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1982 DIGILAW 334 (ALL)

Sankatha Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation

1982-03-02

K.N.MISRA

body1982
ORDER K.N. Misra, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the judgment and order dated 27-11-1976 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh, and order dated 19-8-1976 passed by the Consolidation Officer Sadar, Pratapgarh, by which the objection filed by the petitioner under S. 9-A(2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, in respect of land of Khata No. 65 was rejected being time barred. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the petitioner Sankatha Singh son of Rameshwar Singh, filed an objection under S. 9-A(2) of the Act on 9. 7. 1975 claiming half share in the aforesaid disputed holding khata No. 65 situate in village Poorap Gaon, district Pratapgarh with the allegation that his father Rameshwar Prasad and his uncle Rudra Pal Singh were the co-sir-holders of the land in dispute and their names were recorded in the Khatauni of second and third settlements jointly with half share each in it. The petitioner further asserted that Rudra Pal Singh was the Karta of the family and his name was recorded over the joint holding and he was in possession over it. It was further pleaded that on 8-7-1975, when Smt. Bhukna and her husband tried to interfere in the possession of the petitioner over the land in dispute he came to know about the manipulated entry in the name of Rudra Pal Singh and inspection was made of the record and thereupon he filed an objection the very next day under S.9-A(2) of the Act and also seeking condonation of delay. This objection was opposed and a counter affidavit was filed on behalf of Snit. Bhukna by her husband asserting that the long delay of six years should not be condoned and the objection he dismissed. 3. The Consolidation Officer framed a preliminary issue on the point whether the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of S. 5 of the Limitation Act or not and after taking into consideration the fact that notification under S. 9 of the Act was made on 15-8-1969 and the objection was highly belated for which no just and sufficient cause was shown he rejected the objection being time barred. The petitioner preferred a revision against the order passed by the Consolidation Officer which was rejected by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on 27-11-1976 holding that the Consolidation Officer has rightly refused to condone the delay. The Deputy Director of Consolidation referred in the order to the earlier litigation in respect of this very land between one Rant Pal Singh and the petitioner and his uncle Rudra Pal Singh wherein Ram Pal Singh had claimed share in the holding in dispute along with several other holding. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has held that the petitioner had knowledge about the proceedings under S. 9-A of the Act and so he came to the conclusion that no just and sufficient cause has been shown by the petitioner as to why he had not filed objection within limitation claiming co- tenancy rights in the land in dispute. The petitioner has challenged the aforesaid orders in this writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the land in dispute was a joint property of his father and uncle Rudra Pal Singh in which he had half share and an objection was filed by the petitioner the very next day when the opposite party Snit. Bhukna and her husband tried to interfere in his possession over the land in dispute. Learned counsel urged that since the petitioner has got bona fide claim in respect of the land in dispute the title of the petitioner in respect of it should have been determined on merits by the consolidation authorities instead of throwing the objection on the ground of laches. I am unable to agree with this contention. 5. While considering the question whether delay should be condoned or not the merits and demerits of the claim are irrelevant for consideration. In Ram Sunder Singh v. Rani Mohan Singh, 1978 All WC 588 : 11978 All LJ 823. Para 71, R. M. Sahai, J. held that: "Any person approaching any authority beyond time had to satisfy the reason for his absence of the cause due to which he was prevented from appearing in time. The concept of sufficient cause is well known. Para 71, R. M. Sahai, J. held that: "Any person approaching any authority beyond time had to satisfy the reason for his absence of the cause due to which he was prevented from appearing in time. The concept of sufficient cause is well known. It is true that S. 5 of the Limitation Act has to be construed liberally but it cannot be given a go-by otherwise the Courts of law shall cease to be Courts of law and shall become Courts where instead of law the will of the authority shall prevail." 6. In Parsidh Narain Rai v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Azamgarh. 1979 All LJ 764 (Para 8). K. P. Singh, J. held that : "When a remedy of a party is barred by lapse of time, the other party gets valuable right and that right can be negatived only when sufficient cause has been shown in preferring the delayed revision petition." 7. In State of W.B. v. Howarah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the expression sufficient cause should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. 8. In the present case, therefore, it has to be seen whether the petitioner had acted negligently in filing the objection or not and whether he had given sufficient reasons in not filing objections under S. 9- A 1-2) of the Act at the appropriate stage claiming co-tenancy rights in the holding in dispute. If he is not guilty of negligence or want of inaction or lack of bona fide the delay in filing the objection deserved condonation otherwise not. 9. In the present case, it is evident that in respect of the disputed holding Khata No. 65 which was recorded in the basic year Khatauni in the name of Rudra Pal Singh the uncle of the petitioner, Rant Pal Singh and others had claimed one third share in the said holding along with other holdings in dispute, namely. Khatas Nos. 234. 100, 101. 189. 65 and 99. In all these holdings Ram Pal Singh and other have claimed one third share. Khata No. 100 was recorded in the name of Sankatha Singh petitioner. Khatas Nos. 234. 100, 101. 189. 65 and 99. In all these holdings Ram Pal Singh and other have claimed one third share. Khata No. 100 was recorded in the name of Sankatha Singh petitioner. The petitioner's name was also recorded as a co-tenure holder in Khata No. 189 along with Badri Singh and Kedar and in Khata No. 181 the petitioner's name was recorded' in the is year along with Rudra Pal Singh (his uncle). Badri. Kedar and Smt. Manraj Kuer and in Khatas Nos. 65 and 234 the name of Rudra Pal Singh alone was recorded in the basic near. In all these khatas Rant Pal Singh had claimed l/3rd share. Opposite party Rudra Pal Singh contested the claim and asserted that the, entries in the disputed khatas were correctly recorded and the objector Ram Pal Singh had got no share in it. The Consolidation Officer vide order dated 13-3-1969 had rejected the objection filed by Ram Pal Singh who thereupon filed an appeal which too was dismissed on 17-10-1970 and the basic year entry on the aforesaid khatas was maintained. The result was that in respect of land of khatas Nos. 65 and 234 the entry recording the name of Rudra Pal Singh alone as sole tenure holder was maintained whereas the entry of the name of petitioner Sankatha Singh over Khata No. 100 was maintained. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has observed in the impugned order that the petitioner was aware about consolidation proceedings in the village and the objection under section 9-A (2) of the Act was also fought out in respect of the land in dispute. He thus observed that the petitioner was negligent in not preferring objection at the relevant time and he has not given any sufficient cause for his inaction in the matter. He thus refused to condone the inordinate delay of six years in filing the objection. 10. Having given my anxious consideration to the matter I am of the opinion that the findings recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in refusing to condone the delay do not suffer from an% infirmity. He thus refused to condone the inordinate delay of six years in filing the objection. 10. Having given my anxious consideration to the matter I am of the opinion that the findings recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in refusing to condone the delay do not suffer from an% infirmity. It is well settled that findings recorded about sufficiency or insufficiency of the grounds shown for condonation of delay raises no question of jurisdiction and as such the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation whereby he has refused to condone the delay by holding that no just and sufficient cause has been shown for condoning the delay cannot be interfered with by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. 11. In the result, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. I, however, direct the parties to bear their own costs.