JUDGMENT R.C. Shrivastava, J. The suit out of which this Second Appeal has arisen was instituted by Mst. Gopibai on 21-4-1962 against the respondents. She had executed a registered sale-deed dated 28-10-1961, which purported to be for a consideration of Rs.3500, in favour of the respondent-defendant No. 1 Motiram in respect of a house situated in Gwalior town. That sale-deed was signed by the respondents 3 and 4 (defendants 3 and 4, respectively) as attesting witnesses. It was alleged that the sale-deed was without consideration and the defendants got it executed by practising fraud and misrepresentation upon the plaintiff. It was also pleaded that, afterwards, the plaintiff came to know from her brother's son Chandmal that, on the same date, the respondent No. 3 (defendant No. 3) had also executed a document whereby he guaranteed that the house belonged to the vendor Mst. Gopibai, the plaintiff, that the respondent No. 2 (defendant No. 2) had also executed a rent-deed whereby she purported to take the house on lease from the respondent No. 1 (defendant No. 1) after execution of the sale-deed and that an agreement to reconvey the house was also executed by the respondent No. 1 (defendant No. 1) in her (plaintiff's) favour. The plaintiff pleaded that documents were all fraudulent and sham. On these allegations, she claimed a declaration that the sale-deed dated 28-10-1961 and those documents were void and inoperative. In the alternative, she prayed that, if she was found to be liable to make any payment, she may be declared to be the owner of the house on payment thereof. To be more exact, it appears to be proper to reproduce the relief clause, contained in the last paragraph of the plaint. It reads as follows. The suit was resisted by the respondents 1, 3 and 4 (defendants 1, 3 and 4, respectively). They denied the plaint allegation that the sale-deed was got executed without consideration by practising fraud and misrepresentation. It was also denied that the agreement of reconveyance executed by the respondent No. 1 (defendant No. 1), the document of guarantee executed by the respondent No. 3 (defendant No. 3) and the rent-deed executed by the respondent No. 2 (defendant No. 2) were fraudulent and sham. According to them, the transactions were all genuine and the plaintiff's case was false and vexatious. According to them, the transactions were all genuine and the plaintiff's case was false and vexatious. The respondent No. 2 (defendant No. 2) did not put in appearance and the suit was proceeded with ex parte against her. The original plaintiff Mst. Gopibai having died during pendency of the suit, the present appellant Kamalabai, who claimed under a will, was substituted as her legal representative. 4 The trial Court negatived the plaint allegations and dismissed the suit with costs. First appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed. The first appellate Court concurred with the views taken by the trial Court. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred this second appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the alternative relief claimed in the last paragraph of the plaint, already reproduced above, amounts to claim for specific performance of the agreement dated 28-10-1961. This contention of the learned counsel is fallacious and ill conceived. Even the existence or validity of the agreement was not admitted in the plaint. That being so, there could be no question of making an alternative claim for specific performance thereof and, in my opinion, there is nothing in the plaint or, in the alternative relief claimed therein to show or suggest that the appellants were, in the alternative, making a claim for specific performance of the agreement. The learned counsel for the appellant has drawn my attention to the facts that, during pendency of the suit, an application dated 2-1-1963 for granting that relief was filed on behalf of the plaintiff and a notice dated 18-10-1963 (Ex. P-38) was also given on her behalf to the respondent No. 1 demanding specific performance of the agreement dated 28-10-1961 and argued that, in view thereof and also in view of the fact that the agreement to reconvey the house was admitted by the respondent No. 1 (defendant No. 1) in his written statement, the appellant is entitled to get a decree against the respondent No. 1 for specific performance thereof. He has placed reliance on decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad and others AIR 1951 SC 177 . I have carefully perused the application dated 2-1-1963. He has placed reliance on decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad and others AIR 1951 SC 177 . I have carefully perused the application dated 2-1-1963. The relevant portion thereof reads as follows: It is significant that the plaintiff was not admitting her liability to pay Rs.3500/- as considcration for obtaining reconveyance of the house and she was not prepared to give up the pleas raised by her in the plaint. She wanted to fight out the suit and, on failure of her pleas, to obtain reconveyance of the house on payment of Rs.3500/-. According to the contents of paragraph No. 5 of the application, she expressed her willingness to deposit the amount in Court only if the other party (i. e., the defendant No. 1) expressed his Razamandi but not otherwise. The offer made by her in the application was dearly a conditional one and the conditions advanced by her were not justified. Notice dated 18-10-1963 (Ex. P-38) has also been perused by me. That was also conditional, as is dear from the last sentence, which reads as follows.- That is to say, the plaintiff was not prepared to admit the validity of the sale deed, the agreement to reconvey and other documents executed on 28-10-1961. The application and the notice could not, in any case, take the place or assume the character of plaint and, despite the application and the notice, the fact remained that speciric performance of the agreement was not claimed in the plaint. In the case of Messrs Trojan and Co. v. R.M.N.N. Nagappa Chettiar AIR 1953 SC 235 , no prayer was made to amend the plaint so as to incorporate in it an alternative case, which the plaintiff could have made. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows. It is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows. It is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. Without an amendment of the plaint, the Court was not entitled to grant the relief not asked for and no prayer was ever made to amend the plaint so as to incorporate in it an alternative case." The same principle was stated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Firm Shrinivas Ram Kumar (supra) also in the following words. The rule undoubtedly is that the Court cannot grant relief to the plaintiff on a case for which there was no foundation in the pleadings and which the other side was not called upon or had an opportunity to meet." Then, their Lordships proceeded to observe as follows. But when the alternative case, which the plaintiff could have made, was not only admitted by the defendant in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in giving the plaintiff a decree upon the case which the defendant himself makes. A demand of the plaintiff based on the defendant's own plea cannot possibly be regarded with surprise by the latter and no question of adducing evidence on these facts would arise when they were expressly admitted by the defendant in his pleadings. In such circumstances, when no injustice can possibly result to the defendant, it may not be proper to drive the plaintiff to a separate suit. These observations were made with reference to the facts and circumstances of that case. As observed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Khumansingh v. Dhansingh 1971 RN 351. It is a trite proposition that a case is an authority for what it actually decides and the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not to be intended to be expositions of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The facts and circumstances of the case of Finn Srinivas Ram Kumar (supra) were entirely different from those of the present case. The facts and circumstances of the case of Finn Srinivas Ram Kumar (supra) were entirely different from those of the present case. In any case, in view of the above-quoted observations in the case of Firm Srinivas Ram Kumar (supra), in order to justify a plaintiff's demand for an alternative relief on the defendant's own plea, ( i ) the alternative case should be such as the plaintiff could have made, (ii) the plaintiff's demand should not be such as may possibly be regarded with surprise by the defendant, (iii) the question of adducing evidence should not be involved, and (iv) no injustice should possibly result to the defendant. In the present case, the plaintiff was not entitled to claim the relief of specific performance of the agreement in the alternative, she having challenged the existence or validity of the agreement itself. In the case of Prem Raj v. The D.L.F. Housing and Construction {Private) Ltd. and another AIR 1968 SC 1355 . the sole question for decision before their Lordships was whether a plaintiff suing for declaration that a certain contract against him was void and inoperative, having been obtained by undue influence, can in the same suit, in the alternative, ask for the relief of specific performance of the same contract. The question was answered by their Lordships in the negative. Referring to section 37 of the Specific Relief Act 1877, by which this case is also governed, their Lordships observed as follows: It is expressly provided by this section that a plaintiff suing for specific performance of the contract can alternatively sue for the rescission of the contract but the converse is not provided. It is therefore not open to a plaintiff to sue for rescission of the agreement and in the alternative sue for specific performance. Section 35 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 states the principles upon which the rescission of a contract may be adjudged. But there is no provision in this section or any other section of the Act that a plaintiff suing for rescission of the agreement may sue in the alternative for specific performance. In our opinion, the omission is deliberate and the intention of the Act is that no such alternative prayer is open to the plaintiff. In the present case also, the plaintiff claimed declaration that the agreement was void and inoperative. In our opinion, the omission is deliberate and the intention of the Act is that no such alternative prayer is open to the plaintiff. In the present case also, the plaintiff claimed declaration that the agreement was void and inoperative. Its validity was challenged by her on the ground that it was fraudulent and sham. The fact that, in the case of Prem Raj (supra), validity of agreement was challenged on the ground of undue influence; whereas, in the present case, the challenge is on the allegation of fraud does not make any practical difference because the principle remains the same. In view of the said decision of the Supreme Court, it is dear that a plaintiff challenging validity of an agreement and suing for declaring it to be void and inoperative cannot, in the same suit, in the alternative, ask for specific performance of the same agreement. Apart from that, a suit for specific performance of an agreement stands on a footing and cause of action different from a suit for declaring the agreement to be void and inoperative and defences to a claim for specific performance are also different from those in a suit for declaring the agreement to be void and inoperative. The defendant No. 1, against whom decree for specific performance of the agreement is now asked for, had no occasion to meet the claim for specific performance, to plead defences against that claim and to adduce evidence to defend against that claim. That being so, he is now being taken by surprise and grave prejudice and injustice would be caused to him if the appellants' demand for granting the relief of specific performance of the agreement is acceded to. Under these circumstances, the above-quoted observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Firm Shrinivas Ram Kumar (supra), with regard to decreeing of alternative claim on the defendant's plea can be of no help to the appellants in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It follows that, in the present suit, the appellants cannot, in any case, get a decree for specific performance of the agreement. During the pendency of this appeal, on 3-7-1982, an application was filed on behalf of the appellants for amendment of the plaint by adding the relief of specific performance of the agreement at the end of the plaint. It follows that, in the present suit, the appellants cannot, in any case, get a decree for specific performance of the agreement. During the pendency of this appeal, on 3-7-1982, an application was filed on behalf of the appellants for amendment of the plaint by adding the relief of specific performance of the agreement at the end of the plaint. The application has been vehemently opposed by the opposite party. The circumstances obtaining in the case are that the suit was instituted as long ago as on 21-4-1962, i.e., more than 20 years before presentation of the amendment-application. The existence or validity of the agreement was not admitted but, instead, challenged in the plaint. Despite the defence contention as to existence of the agreement, the plaintiff or the appellant never before thought of applying for such an amendment and went on relying upon the pleas, that the sale-deed dated 28-10-1961 was got executed without consideration by practising fraud and misrepresentation and that the other documents, including the agreement, executed on the same date were all fraudulent and sham. The suit was disposed of by the trial Court on 19-2-1969 and the first appeal was disposed of on 2-1-1973. This second appeal was filed on 23-4-1973. The above-mentioned pleas relied upon by the plaintiff were found by both the lower Courts to be false and the findings in that respect being those of facts based on appreciation of the evidence on record could not be interfered with in second appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant had no mouth to challenge those concurrent findings of facts in this Court. That is dear from the fact that, at the time of hearing of this appeal, he did not challenge them. Faced with the situation, he hit upon the idea of making the amendment application after the lapse of such a long period as more than 20 years from the date of institution of the suit and more than 9 years after the date of filing of this appeal. Noticing that the appeal had no substance otherwise, he, by making the amendment-application, wanted to infuse some life into it, incase, perchance, the application happened to be allowed. There is no explanation for the abnormal delay in filing the amendment-application. Noticing that the appeal had no substance otherwise, he, by making the amendment-application, wanted to infuse some life into it, incase, perchance, the application happened to be allowed. There is no explanation for the abnormal delay in filing the amendment-application. Despite effecting the amendment applied for, the plaint would not show that the plaintiff was always ready and wiliing to perform her part of the agreement. On the contrary, the plaint-allegations as regards absence of consideration, fraud, misrepresentation etc. will continue to show that the plaintiff was not wiliing to perform her part of the agreement. The contents of her application dated 2-1-1963 and notice (Ex. P-38), adverted to in paragraph No. 7 above, will also go to show that she was not unconditionally wiliing to perform her part of the agreement, the existence or validity of which she was not prepared to admit. Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act 1963, which came into force from 1-3-1964, provides that specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and wiliing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. The suit, out of which this second appeal has arisen, was instituted on 21-4-1962 when the Specific Relief Act 1877 (which was repealed by the Act of 1963) was in forca. Therefore, the present suit is governed by the Act of 1877. Even before coming into force of the Act of 1963, the law in that behalf was not different. Even then, in a suit for specific performance of an agreement, it was necessary for the plaintiff to allege and if, traversed, prove his continuous readiness and willingness from the date of the agreement to the time of hearing to perform his part of the agreement, as is dear from decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Prem Raj (supra). It is also dear there from that, in the absence of such an averment, the plaintiff would have no cause of action for claiming specific performance of the agreement. It is also dear there from that, in the absence of such an averment, the plaintiff would have no cause of action for claiming specific performance of the agreement. The opposite party had no occasion to defend against the claim for specific performance and, therefore, the amendment, if allowed, would involve re-opening of the whole case after the lapse of more than 20 years. Above all, as already held, in a suit for declaring an agreement to be void and inoperative, the plaintiff is not entitled to claim the relief of specific performance of the same agreement in the alternative. In the circumstances, it is quite ciear that the amendment applied for cannot be allowed to be made. The amendment application is, therefore, dismissed. No other point has been pressed or argued before me. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The appellants shall pay the respondents' costs. Counsel's fee shall be upto Rs.200 only, if pre-certified. Appeal dismissed