JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal at the instance of the defendant no. 1 arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiff against the defendant no 1. and others for declaration of title of the deity in respect of the suit property and recovery of possession and for permanent injunction. The plaintiff's case was that the suit land was absolute debutter of the family deity of the plaintiff and defendants nos. 1 and 3 to 10 Plaintiff's father Suresh became a shebaiti of the deity after the death of his grandfather bepin and as shebaiti he possessed the suit lands. In 1343 B. S. Suresh became insane and he died on 29th of Baisakh, 1354 B. S. and after his father's death the plaintiff became a sebait of the deity ; but he was a minor when his father died. After attaining majority when the plaintiff went to exercise acts of possession in the suit lands the defendant no. 1 disclosed that he had purchased the suit land by a kobala from Suresh on the 10th of Ashar, 1347 B. S, it is alleged that the kobala was obtained by defendant no. 1 by practising fraud, misrepresentation and undue influence on Suresh who was insane when the kobala was made. There was no legal necessity for the sale and the deity was not benefited. Defendant no. 1 leased out a portion of the suit lands to defendant no. 2, but that transfer was also not for legal necessity and so it was not binding on the deity and the plaintiff is therefore entitled to get back possession of the suit lands. 2. THE defendants nos. 1 and 2 contested the suit. Their defence was that Suresh was not insane. The suit lands were not absolute debuttar. They are only nominal or family debuttar. Suresh transferred the suit lands to the defendant no. 1 for legal necessity of the deity and the defendant no. 1 did not obtain the kobala by any unfair means and the defendant no. 1 leased out a portion of the suit lands to defendant no. 2 for legal necessity of the deity. The suit was barred by limitation as the plaintiff attained majority more than three years before the filing of the suit. The defendants nos. 3 to 5 in a written statement supported the contesting defendants. 1 leased out a portion of the suit lands to defendant no. 2 for legal necessity of the deity. The suit was barred by limitation as the plaintiff attained majority more than three years before the filing of the suit. The defendants nos. 3 to 5 in a written statement supported the contesting defendants. Both the courts below held that the property is absolute debutter and not secular property of the party. The courts below further held that the suit was not barred by limitation under Article 142 of the Limitation Act and transfer of the property to the defendant no. 1 was not for legal necessity. The appellate court also held in favour of the plaintiff holding inter alia that the transfer was not for legal necessity of the deity. Secondly, the property was absolute debuttar and thirdly, the suit was not barred by limitation and fourthly, the defendant's kobala was not obtained by misrepresentation or fraud. 3. BEING aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court the defendant no. 1 has preferred the present appeal. 4. MR. Panda on behalf of the appellant contended that the transfer was for legal necessity. Secondly, it was argued that the transfer was not in respect of the land in question but only the right of she bait ship was transferred. Reliance has been placed in a case reported in AIR 1951 SC 293 and air 1953 SC 125 . Both the cases were considered in the background of Hindu women's Right to the Property Act. It was considered whether the shebaitship is a property within the meaning of section 3 (1)of the Hindu Women's Right to the Property Act. In AIR 1953 SC 125 the widow's right to the shebaitship and the date of running of limitation for filing suit by reversioner after the death of the widow has been considered. These two cases were considered by Dr. B. K, Mukherjee, J. in his Tagore's Law Lectures, Fourth Edition at pages 221 and 232. At page 221 it was observed by B. K. Mukherjee, J. while considering the case reported in AIR 1953 SC 125 , as follows :- "Whatever might be said about the office of a trustee, which carries no beneficial interest with it, shebaitship, as is now well settled, combines in it both the elements of office arid property. At page 221 it was observed by B. K. Mukherjee, J. while considering the case reported in AIR 1953 SC 125 , as follows :- "Whatever might be said about the office of a trustee, which carries no beneficial interest with it, shebaitship, as is now well settled, combines in it both the elements of office arid property. As the shebaiti interest is heritable and follows the line of inheritance from the Founder, obviously when the heir is a female, she must be deemed to have, what is known, as widow's; estate in the shebaiti interest. Ordinarily there are two limitations upon a widow's estate. In the first place, her rights of alienation are restricted and in the second place, after her death the property goes not to her heirs but to the heirs of the last male owner." These principles do not support at: all mr. Panda's contention. It only says that shebaitship is heritable and the widow inherits the shebaitship after the death of the last male heir subject to the limitation of the woman's right to the property. The case reported in AIR 1951 SC 293 was also discussed in Tagore's Law Lectures at page 219 under the heading woman's right to succeed to shebaitship. It was held therein that a women can succeed to shebaitship. In this case we are not concerned with the woman's right to the property at all. There is no question of any widow succeeding to the shebaitship. 5. MR. Panda, however, contended that the property of the deity was not transferred only the shebaitship was transferred. At page 232 of Tagore's Law Lectures it has been specifically stated, that the shebaitship right is not alienable in law. At page 229 in paragraph 5. 32 of Tagore Law lectures it has been stated as follows:- "Although Shebaiti right is heritable like any other property, it lacks the other incident of proprietary right, viz., the character of being freely transferable by the person in whom it is vested. The reason is that the personal proprietary interest which the Shebait has got is ancillary to and inseparable from his duties as a ministrant of the deity, and a manager of its temporalities. The reason is that the personal proprietary interest which the Shebait has got is ancillary to and inseparable from his duties as a ministrant of the deity, and a manager of its temporalities. As the personal interest cannot be detached from the duties, the transfer of Shebaitship would mean delegation of the duties of the transferor which would not only be contrary to the express intentions of the founder, but would also contravene the very policy of law. A transfer of Shebait ship or, for the matter of that, of any religious office has nowhere been countenanced by Hindu lawyers". In the circumstances therefore, in my opinion, there is no merit in the contention of Mr. Panda that Shebaitship is transferable. 6. THE next contention of Mr. Panda was that the suit is barred by limitation because the transfer was made on 24th of June, 1940 and the suit was filed on 7th of december, 1955. It must be remembered that Suresh was a Shebait under the deed upto 13th of May, 1947. The other shebaits had no right at that point of time to challenge the same being effected by Suresh during his life time and the suit after the death of Shebait Suresh on 13th of May, 1957 was brought within 12 years under article 124 or 144 of the Indian Limitation act. In my opinion, the learned Judge was right in holding that the time runs from the date of death of Suresh and therefore, the suit was brought within the period of limitation, that is, within 12 years. In the circumstances therefore the appeal stands dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.