JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, CJ. 1. This is a plaintiff's application in revision. It is directed against an order of the learned Civil Judge dismissing an application for amendment of the plaint. 2. The suit was for specific performance of a contract dated August 23, 1976 for sale of a portion of a house. The suit was filed on August 4, 1979. The application for amendment was instituted by the plaintiff on November 20, 1979. The plaintiff wanted to add in the plaint the plea that the plaintiff is still ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement. The learned Civil Judge dismissed the application. The court held that in view of Sec. 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act the plaintiff has to make the requisite averment in the plaint and then to prove by evidence that he has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. In the absence of such an averment in the plaint, the suit cannot succeed. Since valuable right has accrued to the defendant and, in the second place, because the amendment seeks to bring out a fresh cause of action in the plaint which was originally absent, the amendment cannot be allowed. In the original plaint, it was pleaded that the plaintiff was a tenant in a portion of the house which was subject-matter of the contract of sale by the defendant to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 35,000/-. The plaintiff alleged that he had advanced a sum of Rs. 5,000/- to the defendant on August 23, 1976, the date on which the defendant executed an agreement to sell; the portion in his tenancy to him. The plaint went on to allege that the defendant had promised to obtain permission from the ceiling authorities to sell the house to him but he kept on deferring the matter. The plaintiff several times approached the defendant to get the sale deed registered but the defendant put the plaintiff off on one pretext or another. It was further alleged that the defendant is trying to resile from the contract because he wants to sell it to some other party for a higher price. The plaintiff several times approached the defendant to get the sale deed registered but the defendant put the plaintiff off on one pretext or another. It was further alleged that the defendant is trying to resile from the contract because he wants to sell it to some other party for a higher price. In paragraph 8 of the plaint it was stated that the cause of action for the present suit arose on August 23, 1976 when the agreement was entered into between the parties at Allahabad and on all subsequent dates, when the plaintiff offered to pay the price and get the sale deed registered. 3. Form No.47 of Appendix A CPC gives the model form for a plaint for a suit for specific performance of contract of sale. Clause (3) of this Form provides: (3) The plaintiff has been and is still ready and willing specifically to perform the agreement on his part of which the defendant has had notice. "In accordance with this Form such an allegation should be made in the plaint. 4. Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act provides that specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person who fails to aver and prove that, he has performed or is always ready and willing to perform the essential part of the contract, which has to be performed by him other than the terms, the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Reading these two statutory provisions, it is plaint that the plaintiffs' willingness and readiness to perform his part of the agreement has not only to be proved but has also to dearly stated in the plaint. Lack of such an averment in the plaint can lead to the dismissal of the sujt on the ground that relief of specific performance of the contract cannot be granted to the plaintiff because of failure to comply with the statutory requirement of Sec. 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act. The court below has observed that the amendment sought by the plaintiff seeks to introduce a fresh cause of action in the plaint which was absent in the plaint as filed originally. This is incorrect. The court below has observed that the amendment sought by the plaintiff seeks to introduce a fresh cause of action in the plaint which was absent in the plaint as filed originally. This is incorrect. The introduction of the plea that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract is not a part of the cause of action for a suit for specific performance. It is one of the necessary averment. In the plaint as originally filed, it was alleged that the plaintiff has been offering the defendant the price and asking him to get the sale deed registered, but the defendant continued to postpone the matter on one pretext or the other. The cause of action was stated to be the date of the agreement, namely, August 23, 1976 and all subsequent dates when the plaintiff offered to pay the price and to get the sale deed registered. So the requisite averment to constitute the cause of action were there. It is not right to say that the plaintiff was attempting to introduce a fresh cause of action by the amendment. 5. In the plaint it was stated that after the agreement the plaintiff got a site plan of the house prepared by a civil engineer and the defendant approved the same on October 26, 1977. It was pleaded that the plaintiff approached the defendant to get the sale deed registered in conformity with the contract but the defendant has been trying to defer it on one pretext or the other. It was then alleged in paragraph 5 of the plaint that certain other persons have approached the defendant and offered higher price for the house including the portion in the tenancy of the plaintiff and the defendant refused to comply with the contract with the plaintiff. In paragraph 6 it was alleged that the defendant is proposing to resile from the contract because of higher offers being received from third parties. Hence the need for the suit. 6. In the written statement it was pleaded that the defendant never entered into an agreement with the plaintiff, that the alleged agreement was concocted and forged, that the defendant had agreed to sell the house to another person by a deed of 4-4-1979 and that the plaintiff has no case. Hence the need for the suit. 6. In the written statement it was pleaded that the defendant never entered into an agreement with the plaintiff, that the alleged agreement was concocted and forged, that the defendant had agreed to sell the house to another person by a deed of 4-4-1979 and that the plaintiff has no case. Article 54 of the Indian Limitation Act prescribes a period of three years for filing a suit for specific performance of contract of sale. The period of limitation of three years commences to run from the date fixed for the performance in the "agreement or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff had notice that performance is refused. It is not in dispute that the agreement did not fix any date or time for performance. The date of agreement is irrelevant for purpose of computing the period of limitation. For this purpose, two dates are material, namely, the date fixed for performance or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. From this point of view, the plaint was defective. It was very inartistically drafted. It neither mentioned whether a date was fixed for performance of contract nor did it specifically mention the date when the notice of performance was refused. 7. According to the plaint allegations, the defendant kept on deferring the matter of executing the sale deed on one pretext or the other. That does not necessarily mean that the defendant had refused performance, muchless that plaintiff had notice of such refusal of performance. A reading of the plaint shows that the plaintiff was apprehensive that the defendant is not likely to comply with the contract and hence the suit. From the written statement it appears that the defendant had executed an agreement to sell the house on April 4, 1979 in favour of some other person. A reading of the pleadings shows that the period of limitation could at the earliest commence from April 4, 1979. Thus the suit filed on November 20, 1979 was well within the prescribed period of three years from April 4, 1979 assuming that the plaintiff had notice of the execution of that agreement in favour of the third party on that date. 8. Thus the suit filed on November 20, 1979 was well within the prescribed period of three years from April 4, 1979 assuming that the plaintiff had notice of the execution of that agreement in favour of the third party on that date. 8. In this point of view the amendment application dated November 20, 1979 was well within the period of three years form the date of the commencement of limitation for this suit. On the allegations contained in the pleadings of the parties, it is apparent that the plaintiff could file another suit on November 20, 1979 after making the correct and the requisite allegations in the plaint. That plaint could not be said to be barred by time. The present suit could well be dismissed on the ground that it likely to fail for technical defects. For that reason the court could well grant permission to the plaintiff to file another suit under Order XXIII, Rule 3 Cr PC. 9. In this view of the matter I fail to see what valuable right had accrued to the defendant. The defendant could say that a valuable right has accrued to him if a fresh suif filed on the date of the application for amendment would be barred by limitation. That is not the case here. Neither the court below nor the counsel for the defendant opposite party has been able to spell out what exactly is the valuable right which has accrued or vested in the defendant on the date of the amendment application. 10. The requirements of section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act or of Form 47 of Appendix A, CPC do not lay down any straight jacket formula. A reading of the plaint shows that the plaintiff was keen to buy the house for fulfilment of the contract but the defendant was resisting. It is evidence that clear cut averment requited by Section 16 (c) had not been made. The plaintiff desired to make the position clear by inserting the requisite allegations specifically. This, in my opinion, was formalising the allegations already existing in the plaint and since no right in virtue of lapse of period of limitation had accrued, it could not be said that any valuable right had accrued to the defendant. The plaintiff desired to make the position clear by inserting the requisite allegations specifically. This, in my opinion, was formalising the allegations already existing in the plaint and since no right in virtue of lapse of period of limitation had accrued, it could not be said that any valuable right had accrued to the defendant. The court below as well as learned counsel for defendant opposite party has heavily relied on Mahmood Khan v. AbdulIa Khan, AIR 1978 Allahabad 463. In that case the requisite averments as required by Section 16 (c) Specific Relief Act or by clause (3) of Form 47 of Appendix A of the First Schedule of the CPC had not at all been made in the original plaint directly or indirectly. The amendment was sought at the second appeal stage in the High Court. By that time the period of limitation for fresh suit had long expired. in that context the court held that the mandatory requirement of law was not only proof but averment in the plaint and in the absence of an averment to that effect, the suit cannot succeed even though the plaintiff may have adduced evidence to prove it because proof of the fact cannot be a substitute for its averment in the, plaint. This decision is not applicable. Here the prescribed period of limitation had not expired. The amendment application was filed at the first hearing of the suit after its institution. Issues had not been framed till then what to say of evidence having been adduced. There was no undue delay on the part of the plaintiff. It appears that the lawyer who drafted the plaint was inefficient or incompetent and subsequently he came to realize it and then tried to make up the deficiency in the drafting of the plaint. 11. One of the factors which the court has to keep in mind in matters of disposing of amendment application is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. If the character of the cause of action is not altered and if a fresh suit could be filed then it is better to allow amendment in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings provided no irredeemable injustice or prejudice is caused to the defendant. In the present case, I see neither injustice nor any such prejudice. If the character of the cause of action is not altered and if a fresh suit could be filed then it is better to allow amendment in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings provided no irredeemable injustice or prejudice is caused to the defendant. In the present case, I see neither injustice nor any such prejudice. The rules of procedure are not meant to trap on unwary litigant or to punish him for the incompetence of the lawyer. 12. In the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the court below is directed to allow the amendment application. The parties may, however, bear their own costs. Revision allowed.