JUDGMENT - Padhye R.S. , J.-Petitioner seeks to challenge an order of eviction passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Darwha, district Yavatmal against him under the provisions of section 120(c) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 (referred to hereinafter as the Bombay Tenancy Act) upon an application by landlord-Akbarali who is respondent before me, as confirmed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal at Nagpur in Revision Application No, Ten-A-169/80 on 2-2-1981. 2. Briefly stated the facts relevant for the purpose of this petition are that respondent Akbarali claimed that petitioner Noorkhan was engaged as a servant to work on his field survey No. 73/2 of Darwha owned by him and when his services were terminated on 26-6-1976 he obtained forcible posses-sion of the said field by putting forward a false claim that he was a tenant under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act. It was contended tkat there was no contract of tenancy and Noorkhan was a rank trespasser. Summary eviction under the provisions of section 120(c) of the Bombay Tenancy Act was prayed. Noorkhan denied that he was a servant of Akbarali at any time and further claimed that the field in question was leased out to him in the summer of 1961 by the father of Akbarali who was managing the field property on his behalf and that he continued to cultivate the field in question as a tenant even after 1965, in which year father of Akbarabli died. According to defence, Noorkhan being a tenant under the Bombay Tenancy Act, on 1-4-1961 had acquired statutory ownership over the field in question. 3. After discussing the evidence adduced by both parties, Sub-Divisional Officer, Darwha came to a conclusion that there was no agreement of lease entered between Noorkhan and father of applicant Akbarali and that Noorkhan was an employee of the father of applicant Akbarali. Apart from the evidence adduced, reliance was also placed on an admission in this behalf alleged to have been given by Noorkhan in a Rent Control Case. With these findings summary eviction of Noorkhan from survey No. 73/2 of Darwha was ordered. These findings were confirmed in revision. 4. Apart from the evidence adduced, reliance was also placed on an admission in this behalf alleged to have been given by Noorkhan in a Rent Control Case. With these findings summary eviction of Noorkhan from survey No. 73/2 of Darwha was ordered. These findings were confirmed in revision. 4. Before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal an argument was advanced on behalf of Noorkhan that he could not be ousted from possession of the field in question under the provisions of section 120(c) of the Bombay Tenancy Act because it could not be said that he was unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of field survey No. 73/2 of Darwha to the use and occup1tion of which he is not entitled under the said provisions (provisions of Bombay Tenancy Act). This argument was advanced by reference to a decision of the Supreme Court 'Of India in the case of (State of Punjab and others v. Bhai Ardaman Singh and others)1. Shn P. C. Madkholkar learned counsel appearing for petitioner submitted that Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal at Nagpur brushed aside this argument without discussing its merits and merely by observing that the case of Supreme Court of India referred to above related to Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1953 and, there-fore, it need not be considered. 5. For appreciating the above contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner it will be necessary to briefly refer to the facts involved in the Supreme Court case of Bhai Ardaman Singh (supra), and the finding which is relied upon. Alleging that Bhai Arjun Singh who was predecessor of respondent Bhai Ardaman Singh before the Supreme Court of India forcibly evicted 70 tenants from certain lands in May-June 1943, applications to Collector Sangrur and Bhatinda for an order for restoration of possession under section 43 of Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (No.8 of 1953) was moved by the evicted tenants. Collector granted the applications and the orders were confirmed in appeal before the Commissioner. A writ Petition filed by Bhai Ardaman Singh against these orders came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab. Collector granted the applications and the orders were confirmed in appeal before the Commissioner. A writ Petition filed by Bhai Ardaman Singh against these orders came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab. However, all these concurrent orders were set aside in Letters Patent Appeal by the High rCourt of Punjab holding that section 43 not being retrospective had no application to the facts of the case and that sufficient opportunity to Jead eVIdence was not given to Bhai Ardaman Singh. Thi's appellate decision in Letters Patent Appeal was a subject marter of challenge before the Supreme Court of India in an appeaJ filed by State of Punjab and the tenants. The relevant portion of section 43 of the E.epsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (No.8 of 1953) is as under:- “43. Summary eviction and fine. - (1) Any person who is in wrong-ful or unauthorised possession of any land (b) to the use and occupation of which he is not entitled under the provisions of this Act; may, after summary enquiry, be ejected by the Collector....” Referring to this provision in Pepsu Act, Supreme Court of India found: “In order that the jurisdiction of the Collector to hold a summary enquiry and pass the order complained of may be attracted, it was neces-sary to establish under clause (b) of section 43(1), the person in wrongfulor unauthorised' possession was not entitled to the use and occupation of lands under the provisions of the Act. Counsel for the State of Punjab is unable to invite our attention to any provision which renders the first respondent (landlord Bhai Ardaman Singh) disentitled by virtue of the provisions of the Act to the use and occupq,tion of the lands. Section 43(1)(b) has, therefore, no application. The condition precedent to the investment of jurisdiction in the Collector being absent, the revenue authorities had no power to pass the order in ejectment which they purported to pass.” Besides the initial lack of jurisdiction on the above interpretation, Supreme Court of India further held agreeing with the High Court that Clause (b) of section 43 had no retrospective operation. 6. Section 120 of the Bombay Tenancy Act reads as under:- “120. 6. Section 120 of the Bombay Tenancy Act reads as under:- “120. Any person unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of any land- (a) the transfer of which either by the act of parties or by the operation of law is invalid under the provisions of this Act, ' (b) the management of which has been assumed under the said provisions, or (c) to the use and occupation of which he is not entitled under the said provisions and the said provisions do not provide for the eviction of such person, may be summarily evicted by the Collector after such inquiry as he deems fit.” It was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the opening part of sec-tion l20(c) of Bombay Tenancy Act and the relevant part of section 43(b) considered by the Supreme Court of. India in the case of Bhai Ardaman Singh (supra) were identical and, therefore, the law laid down relating to interpretation of section 43(b) of Pepsu Act (No.8 of 1953) was applicable to inter-pretation of section 120(c) of the Bombay Tenancy Act. On that basis it was urged that so long as it was not declared that petitioner Noorkhan was not a tenant under the Bombay Tenancy Act, it could not be said that he was disentitled to possession of the field in question under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act. 7. At the end of paragraph 4 of the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Bhai Ardaman Singh's case (supra) there is an observation to the effect that the Supreme Court was agreeing with the High Court's decision in Letters Patent Appeal that clause (b) of section 43 of Pepsu Act (No.8 of 1953) had no retrospective operation and therefore the observation in para-graph 3 extracted above relating to interpretation of section 43(1)(b) of Pepsu Act was obiter-dictum and nothing more than the opinion expressed by the Supreme Court of India though it was not necessary for the decision of the case 8. According to the decision on the question of interpretation of sec-tion 43(1)(b) of Pepsu Act having been called upon, the relevant observations cannot be termed as obiter dicta. It was so held by a Division Bench of this Court in (Mohandas Issardas and others v. A. N. Sathanathan)2. According to the decision on the question of interpretation of sec-tion 43(1)(b) of Pepsu Act having been called upon, the relevant observations cannot be termed as obiter dicta. It was so held by a Division Bench of this Court in (Mohandas Issardas and others v. A. N. Sathanathan)2. by observing that “it would be incorrect to say that every opinion of the Supreme Court would be binding upon the High Courts of India. The only opinion which would be binding would be an opinion expressed on a question that arose for the determination of the Supreme Court and even though ultimately it might be found that the parbcular question was not necessary for the decision of the case, even so, if an opinion was expressed by the Supreme Court on that question then the opinion wou]d be binding upon us “ In another decision of a Division of this Court in the case of (Anant Baburao Sawant and others v. State)3, it was held that “A decision was invited on that point, and if the Supreme Court pronounced a decisioR, in that circumstance we do not think that the observations could te trea ted as obiter dicta. In any case, even the obiter dicta of the highest Court are binding upon the Courts subordinats to it.” Shri Madkholkar pointed out that the law on this point as it stands today is that “Judgments of this Court are decisional tetween litigants but declaratory for the nation,” as laid do” n by Supreme Court of India in (Ganga Sugar Corpn. v. State of U. P.)4 and therefore the observations of Supreme Court in Bhai Ardaman Singh's case (snpra) were binding upon us. 9. That may be so, but it is equally true as observed by Masodkar J. in the case of (Wasudeo Madhaorao Asarkar and another v. State of Maharashtra)5, that: “But every decision of a case has to be understood in the context of the controversy. Mere logical extensions from the ratio or from obiter dicta are not the part of ratio nor of dicta.” Therefore, before the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhai Ardaman Singh's case (supra) is made applicable to the facts of the present case it will be necessary to understand it in tbe context of tbe controversy in the present case. 10. Pepsu Act (No.8 of 1953) contains 53 sections. 10. Pepsu Act (No.8 of 1953) contains 53 sections. After perusing the entire Act I find that there is no provision similar to section 36(2) of the Bombay Tenancy Act which contains a mandate providing that no landlord shall obtain possession of any land held by a tenant except under an order of Tahsildar. If a case similar on facts to the case of Bhai Ardamen Singh under the Bombay Tenancy Act was before the Supreme Court, Counsel for appellant could certainly have pJaced his finger on section 36 (2) of the Bombay Tenancy Act for showing that it rendered the landlord disentitled by virtue of the said provision to the use and occupation of the landlord in dispute. An attempt was made on behalf of the petitioner to canvass that disentitlement should be construed to mean a prohibition contained in the provisions of the Act but ultimately it was conceded tbat if there was a decision by Tahsildar under the Bombay Tenancy Act that the person was not a tenant, it could be said that he was disentitled to use and occupation of the disputed land under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act. Pepsu Act (No.8 of 1953) did not contain a provision to justify an argument that tbe landlord who had taken forcible possession of land from tenants was not entitled to its use and occupation under the provisions of the said Act. But such a situation does not arise in a case under the Bombay Tenancy Act, where a landlord comes to the Court of Collector with an application under section 120 (c) of the Bombay Tenancy Act alleging that the tenant claimed entitlement to use and occupation of land under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act, but the facts and circumstances disclose that he was not so entitled. A person who claims right of occupation and possession of land on the allegation that he is a tenant, can certainly be said to be disentitled to occupation and possession of the said land under the provisions of Bombay Tenancy Act if the landlord is able to satisfy that the said claim has tIo legs to stand. 11. I feel that if such an interpretation is not placed on the concept of 'entitlement' or 'disentitlement' under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act section 120(c) of the Bombay Tenancy Act will be rendered almost Iife-less. 11. I feel that if such an interpretation is not placed on the concept of 'entitlement' or 'disentitlement' under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act section 120(c) of the Bombay Tenancy Act will be rendered almost Iife-less. Shri Madkholkar submitted that provisions of section 120(c) of the Bombay Tenancy Act were intended by the Legislature to apply to only those cases in which disentitlement ora person to use and occupation ,of land was established by a decision of compe-tent authority in proceedings under the Bombay Tenancy Act. I am unable to agree with such an interpretation which will result into stifling the remedy of summary eviction by requiring the parties, seeking summary eviction to resort to a long-drawn procedure of obtaining adjudication of the disputes raised under regular procedure provided by the Bombay Tenancy Act. The very purpose of providing a summary remedy was evictipn of trespassers who had ceased to be entitled to possession of lands or whose claims to such possession based on some provision in Bombay Tenancy Act were so flimsy that the real question involved was of eviction of a trespasser and not eviction of a person who could put forward some reasonab!e and substantial claim under Bombay Tenancy Act. I feel that an interpretation which will promote the remedy of summary eviction and not which will stifle it, should be accepted. 12. The second contention advanct'd on behalf of the petitioner pertains to a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of (Kashiram Shriram Dobale v. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur and another) 6. Jurisdiction to decide as to whether a person is or was at any time past, a tenant under the Bombay Tenancy Act is vested in Tahsildar under section 100 (2) of the Bombay Tenancy Act. For applicablility of the provisions of section 120(c) for the purpose of summary evictIOn Collector has to be satisfied that (1) tenant is in unauthorised or wrongful possession of land (2) tenant has ceased to be entitled to the use and occupation of the said land under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act and (3) provisions in Bombay Tenancy Act do not provide for the eviction of such person. The question as to whether such person has ceased to be entitled to the use and occupation of the disputed land and the question as to whether such person is or is not a tenant fell for decision of two different authorities under section 100(2) and under section 120(c) of the Bombay Tenancy Act and since the two questions are over lapping the conflict so created was required to be solved by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Kashiram (supra). The so!ution that was found out was that it was for the Collector entertaining an application under section 120 of the Bombay Tenancy Act to see as to whether “in substance” the application before him was an application complaining of unauthorised occupation or wrongful possession of a person and if he came to a conclusion that the person was in unauthorit'ed occupation or wrongful possession he would have jurisdiction under section 120 of the Bombay Tenancy Act to decide the question of summary eviction even if that person raised a plea that he was a tenant, because the mere raising of plea, would not, as in the case of Civil Court, oust the jurisdiction of the Collector. It was held that the Collector will have to look to the substance of the matter and decide whether it was a dispute'regarding unauthorised occupation or wrongful dispossession or was a dispute, in substance, regardirig tenancy. If it was latter he had to refer the malter to Tahsildar. If it was former, he had jurisdiction to decide it. Shri Madkholkar submitted that the solution of apparent conflict between the two jurisdictIons under sections 120 and 100(2) of the Bombay Tenancy Act as found out by the Full Bench was not satisfactory and requires reconsideration and clarification and that a reference to a larger Bench should be made. Pointing out the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of State of (Maharashtra v. Kusum Wd/0 Charudutta Ors)7 it was submitted that existence of a Full Bench decision in the case of Kashiram was no bar for reference of the question raised to larger Bench. Pointing out the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of State of (Maharashtra v. Kusum Wd/0 Charudutta Ors)7 it was submitted that existence of a Full Bench decision in the case of Kashiram was no bar for reference of the question raised to larger Bench. I myself am unable to agree with the contention that Collector could not, even for the limited purpose of ascertaining his own jurisdiction, examine the question as to whether the plea of tenancy raised by the tenant in a case under section 120 of the Bombay Tenancy Act was a plea of substance or not. I do not, therefore, think that a reference to a larger Bench as submitted is necessary. 13. It was then submitted that appeal against tenancy Tahsildar's deci-sion under section 100(2) of the Bombay Tenancy Act on the question as to whether the person was or was not a tenant was with Collector and, therefore, section 120(c) of the Bombay Tenancy Act under which an application could lie to Collector directly should be interpreted in such a fashion as to exclude jurisdiction to decide the question of tenancy. It is nobody's case that Collector can decide a question of tenancy under the provisions of section 120(c) of the Bombay Tenancy Act, and therefore, this argument has no substance. Every Court or Tribunal has got a right to decide for itself as to whether it has got jurisdiction in a given matter and for that limited purpose the question as to whether a plea raised for ousting the jurisdiction is a plea of substance or not, is always there. 14. Shri Bapat. learned counsel appearing for respondent invited my attention to two decisions of this Court in the case of (Babulal v. M. R. T.)8 and (Dadaji v. Shamrao and others)9, for pointing out that rank trespassers and sub tenants introduced by a tenant who has left could be evicted under the provisions of section 120(c) of the Bombay Tenancy Act. I do not think that detailed reference to these decisions is necessary for the simple reason that the question regarding interpretation of section 120(c) raised in the present case was not, in terms, raised in these two cases. I do not think that detailed reference to these decisions is necessary for the simple reason that the question regarding interpretation of section 120(c) raised in the present case was not, in terms, raised in these two cases. He also invited my attention to a decision of this Court in (Kausalyabai v. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal at Nagpur)lO for the proposition that a person who is not a tenant was not entitled to possession and occupation of land under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act. I have already held that a person whq claims a right for use and occupation of land on the basis that he is a tenant under the Bombay Tenancy Act, could certainly be evicted under section 120(c) of tpe Bombay Tenancy Act, showing that his claim was totally unfounded and this could be done even without obtaining a declaration of the Tahsildar under section 100(2) of the Bombay Tenancy Act and the view taken is the above case supports my observations. 15. A submission on merits of the case was also made on behalf of the petitioner. It was submitted that tLere was variance in pleadings and the case as ultimately unfolded by evidence and that there was no proper enquiry. Shri Madkholkar took me through the pleadings and the evidence as wen as the findings of the two Courts below on the merits of the case and I find, apart from the fact that there is a concurrent finding of facts recorded by the two Courts below that the contention that there was lack of proper enquiry or that there was variance in pleadings of the case ultimately unfolded, is without merit. In the circumstances of the case, it is not possible to contend that the findings of fact recorc!ed by the two Courts below are eith”r perverse or based on no material. 16. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Rule discharged. Petition dismissed. -----