Judgment :- 1. The facts leading to the revision petition are shortly as follows: The revision petitioners are two in number, Fathima Bibi and Kaja Moideen. They claim the right of tenancy under the following circumstances. Door No. 256, East Masi Street, Madurai town, is owned admittedly by the respondents. It was let out to one Mohammed Ibrahim on a monthly rent of Rs. 220. He was carrying on wholesale that business in the petition premises. He died on 13th December, 1977. The revision petitioners are none other than the widow and the brother of Mohammed Ibrahim. They contended that they are the heirs of deceased Mohammed Ibrahim tendering the rent to the respondents who refused to receive it. Therefore, the petition in R.C.O.P. No. 342 of 1978 was filed before the Principal District Munsif of Madurai town under S. 8(5) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 1960. They deposited the rent into court. The respondents disputed the status of the revision petitioners as tenants and contended that they did not associate themselves with the business carried on by Mohammed Ibrahim, and as a result, they did not satisfy for definition of ‘tenant’ occurring in S. 2(8) of the Act, and, therefore, the petition was not maintainable. The Rent Controller was of the view that the revision petitioners must be held to be tenants within the meaning of S. 2 (8) of the Act, and accordingly he allowed the petition. Thereupon, the respondents herein preferred an appeal to the Appellate Authority contending that the revision petitioners are not tenants within the meaning of S. 2(8) and the order of the Rent Controller was wrong. The Appellate Authority was of the view that since there was no association within the meaning of S. 2 (8) of the Act, they could not be called tenants. It is this finding which is now attacked. 2. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. T.R. Mani, that this is a case in which the association of the widow at any rate is fully established. There were series of lending and taking money from the business of Mohammed Ibrahim. On that score, there is a relationship between the wife and Mohammed Ibrahim as creditor and a firm. T.R. Mani, that this is a case in which the association of the widow at any rate is fully established. There were series of lending and taking money from the business of Mohammed Ibrahim. On that score, there is a relationship between the wife and Mohammed Ibrahim as creditor and a firm. The appellate Court erred in holding that a creditor of a business firm cannot be said to associate himself in the business and if that be the case, no business is safe. As far as the widow is concerned, there cannot be a better association than investment of moneys. Certainly, it cannot be expected that day to day business should be attended to by the widow in order to fall within the definition of the word ‘associated’ occurring in S. 2 (8) of the Act. In a loose sense ‘associated’ in this case has been used and the court below erred in relying upon the ruling reported in Mohd, Sultan Moideen v. Official Trustee 1 , which has no application to the facts of the case. All the decisions of the courts de not render any assistance as to fixing the meaning of the word ‘associated’ occurring under the section. Even otherwise, the word ‘associated’ if it is confined only to legal representatives and not to be held applicable to the spouse, son or daughter, then this question does not arise. As regards the brother, merely because he has been paid for his services rendered there, he does not cease to be an associate. For w hatever work he had done with reference to the business of Mohammed Ibrahim, he was paid and so to call him as a servant is wrong as had been done by the lower court. Therefore, the order of the Appellate Authority is liable to be set aside and that of the Rent Controller has to be restored. 3. Mr. T.R. Ramachandran, learned counsel for the respondents relying upon Ashiah and another v. Mereh Bell and others 1 would contend that this is a case in which there was no pleading that the revision petitioners were associated with the business. On the contrary, they claimed to be the legal heirs which certainly cannot bring them within the meaning of S. 2(8) of the Act, it is not every legal heir who could claim the benefit of statutory tenancy right. On the contrary, they claimed to be the legal heirs which certainly cannot bring them within the meaning of S. 2(8) of the Act, it is not every legal heir who could claim the benefit of statutory tenancy right. Mere lending moneys is not association. There must be something more, namely that they must be looking into the accounts or the correspondence of the firm. Even the ledgers have not been properly proved, in the sense whether Fathima Bibi had the funds to lend on those various dates or she had the money of the husband which was entered in the name of Fathima Bibi are all matters of guess. The court cannot therefore, act upon them assuming they had some evidential value. The case as far as the second revision petitioner, the brother, is concerned, is on a stronger footing. He was merely a servant for whom the necessary payments were made for services rendered. Therefore, no exception could be taken to the order of the Appellate Authority. 5. In order to appreciate the only point that arises for my determination as to what is the meaning of the words ‘Association’ occurring in the definition in S. 2(8), I will have to refer to the necessary legal background. Instead of myself labouring on that, I may usefully quote the following relevant portion from the decision reported in Mohd. Sultan Mohideen and others v. Official Trustee . 1 “On an examination of the two limbs of the definition of ‘tenant’ in S. 2(8) as amended in 1073, one gains the impression that in order to secure continuity in the tenancy the heirs should prove, as a fact, that they were in the case of a non-residential building, that they were in continuous association with the tenant for the purpose of carrying on the business of the tenant upto the death of the tenant and continue to carry on such business thereafter. It is therefore fairly clear that such a commercial association with the deceased tenant in the business or non-residential activity which was carried on by the deceased tenant in the premises is an essential sine qua non to claim the benefits under S. 2(8)(ii) of the Act”. I may immediately say that this decision does not in any manner help to resolve the issue before me and having regard to the facts of the case, these observations were obiter. I may immediately say that this decision does not in any manner help to resolve the issue before me and having regard to the facts of the case, these observations were obiter. Therefore, one is back to S. 2., Cl. (8). In the case of non-residential building, as the one I have on hand, the requirement is “had been in continuous association with the tenant for the purpose of carrying on the business of the tenant upto the death of the tenant and continues to carry on such business thereafter.” 6. In this case, the pleading in the petition was as under— “The property mentioned hereunder belongs to the respondents. The property was leased to Mohammed Ibrahim on a monthly rent of Rs. 220 for running the shop. The said Mohammed Ibrahim had paid rent upto the end of Agrippa month for Pingala year, Mohammed Ibrahim died on 13th December, 1977. The first petitioner is the widow of Mohammed Ibrahim. The second petitioners are the heirs of Mohammed Ibrahim and they are conducting the shop in the property mentioned hereunder.” In the counter statement filed by the respondents, it was stated as follows after admitting that the deceased Mohammed Ibrahim was a tenant of the petition premises: “It is submitted neither of these petitioners were associated with the deceased Mohammed Ibrahim in the carrying on of the business at any time prior to the death of Mohammed Ibrahim. It is submitted that Mohammed Ibrahim died on 13th December, 1977. The petitioners are not tenants of the petition mentioned building as per the Act, and as such they are not entitled to claim any of the benefits of the tenancy. They are only trespassers. The Rent Control Act is not applicable to them.” It is true Fathima Bibi, the first of the petitioners-did not enter the box. P.W. 2 is the accountant in the shop of the petitioners for more than 20 or 23 years. It is stated by him that even before the death of Mohammed Ibrahim, the petitioners evinced interest in the business and were looking after the business. On this point there has not been any cross-examination. Before the Rent Controller certain ledgers were marked. Ex. It is stated by him that even before the death of Mohammed Ibrahim, the petitioners evinced interest in the business and were looking after the business. On this point there has not been any cross-examination. Before the Rent Controller certain ledgers were marked. Ex. A 10 is for the year 1975.1976, Page 125 of that ledger shows that Fatima Bibi had invested large sums of money for a period ranging from 30th July, 1975 to 9th January, 1976 and the same is carried over to page 126. That page relates to the period from 10th January, 1976 to 29th March 1976. Equally, Ex. A11 at page 211, Ex. A12 at page 4, Ex. A13 at page 251, Ex. A14 at page 4. Ex. A14 at page 4, and Ex. A16 at page 4 do show her participation by way of financial investment. Under these circumstances, can it be said that there is an association or not The cases which have considered the scope of a surviving spouse claiming the benefits of this section may now be referred to for the sake of completion, because, as I said above, there is no direct ruling on this aspect. 7. Guruswami Nadar v. Natesa Nadar 1 is a case which arose prior to the amendment of S. 2(8). In Dr. Natesan v. Santhalakshmi , 2 again it was held that the surviving spouse did not claim during the life time of the tenant. In Saraswathi Sriraman v. P.C.R. Chettis Charities 3 Kailasam, J. as he then was, held that the surviving spouse living with the tenant could alone claim the benefit of tenancy in view of S. 2(8). Mohd. Sultan Mohideen v. Official Trustee 4 has already been referred to. Therefore, we are left with no option than to delve into the question. The meaning of the word ‘association’ and ‘associate’ as per Websters Dictionary is this:— “Association”An act of associating, union, connection of persons. The state of being associated, companionship, fellowship, partnership; A society formed for transacting or carrying on some business or proceed for mutual advantage. ‘Associate’ (v) to bring into relationship with oneself or another, as a friend, companion partner or confederate; To unite in the same mass, to continue to join, to connect; (n) A person associated, a friend, the partners; the colleagues, a fellow worker. ‘Associate’ (v) to bring into relationship with oneself or another, as a friend, companion partner or confederate; To unite in the same mass, to continue to join, to connect; (n) A person associated, a friend, the partners; the colleagues, a fellow worker. “ These words as per the Oxford Dictionary mean: “Association”—Act of associating (in all senses) Organ, body of persons. ” ‘Associate’—Join (persons, things connected with one another) connected in idea; make oneself a partner in; combine for common purpose. ” Here that which has a bearing will be ‘combine for common purpose’. I am unable to accept the argument of Mr. T.R. Ramachandran, learned counsel for the respondent, that ‘association’ means actual participation, for instance, writing accounts or looking after the correspondence, etc.’ Whatever may be said of the western countries, as far as India is concerned, women have always been held under subjugation for a long period. In the social conditions in which the Indian women are placed, it is impossible to expect them to take an active part in the business. May be times are changing. Nevertheless to insist upon actual participation in some form or other is not warranted in a country like ours. If at all a person requires protection, it is mostly an Indian woman. I am tempted to quote what Abraham Lincoln said of woman— “The woman was not taken from Adams head, we know; To shew she must not rule him— ‘Tis evidently so. The woman she was taken from under Adams arm So she must be protected from injuries and harm”. It should also be remembered that but for women, the world would have been a place of great boredom as Nictmsche said. To many a poet, women have always been the subject of adoration as the following passage of Scott would reveal: “O Women! It should also be remembered that but for women, the world would have been a place of great boredom as Nictmsche said. To many a poet, women have always been the subject of adoration as the following passage of Scott would reveal: “O Women! in our hours of care Uncertain, coy, and hard to please, And variable as the shade By the light quivering as pen made; When pain and anguish wring the brow, A ministering angel thou!” Notwithstanding all these, an average man in India has always taken pride in his masculine gender and has held women under sway stating she must be won No wonder Shakespeare said as follows— “Shes beautiful and therefore, to be woed; Shes a woman, therefore to be won,” Therefore, I should, for my part, think, if association means combining for the common is purpose, there cannot be a better association than to invest in the business of the husband. Meagre as the earnings of women are, they would like to cling to whatever they have and yet if one comes forward to invest in the business of her husband that is enough association. 8. In this case, Fatima Bibi has been continuously associated with, her husband, is evident from the testimony of P.W. 2, to which I have made reference. He is categoric in stating that during the lifetime of Mohammed Ibrahim, she evinced interest. This is true because the ledgers show they have been looking after the business. It is not denied before me that Fatima Bibi changed the name of the business and is continuing the same business. 9. It passes my comprehension to appreciate the reasoning of the learned Appellate Authority when he says— “It is but natural for the wife to advance moneys to the husband for the business. There is nothing wrong in that. She was as any other creditor. So can we say a creditor of a business firm is said to associate himself in the business with the owner of such business. I think it is well nigh impossible to conclude so. If this is accepted as correct then no business is safe. Every creditor of a business will begin to claim interest in the business itself and the consequence wilt be disastrous.” This finding clearly overlooks the scope of S. (8). I think it is well nigh impossible to conclude so. If this is accepted as correct then no business is safe. Every creditor of a business will begin to claim interest in the business itself and the consequence wilt be disastrous.” This finding clearly overlooks the scope of S. (8). The right of statutory tenancy can be claimed only by the following categories of persons: (1) surviving spouse; (2) any son; (3) daughter, and (4) the legal representatives. Therefore, a stranger creditor has no place within the scope of S. 2(8) and the disaster which the learned appellate Judge thinks of is totally illusory. If, therefore, Fatima Bibi was in continuous association in the business of her husband, in view of what I said above, it stands to reason that as a surviving spouse she is entitled to the benefit of S. 2(8). 10. As against the second revision petitioner, the criticism that he was merely a paid servant is in a way justifiable. There is nothing to show excepting that he was paid by way of salary for the services rendered, he combined in the business. It is one thing to say that a person combined in business. It is another thing to say that he was in the employ of the firm. The second petitioner falls only under that category. 11. I am unable to accept the extreme contention of Mr. T.R. Mani, learned counsel for the petitioners that the requirements under Cl. (ii) of S. 2(8), namely, continuous association of the tenant, must be confined only to the legal representatives. In my considered view, the requirement under Cl. (ii), involves all the four mentioned; namely, surviving, spouse, son, daughter or the legal representative. 12. It is true that the parties here did not claim the benefit of this sub-section in the pleading. On that score I do not think that the doors of justice must be shut. Evidence was also let in and findings rendered as to the scope and applicability of S. 2(8), Therefore, it is too late for the respondents here to contend that the parties must specifically plead the benefit of S. 2(8), failing which the same can-not be claimed. Evidence was also let in and findings rendered as to the scope and applicability of S. 2(8), Therefore, it is too late for the respondents here to contend that the parties must specifically plead the benefit of S. 2(8), failing which the same can-not be claimed. Another criticism levelled on behalf of the respondents is that Fatima-Bibi did not enter the box and therefore one is at a loss to know whether actually she invested money or her husband invested on her behalf. I do not think this argument carries any substance. Nobody could have foreseen the events, especially the amendment caused to S. 2(8), and created these records so as to make entries in the ledger. It also requires to be noted that these ledgers were from 1966-1967 onwards, long before the amendment to S. 2(8) which was effected only by Tamil Nadu Act 23 of 1973. Even otherwise, if the husband had intended that the wife should associate herself in business and therefore, invested certain moneys in her name, I cannot think of a greater intention on the part of the husband to actively associate his wife with the business. On the pleadings, therefore, this argument has to be rejected. 13. For all these reasons, I have not the slightest hesitation in allowing the civil revision petition. I may make it clear that only Fatima Bibi (the first petitioner) alone could claim the benefit of S. 2(8). However, this matters very little for the purpose of accepting the deposit under S. 8(5) of the Act. 14. The civil revision petition is therefore, allowed. There will be no order as to costs.