JUDGMENT R.C. Shrivastava, J. The suit, out of which this second appeal has arisen, was instituted by the respondents against the appellant for possession of an accommodation and recovery of arrears of rent in respect thereof. Ejectment was claimed on the grounds specified in clauses (a),(b) and (i) of section 12(1) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The suit was resisted by the appellant on several grounds. The trial Court upheld the plaint allegations that the respondents were the appellant's landlords, they having purchased the premises from his previous landlord Gyanchand and were entitled to recover rent from him. The grounds on which ejectment was claimed were, however, negathed by it. Accordingly, the trial Court dismissed the claim for ejectment but, by stating that the respondents were entitled to get the entire rent deposited by the appellant in Court, impliedly decreed the claim for recovery of rent. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of their claim for ejectment, the respondents preferred first appeal before the Third Additional District Judge, Gwalior. In that appeal, the appellant filed a cross-objection contending, among other things, that he was not proved to be a tenant of the respondents. The first appellate Court confirmed the finding that the appellant was tenant of the respondents. The grounds on which ejectment was claimed were also upheld by it. Finally, the appeal was allowed. The claim for ejectment was decreed and the amount of rent deposited by the appellant in Court was permitted to be withdrawn by the respondents. The cross-objection was dismissed. Being aggrieved thereby, the defendant preferred this second appeal, which was admitted only on the following substantial questions of law. (i) Whether, by not considering some points raised by the present appellant in his cross-objection in the lower appellate Court, that Court has committed an error of law ? (ii) Whether the lower Court's rinding as to the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is vitiated for want of proof of Gyanchand's title to the accommodation in question ? Question No. (i) :- The points which were raised in the cross-objection are stated in the latter part of paragraph No. 5 of the lower appellate Court's judgment. Question No. (i) :- The points which were raised in the cross-objection are stated in the latter part of paragraph No. 5 of the lower appellate Court's judgment. Some of them were decided by that Court and, then, in paragraph No. 27 of its judgment, that Court stated that the parties did not press any other point and, therefore, no other point was considered. In that context, the following observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Gouri Shankar v. M/s. Hindustan Trust (Pvt.) Ltd. and others AIR 1972 SC 2091 are note-worthy. It may be pointed out that raising grounds in the Memorandum of Appeal is not sufficient to show whether a particular point was actually argued or pressed before the Court. If the Court expressly says that only certain points have been argued and no other point has been argued the statement in the judgment has prima facie to be accepted as correct. It was open to the present respondent to file a proper affidavit preferably of his counsel who had argued the case along with the Memorandum of Appeal that such a point had been raised but the Court recording the concession had done so either wrongly or under some misapprehension. No such affidavit was filed with the Memorandum of Appeal and therefore we find no force in the submission of Mr. Chagla that the question of notice had been raised at the time of arguments before the Rent Control Tribunal. The same principles would be applicable in the case of a memorandum of cross-objection also filed under Order 41, Rule 22. That is to say, raising grounds in the memorandum of cross-objection is not sufficient to show that a particular point was actually argued or pressed before the Court at the time of hearing. If the Court expressly says that only certain points have been argued and no other point has been argued, the statement in the judgment has prima facie to be accepted as correct. It is, of course, open to the party concerned to file a proper affidavit, preferably of the counsel who had argued the cross-objection in the lower Court on its behalf, that such a point had been raised but the Court recording the concession had done so either wrongly or under some misapprehension. It is, of course, open to the party concerned to file a proper affidavit, preferably of the counsel who had argued the cross-objection in the lower Court on its behalf, that such a point had been raised but the Court recording the concession had done so either wrongly or under some misapprehension. It has not been contended, nor has any affidavit been filed, that the above-mentioned observation made by the lower Court in paragraph No. 27 of its judgment was wrong. That being so, it must be held to be correct. It follows that the points which were actually raised before it in support of the cross-objection at the time of hearing were decided by it and that the points left undecided by it were not actually raised before it at the time of hearing. Thus, the lower Court cannot be held to have committed an error of law in leaving the points which, though stated in the memorandum of cross-objection, were not raised or pressed at the time of hearing. However, according to the contents of the memorandum of the present appeal, only two contentions, raised in the cross-objection filed in the lower Court, were not considered. Those points are mentioned at (g) and (h) under the heading "SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF LAW" in the memorandum of appeal. The first point is that the lower Court did not consider the objection that the appellant's application under Order 13, Rule 2 for permission to file certain documents was wrongly rejected by the trial Court. On perusal of the cross-objection filed in the lower Court, 1 find that such a contention was not raised therein. So, the appellant has no mouth to say that such a contention was wrongly left unconsidered by the lower Court. The only other point, according to the contents of the memorandum of appeal, is that the lower Court did not consider the contention that an amendment-application filed on behalf of the appellant had been improperly rejected by the trial Court vide order dated 25-12-1978. On perusal of the cross-objection, I find that such a contention was nowhere raised therein. The contention in the cross-objection was that the trial Court had committed a grave error of law in rejecting, vide its order dated 28-12-1978, the appellant's amendment-application dated 21-12-1978. On perusal of the cross-objection, I find that such a contention was nowhere raised therein. The contention in the cross-objection was that the trial Court had committed a grave error of law in rejecting, vide its order dated 28-12-1978, the appellant's amendment-application dated 21-12-1978. On perusal of the trial Court's record, 1 find that no amendment-application dated 21-12-1978 was filed nor was any amendment-application dismissed on 28-12-1978. Therefore, no blame can be fastened unto the lower Court in this behalf also. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that amendment-application had in fact been filed on 10-7-1978 and dismissed on 21-12 1978. The cross-objection did not relate thereto and it was also never amended. Therefore, the counsel is not entitled to make the said submission. Thus, my answer to the first question on which this appeal was admitted is in the negative. Question No. (ii) :-Ex. C-l is the rent-deed dated 1-5-1967 executed by the appellant in favour of Ganeshilal showing that the accommodation in question had been taken on lease by the appellant from Ganeshilal from 1-5-1967 for 11 months on monthly rent of Rs.25 only. The entire house, of which the accommodation in question is a portion, was purchased by the respondent from Gyanchand by three registered sale-deeds dated 1-10-1971. Those sale-deeds are on record. According to the recitals of the sale-deeds, the house had been purchased by Gyanchand from sons of Ganeshilal by a registered sale-deed dated 27-5-1971. That sale-deed having not been produced and proved, the alleged sale in favour of Gyanchand was not proved. It is not disputed that Ganeshilal had already died before the date of the alleged sale in favour of Gyanchand. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that Gyanchand having not been proved to have had title, the respondents did not get any under the sale-deeds dated 1-10-1971 executed by Gyanchand in their favour and, therefore, he is not proved to be the respondents' tenant. In support of his contention that execution of sale-deed alone would not prove title of the vendee unless the vendor's title is established, he has placed reliance on this Court's decision in the case of Sabrani v. Muniya 1967 RN 507. There is no dispute with regard to that proposition of law. But, unlike that case, the suit, out of which this appeal has arisen, is based on alleged relationship of landlord and tenant. There is no dispute with regard to that proposition of law. But, unlike that case, the suit, out of which this appeal has arisen, is based on alleged relationship of landlord and tenant. The lower Courts have concurrently held that, after the alleged sale of the house in favour of Gyanchand, the appellant was paying rent to him. That is not disputed Ex. P-10 is the appellant's reply dated 6-9-1971 to a notice sent to him by Gyanchand. In paragraph No. 2 thereof, he admitted that the house had been purchased by Gyanchand and that he was in occupation as a tenant on monthly rent of Rs.25. In the next paragraph, he informed Gyanchand that he had remitted to him rent for the months of June, July and August 1971 by money-orders and the receipts were also received by him. Ex. P-9 is the appellant's reply dated 29-11-1971 to the respondents' notice. In paragraph No. 1 thereof, he stated that, formerly he was tenant of Gyanchand and that he was regularly paying rent to Gyanchand at the rate of Rs.25 p. m. Thus it is abundantly clear not only that the appellant admitted the sale in favour of Gyanchand but also that he attorned to Gyanchand and started paying rent to him. In view of the admission of sale in favour of Gyanchand contained in second paragraph of Ex. P-9, it was not necessary for the respondents to prove it. In any case, the appellant having attorned to Gyanchand, he is estopped from denying Gyanchand's title. Under section 116 of the Evidence Act, a tenant of immovable property is estopped from denying, during continuance of the tenancy, his landlord's title to such property at the beginning of the tenancy. As pointed out in the case of Smt. Sugga Bai Ramnath Gupta and others v. Smt. Hiralal and others 1968 MPL J 840, That only provides for a restricted kind of estoppel. There may be other kinds of estoppel which might operate and which have been applied by the Indian Courts on principles of equity, justice and good conscience. In that case, reliance was placed on a decision of the Privy Council. After quoting a passage from that decision, this Court concluded in the following words. Therefore, what a tenant cannot be permitted to do is to deny the title of the original lessor. In that case, reliance was placed on a decision of the Privy Council. After quoting a passage from that decision, this Court concluded in the following words. Therefore, what a tenant cannot be permitted to do is to deny the title of the original lessor. Similarly, he cannot be permitted to deny the derivative title of a reversioner if he has attorned to him. However, if he has not attorned to him or if he has not paid any rent to him, he can certainly deny the derivative title of a reversioner. To this extent, their Lordships of the Privy Council have laid down that a tenant can deny the title within these permissible limits. Similarly, he can also contend as against the original lessor that he has ceased to be his landlord because of some subsequent transfer. These, in my opinion, are the permissible limits where the estoppel will not be applied as against the tenant. Thus, it is clear that, having attorned to Gyanchand, the appellant is not entitled to deny his title. It follows that the question No. (ii) on which the appeal was admitted is also answered in the negative. An application (Interlocutory Application No. 1795/80) has been tiled on behalf of the appellant under Order 41 Rule 27 for permission to file some rent receipts and water supply bills. The only ground on which the permission has been applied for is that 'these papers are found when he made deep searches'. That is to say, permission is sought under clause (aa) only of Order 41 Rule 27 (1). No affidavit has been filed in support of this contention and no reason has been assigned for having not made such an alleged search during pendency of the suit in the trial Court or during pendency of the first appeal. The suit was instituted as long ago as on 28-1-1972. Date of the alleged search and the place of discovering the documents have also not been disclosed. In these circumstances, no reliance can be placed on the said ground. Not only that, if the documents are permitted to be filed at this stage, further oral evidence will have to be adduced to prove them and the entire suit will be reopened after the lapse of such a long period. In these circumstances, no reliance can be placed on the said ground. Not only that, if the documents are permitted to be filed at this stage, further oral evidence will have to be adduced to prove them and the entire suit will be reopened after the lapse of such a long period. Further, the documents are not at all relevant to the questions on which the appeal was admitted for hearing. Under these circumstances, the application cannot be allowed and is hereby dismissed. In the end, the learned counsel for the appellant wanted to argue that the grounds on which ejectment was claimed were not proved. Before admission of the appeal, an application (Interlocutory Application No. 3067/80) had been filed on behalf of the appellant praying for admission of the appeal on those grounds. That was considered when the appeal was posted to 29-10-1980 for motion hearing. After hearing the appellant's counsel on that date, the appeal was admitted only on the substantial questions of law mentioned in paragraph No. 1 above. It is, therefore, not now open to the appellant's counsel to raise any other question. A cross-objection has been filed on behalf of the respondents but it has not been pressed. In the result, the appeal as well as the cross-objection are dismissed. That being so, the parties are left to bear their own costs as incurred. Counsel's fee shall be up to Rs.100 only, if pre-certified. Appeal dismissed