JUDGMENT 1. THE petitioners obtained those six rules under art 227 of the constitution against the order o the commissioner presidency division acting as the Asppllate Authority under secation 33 of the ueban land (celling and Regulation)Act 1976 the petitioners had preferred the side appeals against the order of the competent Authority of Barrackpore disposing of under secation 9 of the side Act Returns submitted by the petitioners under secation 6 (1) of the side Act. 2. THE principal point of controversy was whether the lands in question were vacant lands within the meaning of the Urban land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act or whether they were being use J mainly for the purpose of agriculture at the relevant date. The Competent Authority, Barrack pore had overruled the claim of the petitioners that the said lands were being used mainly for the purpose of agriculture and therefore they were not liable to vest as excess lands under the aforesaid Act. In our view, the impugned order of the commissioner, Presidency Division, acting as the Appellate Authority ought to be set aside and the appeals remitted back for fresh disposal in accordance with law. On 10th April, 1980 the Competent Authority had heard the parties and had reserved his orders. The Competent Authority in its order had relied upon a certified copy of the extract from the Assessment Register of Kamarhai Municipality. It appears that the said certified copy was granted by the municipality only on 12th April, 1980, i. e., after the Competent Authority had already heard the parties and had reserved his orders. The Appellate Authority was undoubtedly right in holding that according to section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, documents forming the acts and records of the official bodies and public offices are public documents. Certified copies of the said records would be admissible in evidence without calling for or proving their originals. But the Appellate Authority had committed a jurisdictional error by overlooking the provisions of section 35 of the indian Evidence Act under which the said copies would be relevant evidence and therefore, acting as a quasi judicial authority the Competent Authority was bound to give opportunities to the petitioners to lead evidence controverting the presumption. arising from the said entries in respect of the disputed lands. arising from the said entries in respect of the disputed lands. In the instant case the said certified copy of the Municipal Register was brought on record after conclusion of hearing before the Competent Authority. Therefore, obviously the petitioners had no such opportunity to adduce rebutting evidence. We add, however, that by the expression "rebutting evidence" we do not mean adducing oral evidence. The same may consist of any documentary evidence or affidavit evidence by the competent persons. Therefore, we propose to direct the appellate Authority to re-hear the appeals by considering the evidence or record including the extracts from the said municipal records along with any rebutting evidence and affidavit evidence which I may by produced by the appellants within one month of service of notice of arrival of records upon the appellants. 3. WE may also indicate that another reason why we propose to remit the matter back to the Appellate Authority, is that the competent Authority did not at all refer to the contents of the supporting affidavits filed by the appellants who were described as Returnees in the order of the Competent authority. The Appellate Authority at the fresh hearing of the appeals would consider the said affidavits along with the other evidence adduced regarding the nature of the disputed lands. We add that we are not ourselves recording any finding as to whether the said lands were vacant lands or they were to be treated as agricultural lands and the said points are left for determination by the Appellate Authority in accordance with law. 4. NEITHER the Competent Authority nor the Appellate Authority have as yet considered the section 2 (0) Exp (C) of the urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. For this purpose the Appellate Authority would be entitled to receive additional evidence to find whether or not the lands in question had been specified in the Master plan, if any. In that event, the appellants would be also given opportunity to lead documentary evidence to the contrary. We record that both the parties have prayed that the consideration of evidence including additional evidence mentioned above ought to be done, by the Appellate authority. Therefore, we have not been called upon to decide whether or not the appellate Authority has power to receive additional evidence. We record that both the parties have prayed that the consideration of evidence including additional evidence mentioned above ought to be done, by the Appellate authority. Therefore, we have not been called upon to decide whether or not the appellate Authority has power to receive additional evidence. For the disposal of this case we have proceeded on the common consensus that the Appellate authority is entitled to receive additional evidence. 5. SINCE we have decided to remit the cases to the Appellate Authority, we do not propose to allow the application for addition of parties arid we dispose of them. As we have not decided on the merits, we record that either of the parties will not be bound by any statement which they have not controverted by counter-affidavit. 6. WE accordingly make the Rules absolute, set aside the order of the Appellate authority and remit the cases to the Appellate Authority for fresh disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained in our order. There will be no order as to costs. Let the records be sent down expeditiously.