JUDGMENT Kausal Kishore, Member - In this reference dated 10.4.1974, the learned Additional Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur, has recommended that the revision petition of Prabhu Singh plaintiff/revisionist be allowed and the order of the learned trial court dated 10.9.1973, setting aside the ex parte decree in favour of the plaintiff be set aside. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the revisionist and have also perused the record. None appeared for the opposite-party number 1 and the learned DGC (R) was Learned on the point of partial compromise. 3. The learned counsel for the applicant argued that there was no fraud on the court, it was a consent decree and could not be set aside except by a civil court. On looking into the file, it appeared that there was a written statement by the State signed by the Collector and filed by the learned DGC (R) which said that it was a case of collusive transfer and illegal transaction. The learned counsel argued that the DGC (R) was also a party to the compromise, but I find this is not so. The counsel's argument that the State first contested and then did not contest neither is supported by any document, nor appears logical. The counsel further argued that the restoration application was filed beyond limitation. 4. The learned Additional Commissioner has found that the trial court did not examine whether the admission was filed by Smt. Phuljharia or not, if not then what was the date of knowledge and whether the application was within limitation. However, these observations depended on consideration of the decree as ex parte and no consideration of fraud was there, possibly because the learned trial court also did not give any precise finding on the point of fraud or any points raised by the learned Additional Commissioner though the trial court did mention the facts. Before deciding about the need of remanding the case to the trial court, in my considered opinion, it is necessary to see if after about 8 years of the restoration order, grounds based on facts exist or not, justifying the restoration order. I consider it desirable to exercise the powers under Section 333 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, covering a wider scope, as well as those under section 333-A, in the interest of justice, now that all facts have been brought to notice. 5. I consider it desirable to exercise the powers under Section 333 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, covering a wider scope, as well as those under section 333-A, in the interest of justice, now that all facts have been brought to notice. 5. It is a material fact that Mst. Phuljharia categorically denied in her affidavit to have put her thumb impression on any admission or Vakalatnama but Prabhu Singh in his affidavit dated 13.6.73 merely said that Mst. Phuljharia made a mark on admission and Vakalatnama (Nishan Banaya) ? and did not say anything about the thumb-mark, nor offered to get the thumb marks compared by expert evidence till the date of order 10.9.1973. Mst. Phuljharia denied to have come to Deoria and to have engaged Sri Daya Shanker Lal as her counsel but the revisionist had no evidence to show that she had come to Deoria. The Vakalatnama shows the name of Rajvanshi Tewari as counsel and this name was struck off and the name of Daya Shanker Lal was written in the line below, to the left, without any attestation or thumb-mark on this cutting by Mst. Phuljharia. Her alleged thumb-mark only at one place is there on the margin. This circumstance creates suspicion. The first written name Rajvanshi Tewari is of the same counsel who represented the plaintiff and even if it may not be wrong under any law, it was certainly against propriety since the interest of the two parties could differ, and according to the allegations in the plaint, must have differed in which situation no one counsel could protect the interest of the plaintiff and defendant both. So this aspect also creates suspicion. Apart from suspicion, the Vakalatnama itself does not remain valid for want of attestation by Mst. Phuljharia on the cutting, which alone could change the counsel from Rajvanshi Tiwari to Daya Shanker Lal. 6. The learned Additional Commissioner has not given due importance to the use of the word compromise in place of admission by the trial court in the order dated 7.9.1972. The State had contested the case. It was a matter of 20 plots total area 8 acres, all entered bhumidhari of Mst. Phuljharia, State called it a collusive suit and a proposed illegal transfer. Even if Mst. The State had contested the case. It was a matter of 20 plots total area 8 acres, all entered bhumidhari of Mst. Phuljharia, State called it a collusive suit and a proposed illegal transfer. Even if Mst. Phuljharia filed an admission, the suit could not be decreed and it had to be proceeded against the State, issues framed and case decided on merits. It is well known law that compromise or admission by one of several defendants is not sufficient for passing a consent decree. This may be the reason for the trial court to describe it as a compromise and pass decree on its basis. This error was detected by the trial court and was one of the grounds for restoring the suit, and rightly so, for there was no question of passing consent decree when the State was still contesting. 7. There is no order-sheet after 25.7.1972, and on this date the next date fixed was 4.9.1972. Hereafter fraud on the court started. The application on behalf of Mst. Phuljharia appears to be written on 4.9.1972 and filed on 7.9.1972 after identification by Daya Shanker Lal pleader same day. The court took it to be a complete compromise and decreed the suit on its basis. The plaintiff's counsel assisted the court in forgetting that no information of this date 7.9.1972 was given to the DGC who appeared on behalf of the State and was a necessary party, that the compromise could not be entertained without including the State as a party and without obtaining signatures of the Collector also on the compromise. The learned DGC (R) also argued that no compromise decree or consent decree was possible unless the State through Collector also joined in the compromise or admitted the claim of the plaintiff' or did not contest the case in the first instance. The application allegedly presented on 7.9.1972 by Mst. Phuljharia could only be termed admission but the court was led to believe that it was a compromise and amongst all the parties to the suit. After no hearing on 4.9.1972, how the case was taken up on 7.9.1972 is not revealed. How the plaintiff and the defendant no. 1 got this date 7.9.1972 when the space for order-sheet on the other side of the order-sheet dated 25.7.72 is entirely blank, is not revealed. After no hearing on 4.9.1972, how the case was taken up on 7.9.1972 is not revealed. How the plaintiff and the defendant no. 1 got this date 7.9.1972 when the space for order-sheet on the other side of the order-sheet dated 25.7.72 is entirely blank, is not revealed. The basis of declaring the plaintiff as sirdar on the whole land, when Mst. Phuljharia was continuing recorded bhumidhar for the past several years without the plaintiffs being recorded anywhere in any capacity is not revealed. What happened on 4.9.1972 and why not order sheet for that date was written is not revealed. Obviously, there was considerable concealment from the court. The fraud on the trial court is sufficiently made out from the above facts. 8. Although the trial court may have missed some of the above facts while passing the order on 10.9.73, in view of the factual position and since there was fraud, no question of limitation would arise in passing orders under Section 151 C.P.C. In fact, in the circumstances, the order dated 10.9.1973 must be deemed to be an order under section 151 C.P.C. or Order IX Rule 13 CPC and on that basis, it is confirmed as quite in order. In view of the above, there is no need to remand the case to the trial court to grasp all these facts and reach the above conclusions after this lapse of about 8 years, in the interest of saving further delay. It is only a surprise, why the trial court docs not have further enquiries made separately about the persons/parties involved in the fraud and consider the need of criminal action if wilful illegal conduct is established. However, for the purposes of this revenue suit, no further action is needed than to dismiss the revision petition and let the suit proceed, enabling both the parties opportunity of hearing. 9. In the result, the revision is found to be without force and is dismissed. The order of the learned trial court dated 10.9.73 is confirmed. 10. The records of the courts below may be returned without further delay.