JUDGMENT - S.C. PRATAP, J.:---This Constitutional action stands in a class by itself. Sui generis, if one may say so. The petitioner, one R.J. Mehta, a trade union leader, has moved this Court by this unusual action under Article 226 of the Constitution. Respondent No. 1, Mr. Justice V.S. Deshpande, is the learned Chief Justice of this High Court and the others two respondents, Mr. Justice B.A. Masodkar and Mr. Justice R.L. Aggarwal, are the learned sitting Judges of this High Court. Arguments advanced by the learned Counsel Miss Indira Jaising in support of this petition were heard in extenso. A speaking order was requested. There being precedents of different courts on speaking orders at the admission stage, I proceed to give one here. 2. Initially to summarise the averments : In October 1980 a trust viz., Indira Gandhi Pratibha Pratisthan Trust was set up by Mr. A.R. Antulay, till recently the Chief Minister of Maharashtra. Mr. A.R. Antulay is the Principal trustee thereof and Mr. Justice S.A. Masodkar and Mr. Justice R.L. Aggarwal, respondent Nos. 2 and 3 respectively, are two of the other trustees. For this trust, huge sums were collected from various persons. Contributions were obtained by Mr. A.R. Antulay and/or the other trustees from persons who had business with the Government such as grant of cement permits, no objection certificates, liquor permits etc. In receiving these, favours may have been or would be shown to the donors most of whom were wealthy persons who not only have business with the Government but are also often litigants in this Court these being the obvious reasons for their contributions. Though this trust has been ".....a symbol of political corruption", respondent Nos. 2 and 3 did nothing to dissociate themselves there from. ".....their duties as judges are likely to conflict with their interest in the said trust as also in the persons who are donors to the trust as also in the Government". They have, therefore, ceased to possess the necessary qualifications for being judges and are hence disqualified in that behalf or in any event from entertaining and trying matters in which Mr. A.R. Antulay, the State Government, the ruling party viz., Congress (I) and the donors to the said trust are parties impleaded. 3. They have, therefore, ceased to possess the necessary qualifications for being judges and are hence disqualified in that behalf or in any event from entertaining and trying matters in which Mr. A.R. Antulay, the State Government, the ruling party viz., Congress (I) and the donors to the said trust are parties impleaded. 3. Reference is then made to : (a) ".....an openly political and partisan conference' viz., The All India Conference of the Intelligentsia held in August, 1981 under respondent No. 2's Chairmanship of its Reception Committee; (b) certain cases involving the trust and the trustees pending under the Constitutional as also the Criminal processes of this Court; (c) resolutions of the Bar Council of India and the Bar Council of Maharashtra expressing disapproval to the continued participation by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 as trustees; (d) press interview by respondent No. 2 identifying himself with the objective of the said trust and declining to resign there from." 4. Submitting that he is associated with several petitions pending in this Court against the State of Maharashtra and is, therefore, vitally concerned and affected by administration of justice in this Court, the petitioner, to quote him verbatim, avers : ".....for the first time issues of great Constitutional significance which involve some issues of judicial functioning in an open society, issues which ultimately have a bearing on the basic structure of the Constitution, have been raised by this petition. The questions are : whether the highest judicial functionary of the State can still discharge judicial functions when he associates with a trust; the funds of which are collected by means considered questionable by the general public, when there is great public resentment about the mode and manner in which the said funds are collected, the misrepresentation made about the true character of the trust in an official publication of the State and moneys are collected on such misrepresentation. The petitioner says that there is such a public censure about the transactions of the trust in the press, in Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha, that it is considered by the general public as a raging political scandal of the day resulting in tendering of the resignation of the Chief Minister, Shri Abdul Rehman Antulay, the principal trustee of the said Trust. A criminal complaint has been filed against the Chief Minister ( Mr. A.R. Antulay) where respondent Nos. A criminal complaint has been filed against the Chief Minister ( Mr. A.R. Antulay) where respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have been cited as witnesses. It is submitted that a Judge should function or be allowed to function or even assigned any work in such a situation is the very negation of all Constitutional value viz., the independence of the judiciary. It is submitted that the petition is filed to restore the Constitutional values and that to do so is not to show disrespect to the Judges. The petitioner submits that he has the highest respect for the Judges and the present petition is confined only to the Constitutional issues arising out of their actions which are inconsistent with their functions." 5. Reliefs claimed are mainly to the effect that : (a) the Court should issue a writ of quo warranto declaring respondent Nos. 2 and 3 disqualified from continuing to hold the office of a Judge in this High Court and that the office they enjoy stand vacated; (b) Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 should be restrained from acting as judges in all cases to which the State of Maharashtra, co-trustees of the said trust, the donors to the said trust including the donors listed in Exhibit A to the said trust (deed) and members of the Congress (I) are parties impleaded; (c) Alternative relief claimed is injunction restraining respondent No. 1, the learned Chief Justice, not to assign any judicial work to respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 6. It is in this overall context that the learned Counsel, Miss Indira Jaising, expressed serious apprehension in the mind of the petitioner and several like minded other citizens on the question of judicial independence with specific reference to the second and third respondents' association as trustees of the trust in dispute. The important question at the outset, however, is : Is such apprehension justiciable? Equally important next question being : Is a writ petition such as this an appropriate remedy at all? My answer to both these questions is in the negative. In the first instance grievance to be justiciable should at the minimal be concrete and real. This indeed is the sine qua non, an indispensable condition for judicial review. Basic to judicial adjudication is not a general atmospheric situation, howsoever genuine it be, but an active lis, an actual case in controversy. In the first instance grievance to be justiciable should at the minimal be concrete and real. This indeed is the sine qua non, an indispensable condition for judicial review. Basic to judicial adjudication is not a general atmospheric situation, howsoever genuine it be, but an active lis, an actual case in controversy. An issue or a controversy to be amenable to judicial adjudication and redress, as distinguished from academic or theoretical discussion, must have a visible setting of specific facts and circumstances, in the context whereof alone it can be legally considered and judicially determined. Courts do not decide abstract apprehensions. Writs operational judicial instruments are not issued in isolation or in vacuo. There can be no general judicial determination of a hypothetical apprehension. Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is not an advisory or consultative jurisdiction. Even the infrequently invoked jurisdiction under Article 143 of the Constitution has almost always been invoked and exercised in the light initially of one or another concrete setting. Therefore, howsoever laudable may otherwise be the object of this petition, it reflects at the highest an admirable passion for judicial independence but de hors any specific lis or case. 7. That apart and even otherwise, the circumstances set forth in the petition do not ipso facto lead to the inference loss of confidence in judicial independence sought to be so readily drawn therefrom. The advocated anxiety is more conjectural than real. The reliefs claimed are also unprecedented. And though a Court need not feel constrained by mere want of precedent, it must nevertheless, when asked to set up one, act with great judicial caution and prudence, restraint and propriety. It would be a highly dangerous precedent to lay down by holding as validity subsisting in a Court, power to examine, consider and adjudicate upon a Judge's judicial independence. Such a role is plainly beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. Such extraordinary investigation would be an extremely hazardous course to navigate and a wholly unconstitutional exercise of judicial power. 8. So far as assignment of work is concerned, it is subject, of course, to the rules of the High Court, the exclusive right, duty and privilege of the learned Chief Justice. Contention, however, has been that the time has come to lay down norms in that behalf. 8. So far as assignment of work is concerned, it is subject, of course, to the rules of the High Court, the exclusive right, duty and privilege of the learned Chief Justice. Contention, however, has been that the time has come to lay down norms in that behalf. But in a sphere so sensitive and with many a delicate aspect and element entering the field, the norms are best left undefined and best left to the good judgment and discretion of the learned Chief Justice. A system which has by and large worked well for a century and more is best left undisturbed. Counsel contends that assignment of work is an administrative function and, therefore, subject to judicial review. Even assuming it to be so, every singular administrative function is not judicially reviewable. Save and except perhaps in a case of a patent and clear breach of the express rules affecting the jurisdiction of the Court, I am not prepared to go to the length of holding that this function is justiciable and can, therefore, be judicially reviewed and controlled. To so hold can only open the floodgates for a virtual statement and anarchy in administration. Every assignment list why, every singly unpleasant assignment can then become amenable to a judicial challenge. The wheels of judicial administration may as well come to a grinding halt. In the very nature of things, therefore, implicit confidence in the bona fide exercise of that function by the learned Chief Justice is necessary. Such confidence is all the more warranted when in a given case a request to the learned Chief Justice to lock into and consider any reasonable grievance can always be made. 9. Miss Indira Jaising, however, vehemently continued to pursue her contentions. And this may it be said to the credit of her efforts in that regard not by way of mere ipse dixit but by reference to authorities. The first of these is the ruling of the Supreme Court in (Jyoti Prakash Mitter v. The Hon'ble Mr. Justice H.K. Bose, Chief Justice of the High Court, Calcutta and another)1, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 961. That matter, however, arose from a concrete case relating to a live dispute on the age of the learned Judge concerned. The first of these is the ruling of the Supreme Court in (Jyoti Prakash Mitter v. The Hon'ble Mr. Justice H.K. Bose, Chief Justice of the High Court, Calcutta and another)1, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 961. That matter, however, arose from a concrete case relating to a live dispute on the age of the learned Judge concerned. It was in that context that the observations, to which my attention was invited, were made viz., "............If a dispute arises about the age of a Judge, any prudent and wise Chief Justice would naturally think of avoiding unnecessary complications by refusing to assign any work to sitting Judge, if at the time when the dispute had been raised, it appears that the allegation is that at the relevant time the Judge in question has reached the age of superannuation", it being.........the duty of the Chief Justice to avoid such a complication." (Vide page 967 of the report). The principle of this decision does not help the learned Counsel. The cited observations cannot be delinked from the very specific nature of the dispute which evoked the same. 10. My attention was also invited to the following observations of the learned Chief Justice of India in (Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth)2, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2328. "It is beyond question that independence of judiciary is one of the foremost concerns of our Constitution." (Vide page 2328 of the report). 10. My attention was also invited to the following observations of the learned Chief Justice of India in (Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth)2, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2328. "It is beyond question that independence of judiciary is one of the foremost concerns of our Constitution." (Vide page 2328 of the report). As also to the following observations of the learned Judge Bhagwati, J., in his recent judgment dated 30th December, 1981 in the Judges' Transfer case : "...........the principle of independence of the judiciary is not abstract conception but it is a living faith which must derive its inspiration from the Constitutional charter and its nourishment and sustenance from the Constitutional values." As also : "The appointment of a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court does not depend merely upon the professional or functional suitability of the person concerned in terms of experience or knowledge of law though this requirement is certainly important and vital and ignoring it might result in impairment of the efficiency of administration of justice, but also on several other considerations such as honesty, intergrity and general pattern of behaviour which would ensure dispassionate and objective adjudication with an open mind, free and fearless approach to matters in issue, social acceptability of the person concerned to the high judicial office in terms of current norms and ethos of the society, commitment to democracy and the rule of law, faith in the Constitutional objectives indicating his approach towards the preamble and the directive principles of State policy, sympathy or absence thereof with the Constitutional goals and the needs of an activist judicial system." Now, while dealing with a petition as the present, the context in which the above observations were made cannot be ignored. In cases relating to the scope and ambit of the Constitutional power to transfer a High Court Judge from one High Court to another arose the question of the independence of the judiciary from executive interference, untrammelled executive power in that respect said to be undermining the independence of High Court Judges. It is while dealing with this altogether different question that the aforesaid observations come to be made. It is, therefore, difficult to see how these general observations can be availed of in support of the reliefs prayed for here. 11. Yet another case referred to was a ruling of the Court of Appeal in (Metropolitan Properties Co. It is while dealing with this altogether different question that the aforesaid observations come to be made. It is, therefore, difficult to see how these general observations can be availed of in support of the reliefs prayed for here. 11. Yet another case referred to was a ruling of the Court of Appeal in (Metropolitan Properties Co. v. Lanen and others)3, 1969(I) Queen's Bench Division 577. In the context here, two questions arising there (see page 598) may be referred to viz., (a) Was there "direct pecuniary interest"? No; the purported interest in question being held to be too remote, indirect and uncertain and hence not a disqualification. (b) Was there bias? No; it being observed inter alia there must appear to be"..........real likelihood of bias. Surmise of conjecture is not enough." In the present case there is not even the remotest indication of direct pecuniary interest nor-apart from sheer surmise and conjecture-of real likelihood of bias. This authority also thus has no application here. 12. Coming to yet another authority viz., that of the United State Supreme Court in (Stephen S. Chandler, United States District Judge for the Western District of Oklahoma v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the United States)4, Twenty Six Lawyers Edition 100. The same turned on altogether different and peculiar facts and distinguishing features. That was a matter where, unlike here, the learned Judge himself viz., Judge Stephen S. Chandler, who was a Judge of the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, filed in the Supreme Court of the United States a motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition against the judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit which Council had by various orders deprived him of the assignment of cases filed in the District Court. The Supreme Court by majority (five to two with one not participating) denied the motion. The Supreme Court by majority (five to two with one not participating) denied the motion. In the majority as also in the dissenting opinion, observations on which there cannot be two views have been made on the independence of the judiciary such as e.g. ".....the imperative need for total and absolute independence of judges in deciding cases or in any phase of the decisional function." ".....An independent judiciary is one of the is nation's outstanding characteristic." These observations, unexceptional as these are, do not, however, take the petitioners' case there any further in relation to the reliefs claimed by him. The authority is clearly distinguishable. 13. The last decision referred to by Miss Indira Jaising is a Division Bench ruling (per Mr. Justice Masodkar and Mr. Justice Agarwal) of this Court in. In (Re A Letter Dated 2nd/15th September, 1981 of Shrikant v. Bhat)5, (1981) LXXXIII Bombay Law Reporter 251. It is a detail speaking order at the admission stage of a proceeding initiated upon an order of the then learned Chief Justice whose attention was invited by an Advocate's letter to a report of the speeches of the (then) Chief Minister Mr. A.R. Antulay and the Sales-tax Commissioner Mr. K. Padmanabaiah. In the context here, the first head note, part of which is actually an extract from Supreme Court's opinion in the matter of special Reference No. 1 of 1964, runs as follows : "Wise Judges never forget that the best way to sustain the dignity and status of their office is to deserve respect from the public at large by the quality of their judgments, the fearlessness, fairness and objectivity of their approach, and by the restraint, dignity and decorum which they observe in their judicial conduct." As in Judge Stephen S. Chandler's case supra, this Court's response to the above Division Bench ruling is also the same. And while there need be no conflicting views on a judge's role as a judge, the questions here raised and the reliefs here claimed stand on an altogether different footing and substratum. 14. Miss Indira Jaising then referred to the following from the eminent jurist who was then the Advocate General of Maharashtra Mr. And while there need be no conflicting views on a judge's role as a judge, the questions here raised and the reliefs here claimed stand on an altogether different footing and substratum. 14. Miss Indira Jaising then referred to the following from the eminent jurist who was then the Advocate General of Maharashtra Mr. H.M. Seerval's Sir Chimanlal Setalvad Lectures on "The Position of Judiciary under the Constitution of India." "But if the judge is unable or unwilling to put an end to this perversion of justice, the Chief Justice is no without a remedy. The Chief Justice sets the tone of the High Court, and is ultimately responsible for all that happens in it. He assigns work of judges, constitutes Benches and where a High Court sits at two different places in the State, he decides the place at which a judge is to sit." (Vide page 116). And to the following from the same learned jurist's book on "The Emergency, Future Safeguards and The Habeas Corpus Case: A Criticism": "The present writer is aware that judicial power, like any other power can be abused.......It appears to him that two simple rules, which have only to be stated to command general acceptance are necessary. First, no judge should make any public announcement, whether under the guise of a lecture or a seminar or not, on any matter, social, political, economic or legal which is likely to come before him as a judge. This rule does not prevent a judge from stating the law as it exists.........Secondly.........No judge should have frequent social contacts with Ministers and members of the executives........The two simple rules were have mentioned earlier should be incorporated in the conditions of service of every Judge, if necessary, by a suitable Constitutional amendment. And the contravention of these rules should be made a "misbehaviour" within the meaning of Article 124(4)." (Vide pages 126 and 127). And finally to item 3: Avoidance of appearance of impropriety: 24 Business Promotions and solicitations for charity : 26-Executorships and trusteeships; and 27-Partisan politics;-from Appendix II, Canons of Judicial Ethics from the book "Legal and Judicial Ethics" (adapted for the Republic of the Philippines) by George A. Maloolm. And finally to item 3: Avoidance of appearance of impropriety: 24 Business Promotions and solicitations for charity : 26-Executorships and trusteeships; and 27-Partisan politics;-from Appendix II, Canons of Judicial Ethics from the book "Legal and Judicial Ethics" (adapted for the Republic of the Philippines) by George A. Maloolm. Now, in regard to all these citations, suffice it to state that the principles expounded therein, however unexceptional these be, constitute at best a code of conduct and conventions, at highest a charter of judicial ethics. The permissible limits envisaged thereunder at least in this Country and as at present a matter of self-realisation and of self regulation. Not being law nor part of any adopted Code here, such ideals and ethics cannot per se constitute the basis of judicial reliefs and Constitutional writs. 15. Though under the recent trend, even a citizen not directly aggrieved may initiate a public interest action, the instant petition in that behalf is not just unusual but also goes too far. It may be that ambition and judicial independence may not happily co-exist. It may also be that continuous close proximity to the powers that be may as well blur the laxman rekha, the vital dividing line of thus far and no further. Even so, however, an individual's right to hold on to his independent thinking cannot be judicially abrogated. Freedom for the thought and action one does not like is one of the basic attributes of an independent people wedded to a democratic way of life. It is equally so not permissible to judicially audit a judge's action de hors or outside his judicial sphere or his reasons for the said action. Stripping a judge of his judicial functions akin to removing him pro tanto or pro tempro from office is an unheard of exercise even in a public interest action. Guarding the guardians is no function of this Court. Such exercise and function this Court will, therefore, decline to perform. The crescendo of public clamour and the irony of events and times "times that try men's souls" may not cloud this fundamental issue. 16. This is not to belittle the forceful contentions of the learned Counsel on the importance and purity of the springs of justice. Far from it, an independent judiciary is not an irrelevant appendage but a priceless asset and conscience keeper of a free and democratic people. 16. This is not to belittle the forceful contentions of the learned Counsel on the importance and purity of the springs of justice. Far from it, an independent judiciary is not an irrelevant appendage but a priceless asset and conscience keeper of a free and democratic people. Though it has no influence over either the sword or the purse, it has behind it the equally important and more lasting power of truth and justice. It also acts as a safety valve and a balance wheel. It often prevents and pre-empts crisis and chaos. An independent judiciary thus becomes an indispensable essence the very quintessence of rule of law. That is its true rationale and raison deter in the scheme of things, therefore, what is of the highest importance is that a Judge, while on the seat of justice, is judicially independent and enjoys public confidence in the judicial processes at his hands. The pertinent and relevant question thus is : Does this public confidence depend upon whether a judge is or is not associated with a trust? I think not. Judicial independence may not be so easily wished away. It may not so lightly become a forlorn hope. Though a perfect Judge free of human frailties is yet to be born "judges are men, not disembodied spirits" judges seized of judicial work do not deflect from the path of duty. Those holding the scales of justice do not falter not fail their sacred oath. Any lesser role would be inappropriate to judgeship itself. Judicial independence is not an artificial element. It is a live inner force. If liberty lies in the hearts of the people, judicial independence lies in the hearts of the Judges. And that of all is its best guarantee. And if it remains there, the flag of a free and independent judiciary should nay, it will continue to fly aloft the temples of justice for the benefit of all wings of the State and all citizens of the Country. 17. It has been a painful task hearing this petition against my colleagues and high Constitutional dignitaries of the State. Controversy of a political or a quasi political character should, one very sincerely feels, be out of bounds for a Judge. The principle of high conventions and standards in public offices applies to all the wings of the State but with greater rigour to its special wing. Controversy of a political or a quasi political character should, one very sincerely feels, be out of bounds for a Judge. The principle of high conventions and standards in public offices applies to all the wings of the State but with greater rigour to its special wing. Indeed the political party constituting the executive wing of the State has after the judgment in Writ Petition No. 1165 of 1981 (the cement case) and irrespective of appeal therefrom laid down an ennobling example of first honouring the said judgment by calling upon its party leader in the State Legislature to lay down the highest executive office of the State of justice must not only be done but also appear to be done, the effect of controversial trusteeship on the office of judgeship cannot be altogether ignored. Lending one's official prestige and with in albeit sub silentio the high authority and dignity of the High Court to a politically controversial trust cannot but cause great anxiety to all concerned. This anxiety grows all the more by the following observations in the cement case judgment to which my attention was pointedly invited :--- ".........inescapable inference in this case is that there is a nexus between allotments and donations and that one was a wuid pro quo for the other, once nexus is established, mala fides must be the natural sequitur. It cannot be said in defence or mitigation that the donations were openly received by cheque and are accounted for by the Trust or that they did not go into the pocket of the 2nd respondent himself. None of this would make any difference. It would even have made no difference had the 2nd respondent not been connected with these Trusts. That he is, makes it worse." Surely then, as is seriously contended by the learned Counsel, if this be the finding relating to the main or the chief trustee, can the position of co-trustees remain unaffected? A cloudy sky is anathema to a judicial universe. Will not the gathering storm amidst a vast section of lawyers and citizens as witnessed by public statements and resolutions of Bar Councils and leading Bar Associations referred to by the learned Counsel ipso facto impair the confidence inspiring quality and atmosphere of an independent judiciary? A cloudy sky is anathema to a judicial universe. Will not the gathering storm amidst a vast section of lawyers and citizens as witnessed by public statements and resolutions of Bar Councils and leading Bar Associations referred to by the learned Counsel ipso facto impair the confidence inspiring quality and atmosphere of an independent judiciary? As observed by Chandrachud, J., as the learned Chief Justice of India then was : "Respect for law is, in a large measure, dependent upon the esteem in which the society holds those whose duty it is to interpret the law." (74 Bom.L.R. 68 at page 72 cited by Counsel). 18. Questions raised in this petition are undoubtedly of considerable public importance. But if I am right in the view I have taken, these questions are not amenable to judicial process and legal redress. Every public question is not capable of Constitutional adjudication. Judicial independence and public confidence therein is not and cannot be a matter of writs and injunctions. It is much too sacred to be secured and sustained through such strait jacket formulae. Therefore, whatever else be the remedy, I for one feel certain that a petition such as this is no solution to the problem posed and the reliefs prayed no answer to the questions raised. 19. This petition thus fails and is rejected. Petition fails. -----