or more of the several heirs of the original promise, a single individual could not by himself or themselves institute a suit for specific performance of the contract of reconveyance by making the remaining heirs as parties defendants to the suit. On the death of original promisee his heirs did not become themselves several joint promisees. In the present case, the plaintiffs and the pro-defendants nos. 2 to 4 were the joint promisees in respect of indivisible contract of a property sold. In such case, all the promisees must be joined for the maintenance of the suit for the specific performance of a contract for sale. ( 6 ) MR. Ghose referred to the case reported in AIR 1978 All 212 (Lalji v. Ramji) wherein it has been held that the principle of mutuality has been abolished and now not recongnised by the Specific Relief Act, 1963. In my opinion the said judgment does not apply in the facts of the case. The decision reported in AIR 1937 Nag. 186 (Jagdeo Singh v. Bisambhar) is a judgment contrary to the Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 24 ILR (Cal) 832 (Safiur Rahman v. Maharamunnessa ). This judgment has been referred to in the case reported in AIR 1960 Cal 187 (The State v. Abdul Sukur) and Mr. Justice B. N. Banerjee preferred to follow the decision reported in ILR 24 Cal. 832. In my opinion, in view of the Division Bench judgment it must be held that when the contracting parties are more than one the property can only be reconveyed on the basis of the contract of the promisors. It cannot be held that the contracting promisees must reconvey to one of the promisors if the other promisors do not want to join for obtaining the specific performance of a contract. It is clear in view of the principle laid down in the case reported in 24 ILR (Cal) 832 that all the persons must appear as plaintiffs as against the defendants for the enforcement of the contract. ( 7 ) IN view of the Division Bench judgment of this Court as hereinbefore stated I am of the opinion that the suit as framed cannot be said to be maintainable and the judgment and decrees of both the Courts below therefore must be set aside. The suit must, therefore, stand dismissed. ( 7 ) IN view of the Division Bench judgment of this Court as hereinbefore stated I am of the opinion that the suit as framed cannot be said to be maintainable and the judgment and decrees of both the Courts below therefore must be set aside. The suit must, therefore, stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed; suit dismissed.