JUDGMENT Kaushal Kishore, Member - In this reference dated January 31, 1974, the learned Additional Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur, has recommended that the revision petition against the learned trial court's order dated August 18, 1973, setting aside the ex parte decree against the Gaon Sabha in a suit under Section 229-B of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, may be dismissed. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties and have also perused the record. 3. The learned counsel for the applicant argued that the learned trial court while allowing the restoration application of the present Pradhan Gaon Sabha has not decided the question of limitation which was necessary since the application was made under Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C. He further argued that even if there was any collusion between the then plaintiff Ram Udit and the then Pradhan Suggan Pandey, it does not lead to any conclusion of fraud on the court. Thirdly, he argued that knowledge of ex parte decree to the Pradhan or Secretary of the L.M.C. must be deemed to be knowledge to the L.M.C. 4. The learned DGC(R) has argued that the Gaon Sabha had not been Informed of the litigation and the ex parte decree by the then Pradhan Suggan Pandey, who being son of the then plaintiff Ram Udit now deceased, is the present revisionist also, and so the decree passed by the learned trial court on July 21, 1966 was ex parte against the Gaon Sabha. Further, He argued that it was a matter of fraud played on the court and so the application by the Pradhan Gajraj Yadav was under Section 151 C.P.C. as well as under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. and, therefore, the question of knowledge to Gaon Sabha or limitation would not be necessary to consider and decide. He also contented the equivalence of knowledge of the ex parte decree to the Pradhan or Secretary to the knowlEdge to the Gaon Sabha. 5. I would like to take up the last point first. It is necessary to be clear about facts. Pradhan is not Gaon Sabha. Secretary L.M.C. i.e. Lekhpal is not Gaon Sabha. Service of notice summons in a suit on the Pradhan on behalf of the Gaon Sabha is provided, and such service is considered sufficient prima-facie for the purpose of proceeding with the case. It is necessary to be clear about facts. Pradhan is not Gaon Sabha. Secretary L.M.C. i.e. Lekhpal is not Gaon Sabha. Service of notice summons in a suit on the Pradhan on behalf of the Gaon Sabha is provided, and such service is considered sufficient prima-facie for the purpose of proceeding with the case. But die Gaon Sabha is not debarred under any law, from representing that its agent Pradhan did not convey the notice to it, that the Pradhan did not seek instructions front the L.M.C. which is authorised under the law for all litigation on behalf of the Gaon Sabha, and that the Pradhan colluded against the Gaon Sabha. 6. It is obvious that the Gaon Subha can always show that it had no knowledge of any suit or proceeding or ex parte decree. This knowledge to the Gaon Sabha who is the real party to a suit or proceeding, is not something imaginary. Since the only body authorised to conduct litigation of the Gaon Sabha, is L.M.C., as provided in para 128 of the Gaon Sabha and the Land Management Committee Manual, and this, body L.M.C. acts and even receives information when in meeting, it follows that knowledge to the Gaon Sabha is complete only when the matter is brought to the notice of the L.M.C. in a meeting. The Hon'ble High Court in Vrindavan v. Gaon Sabha, 1980 AWC 243 have held that 'Even the language used in para 128 of the Manual leads to only one conclusion, namely that the provisions made therein must be held to be mandatory'. The Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that no party is to suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission or misdemeanour of his agent, as reported in A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1400. The Pradhan or Secretary of the L.M.C. are mere functionaries of the Gaon Sabha having limited powers and limited functions and there is no presumption that they can never be dishonest to Gaon Sabha, or that the Gaon Sabha must suffer for their defaults. After deep consideration of the matter, I, There for, came to the conclusion that knowledge of the L.M.C. when the later, in a resolution passed in a meeting does not admit such knowledge, and nothing to the contrary is proved. 7. After deep consideration of the matter, I, There for, came to the conclusion that knowledge of the L.M.C. when the later, in a resolution passed in a meeting does not admit such knowledge, and nothing to the contrary is proved. 7. In the instant case, the present Pradhan has categorically denied any knowledge of the ex parte decree to the Gaon Sabha, in his restoration application dated January 20, 1973, in his affidavit dated January 20, 1973 and this fact is supported by the subsequent resolution dated January 25, 1973 by the L.M.C. according approval to the restoration application filed by the Pradhan Gajraj Yadav in anticipation of approval of the L.M.C., as provided in para 28 of the Gaon Sabha and Management Committee Manual. The L.M.C. resolution also took note of the fact that the knowledge of the ex parte decree had been concealed from the Gaon Sablia. Therefore, there is no doubt left that the Gaon Sabha had no knowledge of the ex parte decree before January 25, 1973. 8. The learned trial court has not stated specifically in its order the date of knowledge of the ex parte decree to the Gaon Sabha and the limitation period, but it appears to be no-mistake in the circumstances of the ease, since the application was clearly within time from the date of knowledge to the Gaon Sabha January 25, 1973. 9. Coming to the question of fraud, I again disagree with the contention that collusion between the plaintiff/father Ram Udit and defendant/Gaon Sabha/Pradhan Suggan Pandey (son of the plaintiff) would not amount to fraud on the court. It is true that this collusion which is natural, considering the natural relationship of the two parties, would not in itself amount to fraud on the court, but its consonance, which was also the intention of the former Pradhan and the present revisionist (against Gaon Sabha, ironically), does amount to fraud on the court. The Pradhan, accepted the summons, did not inform the Gaon Sabha or the L.M.C., remained absent from the litigation and did not contest it, in his absence as provided under Rule 110-A(1), did not get the L.M.C to authorise any other member to conduct the suit, and also did not take any action under Rule 110-AAA. The Pradhan, accepted the summons, did not inform the Gaon Sabha or the L.M.C., remained absent from the litigation and did not contest it, in his absence as provided under Rule 110-A(1), did not get the L.M.C to authorise any other member to conduct the suit, and also did not take any action under Rule 110-AAA. It is true that he himself was not a party to the suit, but his father was a party against Gaon Sabha and if he had any bona fide, he was not debarred from acting under Rule 110-AAA and appoint any other member of the L.M.C. to conduct this litigation after a proper resolution of the L.M.C. But he remained completely inactive-purposely, for inactivity served him best and led the trial court to believe, that the Gaon Sabha had been served with the summons and had notice. Here lies the fraud on the court, for the trial court did consider the Gaon Sabha to be absent in spite of notice, not desirous to contest the case. 10. In whatever manner the facts are considered, the trial court was subjected to this constructive fraud, and there can not be two opinions about it. In this view of the matter also, the question of limitation docs not arise. It is noteworthy that the restoration application by the Pradhan dated January 20, 1973 does not show any section or provision of law and so it must be understood from its contents under what provision of law it must be considered. The application clearly mentions the ex parte decree dated July 21, 1966 being passed without the-knowledge of the Gaon Sabha, that during consolidation proceedings, the Pradhan come to know on January 18, 1973 that Suggan Pandey had got the entries in his name, and that there was collusion against the Gaon Sabha. This collusion against the Gaon Sabha combined with the impression on the trial court while, passing the ex parte decree amounts to fraud on the court and there is no scape from this factual position. 11. There is one more argument by the learned counsel for the applicant that the State had contested, therefore, it matters little if the Gaon Sabha contested or not. 11. There is one more argument by the learned counsel for the applicant that the State had contested, therefore, it matters little if the Gaon Sabha contested or not. This really does not deserve consideration in view of the obvious position that the State and the Gaon Sabha are two distinct necessary parties as the defendants and the law does not provide that they are interchangeable, or either of them may serve the purpose of both, howsoever intimate friends they may be and even if they have the same interest. 12. I agree with the observations of the learned Additional Commissioner that the delay of any number of years in moving the restoration application is of no consequence, when on principle, the application is either held to be within time from the date of knowledge or there is justification for condonation of delay. The learned first appellate court rightly placed reliance on the ruling reported in 1971 R.D. 104. Apart from this, when fraud on the court was there, in making the court believe that the suit was not being heard ex parte against the Gaon Sabha when actually the Gaon Sabha was not at all aware of this litigation, the decree had to be set aside under Section 151 of the C.P.C. I also, agreeing with the learned Additional Commissioner, defined that the learned trial court acted within its jurisdiction and did not commit any illegality or material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction, in setting aside the ex parte decree passed on July 21, 1966 against the Gaon Sabha through fraud played on the court. 13. Accordingly, the reference is accepted, the revision petition is found without force and is dismissed with costs.