G. T. NANAVATI, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision application is filed against the judgment and order passed by the learned Assistant Judge Baroda in Civil Revision application No. 41 of 1979. That was a revision application filed under sec. 29 (3) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 (hereafter referred to as the Act) by the original applicant tenant against an order passed by the learned Judge of the Small Causes Court Baroda under sec. 11 (4) of the Act. It was dismissed on the ground that it was not maintainable under sec. 29 (3) of the Act. ( 2 ) ). The case of the petitioner tenant is that rent of the suit premises is Rs. 1 200 per month: He has also to pay education cess at the rate of Rs. 200. 00 per month. This agreed rent was paid by him from March 197 6/11/1977 Even then the opponent tenant raised a dispute regarding standard rent; and therefore he was required to file Rent Miscellaneous Application No. 172 of 1978 in the Small Causes Court at Baroda for fixation of standard rent. That was done on 6 Along with the said application he had also filed an application Exh. 8 for fixing interim standard rent. The learned Judge of the Small Causes Court by an order passed below Exh. 8 fixed interim standard rent at Rs. 1 200 per month plus Rs. 200. 00 as taxes. The landlord on 16-1-1979 filed application Exh. 16 for modifying the said order and for directing the petitioner to pay full amount of all taxes. The petitioner opposed that application. The learned trial Judge by an order dated 16-8-1979 modified the previous order passed by him and directed the petitioner tenant to pay standard rent at the rate of Rs. 1 200 month plus all taxes and not at the rate of Rs. 1 200 plus Rs. 200/- only by way of taxes. The tenant was also directed to deposit an amount of Rs. 8 416. 36 Ps. towards taxes which were required to be paid in respect of the suit premises. The order was challenged by the tenant by filing the aforesaid revision application in the Court of the Assistant Judge Baroda. ( 3 ) ). 200/- only by way of taxes. The tenant was also directed to deposit an amount of Rs. 8 416. 36 Ps. towards taxes which were required to be paid in respect of the suit premises. The order was challenged by the tenant by filing the aforesaid revision application in the Court of the Assistant Judge Baroda. ( 3 ) ). The learned Assistant Judge upheld the contention of the landlord that the revision application was not maintainable under sec. 29 (3) of the Rent Act. The learned Judge was of the view that as an appeal against an order made under sub-secs. (3) and (4) of sec. 11 of the Act is barred by sub-sec. (5) thereof and not by sec. 29 and independently of it sub-sec. (3) of sec. 29 which provides that where no appeal lies under that section. . . . . . . the District Court may. . . . . . . . call for the case. . . . and pass such order with respect thereto as it think fit will have no application. In coming to this conclusion the learned Assis tant Judge also relied upon the following observations made in HARKISAN DAS V. PRABHAVATI BEN 14 G. L. R. 438. "the effect of this provision is that no order under sub-see. (4) would be an appealable order The order may however be subject to revision under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and also subject to the scrutiny of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India if it is found in a given case that the order raises a question which could be dealt with or decided in exercise of such power. It may also be mentioned that Rules 9 9 and 13 of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Rules 1948 which deal with procedure in appeals under sec. 29 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act provide that the appellate Court shall as far as may be and with necessary modification follow the practice and procedure prescribed for appeals from original decrees by the Civil Procedure code. Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure would therefore be attracted and it would be open to a tenant to set forth any error defect or irregularity in any order passed by the trial Court under sub-sec. Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure would therefore be attracted and it would be open to a tenant to set forth any error defect or irregularity in any order passed by the trial Court under sub-sec. (4) when he prefers an appeal under sec. 29 (1) (a) or (b) of the Act as the case may be. " ( 4 ) MR. Oza the learned advocate for the petitioner has challenged this view of the learned Assistant Judge as erroneous. He submitted that on this point there are direct decisions of this Court in Civil Revision Application No. 581 of 1970 decided on 21-8-1970 Civil Revision Application No 470 of 1971 decided on 26-7-1971 and Civil Revision Application No. 508 of 1972 decided on 10-10-1972 and the learned Assistant Judge should not have taken a contrary view. ( 5 ) ). The order which was challenged before the learned Assistant Judge was made under sec. 11 (4) of the act. Mr. Oza therefore submitted that in view of sec. 11 (5) no appeal could have been filed against that order and a revision application before the District Court was therefore maintainable under sec. 29 (3) of the Act. ( 6 ) ). In C. R. A. 581 of 1970 (decided by S. H. Sheth J.) on 21 it is held that to link up sub-sec. (3) with provision to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 29 is to confine its operation to a very narrow ambit without any justification and therefore except decrees and orders made appealable under sub-sec. (1) all decrees and orders are revisable by the District Court under sub-sec. (3 ). Again the same view was taken by D. P. Desai J. in Civil Revision Application No. 470 of 1971 He observed as under:" When sub-sec. (3) says when no appeal lies under this section of necessity it postulates the conferment of a right of appeal against certain decrees and orders and the exclusion thereof in certain cases. It is with regard to that right of appeal which is conferred by sub-sec. (1) that the aforesaid phrase is employed in sub- sec. (3) meaning thereby that in all cases where an appeal does not lie under sub- sec. (1) whether by virtue of a given order falling under the proviso to sub-sec. (1) or by virtue of specific prohibition like sub-sec. (5) of sec. (1) that the aforesaid phrase is employed in sub- sec. (3) meaning thereby that in all cases where an appeal does not lie under sub- sec. (1) whether by virtue of a given order falling under the proviso to sub-sec. (1) or by virtue of specific prohibition like sub-sec. (5) of sec. 11 the revisional jurisdiction of the District Court will come into operation. The purpose of sub- sec. (3) therefore is only to indicate that against all orders from which no appeal lies under sub-sec. (1) a revisional application can be filed in the District Court. Therefore in order to decide whether a revisional application under sub-sec. (3) would lie to the District Court the Court has to ask itself whether an appeal lies under sub-sec. (1) against the order sought to be brought before it in revision. If the District Court comes to the conclusion that an appeal against such an order does not lie its powers of revision arise and it has not to inquire by what parti- cular provision in the Act the appeal does not lie. The powers of revision unrestricted as they are in view of the terminology employed in sub-sec. (3) arise irrespective of the question whether the appeal is prohibited by the proviso to sub-sec. (1) or by any other section in the Act for instance sec. 11 (5) of the Act. " These two decisions were followed in Civil Revision application No. 508 of 1972 decided on 10-10-1972 B. K. Mehta J. not only agreed with the view expressed by S. H. Sheth J. and D. P. Desai J. but also supported it by observing as follows: " Apart from the above reasoning the conclusion reached in above revisions appear to be correct in view of the proviso to clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 29 which provides that no appeal shall lie from an order made upon an application for fixing standard rent or for determining the permitted increases in respect of any premises. Sub-secs. (3) and (4) of sec. 11 in effect provide for fixation of interim standard rent and the reasonable amount of rent to be deposited and to be paid to the tenant and also for striking off of the defence in case of failure on the part of tenant to so deposit. Sub-secs. (3) and (4) of sec. 11 in effect provide for fixation of interim standard rent and the reasonable amount of rent to be deposited and to be paid to the tenant and also for striking off of the defence in case of failure on the part of tenant to so deposit. In my opinion therefore there is a further ground to hold that sub- clause (3) of the proviso to clause (b) of sec. 29 (1) pro limits an appeal from order on an application for fixing standard rent or for determining permitted increases. The amount of standard rent that is to be fixed under sec. 29 may be either provisional standard rent or final standard rent but none the less an order fixing standard rent and therefore under sub-clause (3) of the said proviso the appeal is not competent. In that view of the matter therefore also sub-sec. (3) is attracted and the revision is competent in such cases. " ( 7 ) ). In Harkisans case (supra) referred to by the learned Assistant Judge such a question had not arisen. It is not held therein that no revision application is maintainable under sec. 29 (3) of the Act against an order passed under sec. 11 (4 ). The observations relied upon by the learned Assistant Judge do not justify such an inference. The learned Assistant Judge has not correctly appreciated the effect of these observations and erroneously dismissed the revision application as not maintainable. For all these reasons the judgment and order passed by him will have to be set aside. ( 8 ) ). In the result this revision application is allowed. The judgment and order passed by the learned Assistant Judge are set aside; and the matter is remanded to him for disposal in accordance with law. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs. The learned Assistant Judge is directed to dispose of the matter as early as possible and preferably within three months from the date of receipt of the record by him. Till final order is passed by the Court below the order direc ting the petitioner to deposit Rs. 8 416. 36 is stayed. .