G. N. Sridharan v. Union of India, represented by Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi
1982-10-08
S.NAINAR SUNDARAM
body1982
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER.- The petitioner in these two writ petitions is one and the same and the respondents are also the same in both the writ petitions. The petitioner is a Class I Officer in the Life Insurance Corporation of India hereinafter referred to as the Corporation. The prayer in W. P. No. 3972 of 1978 is for the issue of a certiorari calling for the records relating to the order of the third respondent — Executive Director (Personnal), Life Insurance Corporation of India, in Ref Personnel 1/B/ZD/365, dated 23rd September, 1978 and quash the same in so far as it affects the petitioner. The prayer in W.P. No. 3973 of 1978 is for the issue of a writ of certiorari fied mandamus, calling for the records relating to the order of the second respondent — Life Insurance Corporation of India, represented by its Chairman, dated 22nd June, 1976 communicated in the order of the third represented in Circular. No. 3543/ASP/76, dated 23rd June, 1976 and quash” the same in so far as it affects the petitioner and direct the second respondent to pay bonus to the petitioner for the years 1975-76, 1976-77 and 1977-78, in accordance with Life Insurance Corporation (Bonus to Class I Officers) Instructions 1970, hereinafter referred to as the Instructions 1970, dated 16th September, 1970 as amended. 2. At the outset, it must be pointed out that the controversy in both the writ petitions relates to the claim for bonus For Class I Officers of the Corporation. For the purpose of appreciating and assessing the grievance of the petitioner and his attack on the two proceedings subject-matter in the two writ petitions as, it becomes necessary to briefly trace what transpired earlier and that too, with reference to the statute concerned and the Regulations that came to be passed there under. The statute is the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The Constitution of the Corporation has been done under section 4 (1) of the Act and one of the members who go to constitute the corporation shall be appointed by the Central Government to be the Chairman thereof. Section 49 enables the Corporation to make regulations and such regulations may provide for the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the Corporation. This is found from clauses (b) and (bb) of sub-section (2) of section 49 of the Act.
Section 49 enables the Corporation to make regulations and such regulations may provide for the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the Corporation. This is found from clauses (b) and (bb) of sub-section (2) of section 49 of the Act. The said power was. exercised and the result is the making of the regulation which bears the nomenclature, Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, hereinafter referred to as the Regulations. Regulation 4 gives the power to the Chairman to issue instructions and directions from time to time, as may be necessary to give effect to, and carry out, the provisions of the Regulations. Regulation 58 governs the payment of bonus. Admittedly, Regulation 58 has undergone amendments from time to time. Until 1967, Regulation 58 enabled the Corporation to pay non-profit sharing bonus to its employees belonging to Classes III and IV. By notification dated 11th February, 1967, Regulation 58 was substituted and the substituted regulation read as follows: “The Corporation may, subject to such directions as the Central Government may, issue from time to time, grant non-profit sharing bonus to its employees”. By notification dated 7th August, 1971, Regulation 58 was again substituted and the substituted regulation read as follows: “The Corporation may, subject to such directions as the Central Government may issue, grant non-profit sharing bonus to its employees and the payment thereof, including conditions of eligibility for the bonus, shall be regulated by instructions issued by the Chairman from time to time”. 3. A plain reading of Regulation 58, as substituted above, conveys the meaning that there are two sets of powers with regard to bonus. The Corporation may subject to such directions as the Central. Government may issue, grant non-profit sharing bonus to its employees. This is the first part of Regulation 58. On the basis of the grant, the payment thereof including the conditions of eligibility for bonus shall be regulated by instructions issued by the Chairman from time to time. This is the second part of Regulation 58. Regulation 58 which was anterior to the substitution by notification dated 7th August, 1971, spoke only about the grant of bonus by the Corporation to its employees, subject to such directions that the Central Government may issue from time to time.
This is the second part of Regulation 58. Regulation 58 which was anterior to the substitution by notification dated 7th August, 1971, spoke only about the grant of bonus by the Corporation to its employees, subject to such directions that the Central Government may issue from time to time. It is not disputed that the Chairman has the power to issue instructions or directions to give effect to the grant of the bonus by the Corporation to its employees, under the Regulations and this he is enabled by Regulation 4 of the Regulations. The second part of Regulation 58, as substituted by notification dated 7th August, 1971, has merely exemplified the above position. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not put forth a proposition that the Chairman, by himself, could grant bonus to the employees of the Corporation and that his instructions could over-ride the terms of the grant, if any, made by the Corporation. The admitted case of the parties is that there were negotiations between the Federation of Life Insurance Corporation of India Class I Officers’ Associations and the second respondent for the grant of bonus from time to time, from 1964-65 onwards and those negotiations matured themselves into agreements and the Chairman issued intructions to implement them and non-profit sharing bonus was paid to all Class I Officers in accordance with the agreements and the instructions which followed. The last agreement between the Federation and the second respondent was the one dated 14th August, 1970. We are not concerned with the other terms of the settlement except the one that relates to the grant of bonus. Learned counsel for the respondents has furnished me a copy of the terms of settlement arrived at on 14th August, 1970, and Clause IV thereof provides for payment of bonus at the rate of one and a half months’ basic pay as on 31st March, of the year to which the bonus relates subject to a maximum bonus of Rs. 1,200. Clause V thereof speaks about the effective date of revision as 1st April,1969, and Clause VI lays down the duration of the settlement as four years, i.e., upto 31st March, 1973. This settlement was followed up by the Instructions issued by the Chairman on 16th September, 1970, bearing the nomenclature, Life Insurance Corporation (Bonus to Class I Officers) Instructions 1970.
Clause V thereof speaks about the effective date of revision as 1st April,1969, and Clause VI lays down the duration of the settlement as four years, i.e., upto 31st March, 1973. This settlement was followed up by the Instructions issued by the Chairman on 16th September, 1970, bearing the nomenclature, Life Insurance Corporation (Bonus to Class I Officers) Instructions 1970. Clause 2 of Instructions 1970 provided as follows: “These instructions shall apply in respect of grant of bonus for the financial year commencing on 1st April, 1969, and the subsequent financial years.” The set of expressions “and the subsequent financial years” is sought to be construed in two ways, one by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the other by the learned counsel for the respondents. ‘I will presently advert to this aspect. 4. Bonus to Class I Officers was disbursed for the years 1969-70, 1970-71, 1971-72, 1972-73, 1973-74 and 1974-75. There could not be any dispute with regard to the sanction for the disbursement of bonus upto the year 1972-73. Learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the terms of settlement dated 14th August, 1970 followed by Instructions 1970 governed such disbursement and that the disbursement of bonus for the years 1973-74 and 1974-75 was not pursuant to Instructions 1970, because the period stipulated under the settlement dated 14th August, 1970, on the basis of which alone Instructions 1970 came to be issued, lapsed with the end of the year 1972-73. Learned counsel for the petitioner has got his own construction to be put on the set of expressions “and the subsequent financial years” occurring in clause 2 of Instructions 1970 and would say that the sanction and instructions would govern the disbursement of bonus for the period subsequent on 1972-73. Reserving the resolution of the controversy to a subsequent stage, I shall complete, the narration of the events which led to the passing of the impugned proceedings. 5. Neither the Payment of Bonus Act nor the Industrial Disputes Act could apply to Class I Officers of the Corporation.
Reserving the resolution of the controversy to a subsequent stage, I shall complete, the narration of the events which led to the passing of the impugned proceedings. 5. Neither the Payment of Bonus Act nor the Industrial Disputes Act could apply to Class I Officers of the Corporation. There was a circular dated 26th September, 1975, issued by the third respondent, by which he informed all the officers of the Corporation that the question of payment of bonus was being reviewed in the light of the Ordinance dated 25th September, 1975, and hence, no bonus to employees should be paid under the existing provisions until further instructions. So far as Class III and Class IV employees are concerned, their right to bonus was governed by two settlements, one dated 24th January, 1974, and the other dated 6th February, 1974. In March, 1976, the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Settlements) Act, 1976 was enacted, purporting to rescind the two settlements dated 24th January, 1974 and 6th February, 1974 with reference to Class III and Class IV employees of the Corporation. The Chairman of the Corporation passed an order on 22nd June, 1976, on the question of payment of bonus to the employees of the Corporation, which order was reproduced in the communication of the third respondent dated 23rd June, 1976, which is the subject-matter of challenge in W. P, No. 3973 of 1978. It is worthwhile to have the entire communication extracted as follows, even though the attack is on the clauses relating to bonus to class I Officers of the Corporation. “Life Insurance Corporation of India (CENTRAL OFFICE) Ref: Personnel. A. ‘Yogakshema’ Jeevan Beema Marg, Bombay-400002. June 23, 1976. To All the Officers of the Corporation. Ref: — Payment of Bonus to the Employees of the Corporation “By our circular Ref: Personnel — A. No. 35 38/ASP/76 dated 22nd March, 1976, we had advised all the offices of the Corporations that until further instructions. no payment by way of bonus should be made to any employee irrespective of the class to which he belongs. In this connection, Chairman has issued an order, Which is reproduced below. i) The Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, has been amended by Act XXIII of 1976 retrospectively from 25th September, 1975.
no payment by way of bonus should be made to any employee irrespective of the class to which he belongs. In this connection, Chairman has issued an order, Which is reproduced below. i) The Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, has been amended by Act XXIII of 1976 retrospectively from 25th September, 1975. In terms of the provisions of section 32 of the said Act, nothing in the said Act shall apply to the employees employed by the Life Insurance Corporation of India. The employees of the Life Insurance Corporation of India are, therefore ineligible to bonus under the said Act. The Central Government however, have decided that such employees shall be paid an amount ex gratia in lieu of bonus, as may be determined by the Central Government taking into account the wage levels, the financial circumstances and other relevant factors. ii) In view of the above, no employee of the Corporation shall be eligible for bonus for the financial year 1975-76 and thereafter under the following agreements/ settlements/ administrative instructions which are hereby replaced/rescinded: — 1) Agreement dated 25th September, 1970, between the National Federation of Insurance Field Workers of India and the Life Insurance Corporation of India; (2) Administrative instructions called the Life Insurance Corporation (Bonus to Development Officers) Instructions, 1970 as amended from time to time. (3) Circulars issued by the Corporation from time to time in pursuance of the aforesaid agreement dated 25th September, 1970, and the Life Insurance Corporation (Bonus to Development Officers) Instructions, 1970; (4) Agreement dated 14th August, 1980, between the Federation of Life Insurance Corporation of India Class I Officers’ Associations and the Executive Director (Personnel) Life Insurance Corporation of India; (5) Life Insurance Corporation (Bonus to Class I Officers) Instructions 1970 dated 16th September, 1970, as amended from time to time; (6) Administrative instructions issued from time to time in pursuance of the agreement dated 14th August, 1970, between the Federation of Life Insurance Corporation of India Class I Officers’ Associations and the Executive Director (Personnel) Life Insurance Corporation of India, and the Life Insurance Corporation (Bonus to Class I Officers) Instructions, 1970.
(iii) As regards Class III and Class IV employees, under the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Settlements), Act, 1976, the provisions in the settlements dated 24th January, 1974 and 6th February, 1974, with the Class III and Class IV Employees’ Associations shall not have any force or effect and the provisions of the said settlements are set aside in so far as they relate to the payment of an annual cash bonus. (iv) All the administrative instructions issued in pursuance of the said settlements dated 24th January, 1974 and 6th February, 1974, therefore, stand hereby repealed/ rescinded. Dated at Bombay, this 22nd day of June, 1976. Sd. (K B. Pradhan) Chairman 2. As regards ex gratia payment in lieu of bonus, appropriate instructions will be issued in due course. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR.” 6. The Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976, was challenged before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court struck down the said Act as illegal and void. The decision of the Supreme Court is reported in M. M. Pathak v. Union of India1. The said decision did not touch the claim for bonus by Class I officers of the Corporation. They are stated to have carried on their agitation through the Federation and it is stated that two class I Officers and the Federation jointly filed a writ petition in the High Court of Delhi in Civil Writ No. 587 of 1978, challenging the circular dated ?6th September,1975, as well as the order dated 23rd June.1976, and to command the second respondent to continue to pay the bonus to all Class I Officers of the Corporation on the basis of the Bonus Instructions, 1970 as amended, for the years, 1975-1976, 1976-1977 and 1977-1978 as well as for subsequent financial years, While the said writ petition was pending in the High Court of Delhi, the third respondent issued an order dated 23rd September, 1978, which is the subject-matter of challenge in W. P. No. 3972 of 1978 and the said order reads follows: “Life Insurance Corporation of India Central Office Ref: Personnel B/ZD/365. 23rd September, 1978 TO ALL ZONAL MANAGERS AND OFFICERS IN CHARGE OF DIVNS: Ref: Payment of ex gratia amount in lieu of bonus to Class I and Class II Officers for the years 1975-76, 1976-1977.
23rd September, 1978 TO ALL ZONAL MANAGERS AND OFFICERS IN CHARGE OF DIVNS: Ref: Payment of ex gratia amount in lieu of bonus to Class I and Class II Officers for the years 1975-76, 1976-1977. “It has been decided to make an ex gratia payment in lieu of bonus to the Class I and Class II Officers of the Life Insurance Corporation of India for the years 1975-1976 and 1976-1977 at the rate of 8.1/3% of their salary (Basic pay+Spl. pay if any +D. A.+Addl. allowance). The ex gratia amount will be paid only to those officers who were in receipt of salary pay+DA+ DA upto Rs. 1,600 p. m. Further, the maximum salary (PAY + DA+DA) for the purpose of calculation of the ex gratia payment will be deemed to be Rs. 750 per month. We may clarify that the ex gratia payment may be calculated on the basis of salary drawn by an officer in each month during the period from 1st April, 1975 to 31st March, 1977 in order to determine whether in a particular, month, the officer would have satisfied the eligibility criteria for receiving the payment. For example, if an officer had drawn a salary (Pay+DA+DA of Rs. 1,600 or less in a particular month he would be eligible for the ex gratia payment for that particular month, but if the same officer had drawn a salary in excess of Rs. 1,600 in any other month during the period in question, he would not be eligible for the payment for the months in which he had drawn a salary in excess of Rs. 1,600. In the case of employees who opted for fixation in class I cadre from a date after 1st April, 1975, the bonus as per the above instructions shall be calculated till the date of fixation, on the pay they were actually drawing plus notional admissible DA and AA for that pay as applicable to Class I, provided such pay plus DA and AA did not exceed Rs. 1,600 in any particular month. The ex gratia payment may also be made to those, who had retired or died during the period in question, if they would have been otherwise, eligible for such payment. Officers who had resigned and/or whose services were terminated as a disciplinary measure will not receive this payment.
1,600 in any particular month. The ex gratia payment may also be made to those, who had retired or died during the period in question, if they would have been otherwise, eligible for such payment. Officers who had resigned and/or whose services were terminated as a disciplinary measure will not receive this payment. You are now requested to arrange for the payment at an early date. Please send us a list of officers who have been paid this ex gratia amount, specifying the amount paid to individual officers. Please acknowledge receipt. Sd/Executive Director. P.S.: Ex-gratia payment shall not be made for the period of apprenticeship or training on stipend but shall include service on production.” 7. It is now found that the High Court of Delhi has disposed of Civil Writ No. 587 of 1978 and the writ petition was partly allowed, declaring that the circular dated 23rd June, 1976, would not operate for the year 1975-76, but would operate from the year 1976-77 onwards, subject to later circular or orders. How far the parties could take advantage of the decision of the High Court of Delhi, will also be the subject-matter of discussion that would follow hereafter. 8. The major issue is one that is raised in W. P. No. 3973 of 1978. I first propose to deal with the same, With regard to the claim for bonus for the year 1975-76, practically it has lost its significance because, subsequent to the judgment of the High Court of Delhi in Civil Writ No. 587 of 1978 and while the writ petitions were pending, the Corporation, by circular Ref: Personnel/B/ZD/389 dated 8th March, 1979, decided to make the payment of bonus to Class I Officers of the Corporation in accordance with the terms of Instructions 1970. The sheet anchor of the claim for bonus for class I Officers of the Corporation, the petitioner being one of them, is the settlement dated 14th August, 1970, which was followed up by Instructions 1970 of the Chairman. The terms of the Settlement are unambiguous. They could be effective only from 1st April, 1969 and upto 31st March, 1973. This settlement cannot have the sanctity of a settlement which is arrived at, either, in the course of the conciliation proceeding or otherwise than in the course of the conciliation proceeding so as to attract the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.
They could be effective only from 1st April, 1969 and upto 31st March, 1973. This settlement cannot have the sanctity of a settlement which is arrived at, either, in the course of the conciliation proceeding or otherwise than in the course of the conciliation proceeding so as to attract the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Class I Officers of the Corporation fall outside the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. Mr. P. Chidambaram, learned counsel for the petitioner, wants to elevate the settlement dated 14th August, 1970, as a grant within the meaning of Regulation 58 of the Regulations. Mr. J. Kanagaraj, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, of course, would not concede this position. But, the fact remains that there was grant of bonus by the Corporation and merely because it was preceded by a settlement, it cannot be stated that there was no grant at all within the meaning of Regulation 58. We are more concerned with the scope of the grant and the period to which the grant could enure. As stated above, the settlement stipulated a period of four years from 1st April, 1969, upto 31st March, 1973. It is common case of both the sides that the Chairman by himself cannot make a grant of bonus within the meaning of Regulation 58. The grant has to emanate from the Corporation and the power of the Chairman is limited to give effect to and carry out the same and to regulate the payment thereof, including, the conditions of eligibility for the bonus. It is only for this purpose, the Chairman issued instructions from time to time. If the settlement of 14th August, 1970, is accepted to be a grant within the meaning of Regulation 58, then Instructions 1970 could not enlarge either the scope of the period of the grant. Mr. P. Chidambaram, learned counsel for the petitioner, wants to take advantage of the set of expressions “and the subsequent financial years” occurring in clause 2 of Instructions 1970 and would state that there is no limitation with regard to the period for payment of bonus to Class I Officers of the Corporation, and he wants the Corporation to adhere to and honour its obligations under Instructions 1970 for the years subsequent to 31st March, 1973. As against this Mr.
As against this Mr. J. Kanagaraj, learned counsel for the respondents, would submit that once it is admitted that the Chairman by himself has no power to make a grant of bonus and his instructions could only fall in line with the terms of the grant, it is not possible to put up a construction on the above set of expressions as the learned counsel for the petitioner would desire. Learned counsel for the respondents would further submit that such a construction would lead to results which would become irreconcilable not only with the factual position but also with the legal implications. Learned counsel for the respondents hence wants this Court to construe the set of expressions “and the subsequent financial years” in clause II of Instructions 1970 as meaning, and as referable to, the period set out in the settlement dated 14th August, 1970, namely, 1st April, 1969 to 31st March, 1973, “subsequent financial years”, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, could only mean the subsequent financial years after the lapse of the financial year commencing on 1st April, 1969, and this alone would be in accordance with the terms of the settlement, assuming that it could be equated to a grant. In my view, this is the only and the proper way to construe clause 2 of Instructions 1970. If the grant is that expressed in the settlement of 14th August, 1970, definitely, the Chairman, by his Instructions, cannot enlarge the scope of the grant. Hence, I am obliged to reject the plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner to give any sanction for bonus or any period of currency there for other than the one derivable from the settlement of 15th August, 1970. 9. Mr. P. Chidambaram, learned counsel for the petitioner, would then submit that even after 31st March, 1973, the Corporation did pay bonus to its Class I Officers for the period 1973-75 and 1974-75 and this is referable only to Instructions 1970. Any right or claim by Class I Officers of the Corporation could have its source only pursuant to the grant under Regulation 58.
Any right or claim by Class I Officers of the Corporation could have its source only pursuant to the grant under Regulation 58. Unfortunately for them, the Payment of Bonus Act does not come to their rescue and equally so, they are not in a position to agitate for such rights under the Industrial Disputes Act Realising this difficulty, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the disbursement of bonus for the years 1973-74 and 1974-75 must have had the backing of a grant by the Corporation. In my view, this is a submission made out of desperation. No plea has been put forth in the affidavit filed by the petitioner, expressing such a stand. The mere fact that bonus was disbursed to Class I Officers of the Corporation for the above two years concerned, will not provide them with a lever which would have a legal basis to claim bonus as of right. The grant or the sanction for bonus enured only upto 31st March, 1973. Hence Instructions 1970 lost its force after 31st March, 1973. It is redundant to rescind or cancel either the settlement dated 14th August, 1970, which has partaken the nature of grant or Instructions 1970, which has no independent force other than the one derivable from the settlement or grant of 14th August, 1970. Merely because the impugned proceedings of the date 22/23rd June, 1976, came to be issued, purporting to rescind the settlement and Instructions 1970, it could not mean that the grant and Instructions, 1970, in fact survived beyond 31st March, 1973. The disbursement of bonus after 31st Match, 1973, could not have had the backing of the settlement or grant of 14th August, 1970, and Instructions 1970. Learned counsel for the respondents would submit that payment of bonus for the years 1973-74 and 1974-75 was the result of independent subsequant negotiations, which he does not want to equate to grant. This is quite possible. Class I Officers of the Corporation must thank their stars that they had the benefit of payment of bonus even after 31st March, 1973, for two years. By the impugned proceedings dated 22/23rd June, 1976, the position was made clear with regard to non-eligibility of Class I Officers of the Corporation for bonus and it is true that this has afforded the provocation for filing the writ.
By the impugned proceedings dated 22/23rd June, 1976, the position was made clear with regard to non-eligibility of Class I Officers of the Corporation for bonus and it is true that this has afforded the provocation for filing the writ. Assuming the said Officers were paid bonus for the years 1973-74 and 1974-75 pursuant to independent grants, as pleaded by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Central Government seemed to have decided to discontinue the same for future years and this decision has been acted upon, and it cannot be stated that the Corporation can ignore such directions because, under Regulation 58, the grant of bonus by the Corporation will have to be subject to the directions of the Central Government. 10. Another line of submission which the learned counsel for the petitioner put forth before me is that the expression ‘may’ occurring in Regulation 58 must be read as ‘shall’ and would state that the Corporation shall grant bonus to its Class I Officers, within the meaning of Regulation 58. Regulation 58 is only an enabling provision. There is no warrant for giving to the expression ‘may’ any meaning other than the ordinary one. If it is done otherwise, that would practically be re-enacting the regulation and casting an obligation on the (Corporation, which it does not bear under any law. Further, such a construction would lead to anomalous results and it can be stated that the Corporation is bound to grant bonus, irrespective and in spite of instructions by the Central Government, otherwise. 11.
Further, such a construction would lead to anomalous results and it can be stated that the Corporation is bound to grant bonus, irrespective and in spite of instructions by the Central Government, otherwise. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner would pursue his submission and would state that so far as Class III and Class IV employees of the Corporation are concerned, the impugned proceedings in W. P. No. 3973 of 1978 took note of the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Settlements) Act, 1978 and sought to ignore the settlements dated 24th January, 1974, and 6th February, 1974, for payment of bonus to them, this enactment was the subject-matter of challenge before the Supreme Court in M. M. Pathak v. Union of India1, and the Supreme Court struck down the said Act as violative of Article 31 of the Constitution of India, and the policy behind the impugned proceedings of the date 22nd/ 23rd June, 1976, was to deny bonus to all classes of employees of the Corporation and since the claims of Class III and Class IV employees of the Corporation have survived after the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above, it would be discriminatory to deny any bonus to class I Officers of the Corporation, pursuant to the proceedings now impugned. In this behalf, learned counsel for the petitioner says that the action of the Corporation is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. First of all, it must be pointed out that the Supreme Court was dealing with two settlements of the date 21st January, 1974 and 6th February, 1974, entered into by the Corporation with its Class III and Class IV employees and the settlements did have a binding force under section 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. I do not think, in the instant case, it would be proper to adopt and follow the reasonings which weighed with the Supreme Court while arriving at the decision in the said case. Here, we are concerned, with Class I Officers of the Corporation. They stand on a different footing. Their rights and claims, if any, for bonus are referable to and derivable from the grant under Regulation 58.
Here, we are concerned, with Class I Officers of the Corporation. They stand on a different footing. Their rights and claims, if any, for bonus are referable to and derivable from the grant under Regulation 58. It is true, by the impugned proceedings dated 22nd/23rd June, 1976 the subject-matter of challenge in W. P. No. 3973 of 1978, the entire questions of bonus to the employees of the Corporation was dealt with and the specific stand of the Corporation was expressed, denying bonus to all of them. The denial of bonus to class III and class IV employees of the Corporation has now been struck down by the Supreme Court in the case referred to above. On that ground, it cannot be stated that the denial of bonus to Class I Officers of the Corporation cannot also survive and must be ignored and their claims must be countenanced, even though there is no legal and factual basis to support the same. It would be useful to advert to an observation of the Supreme Court, occurring in the decision referred to above, of course, in a different context, where it is stated that: “It is the, settled practice of the Court to decide no more than what is absolutely necessary for the decision of a case.” Equally, it is not argued before me that the decision of the Supreme Court would squarely enure to the benefit of Class I Officers of the Corporation. Class I Officers are far above Class III and Class IV employees of the Corporation and it is not a case of equals being treated unequally. When the impugned proceedings dated 22nd/ 23rd June, 1976, were issued, it cannot be stated that there was an omnibus consideration without reference to classification of the employees on the question of payment of bonus. A reading of the said proceedings, extracted supra, does not leave any such impression in the mind of this Court. May be, there had been a policy behind the said proceedings. But on the simple ground that the policy did not survive as against Class III and Class IV employees of the Corporation, it cannot be taken advantage of to strike down the other decisions with reference to class I Officers of the Corporation. They belong to different classes and categories.
But on the simple ground that the policy did not survive as against Class III and Class IV employees of the Corporation, it cannot be taken advantage of to strike down the other decisions with reference to class I Officers of the Corporation. They belong to different classes and categories. Hence, in my view, it is a misnomer to refer to and rely on Article 14 of the Constitution of India to spell out any discrimination in the instant case. 12. The only other aspect which remains is the decision of the High Court of Delhi in Civil Writ No. 587 of 1978. A copy of the judgment has been furnished to me. I find that the petitioner could not, and in fact his learned counsel did not place any reliance on the reasonings of the High Court of Delhi except to take advantage of the relief, which was partly given when the Court said that the impugned circular dated 23rd June, 1976, would not operate for the year 1975-76 but would operate from the year 1976-1977 onwards. The reason for giving even this much of relief is not the one adopted by the learned counsel for the petitioner for sustaining the plea with regard to the claim for bonus for the periods after 1975-76. As stated above, the claim for bonus for the year 1975-76 has been settled by the Corporation by circular dated 8th March, 1979. For all the above reasons, I do not find a warrant to contenance the contentions put forth to support the prayer in W. P. No. 2973 of 1978. 13. Now, coming to the grievance of the petitioner with regard to the order of the third respondent dated 23rd September, 1978, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the said order is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India because, it discriminates between one Class I Officer and another Class I Officer since by the said order, the basis for calculation of the ex gratia payment in lieu of bonus has been defined as “salary (Basic pay, Special pay, if any, D. A. Adj. Alice)” and all Class I Officers who received a salary in excess of Rs. 1,600 per month are excluded.
Alice)” and all Class I Officers who received a salary in excess of Rs. 1,600 per month are excluded. Learned counsel for the petitioner would state that the consequence is that about 94 per cent, of the 4,100 Class I Officers in the Corporation will stand excluded. Learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that under the impugned order, for the purpose of calculation the maximum salary shall be deemed to be Rs. 750 per month and if this is so, no reason why a class I Officer drawing more than Rs. 1,600 per month should be denied bonus because, even in such a case, the deemed maximum salary of Rs. 750 could be applied and a class I Officer drawing a salary of more than Rs. 1,600 per month could also be paid bonus at the same rate. Learned counsel for the petitioner characterises the impugned order as irrational and discriminatory and states that it brings about a classification within a class. As against this, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that what was sought to be disbursed was payment of ex gratia amount in lieu of bonus and classification, according to him, can always be made between persons receiving higher salary and and those receiving lesser salary and it would be a well-recognized clssification even in the matter of payment of bonus. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the following observation occurring in the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of J.& K. v. T.N.Khosa1. “Classification, therefore, must be truly founded on substantial differences which distinguish persons grouped together from those left out of the group and such differential attributes must bear a just and rational relation to the object sought to be achieved” By virtue of the impugned order dated 23rd September, 1978, it is true that Class I Officers drawing salary in excess of Rs. 1,600 per month are not eligible for the ex gratia payment in lieu of bonus. This payment cannot be insisted as a matter of right. It is the result of a policy decision of the Corporation. The rationale behind it is not new and one adopted for the first time. This has been the rationale for the payment of bonus earlier. 14.
This payment cannot be insisted as a matter of right. It is the result of a policy decision of the Corporation. The rationale behind it is not new and one adopted for the first time. This has been the rationale for the payment of bonus earlier. 14. It is not disputed that the earlier settlement dated 7th August, 1966, provided for payment of bonus to Class I Officers whose pay did not exceed Rs. 1,600 per month and there was a further provision that bonus shall be paid on a basic pay of Rs. 750 per month and this ratio has been followed up for the subsequent years until the settlement of the date 14th August, 1970. It is true that the Payment of Bonus Act does not apply to the case on hand, but, yet to find out the rationale behind the impugned order dated 23rd September, 1978, it will be extraneous to refer to the definition of an employee under section 2 (13) of the said Act. It defines an “employee” as a person employed on a salary or wage not exceeding one thousand and six hundred rupees per mensem. If this aspect has weighed with the Corporation it is not possible to characterise the said action as completely irrational. Obviously the object is to benefit those who draw a lesser salary and who, normally, would have the benefit of the Payment of Bonus Act, but for the fact that the application of the provisions of the said Act has been excluded to the employees of the Corporation. Learned counsel for the respondents draws my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in S. Kodar v. State of Kerala2, where it has been held that classification of dealers on the basis of their respective turnover for the purpose of graded imposition so long as it is based on differential criteria relevant to the legislative object to be achieved is not unconstitutional. In my opinion the said ratio can be applied to the instant case. Viewed in the above light, I am not able to appreciate and sustain the grievances of the petitioner with reference to the order dated 23rd September, 1978, subject-matter of challenge in W.P. No. 3972 of 1978. This obliges me to dismiss both the writ petitions. 15. Accordingly, both these writ petitions will stand dismissed.
Viewed in the above light, I am not able to appreciate and sustain the grievances of the petitioner with reference to the order dated 23rd September, 1978, subject-matter of challenge in W.P. No. 3972 of 1978. This obliges me to dismiss both the writ petitions. 15. Accordingly, both these writ petitions will stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs, S. J. ----- Writ petitions dismissed.