Judgment :- 1. The defendants in O.S. No. 1021 of 1974 on the file of the District Munsif of Kallakurichi are the appellants in this second appeal. The respondent herein is the plaintiff in the suit. The plaintiff laid the suit for declaration of her title to the suit property and for consequential injunction or in the alternative for recovery of possession. The Plaintiff claimed title under a settlement deed, Ex. A1, dt. 18th September, 1972, executed by one Rangasami Chettiar with whom admittedly, the plaintiff had cohabited. Rangasami Chettiar is no more. The first defendant is the sister of Rangasami Chettiar and the second defendant is the son of the first defendant. The defendants attacked the settlement deed, Ex. A1 as void, stating that the object and consideration of the settlement was unlawful and they relied on the deed of revocation, Ex. B1, dated 16th October, 1973 executed by Rangasami Cettiar and the subsequent deed of settlement Ex.B2, dated 18th October, 1973 executed by Rangasami Chettiar in favour of the second defendant. The first Court opined that the object of the settlement deed, Ex. A1 was for future illicit cohabitation between the plaintiff and Rangasami Chettiar and hence, the transaction was invalid, declined to countenance the case of the plaintiff, and dismissed the suit with costs. The plaintiff appealed and the lower appellate Court considered the recitals in the settlement deed, Ex. A1 and came to the conclusion that the motive therefore was only the past cohabitation and the intention of the settlor was only to provide for the maintenance of the settlee the plaintiff and hence, the settlement deed is perfectly valid and the plaintiff could derive title under the same and in this view, allowed the appeal with costs and decreed the suit of the plaintiff for declaration and for recovery of possession with costs. The defendants are challenging the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court in this second appeal. 2. At the time of the admission of this second appeal, the following substantial questions of law have been mooted out for consideration: “1. Whether the settlement deed, Ex. A1 is vitiated in as much as it was executed as consideration for future co-habitation? 2. Even assuming that Ex. A1 was executed as consideration for past cohabitation, is the said settlement deed, Ex. A1 invalid?” 3. Whether the settlement deed, Ex. A1 is vitiated in as much as it was executed as consideration for future co-habitation? 2. Even assuming that Ex. A1 was executed as consideration for past cohabitation, is the said settlement deed, Ex. A1 invalid?” 3. Learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the object of and the consideration for the deed of settlement, Ex. A1, was only future illicit cohabitation between the plaintiff and Rangasami Chettiar and hence, the transaction as a whole, must be ignored as void. Under S. 23 of the Contract Act, if the consideration or object of an agreement is immoral or opposed to public policy, then it is unlawful and consequentially the agreement is void. Every transfer, inter vivos is preceded by an agreement to transfer, and if such agreement is void, on the ground of its object or consideration being unlawful, within the meaning of S. 23 of the Contract Act, then the transfer which rests on such void agreement should also be ignored as void. This is what is enacted in S. 6(h) of the Transfer of Property Act. Judicial pronouncements are uniform that a transfer executed in consideration for future illicit cohabitation is for an immoral consideration and hence it is void. Then the question is as to whether in the instant case, it can be stated that the object of or the consideration for Ex. A1 was future illicit cohabitation. I am not able to appreciate and accept this statement of the learned counsel for the appellants because, reading her evidence as a whole, it leaves no room for doubt that even anterior to the deed of settlement, Ex. A1, the plaintiff had cohabited with Rangasami Chettiar. Further more, the following recital in the deed of settlement, Ex. A1 is unambiguous and it cannot be said that future illicit cohabitation was intended to serve as a condition precedent to the settlement: Tamil Hence it has got to be held that the object or the consideration for Ex. A1 was past cohabitation and the settlee settled the property on the settlee because of his love and affection for her and since she happened to be his concubine. There is a difference of opinion as to whether past cohabitation can or cannot be a valid consideration for a transfer. A1 was past cohabitation and the settlee settled the property on the settlee because of his love and affection for her and since she happened to be his concubine. There is a difference of opinion as to whether past cohabitation can or cannot be a valid consideration for a transfer. So far as this Court is concerned, most of the decided case have taken the view that past illicit cohabitation is a valid consideration. 4. In Manicka v. Muniammal, 1 on which the learned counsel for the appellants places strong reliance, Mr. Ananthnarayanan, C.J., stated that where the connection was adulterous intercourse and therefore, it was opposed to law, it cannot be sustained as a valid consideration, even though it was past. The learned Chief Justice found on the facts of that case that the cohabitation admittedly amounted to adulterous intercourse, since the woman was found to be one married to another man at all relevant periods. Most likely the learned Chief Justice was viewing such transactions as completely contrary to good morals, as some of the observations in the judgment indicate. But, it must be pointed out that the learned Chief Justice was dealing with a case of a promissory note executed in favour of the woman and enforcement thereof was sought for in the suit laid. The citations relied on by the learned Chief Justice also dealt with agreements to pay the woman concerned. Here, we are dealing with a concluded transfer Though I may have my own reservations and hesitation to fall in line with the qualified view of the learned Chief Justice in view of the earlier unqualified pronouncements of this Court, which have also been referred to in the Judgment of the learned Chief Justice, since the matter deserves being looked at from a different angle, I find no necessity to dwell on this aspect, for the purpose of this case. 5. In Saradambal Ammal v. Natesa Mudaliar 2, a Division Bench of this Court, consisting of Ramamurthi and Ganesan, JJ., dealt with a case where the plaintiff, the woman, was legally wedded to another man and had two sons out of the wedlock and yet, while her husband was alive, she lived with the defendant as his permanent concubine and obtained a deed of settlement. In the judgment of Ganesan, J. there is considerable discussion of the case law on the question as to how far past illicit cohabitation would constitute a valid consideration for a transfer. The Division Bench, on a construction of the terms of the deed, held that the transaction was a gift, pure and simple, and not an agreement for any consideration and the past illicit cohabitation was the motive for the settlement and future cohabitation was not intended to serve as consideration or as a condition precedent for the gift to take effect, but was intended only as a condition subsequent and not the object of the transaction. The Division Bench referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Nagarathanamba v. Kunuku Ramayya 3. In that case, coparcenary properties were the subject-matter of two deeds, Exs. A1 and A2 purporting to be sale deeds. The factual findings were that the deeds were not supported by any consideration by way of cash or delivery of jewels and the transfers were made in view of past illicit cohabitation and such past cohabitation was the motive and not the consideration for the transfers, and the two deeds, though ostensibly sale deeds, were in reality gift deeds. The following observations lay down the law which should govern such situations: “Venkatacharyulu (transferor) and the appellant (transferee) were parties to an illicit intercourse. The two agreed to cohabit. Pursuant to the agreement each rendered service to the other. Her services were given in exchange for his promise under which she obtained similar services. In lieu of her services, he promised to give his services only and not his properties. Having once operated as the consideration for his earlier promise, her past services could not be treated under S. 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act as a subsisting consideration for his subsequent promise to transfer the properties to her. The past cohabitation was the motive and not the consideration for the transfers under Exs. A1 and A2. The transfers were without consideration and were by way of gifts. The past cohabitation was the motive and not the consideration for the transfers under Exs. A1 and A2. The transfers were without consideration and were by way of gifts. The gifts were not hit by S. 6(h) of the Transfer of Property Act, by reason of the fact that they were motivated by a desire to compensate the concubine for her past services.” Since in that case the subject-matter of transfers were coparcenary properties, it was held that the transferor had no power to make a gift of them. 6. In all such cases, the fact remains that the woman had cohabited with the man and that cohabitation was illicit by itself, not having the sanction of matrimony. The man had the services of the woman. As pointed out by the Supreme Court, in lieu of her services the man had rendered similar services to her. In those circumstances, the past illicit cohabitation was the motive and not the consideration for the transfer. In my view, the fact that the past illicit cohabitation was adulterous in nature, will not make any difference. It is not possible to state that the transfer was for any object or consideration, so as to invoke the test of finding out as to whether it was unlawful or not, and the transfer must be held to be only a gift, not hit by S. 6(2)(h) of the Transfer of Property Act. Viewed from this angle, there is no other alternative but to uphold the validity of Ex. A1. The recital in the present deed of settlement, Ex. A1 leaves no room for doubt that the motive for the same was only to compensate the plaintiff and the transaction was a gift, pure and simple, and the past cohabitation was only the motive and there was no intention expressed therein that the object was to secure future illicit cohabitation. 7. Even assuming that the learned counsel for the appellants could rely on the decision in Manicka v. Muniammal 1 I find that the facts of the present case do not support such a proposition. 7. Even assuming that the learned counsel for the appellants could rely on the decision in Manicka v. Muniammal 1 I find that the facts of the present case do not support such a proposition. The specific case of the defendants put forth in the written statement is that the plaintiff joined Rangasami Chettiar only after the death of her husband and as pointed out by the lower appellate Court, at the relevant point of time the plaintiff was a widow and Rangasami Chettiar was himself a widower. 8. For all these reasons, I am not able to persuade myself to interfere in second appeal and accordingly, the second appeal fails and the same is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in this Second Appeal.