JUDGMENT : B.N. Misra, J. - This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 27-7-1977 and 3-8-1977 respectively passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Sonepur in Title Appeal No. 11 of 1974 confirming the decision dated 13-2-1974 of the learned Munsif, Sonepur in the final decree proceedings of Title Suit No. 3 of 1951. 2. The present litigation between the parties is going on for more than thirty years. Appellant No. 1 is the widow and Appellants 2 to 4 are the sons of the late Dhajaram who as Plaintiff had filed Title Suit No. 3 of 1951 against the Respondents. The prayer in the suit was for a declaration that Respondent No. 1 (Defendant No. 1 in the suit) had only 1/5th share in holding No. 9 of the second settlement of village Dabalang and that Defendant No. 1 was not entitled to claim mesne profits any more. The Plaintiff's suit was decreed on 25-10-1951. The learned Munsif allotted 1/5th share out of holding No. 9 to Defendant No. 1 and further held that Defendant No. 1 would not be entitled to claim mesne profits any more unless he filed a properly constituted partition suit. No appeal was filed against the aforesaid judgment and decree of the learned Munsif. On 8-8-1966 Defendant No. 1 filed a petition in the Court of the Munsif, Sonepur to make the preliminary decree passed in Title Suit No. 3 of 1951 final allotting to him 1/4th share out of holding No. 9. During the pendency of the proceedings the original Plaintiff died and his legal representatives (the present Appellants) were brought on record. Also in the meanwhile Sitaram, one of the brothers having died issueless, Defendant No. 1 prayed for allotment of 1/4th share to him out of holding No. 9 instead of 1/5th which had been allotted to him in the decree. As the Court considered it undesirable to allot a greater share to Defendant No. 1 in the absence of his other co-sharers, Defendant No. 1's brother Asharam and the legal representatives of his deceased brother Jayaram were added as Defendants in the suit. By his order dated 9-3-1968 the learned Munsif allowed the petition dated 9-8-1966 filed by Defendant No. 1 and directed him to take necessary steps for appointment of a Commissioner to effect partition. By his order dated 9-3-1968 the learned Munsif allowed the petition dated 9-8-1966 filed by Defendant No. 1 and directed him to take necessary steps for appointment of a Commissioner to effect partition. The Amin-Commissioner's report dated 19-7-1969 showing allotment of shares to the parties was accepted by the learned Munsif on 10-10-1969. Against that order the present Appellants preferred Civil Revision No. 328 of 1969 and in that revision a direction was given by this Court that the Commissioner should be called upon to go to the spot again and demarcate the lands as per the allotments after due notice to the parties of the time and date of local inspection. The Amin-Commissioner after visiting the spot submitted a fresh report on 16-9-1969, but the said report was rejected by the learned Munsif on 9-2-1972 and a fresh writ was directed to be issued to the Amin Commissioner to demarcate the lands. The Amin-Commissioner again visited the spot, demarcated the lands and submitted his report on 28-3-1973. By order dated 13-2-1974, the learned Munsif accepted the Commissioner's report dated 28-3-1973 directing the said report to be treated as a part of the final decree and also directing Defendant No. 1 to file stamp paper for drawing up the final decree. The Appellants preferred Title Appeal No. 11 of 1974 before the learned Subordinate Judge, Sonepur against the aforesaid decision of the learned Munsif dated 13-2-1974. The Appellants preferred Title Appeal No. 11 of 1974 before the learned Subordinate Judge, Sonepur against the aforesaid decision of the learned Munsif dated 13-2-1974. The Appellants had raised the following contentions before the learned Subordinate Judge: (1) The original decree in Title Suit No. 3 of 1951 was not a preliminary decree, but a final one; (2) the final decree proceeding was barred by limitation; (3) the Respondents having filed Title Suit No. 11 of 1959 which was a partition suit in respect of the lands including the lands covered under Title Suit No. 3 of 1951 and Title Suit No. 11 of 1959 having been dismissed and the dismissal having been confirmed by this Court, the present final decree proceedings in respect of Title Suit No. 3 of 1951 could not be proceeded with; (4) the Amin-Commissioner's report in the final decree proceeding had not been properly accepted by the lower Court; (5) the lands covered under Title Suit No. 3 of 1951 being bhogra lands, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the final decree proceedings; and (6) the final decree proceeding in Title Suit No. 3 of 1951 was made final on 13-2-1974 and not on 9-3-1968 as claimed by the Respondents. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the original decree in Title Suit No. 3 of 1951 was a preliminary decree for partition and not the final decree, that the final decree proceeding was not barred by limitation, that there was no bar to proceed with the final decree proceeding in Title Suit No. 3 of 1951 inasmuch as in Title Suit No. 11 of 1959 the prayer for partition of holding No. 9 had been dismissed on the ground of res judicata in view of the decree in Title Suit No. 3 of 1951 in respect of the said holding No. 9, that the acceptance of the Amin-Commissioner's report by the lower Court was no longer open to challenge any further that no grounds had been made out for interference with the same, that the challenge to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court could not be entertained in appeal as the point had not been raised in the lower Court nor was there any pleading to that effect at the time of final decree proceeding and that the appeal was filed beyond the period of limitation. Accordingly the appeal preferred by the Appellants had been dismissed and hence this appeal. 3. Initially the hearing of this appeal was confined to the following two substantial questions of law: (1) Whether the appeal (Title Appeal No. 11 of 1974) before the lower appellate Court was barred by limitation; and (2) whether Title Suit No 11 of 1959 (between the same parties and some others) was maintainable in view of the previous partition in T.S. 3 of 1951. However at the first date of hearing of this appeal learned Counsel for the Respondents conceded that the appeal before the learned lower appellate Court was not barred by limitation. Learned Counsel for the Appellants conceded that Title Suit No. 11 of 1959 was maintainable in spite of the judgment and decree in Title Suit No. 3 of 1951. In other words, the present final decree proceeding in Title Suit No. 3 of 1951 is not affected by the decision in Title Suit No. 11 of 1959. These concessions by learned Counsel on both sides are accepted. 4. Learned Counsel for the Appellants has sought permission of this Court to raise the following substantial question of law That the properties in T.S. 3 of 1951 being Bhogra lands which vested in the State of Orissa either by Bhogra Conversion Proceeding in Sonepur or by Orissa Act 10 of 1963 with right of the State to settle the same, whether on the facts and in the circumstances a final decree proceeding would be maintainable in respect of such properties. Learned Counsel for the Respondents has filed an objection mainly on the ground that the aforesaid question of law should not be allowed to be raised at this belated stage. As the point raised involves jurisdiction of the Civil Court, permission is granted for hearing of the aforesaid question of law for the ends of justice. This is the only point urged in this appeal. 5. As the point raised involves jurisdiction of the Civil Court, permission is granted for hearing of the aforesaid question of law for the ends of justice. This is the only point urged in this appeal. 5. According to learned Counsel for the Appellants holding No. 9 forming the subject matter of Title Suit No. 3 of 1951 comprises of Bhogra lands and as the Gounti system was abolished in Sonepur State either with effect from 1-4-1956 by virtue of the Government Press Note dated 2-2-1956 or with effect from 1-12-1972 by virtue of Orissa Act 10 of 1963, thereafter a suit for declaration or a final decree proceeding in respect of holding No. 9 is not maintainable in the Civil Court. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on Mangulu Jal and Ors. v. Bhagaban Rai and Ors. 41 (1975) C.L.T. 526, and Rajkumar Palia v. Sadhuram Palia and Ors. ILR (1980) Cutt 202. In the former case it was held inter alia that the Civil Court had no authority or jurisdiction to settle Bhogra lands with occupancy rights and that even if no settlement had been made either under the Government Press Note dated 2-2-1956 or under Orissa Act 10 of 1963, claims of the parties could not be litigated under old titles as on vesting of Bhogra lands in the State, the prior titles were extinguished and fresh title would accrue only on settlement. In the latter case, it was held that in Sonepur the Gounti system as Well as the Bhogra lands were abolished in pursuance of notification dated 2-2-1956 and the lands vested in the State Government with effect from 1-4-1956 and that a suit in the Civil Court was maintainable in the facts of that case where in pursuance of the notification dated 2-2-1956 Defendant No. 1 had surrendered the lands to the State and thereafter the lands had been settled with him as per the provisions of the notification much before the coming into force of Orissa Act 10 of 1963. 6. 6. Learned Counsel for the Respondents has submitted that the aforesaid point urged by learned Counsel for the Appellants cannot arise for consideration as there is absolutely no evidence or material before the Court nor any pleadings that in 1954 or 1956 the status of the parties was that of a Thikadar or Gountia and that the suit lands appertaining to holding No. 9 continued to be Bhogra lands in 1954 and 1956 or were service tenure lands found to be so by any enquiry made by the Charge Officer or the Collector in accordance with the instructions of the Board of Revenue. It is further submitted that there is not a scrap of material before the Court to show that any application had been made by the Appellants or any of the parties surrendering the suit lands in favour of the Government or that any settlement of the suit lands had been made by the Collector in terms of para. 8 of the instructions of the Board of Revenue. 7. On a scrutiny of the pleadings and records I am convinced that the objection of the Respondents must be upheld. In the plaint, holding No. 9 is described as 'Bhogra', but that description is surely not enough to come to a definite conclusion that in 1954 or 1956 the suit lands had continued to be Bhogra lands or had been found to be so on enquiry by any of the authorities. On the contrary it has been stated in para. 3 of the plaint that the Gounti right had been seized by the previous ruler about 25 years ago and thereafter the village was returned to some Gountias on assessment of fresh fees. This is the only averment regarding the status of the parties and the nature of the lands comprised in holding No. 9. In view of this incomplete and vague statement and in the absence of any evidence and relevant material, it must be held that the Plaintiff-Appellants have failed to prove that the status of the parties was that of a Thikadar or Gountia in 1954 or 1956 and that the suit lands continued to be Bhogra lands in the said years. It is not open to the Court to make any assumptions in the matter. It is not open to the Court to make any assumptions in the matter. In these circumstances, the learned lower appellate Court had not allowed this point to be raised for the first time in appeal arising out of a final decree proceeding. 8. Learned Counsel for the Respondents has further submitted that the Plaintiff-Appellants cannot be allowed to raise the plea referred to above on the principle of constructive res judicata. In this connection reliance is placed on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in State of U.P. Vs. Nawab Hussain wherein it was observed: The principle of estoppel per res judicata is a rule of evidence as has been stated in Marginson v. Blackburn Borough Council (1939) 2 K.B. 426 at page 437 it may be said to be "the broader rule of evidence which prohibits the reassertion of a cause of action". This doctrine is based on two theories: (i) The finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions for the final termination of disputes in the general interest of community as a matter of public policy and (ii) the interest of the individual that he should be protected from multiplication of litigation. It therefore serves not only a public but also a private purpose by obstructing the reopening of matters which have once been adjudicated upon. It is thus not permissible to obtain II second judgment for the same civil relief on the same cause of action, for otherwise the spirit of contentiousness may give rise to conflicting judgments of equal authority, lead to multiplicity of actions and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It is the cause of action which gives rise to an action, and that is why it is necessary for the Courts to recognise that a came of action which results in a judgment must lose its identity and vitality and merge in the judgment when pronounced. It cannot therefore survive the judgment, or give rise to another came of action on the same facts. This is what is known as the general principle of res judicata. But it may be that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. It cannot therefore survive the judgment, or give rise to another came of action on the same facts. This is what is known as the general principle of res judicata. But it may be that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If in such a case a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. Courts have therefore treated such a course of action as an abuse of its process and Somervell L.J., has answered it as follows in Greenhalgh v. Mallard (1947) 2 All E.R. 255 at page 257: I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the Court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject-matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the-process of the Court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. This is therefore another and an equally necessary and efficacious aspect of the same principle, for it helps in raising the bar of res judicata by suitably construing the general principle of subduing a cantankerous litigant. That is why this other rule has sometimes been referred to as constructive res judicata which in reality, is an aspect or amplification of the general principle. 9. On going through the records of the present case I find that by 9-3-1968 when the petition of Defendant No. 1 for drawing up the final decree was allowed and he was directed to take steps for appointment of a Commissioner, no objection had been taken by the Appellants that the final decree proceedings were not maintainable as the suit lands being Bhogra lands had been vested in the State. On 24-11-1970 Civil Revision No. 328 of 1969 filed by the Appellants was allowed by this Court and a direction was given for fresh measurement by the Commissioner, but by that date also no objection had been taken by the Appellants either in the lower Court or in this Court that the final decree proceedings had become infructuous on account of abolition of the Gounti system and vesting of the suit lands in the State. For the first time such a plea was raised by the Appellants during the pendency of the appeal in the lower appellate Court, although they could have and ought to have raised such a plea much earlier. Hence the present plea of the Defendants that the final decree proceedings have become infructuous in view of the abolition of the Gounti system and vesting of the suit lands in 1956 or 1963 is barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. 10. For the reasons stated above this appeal is dismissed. The judgments and decrees of the lower Courts are confirmed. In the facts and circumstances of this case parties will bear their own costs throughout. Final Result : Dismissed