JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Jodhpur, dated May 12, 1980, whereby the appellant's petition for restitution of conjugal rights and in the alternative for judicial separation or divorce, was dismissed. 2. It appears that the relations between the parties became strained since April, 1964, which resulted into not only in various matrimonial cases between the parties, but they also resulted into various other litigations as well. In the matrimonial cases the present appeal appears to be the fourth inning in this Court. The appellant has been unsuccessful previously in his petitions for restitution of conjugal rights and for judicial separation and in petition for divorce. The first petition for restitution of conjugal rights was dismissed by the trial court on 11-1-1965 and his appeal against that decree of dismissal was also unsuccessful. Thereafter his petition for judicial separation was dismissed by the trial court on 25-8-1969 and his appeal was dismissed by this court on 9-5-1972. The appellant thereafter presented a petition for divorce. That too ended in dismissal on 16-8-1978. His appeal was also dismissed by this Court on 28-3-1979. The appellant further preferred a special appeal. That too was dismissed on 18-1-1980 and it is stated at the Bar by the learned counsel for the parties that the appellant chose to present a petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court against the judgment of this Court passed in special appeal, but his official leave petition was also rejected by the Supreme Court. The appellant had been praying for the reliefs for restitution of conjugal rights or for judicial separation or for divorce on the ground that the respondent Smt. Sushila his wife, has left the company of the appellant without any reasonable excuse and has deserted him. 3. The present petition for restitution of conjugal rights was ailed by the appellant on 24-11-1978, about three months after the dismissal of his petition for divorce. The appellant averred in the petition that within two years prior to the presentation of the petition, the appellant has reformed himself and has completely changed himself. After dismissal of the divorce petition, he received a letter dated 18-10-1978 (Ex. I) from the respondent wherein she expressed her desire for reunion. He sent a reply dated 25-10-1978 (Ex. The appellant averred in the petition that within two years prior to the presentation of the petition, the appellant has reformed himself and has completely changed himself. After dismissal of the divorce petition, he received a letter dated 18-10-1978 (Ex. I) from the respondent wherein she expressed her desire for reunion. He sent a reply dated 25-10-1978 (Ex. 2) to that letter, in which the appellant completely surrendered himself and responded to the desire of the respondent. He expressed that the past events have been forgotten and he may be forgiven. He further received an- other letter dated 5-11-1978 (Ex. 5), in which the respondent suggested the ways and methods whereby the reunion between the two, may be possible. The appellant, thus, having shown that there has been a change of heart and that he repents for the past action and he further offered all possible assurance for a happy life, prayed for a decree for restitution of conjugal rights and in case it is found that the respondent is adamant to live separately and not to join with the appellant, then either a decree for judicial separation or divorce may be passed on the ground of desertion. 4. Reply to the petition was filed by the respondent, in which the grounds on which decree for restitution of conjugal rights or in the alternative decree for judicial separation or for divorce has been sought, were traversed and it was stated that there was no genuine desire on the part of the appellant for reunion. On the contrary she alleged that the appellant's action, conduct and deeds had been such which belie that there has been any change in the appellant or that any reformation has taken place in him. The respondent in her reply referred to the past relations between the parties and the litigations, which have arisen between them. It was alleged that the petition for restitution of conjugal rights is simply a device, so that the appellant may subsequently obtain a decree for divorce. In the end it was prayed that the petition may be dismissed. 5. On the pleadings of the parties as many as seven issues were framed, their English version is given by the learned District Judge as under : 1. In the end it was prayed that the petition may be dismissed. 5. On the pleadings of the parties as many as seven issues were framed, their English version is given by the learned District Judge as under : 1. Whether petitioner has made considerable amendments and reforms in his life and behaviour since two years before the filing of the present petition and is he prepared to assure the wife for good behaviour and to keep her properly ? (Petitioner) 2. Whether the respondent has deserted the petitioner without reasonable cause in the said period and if so, is he entitled to have a restitution of conjugal rights ? (Petitioner) 3. Whether, in alternative, the petitioner is entitled to judicial separation under Section 10 or divorce under Section 13 of the Act on the ground of desertion ? 4. Whether the petition has been filed after considerable delay and as such it is liable to rejection ? 5. Whether husband's petitions under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act have been rejected on similar grounds and as such the present petition is barred on the principle of res judicata ? 6 Whether the respondent is entitled to special costs and if so, in what amount ? 7. To what relief are the parties entitled ? 6. In order to substantiate his case, the appellant has examined himself as P.W. 1 and in rebuttal the respondent examined Jaswant Singh, her son; as D.W. 1, herself as D.W. 2 and Banshilal (D.W. 3). The learned District Judge, after hearing the parties, decided issues Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 against the appellant. Issue No. 4 was decided in 'favour of the appellant and while deciding issue No. 7 he declined to grant any relief. In view of the findings on issues Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 no relief was granted to the appellant. It is in these circumstances that the present appeal has been preferred. 7. I have heard Shri Rewachand, learned counsel for the petitioner- appellant and Shri Govind Mal Mehta, learned counsel for the non-petitioner- respondent and have perused the record of the case carefully. 8. 1, 2, 3 and 5 no relief was granted to the appellant. It is in these circumstances that the present appeal has been preferred. 7. I have heard Shri Rewachand, learned counsel for the petitioner- appellant and Shri Govind Mal Mehta, learned counsel for the non-petitioner- respondent and have perused the record of the case carefully. 8. The disposal of this appeal need not detain so long, for in the previous matrimonial litigations, it has been found against the appellant that it is not the respondent, who had deserted him, but it is the appellant, who had compelled the respondent to live apart from him, that is, there was reasonable excuse for the respondent to live separately from the appellant. It is because of this finding that the appellant had been unsuccessful in the previous matrimonial litigation. The finding as to desertion, has gone against the appellant in the previous petition seeking divorce. The whole question is as to whether any change has taken place in the relations of the parties. For bringing about the change in the relations of the parties, the respondent took the initiative by sending a letter Ex. 1 to the appellant. It appears because of that letter, the appellant took an opportunity to move a fresh application for restitution of conjugal rights. It may be mentioned that the appellant had been cruel to the respondent in the past Criminal litigation had to be resorted to by the respondent, which resulted in the appellant's conviction. When there has been such a past between the parties and when there were allegations of misdemeanour, misbehaviour and misdeeds against the appellant. Whether there has been any change or reform brought about by the appellant in himself, on the basis of which it can be said that there has been an earnest, sincere and bona fide desire on the part of the appellant to keep the respondent with him and that it is the respondent alone, who is in wrong in withdrawing herself from the company of the appellant with out any reasonable excuse. On perusal of the statement of the appellant as well as of the respondent, to me it appears that no such change has occurred in the appellant. The appellant is only paying a lip service, for the change and reformation. In his reply to the letter Ex. On perusal of the statement of the appellant as well as of the respondent, to me it appears that no such change has occurred in the appellant. The appellant is only paying a lip service, for the change and reformation. In his reply to the letter Ex. 1, the appellant has reiterated time and again the alleged blameworthy conduct of the respondent. Not only that, his conduct can be fudged from this obvious fact that he continued to contest the appeal against the decree of dismissal of his petition for divorce Having been unsuccessful in appeal, he continued to fight out special appeal and did not content himself upto that level, but he had an inning ever before the Supreme Court. When a question was put to him in cross-examination as to why he did not withdraw the appeal and why he contested the appeal on merits, he gave a lame excuse that there was no way out except to fight out the appeal, as he was in despair. The appellant's conduct has further been blameworthy, as is evident from the statement, which he made in Civil Misc. Application No. 137/77 on 28-1-1978 wherein he even doubted the chastity of respondent and levelled accusations against her character. He even went on to make a statement that both of them considered each other as their deadly enemy and that on account of litigations during the long period, their relations have become bad and disgusting. The appellant also instituted a suit for possession of a house property against the respondent in the year 1978 in the Court of Civil Judge, Jodhpur, the registration number where of is 70/77. When such have been the actions, deeds and statements of the appellant, it cannot be said that a change had occurred in his relations with the respondent. Unless the respondent feels assured that her living with the appellant would be saved and her life would be happy with him, she cannot be compelled to restore conjugal relations with the appellant. The respondent cannot easily forget the treatment meted out to her by the appellant in the past. The relations between the two had already reached such a stage that it is difficult to retrace and retracing is only possible when there is a change of heart in the appellant expressing recourse over his actions and showing love, devotion and sacrifice towards the respondent. The relations between the two had already reached such a stage that it is difficult to retrace and retracing is only possible when there is a change of heart in the appellant expressing recourse over his actions and showing love, devotion and sacrifice towards the respondent. It is only then that he will be in a position to win the heart of the respondent. The possibility of reunion of the broken hearts in the present strained relations is remote. The parties were allowed to make efforts to come closure and to patch up their differences, but it appears, that no serious efforts were made and the parties have not been able to reconcile and patch up their differences. Thus, in the light of the statement of the appellant himself and in the light of the relations between the parties, in my opinion, the appellant is not entitled to any relief whatsoever. I am in agreement with the findings recorded by the trial court on issues No. 1, 2, 3 and 5. It is true that the husband and wife have been living separately for more than 18 years and their marriage appears irretrievably broken, but for such a state of affairs it is only the appellant, who is to be blamed, and, as such the appellant is not entitled to any relief. Where the marriage is irretrievably broken, it does not furnish any cause of action for seeking relief of divorce. I agree with the view of the learned District Judge in this regard. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant is neither entitled to the decree for restitution of conjugal rights nor for decree of judicial separation or decree for divorce. 9. In the result, I find no force in this appeal, so it is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.Appeal dismissed. *******