ORDER.- The petitioner company is covered by the provisions of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948. It is pleaded that it has been regularly remitting the contributions payable under the Act, both employer's as well as the employees’ contributions. While so, in the months of September, 1975, November, 1975, January, 1976, March, 1976, May, 1976, September, 1976 and September, 1977, since stamps were not available in the State Bank of India, even though challans had been prepared and submitted on due dates, the Bank itself had altered the dates in the challans to correspond with the dates when the stamps were actually available, and hence the delay occasioned was beyond its control. When a demand was made by the respondent, the petitioner made representations on 31st August, 1978, also thereafter brought to its notice about the non-availability of stamps, which alone precluded it from complying with the provisions of the Act. In spite of the representations made, the impugned order having been passed with a cryptic finding and with no reason whatsoever, this writ petition came to be filed. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner, refers to the relevant correspondence which begins with the letter dated 11th March, 1976, addressed by the petitioner to the respondent stating that the stamps were not available in the months of February, 1976. The said letter refers to the return of the cheque sent by the petitioner bearing No. 72 560 dated 18th February, 1976, for Rs. 10,290.75 being the contribution for January, 1976, and also the chalan by the bank saying that it has not received the stamps for the value of Rs. 8.25. Similarly, another cheque bearing No. 678668 dated 21st June, 1976, for Rs. 9,606.45 being the contribution for the month of May, 1976, was also returned by the State Bank of India on the ground of non-availability of stamps, which the petitioner intimated by letter dated 7th July, 1976. Hence, the petitioner sought the advice of the respondent as to what should be done because of non-availability of stamps. The said two letters were replied on 17th July, 1976, by respondent stating that he had requested State Bank of India, Madras Main Branch to divert 200 sheets of Rs. 8.25 stamps to its Coimbatore Branch. Hence, the petitioner sought the advice of the respondent as to what should be done because of non-availability of stamps. The said two letters were replied on 17th July, 1976, by respondent stating that he had requested State Bank of India, Madras Main Branch to divert 200 sheets of Rs. 8.25 stamps to its Coimbatore Branch. Therefore, when the delay was due to non-availability of stamps, which resulted in delay in the remittances, there could not be a delay attributed to the petitioner. In spite of these clarifications the respondent had sent a letter dated 15th July, 1978, demanding Rs. 403.45 towards interest for the delay in the submission of contribution cards. This was replied by letter dated 31st August, 1978, again reiterating that nonavailability of stamps was the cause for the delay in submission of contribution cards. Again, respondent sent a letter dated 23rd August, 1978, proposing to recover damages, as listed in the statement appended therein under section 85 (B) of the Act. It was claimed herein that delay had been committed in respect of cards for the months of September, 1975; November, 1975, January, March, May September, 1976 and September, 1977. A reply was sent on 9th September, 1978, repeating what had been earlier represented and narrating the circumstances, which were beyond its control. In almost all cases excepting in one or two, payments had been made on time but the Bank declined to receive the money either because of shortage of or non-availability of stamps. In spite of the representations, the impugned order was passed determining damages for all the months as proposed, even though in the earlier part of the order it has been stated that for September, 1977, the proposal to impose damages is dropped. Hence it is contended that the order is illegal on several grounds. 3. Miss Radha Srinivasan, learned counsel for the respondent, sumbits that, as for non-availability of stamps, a certificate from the Bank could have been produced and in its absence, the authority had to proceed on the prasumption that such stamps were available on time. Hence it is contended that the order is illegal on several grounds. 3. Miss Radha Srinivasan, learned counsel for the respondent, sumbits that, as for non-availability of stamps, a certificate from the Bank could have been produced and in its absence, the authority had to proceed on the prasumption that such stamps were available on time. As for the plea that the order is laconic and does not disclose any application of mind to the representations made, she would state that, there is always a presum-ptionthat in passing such orders, the authority takes into account the representations received and passes order only after application of mind, and hence, it cannot be assailed on the ground that is it a non-speaking order. About inclusion of September, 1977, she would state that if the break-up calculation is looked at, damages for the month had been excluded. 4. The foremost point that calls for consideration is, whether the respondent can pass a laconic order or is bound to give reasons. 5. section 85 (B) of Act XXXIV of 1948 , is akin to the requirements in section 14-B of the Employees ‘Provident Funds and Mis-cellanous Provisions Act. In dealing with the scope of that section in Orpano Chemical Industries v. Union of India1, it has been held that the power exercised by the statutory authority is a quasi judicial power and that the order should disclose the reasons. In para. 8 therein it is stated as follows: — “………..It is, in my view, an imperative of section 14-B that the Commissioner shall give reasons for his order imposing damages on an employer. The constitutionality of the power, tested on the anvil of Articles 14 and 19, necessitates this prescription. Such a guarantee ensures rational action by the officer, because reasons imply relevant reasons, not capricious ink and the need for cogency rivets the officer's mind to the pertinant material on record. Moreover, once reasons are set down, the order readily exposes itself to the writ jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 so that perversity, illiteracy, extraneous influence malafides and other blatant infirmitier might get caught and be corrected. Thus, viewing the situation. from the conspectus of requirements and remedies, statutory agencies may be inhibited and the scare of arbitrary behaviour allayed once reasons are required to be given.” Again in para. Thus, viewing the situation. from the conspectus of requirements and remedies, statutory agencies may be inhibited and the scare of arbitrary behaviour allayed once reasons are required to be given.” Again in para. 38, it is stated “……..Having regard to the punitive nature of the power exercisable under section 14-B and the consequence that ensure therefrom an order under section 14-B must be a ‘speaking order’ containing the reasons in support of it……………” In the impugned order which is in a printed form leaving certain blanks to be filled up, after summarising two of the grounds taken by the petitioner, it is stated as follows: “I have applied my mind to all the relevant facts and have gone into the reasons stated by the employer. My findings are as follows:— However, this being the first notice to mitigate the hardship to the employer, 25 per cent of the damages proposed is levied.” Summarising the points taken by the petitioner does not mean that there was application of mind by the respondent. The claim is that the respondent had applied his mind. Making such a statement repeatedly without indicating in the order that he has understood the points involved and on what grounds the contentions taken cannot be accepted the respondent has committed a patent error apparent on the face of the order. 6. In each case, when the facts involved are different and the pleas raised are varied, to adopt a stereotyped form in every order claiming that the respondent had applied his mind, would not be a satisfactory compliance of the essential requirements expected of him to be dutifully followed under the provisions of the Act. To-day, along with this writ petition, nearly 15 writ petitions have come up, and in all these petitions, he had repeated the same words and imposed the same percentage of damages even though facts are widely varied; This is indicative of the uncared for manner of disposal reported to by the respondent in all these matters. It is also quite revealing that respondent had adopted a short-cut method of imposing a lesser percentage of damages wiihout reference to the pleas raised by the respective petitioners. 7. The order does not give any reason except a blunt finding. It is also quite revealing that respondent had adopted a short-cut method of imposing a lesser percentage of damages wiihout reference to the pleas raised by the respective petitioners. 7. The order does not give any reason except a blunt finding. It has been repeatedly pointed out by this Court and the Supreme Court, that cryptic orders of the nature, cripples affected party by non-application of the mind to the magnitude of the problems involved. Affected citizens are thereby compelled to undergo this process on cover for no fault of theirs. It is for avoiding such situation, cost is awarded in such matters. 8. While imposing damages, there cannot be a rough and ready method adopted, more so when the affected party had come forward to put forth his representations relating to certain relevant factors. In the decision above, referred to, the Supreme Court has laid down that the expressions “as it may think fit” shows that the authority is required to apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case while imposing damages. Hence, the respondent is duty bound to analyse relevant circumstances to justify the percent age of damages imposed. Therefore, the plea raised in the counter that when there has been reduction of 75 per cent, it proves the application of mind is by itself destructive, when it had applied the same percentage in all the cases that have come up before Court to-day, irrespective of different facts and circumstances pleaded by the respective petitioners. There being arbitrariness writ large in the approach made, this is again another error apparent on the face of the order. Therefore, the failure to give reasons and the adoption of a fixed percentage in almost all these cases, had brought forth arbitrary orders being passed, contrary to the requirements of the Act. 9. On the plea made that due to nonavailability of stamps, prompt compliance could not be made, the respondent has shut his eyes to his own communication, dated 17th July, 1976, which shows that stamps were not available in Coimbatore Branch of State Bank of India. When such circumstances existed, which was not within the control of the affected party, no damages could have been imposed. Respondent in respect of September, 1977 had dropped the proposal to impose damages. When such circumstances existed, which was not within the control of the affected party, no damages could have been imposed. Respondent in respect of September, 1977 had dropped the proposal to impose damages. Hence, the imposition of damages wherever stamps were not available was only due to a failure to take into account relevant facts and circumstances, which is one of its ordinary duties to be discharged as pointed out in para. 39 in A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1803, above referred to. Since the matter is being remitted for fresh disposal, this aspect should receive pointed attention of the respondent, who will have to dispose of the matter on merits. 10. Another error pointed out by petitioner is that, even though, in the earlier part of the order respondent had stated that the proposal for imposing damages for September, 1977 was dropped, in the concluding paragraph, the said month is again included. The order does not disclose the break up figures as to how the damages had been arrived at. Learned counsel for the respondent contends that the damages imposed does not include the damages for September, 1977 and that slip has occasioned in including the month, She states that if the break-up figures are looked at, it will show that no damages had been calculated for that month. The order copy does not disclose the break-up figures for the petitioner to know whether it has been included or deleted. Even in the counter-affidavit there is no indication to this effect. It is now for the respondent to furnish the break-up figures while imposing damages and avoid such errors while passing orders. From what respondent's counsel had stated, it appears that no damages has been imposed for the said month, but the manner in which the mistake has crept in it, is a clear pointer that the respondent has not applied his mind to any portion of the order which he has signed. 11. Yet another aspect which has come up for consideration is about the claim made that certain documents have been produced but not considered. There is nothing in the order to indicate as to what are the documents which have been perused by the respondent at the time of personal hearing and which have been taken into account while passing the order and which of those he had rejected as irrelevant. There is nothing in the order to indicate as to what are the documents which have been perused by the respondent at the time of personal hearing and which have been taken into account while passing the order and which of those he had rejected as irrelevant. In more than one matter, counsel who have appeared before the authority, had stated that, when the files are produced, the respondent looks into some of them and returns the entire file, and thereafter passed orders to the detriment of the parties. When respondent is enjoined to hold a hearing, it would be in his interest to refer to the documents placed before him and record such oral evidence as may be let in. Unless respondent indexes the documents produced before him he will be placed in a predicament, when affected parties plead that they have pleaded to the files which are produced before this Court. Whenever a personal hearing is extended, in the order at the end of it, a list of witnesses examined and the documents filed, will have to be indexed. Then alone, the claims made subsequently in Court, that several documents have been produced but not considered; could be repelled by the counsel, who appears on behalf of the respondent. In the instant matter, in the typed set of papers, certain communications which have been adverted to are relied upon. It is not clear as to whether the said documents were before the respondent at the time of passing the order or not. Hence, to avoid this predicament, respondent will have to evolve a procedure by which the documents filed and looked at by him at the time of the hearing, should be received and marked in the proceedings. For purposes of convenience, even if the originals are to be returned, xerox copies of these documents should be retained. Since no appeal is provided against such orders, they are challenged by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution. Even to defend the said proceedings, the respondeat would be handicapped, if the documents which have been placed at the time of personal hearing are not available for preparing counter-affidavit when certain points are taken relying on such documents. Hence, a procedure will have to be evolved for receiving the documents relied upon and indexing them as part of the order, along with the names of the witnesses examined. 12. Hence, a procedure will have to be evolved for receiving the documents relied upon and indexing them as part of the order, along with the names of the witnesses examined. 12. The notice issued does not disclose the percentage of damages proposed. Equally, the final order is not accompanied by a statement as to how the damages had been worked out. If the percentage proposed is not disclosed, it disables the affected party to know the extent of penalty proposed to be levied, and to effectively make representations. Any demand made, unless it clearly spells out percentage only misguides parties. Equally, in the final order unless the percentages are disclosed, as had happened in this case, the affected party has to surmise by permutations and combinations on how the total damages could have been arrived at. For periods for which plausible and reasonable explanations have been given, whether they have found acceptance or not, could be made out, only if a break-up statement is furnished, with percentage of damages imposed. This aspect must be followed to avoid orders being remitted on such omissions, which invite a plea being raised that inspite of valid particulars furnished they have not been considered by the authority. 13. In holding a personal hearing it cannot be made a farcical one, when proviso to section 85 (1) specifically provides that the employer shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. It is claimed by several counsel, that, even if several files are produced, they are not looked into and there is no inclination on the part of the respondent to receive oral evidence. The orders which have come before Court to a great extent strengthen this claim, when in none of the orders any specific document had been referred to or oral evidence recorded. Holding of a quasi-judicial enquiry should enable parties to the proceeding to adduce oral and documentary evidence, and under no circumstances, it should be avoided. If an authority avoids evidence being let in, by such a refusal he brings about not only an illegal order, but also delays the realisation of the amounts by way of damages. 14. In the printed form, a column is meant for listing the grounds. All the points taken in the representations will have to be formulated as grounds. If an authority avoids evidence being let in, by such a refusal he brings about not only an illegal order, but also delays the realisation of the amounts by way of damages. 14. In the printed form, a column is meant for listing the grounds. All the points taken in the representations will have to be formulated as grounds. In spite of several points taken, in most of these orders, only one or two grounds have been catalogued, leaving aside even important points: One of the cardinal duties in holding a quasi-judicial enquiry is to frame the points for consideration and give reasons for each one of the findings arrived at. It is only when reasons are disclosed, as stated by the Supreme Court, it will show whether the order passed has been vitiated by perversity, illiteracy extraneous influence, mala fides or any other patent infirmities, so that they may straightway get caught and be corrected. 15. While assessing damages to be imposed, reasons must be given as to what factors have been taken into account for arriving at different percentages of damages, and inflexible application of a rigid formula, as adopted in this order and the like, must be avoided. Merely because a maximum is prescribed, it does not mean that under any circumstances some arbitrary percentage could be worked out for imposing damages as if concession had been extended. Damages imposed serve both as a penalty for breach of the statutory obligation and achieve the object of providing compensation for the employees. Therefore, the imposition of damages, must be based on relevant facts and circumstances, which should be referred to in the order. 16. In certain counter-affidavits, a stand is taken that an appeal lies under section 75. If so, in such of these matters, at the end of the order, an indication should be made, as a foot note, as to whether an appeal lies, and within what time it is to be preferred. 17. Since the matter is remitted for fresh disposal, in the light of what has been stated above, it is open to the petitioner to adduce such further oral and documentary evidence as it may consider necessary. 18. Apart from the points dealt with, petitioner has also taken other points, inclusive of the jurisdiction of the respondent to pass the impugned order. 18. Apart from the points dealt with, petitioner has also taken other points, inclusive of the jurisdiction of the respondent to pass the impugned order. Now that the matter is remitted for fresh disposal the right of the petitioner to agitate other points is hereby preserved to be argued as and when circumstances may warrant. 19. Hence, for the reasons above stated, the impugned order is set aside and remitted for fresh disposal, resulting in the writ petition being allowed with costs Advocate's fee Rs. 250. R. S. ----- Petition allowed.