JUDGMENT T. R. Handa, J.—The Government Food Inspector Kangra at Dharamsala filed a complaint under Section 7 read with Section 16 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act against the respondents Sarvshri Kehar Singh and Ram Singh in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Kangra. The complaint was filed on 11-2-1981 on which date the learned Magistrate summoned both the respondents vide his cryptic order reading. "11-2-81 Present:—Sh. Bidhi Chand Food inspector for the State. It be registered/Accused be summoned for 5-3-81. The complaint was subsequently transferred to the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate at Dharamsala in pursuance of the order dated 2-5-1981 recorded by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, reading as under :— "2-5-81 Present ;—Shri Bidhi Chand Food Inspector for the State. Accused Kehar Singh & Ram Singh in person. One of the accused named Kehar Singh is a juvenile offender of the age of 14 years. Therefore, this court has no jurisdiction to try this accused Kehar Singh under Section 27 of the Cr. P. C. Accordingly the case is submitted to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kangra at Dharamsala for favour of trial. Accused persons are directed to put in appearnce before the learned C. J. M. Dharamsala on 26-6-1981. Case file be sent immediately to the learned C, J. M, Dharamsala, Announced, 2-5-1981. After such transfer, the respondents put in appearance before the Chief Judicial Magistrate for the first time on 21-8-1^81 when the Chief Judicial Magistrate passed the following order :— "21-8-81 Present :—Accused on bail with Csl. He wants to contest the case. He is directed to furnish bail bond in the sum of Rs. 5000/- with one surety in the like amount. The bail bond has been furnished. The same has been attested & accepted by me. For prosecution evidence to come up on 25-9-81. Sd/- C. J. M." Three prosecution witnesses were summoned for 25-9-1981 in terms of the above order of 21-8-1981. As per report appearing on the record, all these P.Ws. were served. On 25-9-1981 however, the Chief Judicial Magistrate without recording the statements of the complainant or any of the prosecution witness summoned by him, proceeded to record the statements of the respondents after recording the following order :— "25-9-81 Present :— Both the ace. on bail. Accused Kehar Singh intends to confess his guilt to the offence His statement be recorded. On 25-9-1981 however, the Chief Judicial Magistrate without recording the statements of the complainant or any of the prosecution witness summoned by him, proceeded to record the statements of the respondents after recording the following order :— "25-9-81 Present :— Both the ace. on bail. Accused Kehar Singh intends to confess his guilt to the offence His statement be recorded. Sd/- C. J. M." After this the statements of both the respondents were recorded the English transliterations of which are as under :— "Statement of Kehar Singh, accused, aged 14 years. Without Oath. Stated that I plead guilty to the offence under Section 16 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and place myself at the mercy of the court. I had carried the aforesaid milk of my own accord. My father named Ram Singh, accused No. 2 had no hand whatsoever in this offence. Since I am a minor and adulteration in the milk is of negligible margin so I may be pardoned. I shall never repeat such an act m future and shall live like a good citizen. "Statement of Ram Singh s/o Sh. Rasila, aged 40 years, accused Without Oath. I do not know as to when and for what purpose Kehar Singh had carried the milk. Neither I had sent him nor have any knowledge in this regard.” On the basis of the aforesaid statements of the respondents the Chief Judicial Magistrate vide his order dated 25-9-1981 acquitted Ram Singh respondent. The other respondent Kehar Singh was convicted under Section 16 (1) (a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act on his own plea of guilty and sentenced to imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- 2. It appears that this order dated 25-9-1981 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate came to the notice of my Lord the Chief Justice who expressed the view that the matter required interference on the judicial side by way of exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court. My Lord the Chief Justice therefore -exercise of his powers of revision suo moto issued notices to the respondents to show cause why order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate dated 25-9-1981 be not revised. This is how Criminal Revision No. 104 of 1981 came to be registered in this Court. 3. My Lord the Chief Justice therefore -exercise of his powers of revision suo moto issued notices to the respondents to show cause why order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate dated 25-9-1981 be not revised. This is how Criminal Revision No. 104 of 1981 came to be registered in this Court. 3. The State has also after obtaining leave of this Court filed an appeal against the aforesaid order in so far as it operates to acquit Ram Singh respondent. The appeal of the State is registered as Criminal Appeal No 11 of 1982. This order shall dispose of both the Revision as also the Appeal mentioned above. 4. In fairness to the learned counsel for the respondents it may be stated that at the very outset they expressed their inability to support either the impugned order or the procedure adopted by the trial courts in passing such an order. 5. The complaint in this case was presented against the respondents by the Food Inspector before the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate on 11-2-1981. Now the Magistrate could summon the respondents on such complaint only under Section 204 Cr. P. C. (hereinafter referred to as the Code). The relevant provision is found in sub-section (1) of Section 204 of the Code which reads— "204 (1) If in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for proceeding, and the case appears to be— (a) a summons-case, he shall issue his summons for the attendance of the accused, or (b) a warrant-case, he may issue a warrant, or, if he thinks fit, a summons, for causing the accused to be brought or to appear at a certain time before such Magistrate or (if he has no jurisdiction himself) some other Magistrate having jurisdiction." A bare look at the language of this provision would show that the Magistrate is enjoined upon to issue process for compelling the attendance of an accused against whom a complaint has been filed only if in his opinion there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Not only that he has to further form his opinion whether the case against the accused is a summons case or a warrant case. Such opinion can be formed by the Magistrate only on the basis of the material appearing on the record. Not only that he has to further form his opinion whether the case against the accused is a summons case or a warrant case. Such opinion can be formed by the Magistrate only on the basis of the material appearing on the record. This material is supposed to comprise of the allegations made in the complaint and the statements on oath, if any, of the complainant and his witnesses recorded under Section 200 of the Code. It, therefore, necessarily follows that an order summoning the accused is not to be passed as a matter of course nor the passing of such an order depends upon the whim, fancy or caprice of the Magistrate. The same can be passed only after the Magistrate forms the requisite opinion by applying his mind to the material placed before him. It must be remembered that in so far as the accused is concerned such an order is of far reaching consequence. It not only abridges his liberty which is so precious in a democratic State like ours but is also likely to result in his mental torture besides causing a drain on his purse. Such an order should not, therefore, be lightly passed in a mechanical manner. 6. In the instant case a bare look into the contents of the complaint made by the Food Inspector would show that in so far as Ram Singh respondent is concerned there is absolutely no allegation against him on the basis of which the Magistrate could form his opinion that there was sufficient ground for proceeding against this respondent. All that the complaint mentions is that the Food Inspector on 11-2-1981 at Kangra purchased 660 Mi of buffalo milk from Kehar Singh respondent as sample for the purposes of analysis, that the sample was purchased and dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter called as the Food Act) and the Rules framed thereunder and that on being analysed by the Public Analyst, the same was found adulterated. There is no averment in the complaint if Ram Singh respondent was in any manner connected with the milk out of which the sample was taken or if he had anything to do with the sale of the sample. There is no averment in the complaint if Ram Singh respondent was in any manner connected with the milk out of which the sample was taken or if he had anything to do with the sale of the sample. All the documents prepared at the time taking of the sample and which are attached with the complaint, namely Notice on Form VI under Rule 12*, Form containing Report and Evidence taken in course of sampling, Receipt of the price paid for the sample, Form VH under Rule 17 (Memorandum to Public Analyst) as also the Report of the Public Analyst* all mention the name of Kehar Singh respondent alone as the vendor from whom the sample was taken. After the report of the Public Analyst was received, a copy of that as required under section 13 (2) of the Food Act was forwarded to Kehar Singh respondent only. In these circumstances the order dated 11-2-1981 passed by the Magistrate summoning both the respondents, was apparently passed without applying his mind to the allegations made in the complaint and the documents filed along with it and thus is vitiated in law. 7. The next order dated 2-M981 passed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate wherein he observed that he had no jurisdiction to try the case since one of the respondents was a juvenile is also misconceived and does not reflect the correct position in law. There is no provision either in the Cede or in the Food Act which lays down that a Magistrate who is otherwise competent to take cognizance of an offence shall have no jurisdiction to try the same simply because the accused persons or any one of them happens to be a juvenile. The only relevant provision is found in Section 27 of the Code which succeeds Section 26. Section 26 prescribes the Courts by which the offences under the Indian Penal Code as also under any other law can be tried. Section 27 is a special provision which deals with jurisdiction in the case of juveniles. It reads :— "27. The only relevant provision is found in Section 27 of the Code which succeeds Section 26. Section 26 prescribes the Courts by which the offences under the Indian Penal Code as also under any other law can be tried. Section 27 is a special provision which deals with jurisdiction in the case of juveniles. It reads :— "27. Any offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life, committed by any person who at the date when he appears or is brought before the Court is under the age of sixteen years, may be tried by the Court of a Chief Judicial Magistrate, or by any Court specially empowered under the Children Act, 1960, or any other law for the time being in force providing for the treatment, training and rehabilitation of youthful offenders." A bare reading of the language of the provision reproduced above shows that it is not intended to take away the jurisdiction of any Court to try an offence which jurisdiction is otherwise lawfully conferred on it under the preceding Section 26 of the Code or any other law for the time being in force. Section 27 is only an enabling provision. The object in enacting this provision was obviously to confer jurisdiction on certain Courts mentioned therein which jurisdiction such Courts did not otherwise enjoy in terms of Section 26 of the Code. To illustrate, it may be noticed that there are certain offences which in terms of section 26 read with First Schedule of the Code are triable exclusively by a Court of Session irrespective of the age of the offender. Some of these offences are punishable with death/or life imprisonment while there are others which are punishable with lesser punishment. It is for the trial of this second category of offences, namely, such offences as are not punishable with death or imprisonment for life that Section 27 confers concurrent jurisdiction on the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate and other Courts mentioned therein where the offender at the time of his first appearance in the Court is under 16 years of age. Reading the provisions of Section 26 and Section 27 together, the only harmonious construction that can be placed on these provisions is that an offence may be tried by the Court prescribed for its trial under Section 26 of the Code and also by the Court on which special jurisdiction has been conferred under Section 27 of the Code. The view taken by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate that he had no jurisdiction to try the case against the respondents since one of them happened to be a juvenile, therefore, cannot be supported. 8. Coming next to the order recorded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 21-8-1981, the same also reflects complete lack of application of mind by the Chief Judicial Magistrate both to the facts of the case also the law applicable. A perusal of this order shows that only one respondent was present before the Chief Judicial Magistrate on that date and this respondent expressed his desire to contest the case suggesting thereby that the Chief Judicial Magistrate must have asked the plea of this respondent. In the first place a mere look at the complaint would have shown that two persons, namely, Kehar Singh and Ram Singh had been arrayed as accused in the complaint. The Chief Judicial Magistrate did not care to know about the other accused who was absent He simply called. ,upon the respondent present to furnish bail bond in the sum of Rs. 5,000/- with one surety in the like amount. There is only one bail bond which finds place on the record and which was furnished by Kehar Singh respondent and was attested and accepted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 21-8-1981. It is thus apparent that Ram Singh respondent was not present on 21-8-1981 and no notice of his absence was taken by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. He straightaway after the respondent present before him had expressed his desire to contest the case, directed the case to be adjourned to 25-9-1981 for prosecution evidence. This only shows that he did not care to look at the complaint. 9. He straightaway after the respondent present before him had expressed his desire to contest the case, directed the case to be adjourned to 25-9-1981 for prosecution evidence. This only shows that he did not care to look at the complaint. 9. On 25-9-1981 both the respondents put in appearance before the Chief Judicial Magistrate but as already stated instead of recording the evidence of prosecution witnesses who had been summoned and served for that date he straightaway proceeded to record the statements of the respondents and disposed of the complaint on the strength of such statements alone. This shows that the Magistrate was completely ignorant of the procedure which is required to be followed m the trial of warrant cases instituted otherwise than on police report Such procedure is found in Part B of Chapter XIX of the Code which commences with Section 244. This section provides that in a warrant case instituted otherwise than on a police report the Magistrate shall when the accused appears or is brought before him, proceed to hear the prosecution and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution. If after taking such evidence the Magistrate considers for reasons to be recorded that no case against the accused is made out which if unrebutted would warrant his conviction the Magistrate is required to discharge the accused under Section 245 of the Code. If on the other hand the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under the above Chapter and which the Magistrate is competent to try, he is required to (rime in writing a charge against the accused and to explain the same to him It is only after such charge is so framed and explained that the accused can be called upon to plead guilty. The Magistrate has no right or jurisdiction to forthwith require the accused on his first appearance and without recording the prosecution evidence, to state his plea and on his admission of guilt to convict him. 10. All the proceedings conducted in this case right from the day when the complaint was presented till its disposal are thus in complete violation of the procedure prescribed under the Code and are thus vitiated. 10. All the proceedings conducted in this case right from the day when the complaint was presented till its disposal are thus in complete violation of the procedure prescribed under the Code and are thus vitiated. For the same reason the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate convicting Kehar Singh respondent and acquitting Ram Singh respondent is also vitiated. We would accordingly quash the impugned order dated 45-9-1981 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate acquitting Ram Singh respondent and convicting Kehar Singh respondent as also the order dated 11-2-1981 passed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate directing the summoning of the respondents. The case is remanded K to the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Kangra with the directions to proceed in the matter afresh in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code and as discussed above. Both the Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 1982 and Criminal Revision No. 104 of 1981 are disposed of accordingly. Criminal Order accordingly.