Singh, J.- The petitioner is an elector of 7 Ramnagar Asse­mbly Sagment in the West Tripura Parliamentary Constituency. He contested the mid-term Lok Sabha Election held in 1980 from the West Tripura Parliamentary Constituency as a nominee of Congress (I). There were six candidates including the petitioner in the filed. The respondent No. 1, Sri Ajoy Biswas, was a nominee of C.P.I. (M). The date for filing nomination was 8.12.79; the date of scrutiny of the nomination was 11.12.79; and the date of withdrawal was 13.12.79. The polling was held on 6.1.80, and the result of the election was declared on 8.1.80. The main contest was between the petitioner and the respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 secured 1,98,335 votes as against the petitioner who secured 1,42,990 votes. The Respondent No. 1 having secured the highest number of votes, was declared elected. The petitioner filed this election petition challenging the election of the res­ponded No. 1, on various grounds of corrupt practices alleged to have been committed by him. It was also pleaded, inter alia that the respondent no. 1 was disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of the House of People, as he held an office of profit under the Government of Tripura, within the meaning of Article 102 (1) (a) of the Constitution. A number of issues were framed in the petition on the pleadings of the par­ties, but the petitioner has not pressed the other issues except the issue relating to the disqualification of the respondent No. 1. Only one issue as such survived, namely,: "Whether the respondent No. 1 was holding the office of the Accountant-In-Charge under the Agartala Munici­pality on the date of filing his nomination paper? If so, whether he was disqualified from being chosen as a Mem­ber to the House of People, having held an office of profit under the State Government of Tripura, within the mean­ing of Article 102 of the Constitution, as alleged in para 9 of the petition read with paras 14 (a), 14 (b), 14(c), 14(d) 14(e) and 14(f) of the particulars thereof? If the question above is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the petitioner, what relief the petitioner is entitled to? 2. If the question above is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the petitioner, what relief the petitioner is entitled to? 2. It is not disputed that on the date of the filing the nomination paper, the respondent No. 1 was holding the post of the Assistant Accountant and was Accountant-In-Charge under the Agartala Municipality constituted under the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 (Bengal Act XV of 1932), as extended to the State of Tripura and was drawing a monthly salary of Rs. 200-00. On the date of the scrutiny, an objection was raised by the petitioner about the candidature of the respondent No. 1 on the ground of disqualification under Article 102 (1)(a) of the Cons­titution, but the objection was overruled by the Returning Officer. 3. A few facts bearing on the issue above may be stated. The respondent No. 1 entered the service of the Agartala Muni­cipality and held the post carrying the scale of pay of Rs. 80-180/- per month. In 1975 the Commissioners of the Agartala Municipality were under supersession by an order of the State Government made under section 553 of the Municipal Act. The consequence of supersession is provided for in section 554 of the Act. It provides that while the order of supersession was in force, all the Commissioners shall, as from the date of the order, vacate their officers as such Commissioners; and all the powers and duties which may, under the provisions of the Act or any other Act or any Ordinance or any Regulation, or any Rule, bye-laws, order OF Notification or subsidiary legislation made under the provisions of this Act or such other Act or such Ordinance of such Regulation, be exercised and performed by the Chairman and by the Commissioners, shall, during the period of supersession, be exercised by an Administrator appointed by the State Government under section 554 of the Act. The Respondent No. 1, who was under suspension was dismissed from service in the disciplinary proceeding against him, by the Administrator of the Agartala Municipality on 20.12.75. The State Government confirmed the order of dismissal. While the Left Front Govern­ment was in power in the State of Tripura, the respondent No. 1 was re-instated to the post of the Accountant-In-Charge, Agar­tala Municipality on 6th May, 1978, with immediate effect by the Administrator, Agartala Municipality. 4. The State Government confirmed the order of dismissal. While the Left Front Govern­ment was in power in the State of Tripura, the respondent No. 1 was re-instated to the post of the Accountant-In-Charge, Agar­tala Municipality on 6th May, 1978, with immediate effect by the Administrator, Agartala Municipality. 4. Proviso (II) to Section 66 (2) of the Municipal Act provides that no appointment carrying a monthly salary of Rs. 200.00 or a salary rising by periodical increments to more than 200.00 rupees shall be created without the sanction of the State Government, and every nomination to, and dismissal from, any such nomination shall be subject to confirmation by the State Government. As the respondent No. 1 was drawing a monthly salary of more than 200-00 rupees in 1975, he was dis­missed from service with the confirmation of the State Govern­ment. Subsequently, the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tripura in his letter No. F1 (6)-LSJ/77, dated 6th May, 1978, conveyed to the Administrator, Agartala Municipality, decision of the Government for cancellation of the order of confirmation of the dismissal communicated to him on 19.12.75. Consequent upon the cancellation of the order of confirmation aforesaid, the Administrator, Agartala Municipality, reinstated him to the post of the Accountant-in-Charge, Agartala Municipality with imme­diate effect, directing that the period between the period of dismissal and the re instatement would be treated as period spent on duty for all purposes. By another office order of the same date, the Administrator held that his suspension stood cancelled and the period of suspension would be treated as on duty. On these facts, the petitioner raised the plea that respondent No. 1 was holding the office of profit under the State Government. 5. Evidence was Id on behalf of the petitioner in support of the above plea by examining himself as P.W.I and the Exe­cutive Officer of the Agartala Municipality, Sri Phanibhusan Bhattacharjee as P.W.2. Respondent No. 1 did not examine any witness in his defence. Before discussing the cases cited at the Bar on the issue above, it may be pertinent to examine the nature and character of the Agartala Municipality. 6. Respondent No. 1 did not examine any witness in his defence. Before discussing the cases cited at the Bar on the issue above, it may be pertinent to examine the nature and character of the Agartala Municipality. 6. The Act provides that there shall be establishment for each Municipality n body of Commissioners having authority over the municipality and consisting of such members or Commissi­oners, not being more than twenty nor less than six as the State Government may specify in the notification constituting the municipality. Such Commissioners shall be a body corporate by the name of the Municipal Commissioners of the place by ref­erence to which the Municipality is known, having perpetual succession and a common seal, and by that name shall sue and be sued. The Municipality consists of the elected Commissio­ners. A Chairman is elected by the Commissioner from amongst the Commissioners within 30 days from the date of publication of the result of the general election of the Commissioners in the Municipality failing which the State Government has the power to appoint one of the Commissioners to be Chairman. A Vice-Chairman is also elected from amongst the Commissi­oners, Except as otherwise provided, the Chairman is empow­ered with certain limitations to transact the business connected with the Act and exercise all the powers vested in the Comm­issioners under the Act. The Commissioners are to hold office for Four years commencing from the date of the first meeting of the newely formed body of Commissioners after a general selection of Commissioners in the Municipality at which a quorum is present. An elected Chairman or Vice-Chairman may at any time be removed from his office by a resolution of the Commissioners as laid down in section 61(2) and (3) of the Act. The State Government may remove an elected Commissioner on certain grounds set out in section 62 of the Act. 7. Section 66 which is relevant for the purpose is in foll-swlag terms : "66. APPOINTMENT OF SUBORDINATE OFFICERS-(1) The Commissioners at a meeting may, subject to the pro­visions of this Act and the rules made thereunder from time to time, determine what officers and what servants of the Commissioners are necessary for the municipality and may fix the salaries and allowances to be paid and granted to such officers and servants. APPOINTMENT OF SUBORDINATE OFFICERS-(1) The Commissioners at a meeting may, subject to the pro­visions of this Act and the rules made thereunder from time to time, determine what officers and what servants of the Commissioners are necessary for the municipality and may fix the salaries and allowances to be paid and granted to such officers and servants. (2) Subject to the scale of establishment approved by the Commissioners under sub-section (1), the Chairman shall have power to appoint such persons as he may think fit, and from time to time to remove such persons and appoint ethers in their place : Provided as follows : (i) a person shall not be appointed to an office carrying a monthly salary of more than fifty rupees or a salary rising by periodical increments to more than fifty rupees without the sanction of the Commissioners at a meeting, and an officer or servant whose post carries a monthly salary of more than twenty rupees shall not be dismissed without such sanction ; (ii) no appointment carrying a monthly salary of more than two hundred rupees or a salary rising by periodical increments to more than two hundred rupees shall b: created without the sanction of the State Government, and every nomination to, and dismissal from, any such appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the State Government; (iii) no person holding an office carrying a monthly salary of one hundred rupees or more shall be dismissed unless such dismissal is sanctioned by a resolution of the Commissioners passed at a special meeting called for the purpose and, except with the consent of the State Government unless such resolution has been supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of Com­missioners holding office for the time being. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), the creation of and nomination to or suspension, removal or dismissal from, the post of Executive Officer shall, irrespective of the salary assigned to the post, be subject to confirmation by the State Government.' 8. Besides the officers and the servants mentioned above all or any of the officers mentioned in section 67 may be appoin­ted by the Commissioners. Besides the officers and the servants mentioned above all or any of the officers mentioned in section 67 may be appoin­ted by the Commissioners. In certain circumstances, the State Government may declare that the Municipality shall have an Executive Officer for such period as may be specified in the Notification and such Executive Officer shall be appointed by the State Government and shall be paid out of the Municipal fund such salary and allowances as may from time to time be fixed by the State Government. Section 93 provides that as soon as may be after the first day of April in every year not later than such date as may be fixed by the State Government, the Com­missioner shall submit to the State Government a report on the administration of the Municipality during the proceeding year in such form and with such detail as the State Government may direct, and a copy of the report shall also be submitted by the Commissioners to the District Magistrate. The Commissioners of a Municipality may acquire and hold property within or with­out the limits of the Municipality, and all property within the Municipality of the nature specified in section 95, other than property maintained by the Central Government or any other Local Authority, are vested in and belonged to the Commissioners, and are under their direct management and control. By section 102 of the Act, the Commissioners are empowered to purchase, take on lease or otherwise acquire any land for the purposes of the said Act, and may sell, lease, exchange or otherwise dispose of any land not required for such purposes. They are also em­powered to enter into and perform any contract necessary for the purposes of the Act. A fund called the Municipal fund is constituted for each Municipality, and all sums received by or on behalf of the Commissioners under this Act or otherwise, and the balance, if any, standing at the credit of the Municipal fund of the Municipality at the commencement of the Act, are credited to the said fund. The purposes to which the Municipal fund is applicable are enumerated in Section 108 of the Act. The purposes to which the Municipal fund is applicable are enumerated in Section 108 of the Act. If any work is estimated to cost above ten thousand rupees, the State Government may require the plans and estimates of such works to be submitted for its approval, or for the approval of any servant of the Government before such work, in such form as it may prescribe. 9. The Commissioners are empowered subject to the provi­sions of the Act to impose within the limits of the Municipa­lity rates, taxes, tolls and fees or any of them under section 123 of the Act, and make assessment of the rates on the ann­ual value of the holdings under section 128 of the Act. Pow­ers are conferred to impose taxes, on the owner of every carri­age, horse and other animals mentioned in the schedule to the Act, kept or used in the ordinary course of business within or which is let for hire within or without the Municipality, and is used in the ordinary course of business within it, at such rate as may be fixed. Power has also been given to impose taxes on profession, trade and callings specified in section 182 of the Act. There are other provisions for raising fund for the Municipality by way of charging fee for registration etc. In short, various provisions are made to raise funds for the Municipality for carrying out the purposes of the Act. 10. A survey of the Act leads to the irresistible conclusion that the Agartala Municipality is a 'local authority' within the meaning of the expression defined in clause (31) of section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. It appears to me that it is not necessary to consider the validity or otherwise of the Govern­ment's decision conveyed to the Administrator, Agartala Munici­pality, in May, 1978, for cancellation of the order of confirmation of the dismissal of the petitioner from service and his re­instatement to the post by the Administrator consequent upon such cancellation. His past history is irrelevant for determina­tion of the question posted in this case. What is material is whether on the date of the nomination on 8.12.79, the respon­dent No. 1 was holding the office of profit under the State Government. 11. His past history is irrelevant for determina­tion of the question posted in this case. What is material is whether on the date of the nomination on 8.12.79, the respon­dent No. 1 was holding the office of profit under the State Government. 11. A reading of section 66 of the Act reproduced above makes it abundantly clear that the appointment of persons to the category of post held by the respondent No. 1 is made by the Commissioners of Municipality, though the appointment is subject to confirmation by the State Government. He is an officer of the Commissioners. Section 68 of the Act expressly provides that such officers and servants of the Commissioners shall be subordinate to the Executive officer appointed by the Commi­ssioners. Though certain powers are conferred on the State Government for general control on such Municipal bodies, the Municipality under the Act does not perform its function for the Government. 12. The Supreme Court in the case of Sarya Kanta Roy vs. Imamul Hai Khan, AIR 1975 SC 1053 , had occasion to consider a similar question. In that case, under the Bihar and Orissa Mining Settlement Act, 1920, a Board called the Mines Board of Health was established to provide for the control and sanitation of an area within which persons employed in the mine reside and for the prevention therein of the outbreak and spread of epidemic diseases. The Board is a corporate body hav­ing perpetual succession and a common seal with power to acquire and hold property The Chairman of the Board is to be appointed by the State Government from amongst the mem­bers of the Board. The Board can also impose taxes like latrine taxes and also make yearly assessment. There are certain powers conferred on the State Government under the Act but they are no more than powers conferred on the State Governments in respect of various local bodies. The respondent was appointed by the Government as a Chairman of the Jharia Mines Board of Health. His election to the Legislative Assembly of Bihar State was questioned on the ground that he held office of profit under the State Government, within the meaning of Article 191 (1)(a) of the Constitution. The respondent was appointed by the Government as a Chairman of the Jharia Mines Board of Health. His election to the Legislative Assembly of Bihar State was questioned on the ground that he held office of profit under the State Government, within the meaning of Article 191 (1)(a) of the Constitution. Repelling the argument of the unsuccessful candidate who challenged the election of the respondent therein, the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that he was appointed Chairman of the Board by the State Government would not make him a person holding an office of profit under the State Government. The Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision in Shivamurthy Swami vs. Agadi Sanganna Andanappa (1971) (3) SCC 870), wherein the Court pointed out : "The office in question must have been held under a Govt. and to that some pay, salary, emoluments or allowance is atta­ched...... The Court in several decisions had laid down the tests for Siding out whether an office in question is an office under a Government and whether it is an office of profit. Those tests are : (1) Whether the Government makes the appointment; (2) Whether the Government has the right to remove or dismiss the holder; (3) whether the Government pays the remuneration, (4) what are the functions of the holder? Does he perform them for the Government, and (5) Does the Government exer­cise any control over the performance of those functions?" 13. The Supreme Court proceeded and observed at p. 1504: "Here again it is to be pointed out that the Government does not pay the remuneration nor does the holder per­form his functions for the Government. To hold other­wise would be to hold that loci-l bodies like Municipal Council perform their functions for the Government though in one sense the functions they perform are Governmental functions." (underlining supplied) 14. Payment of remuneration of the Accountant of the Agartala Municipality is not from out of the Government revenues but his salaries and allowances are paid from the Municipal fund. He does not perform his functions for the State Government. Payment of remuneration of the Accountant of the Agartala Municipality is not from out of the Government revenues but his salaries and allowances are paid from the Municipal fund. He does not perform his functions for the State Government. The observation made by the Supreme Court in Abdul Shakur vs. Rikhabchand, AIR 1958 SC 52 at page 55, which the ;Supreme Court approved in Surya Kant a (supra), is instructive : "The power of the Government to appoint a person to an office of profit or to continue him in that office or revoke his appointment at their discretion and payment from out of Government revenues are important factors in determining whether that person is holding an office of profit under the Government." Here appointment of the respondent No. 1 as Accountant-in-charge under the Municipality is not vested in the Govern­ment nor has the Government power to appoint him to such an office or to continue him in that office or revoke his appoint­ment at its discretion. Appointment of persons to such cate­gory of posts and their dismissal are vested in the Commissio­ners of the Municipality, though it is subject to the confirma­tion by the State Government. 15. The Supreme Court in D. R. Gurushan-Thappa vs. Abdul Khuddus Anwar and others, AIR 1969 SC 144 pointed out the distinction between the Article 58(2), and Article 66(4) of the Cons­titution, on one hand and Articles 101(1) and 191(1)(a) of the Con­stitution on the other. The distinction has much significance in exa­mining the content of the Article 102(1)(a). It was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Surya Kanta (supra). In Gurushan Thappa (supra), it was observed : "Thus, in the case of election as President or Vice-President, the disqualification arises even if the candidate is holding an office of profit under a local or any other authority under the control of the Central Government or the State Government, whereas, in the case of a candi­date for election as member of any of the Legislatures, no such disqualification is laid down by the Constitution if the office of profit is held under a local or any other authority under the control of the Governments and not direct under any of the Governments. This clearly indi­cates that in the case of eligibility for election as a member of a Legislature, the holding of an office of profit under a corporate body like a local authority does not bring about disqualification even if that local authority be under the control of the Government. The mere control of the Government over the authority having the power to appoint, dismiss or control the working of the officer employed by such authority does not dis­qualify that officer from being a candidate for election as a member of the Legislature, in the manner in which such disqualification comes into existence for being elec­ted as the President or the Vice President." (Underlining supplied) 16. Undoubtedly the office held by the respondent No. 1 is under the Agartala Municipality. The holding of an office of profit under it does not bring about a disqualification even if that local authority be under the control of the Government. The mere control of the Government over the Agartala Muni­cipality having the power to appoint, dismiss or control the working of the officer employed by Municipality does not dis­qualify Respondent 1 from being a candidate for election as a member of the House of People. The control exercised by the State Government over the Agartala Municipality does not make the Municipality an organ of the Government nor does it make the respondent No. 1 a person holding an office of profit under the Government. 17. In D.P. Gurushan Thappa (supra), the respondent whose election was challenged, was holding the post of the Superinten­dent under a Company and was working as such in 1967 when the election was held 100% of the shares of the Company was held by Mysore Government. 17. In D.P. Gurushan Thappa (supra), the respondent whose election was challenged, was holding the post of the Superinten­dent under a Company and was working as such in 1967 when the election was held 100% of the shares of the Company was held by Mysore Government. The Supreme Court held that the mere fact that the Government had control over the Managing Director and other Directors as well and had also power of issuing directions relating to the working of the company could not lead to the inference that every employee of the Company was under the control of the Government ; the power of appoi­ntment and dismissal of the respondent was vested in the Mana­ging Director and not in the Government, direction for day-to day work to be performed by the respondent could only be issued by the Managing Director and not by the Government and the indirect control of the Government which might arise because of the power of the Government to appoint the Mana­ging Director and to issue direction to the company in its general working would not bring respondent directly under the control of the Government. 18. In the instant case also, there is general control by the State Government over the Agartala Municipality as envisaged in the Act. But the day-today work to be performed by the respondent No. 1 is under the control of the Executive Officer and the Commissioners of the Municipality. The Agartala Muni­cipality cannot be treated as either being equivalent to the Government as to be the agent of the Government. 19. Counsel for the petitioner strongly relied on the decisi­on of the Supreme Court in Madhukar G.E. Pankakar vs. Jaswant Chobbildas Rajani, AIR 1976 SC 2283 , in support of his contention that the respondent No. 1 held office of profit under the Government of Tripura. The Supreme Court surveyed its earlier decisions bearing on this question, but it has not laid down a new test. It re-affirmed the principles laid down in the earlier cases. In that case, the returned candidate was a Medi­cal practitioner working as panel doctor under Employees' State Insurance Scheme. His election as President of the Municipal Council under the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965, was challenged on the ground that he held 'office of profit' under the Government. It was observed at page 2290 : "After all, all law is a means to an end. His election as President of the Municipal Council under the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965, was challenged on the ground that he held 'office of profit' under the Government. It was observed at page 2290 : "After all, all law is a means to an end. What is the lagislative and here in disqualifying holders of 'office of profit under Government'? Obviously, to avoid a conflict between duty and interest, to cut out the misuse of official position to advance private benefit and to avert the like­lihood of influencing government to promote personal advan­tage. So this is the mischief to be suppressed." The Supreme Court approved the observation of the Bombay High Court in Deorao vs. Keshav, AIR 1958 Bombay 314 on this point : "The object of this provision is to secure independence of the members of the legislature and to ensure that the Legislature does not contain persons, who have received favours or benefits from the Executive and who, consequ­ently, being under an obligation to the executive, might be amenable to its influence. Putting it differently, the provision appears to have been made in order to eliminate or reduce the risk of conflict between duty and self, in­terest amongst the members of the Legislature. This object must always be borne in mind interpreting Art. 191.” 20. The Supreme Court held that though it was fair to hold that the Insurance Medical Practitioner was not a free-lancer but subject to duties, obligations, control and rates of remun­eration under the overall supervision and powers of Government, he was held not functioning under the Government in the ple­nary sense implied in electoral disqualification and the court pointed out that after all, the means, i.e. the ban on candidature, most have a substantial link with the end viz., the possible misuse of position as Insurance Medical Practitioner in doing his duties as Municipal President. The court concluded that ii was not possible in the circumstances to hold that these doctors, though subject to responsibilities, eligible to remuneration and liable to removal-all with a Governmental savour-could squarely ' fall under the expression 'holding OFFICE OF PROFIT' under the Government. 21. In the instant case, there is not even indirect control over the respondent No. 1 by the Government, nor do I find any substantial link between the ban on his candidature with the end pointed out by the Supreme Court in the above case. 21. In the instant case, there is not even indirect control over the respondent No. 1 by the Government, nor do I find any substantial link between the ban on his candidature with the end pointed out by the Supreme Court in the above case. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to Rule 12 of the Agartala Municipal Employees' (Appointment and Conditions of services) Rules, 1971, which, inter-alia, prohibits the employees from participating in the work of any political party. It provides in clause (n) of Rule 12 that an incumbent is liable to be removed or dismissed from service, if be is found guilty of the charge of active participation in the work of any political party. Counsel submits that the Rule is intended to conserve undivided attention upon their duties as such employees and to avert the likelihood of influencing, Go­vernment to promote personal advance, when the political party to which they belong is in the seat of power. As the object of Article 102(1)(a) of the Constitution is to secure independence of the members of the Legislature and to ensure that Legislature does not contain persons, who have received favours or benefits from the Executive, it was urged that section 66 (2) (ii) of the Municipal Act and Rule 12 (n) of the Employees Rules, should be so construed as imposing a ban on the candidature. 23. The contention has no substance. The Rule simply lays down a rule of conduct for an employee of the Municipality, and it does not entail disqualification on his candidature. The decision of the Supreme Court in Manohar Nathusao Samarth vs. Marotrao and ors., AIR 1979 SC 1084 , is a complete answer to such a contention. In that case, the Supreme Court was concerned with the scope of Regulation 25 of the Life Insura­nce Corporation of India (Staff) Regulation, 1960, which put an embargo on taking part in Municipal elections, save with the permission of the Chairman. In that case, the Supreme Court was concerned with the scope of Regulation 25 of the Life Insura­nce Corporation of India (Staff) Regulation, 1960, which put an embargo on taking part in Municipal elections, save with the permission of the Chairman. The Supreme Court held that the ineligibility must flow from a specific provision of law designed to deny eligibility or to lay down disqualification; if a Rule of conduct makes it undesirable, objectionable, or punishable for an employee to participate in elections to a local authority, it is a distortion, even an exaggeration out of proportion, of that provision to extract out of it a prohibition of a citizen's fran­chise to be member in the shape of a disqualification from be­coming a member of a local authority and the thrust of Regulation 25 is disciplinary and not disqualificatory. 24. For the foregoing reasons, I hold that the first Res­pondent did not hold an office of profit under the Government of Tripura on the date of filing his nomination paper, and as such he was not disqualified for being chosen as, and for be­ing, a member of the House of People, within the meaning of Article 102 (1) (a) of the Constitution. In the result, the elec­tion petition is dismissed. The first respondent will be entitled to his costs, which I fix at Rs. 500.00. The other respondent bear their respective costs.