S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner who was the original owner and occupant of agricultural lands bearing S. No. 81 admeasuring 3 acres-9 gunthas and S. No. 145 admeasuring 2 acres-34 gunthas situated on the outskirts of village Jetalpur in Vadodara taluka of Vadodara district has come to this court by way of the present petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India seeking reversal of the order passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No. TEN B. A. 218/81 which came to be dismissed by the Revenue Tribunal and as a result the orders passed by the tenancy authorities under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) viz the Mamlatdar Baroda and Assistant Collector Baroda in appeal came to be confirmed by the Revenue Tribunal. In order to appreciate the nature of controversy between the parties in the present proceedings it is necessary to glance through a few relevant facts. ( 2 ) RESPONDENT No. 1 herein is a partnership firm. The said firm wanted to purchase some lands and for that purpose respondent No. 1 contacted the petitioner in 1961. The petitioner agreed to sell the aforesaid lands to respondent No. 1 but as they were agricultural lands situated at village Jetalpur and as they were governed by the provisions of the Tenancy Act which were then applicable it was found necessary to apply to the Collector under sec. 63 of the Tenancy Act for obtaining his permission as respondent No. 1 was not an agriculturist. ( 3 ) THEREAFTER the Collector Baroda started an inquiry under sec. 63 of the Act and by his order dated 10/03/1961 he was pleased to grant permission to the petitioner to sell the lands in question to respondent No. 1 on certain conditions. One of the condition mentioned in the said order of the Collector was to the effect that the lands should be used for non-agricultural purpose by respondent No. 1 within one year from the date of getting possession. Pursuant to the aforesaid permission granted by the Collector a sale deed was executed by the petitioner in favour of respondent No. 1 on 24-1-1962 and on the very day possession on the lands conveyed in the document was handed over to respondent No. 1. Pursuant to the aforesaid permission granted by the Collector a sale deed was executed by the petitioner in favour of respondent No. 1 on 24-1-1962 and on the very day possession on the lands conveyed in the document was handed over to respondent No. 1. The sale consideration under the said transaction was to the tune of Rs. 1 0 0 - which were received by the petitioner when the transaction of sale took place as started above. The further case of the petitioner is that respondent No. 1 did not comply with the condition incorporated in the order of permission granted by the Collector under sec. 63 of the Act and the lands in question were not put to non-agricultural use within the period of one year from the date of obtaining of possession of the concerned lands. The case of the petitioner is that the said lands were continued to be used as agricultural lands upto the year 1978 It is further case of the petitioner that the concerned two lands were originally not included in the municipal limits of Baroda city. That by a notification dated 22-6-1964 issued by the Government of Gujarat Rural Development Department the Government of Gujarat in exercise of the powers conferred by sec. 4 (2) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 was pleased to declare that the areas territories of which were shown in the Schedule `a to the notification would get included in the limits of the municipal limits of Baroda Borough Municipality with effect from the date of the notification. The said notification is annexure `c to the petition. Schedule `a to the said notification says that so far as village Jetalpur is concerned the whole village inclusive of all revenue survey numbers being 187 in number got included within the municipal limits of the then existing Baroda Municipal Borough. It is therefore obvious that on the day on which the concerned lands were sold by the petitioner to respondent No. 1 as per the permission of the Collector under sec. 63 of the Act the concerned agricultural lands were outside the Municipal limits of Baroda Borough Municipality and they subsequently got included within the limits of the Baroda Municipal Borough which later on became Baroda Municipal Corporation. ( 4 ) IT is also necessary to note at this stage one important event viz. 63 of the Act the concerned agricultural lands were outside the Municipal limits of Baroda Borough Municipality and they subsequently got included within the limits of the Baroda Municipal Borough which later on became Baroda Municipal Corporation. ( 4 ) IT is also necessary to note at this stage one important event viz. that the then State of Bombay on 29/05/1958 had issued a notification under sec. 88 (1) (a) of the Act specifying the areas of Municipal Borough of Baroda as being reserved for non-agricultural and industrial development. The effect of the said notification was that secs. 1 to 87 of the Tenancy Act did not apply to the lands included within the limits of Baroda Municipal Borough as existing of the date of the notification viz. 29 It is obvious that the lands in question in the present proceedings which were conveyed by the petitioner by a regular sale-deed to respondent No. 1 were not governed by the said notification under sec. 88 issued on 29-5-1968 as they were outside the municipal limits of Baroda Municipal Borough in those days. Even when the sale transaction took place concerning these lands they were outside the limits of Baroda Municipal Borough and they were disposed of as agricultural lands to which the Tenancy Act applied and were accordingly sold by the petitioner after having obtained permission of the Collector under sec. 63 as seen above. The aforesaid resume of facts shows that the concerned conveyed lands sold by the petitioner to respondent No. 1 later on got included within the Municipal limits of Baroda Borough Municipality in 1964 by which time they had already been purchased by respondent No. 1 having obtained previous permission of the Collector under sec. 63 of the Act. ( 5 ) IT appears that subsequently somewhere in the year 1974 the Mamlatdar Baroda initiated suo motu proceedings under sec. 84c of the Tenancy Act on the ground that respondent No. 1 had committed breach of the conditions of the Collectors order under sec. 63 by which it was required to put the conveyed lands to non-agricultural use within one year of the obtaining of their possession from the petitioner and as respondent No. 1 had not complied with the said condition the sale transaction had become invalid and consequently it was required to be dealt with under sec. 84-C of the Act. 63 by which it was required to put the conveyed lands to non-agricultural use within one year of the obtaining of their possession from the petitioner and as respondent No. 1 had not complied with the said condition the sale transaction had become invalid and consequently it was required to be dealt with under sec. 84-C of the Act. In the aforesaid proceedings under sec. 84 which were registered as tenancy case 84-C/1/74 before the Mamlatdar. Baroda; the Talati Jetalpur taluka Baroda was shown as the applicant or plaintiff on behalf of the State while as opponent-defendants were shown the names of respondent No. 1 as well as the present petitioner. The case of the petitioner is that no notice was issued to the petitioner by the Mamlatdar in the aforesaid proceedings and only respondent No. 1 was heard. Ultimately the Mamlatdar Baroda came to the conclusion by his order dated 19-3-1975 that as the lands in question were subsequently included within the limits of Baroda Municipal Borough. provisions of secs. 1 to 87 would not apply to these lands as laid down by sec. 88 (1) (b) of the Act and consequently there was no question of taking any steps against the vendor or vendee viz. the present petitioner or respondent No. 1 and hence the suo motu proceedings were ordered to be dropped. The aforesaid order of the Mamlatdar and ALT dropping the proceedings under sec. 84c is annexed at Annexure `d to the present petition. It appears that thereafter nothing further happened regarding the said lands and the matter practically went into cold storage. But thereafter. it appears that somewhere in the year 1980 the Mamlatdar Baroda again initiated suo motu proceedings under sec. 84c of the Act alleging the same grounds against the petitioner and respondent No. 1 viz. that respondent No. 1 by not putting the lands in question to nonagricultural use within one year after having obtained possession in 1962 had committed breach of the order of the Collector passed under sec. 63 of the Act and hence the proceedings under sec. 84-C were required to be taken out in connection with the said transaction which according to the Mamlatdar. had become invalid. 63 of the Act and hence the proceedings under sec. 84-C were required to be taken out in connection with the said transaction which according to the Mamlatdar. had become invalid. It is pertinent to note that the second suo motu proceedings of June 1980 were initiated on the very ground on which the earlier suo motu proceedings were initiated 5 to 6 years back in 1974 and which were ultimately dropped by the Mamlatdar by his order dated 19-3-1975 as noted above. In the second suo motu proceedings under sec. 84c the Mamlatdar issued notice of hearing to the petitioner as well as respondent No. 1 viz. the original seller and purchaser respectively of the concerned two pieces of land. Having heard the parties the Mamlatdar came to the conclusion that as the earlier proceedings under sec. 84c on the very same ground were already dropped by his predecessor in 1975 the second suo motu proceedings were not maintainable and would be barred by res-judicata. In the result by his order dated 9-7-1980 the Additional Mamlatdar Baroda dropped even the second suo motu proceedings. That should have really put an end to the controversy between the parties. As no appeal was filed on behalf of the State against the order of the Mamlatdar dropping the suo motu proceedings neither the vendor nor the vendee viz. the petitioner or respondent No. 1 could have been said to be really aggrieved by the order of the Mamlatdar dropping the suo motu proceedings under sec. 84c. Still however the present petitioner carried the matter in appeal before the Assistant Collector Baroda feeling aggrieved by the order of the Mamlatdar and ALT dropping the suo motu proceedings against the concerned parties. The said appeal was registered as tenancy appeal/11/80. The Asistsant Collector Baroda dismissed the appeal having taken the view that the present petitioner had no right to the such an appeal before him because the Government had initiated the proceedings suo motu and had dropped them and hence the petitioner had no occasion to go in appeal against that order. The Assistant Collector also took the view under sec. 84c only fact of transfer was to be inquired into and not the breach of conditions of the Collectors order under sec. 63. The Assistant Collector also took the view under sec. 84c only fact of transfer was to be inquired into and not the breach of conditions of the Collectors order under sec. 63. He was also of the view that such suo motu proceedings cannot be taken out after lapse of number of years and as the transaction was of 1962 the second suo motu proceedings as initiated in 1980 were beyond reasonable limit of time and hence also they were rightly dropped by the Mamlatdar. The Appellate Collector was also of the view that even on the ground of res-judicata and constructive res-judicata the second suo motu proceedings were barred. The appellate Collector also considered the provisions of sec. 88 (1) (b) second proviso and held that in view of the aforesaid statutory provision also no inquiry under sec. 84c with respect to the concerned lands could can be held. The appellate Collector did not agree with the contention of the petitioner that she was not heard by the Mamlatdar at the stage of earlier suo motu proceedings in 1974. That no affidavit was filed by the petitioner to show that she was note heard earlier before the Mamlatdar. On the aforesaid grounds the petitioners appeal was dismissed by the appellate authority. The petitioner thereafter approached the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal by way of Revision Application TEN. B. A. 218 of 1982 under sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act. The Revenue Tribunal took the view that the second suo motu inquiry under sec. 84c as initiated by the Mamlatdar in 1980 was barred by the provisions of res-judicata in view of the fact that earlier in 1975 similar proceedings were initiated and dropped. On merits the Tribunal took the view following a Division Bench judgment of the Tribunal in the case of Sharadchandra Chimanrao v. Bai Dahi reported in XIV G. R. T. L. R. 113 that the transaction in question was covered by the second proviso to sec. 88 (1) (b) of the Tenancy Act and therefore also no proceedings under sec. 84c could be initiated by the competent authority so far as the transaction in question was concerned. On the aforesaid reasons the Tribunal dismissed the revision application of the petitioner. It is thereafter that the petitioner has come to this court by way of the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. . . . 84c could be initiated by the competent authority so far as the transaction in question was concerned. On the aforesaid reasons the Tribunal dismissed the revision application of the petitioner. It is thereafter that the petitioner has come to this court by way of the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 6 ) BEFORE proceeding to consider the question of applicability of the second proviso to sec. 88 (1) (b) of the Act it is necessary to keep in view certain undisputed facts which clearly emerge on the record of this case. The lands in question viz. S. Nos. 81 and 145 which belong to the petitioner were situated at village Jetalpur in Baroda district at the time when they were subjected to the transaction of sale in favour of respondent No. 1. They were agricultural lands which were out side the municipal limits of the Baroda city in 1962 when the sale deed after obtaining prior permission of the Collector under sec. 63 was executed by the petitioner in favour of respondent No. 1 having taken the sale consideration of Rs. 1 0 0 from respondent No. 1. The then State of Bombay issued notification under sec. 88 (1) (b) of the Act on 26-5-1958. The said notification provided as under:-"in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (b) of sec. 88 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 (Bombay Act No. IXVII of 1948) the Government of Bombay hereby specifies the areas within the limits of the Municipal Borough of Baroda as being reserved for non-agricultural and industrial development". Sec. 88 (1) of the Tenancy Act states-" 88 Save as otherwise provided in sub-sec. (2) nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Act shall apply. (B) to any area which the State Government may from time to time by notification in the Official Gazette specify as being reserved for non-agricultural or industrial development". It is therefore obvious that the entire machinery of the Tenancy Act as provided by secs. 1 to 87 will not apply to lands which are covered by the notification under sec. 88 (1) (b) as issued by the concerned State Government. Thus secs. It is therefore obvious that the entire machinery of the Tenancy Act as provided by secs. 1 to 87 will not apply to lands which are covered by the notification under sec. 88 (1) (b) as issued by the concerned State Government. Thus secs. 1 to 87 of the Tenancy Act would not have applied to the lands in question if they were within the limits of Baroda Municipal Borough at the relevant time when the aforesaid notification under sec. 88 (1) (b) was issued on 29-5-1958 It is an admitted position on the record of the case that the concerned lands which were situated at village Jetalpur were for the first time brought within the limits of Municipal Borough of Baroda by a later notification of 22-6-1964 which is at annexure `c to the petition. Till that time the lands in question remained outside the limits of Baroda Municipal borough and consequently they remained governed by the provisions of secs. 1 to 87 of the Tenancy Act and that is precisely the reason why for selling these lands to non-agriculturist like respondent No. 1 the petitioner had to apply to the Collector Baroda under sec. 63 of the Act in 1961 for getting permission to sell these lands to respondent No. 1 and that is how the Collector Baroda by his order dated 10-3-1962 which is at annexure `a to the petition granted permission to the petitioner. ( 7 ) A question arose before various tenancy authorities including the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal as to whether the exemption granted to the lands situated within the municipal Borough limits by the notification of 29-5-1958 can automatically extend to areas which were subsequently added to areas situated within such municipal limits by a later notification issued under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 Different courts and authorities had taken different views. Ultimately the Revenue Tribunal took the view that exemption under secs. Ultimately the Revenue Tribunal took the view that exemption under secs. 1 to 87 of the Act would be available also in cases of transactions pertaining to lands which were subsequently included within the municipal limits and the earlier notification issued at the relevant time would automatically cover newly added areas which might have got subsequently included within the municipal limits and in the light of the aforesaid decision of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal number of transactions pertaining to such lands which were subsequently added had taken place between the parties on the assumption that secs. 1 to 87 of the Act would not be applicable to such added areas subsequently brought within the municipal limits on the supposition that the earlier notification of 1958 would even cover subsequently added areas within its sweep. In the background of the aforesaid decisions of various tenancy authorities including the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal which were holding field at the relevant time the State of Gujarat found it necessary to amend sec. 88 (1) of the Tenancy Act by Gujarat Act 36/65 and by the said amendment two provisos were inserted in sec. 88 (1 ). As the dispute between the parties centres round the second proviso which tries to carve out an exception to the operation of the 1st proviso it is necessary to reproduce both these provisos at this stage as under. " Provided that if after a notification in respect of any area specified in the notification is issued under this clause whether before or after the commencement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Gujarat Amendment) Act 1955 the limits of the area so specified are enlarged on account of the addition of any other area thereto then merely by reason of such addition the reservation as made by the notification so issued shall not apply and shall be deemed never to have applied to the area so added notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any Judgment decree or order of any court Tribunal or any other authority. PROVIDED further that if any land in the area so added has been transferred or acquired after the issue of the notification referred to in the first proviso but before the 29th day of October 1964 such transfer or acquisition of land shall have effect as if it were made in an area to which this clause applies". PROVIDED further that if any land in the area so added has been transferred or acquired after the issue of the notification referred to in the first proviso but before the 29th day of October 1964 such transfer or acquisition of land shall have effect as if it were made in an area to which this clause applies". A mere look at the first proviso shows that the legislature made it absolutely clear that for newly added areas within the municipal limits the earlier notification issued under sec. 88 (1) (b) would not automatically apply notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any judgment decree or order of any court Tribunal or any other authority. Thus the legislature by enacting the first proviso made it explicitly clear that if any transactions have taken place with respect to lands which were subseque ntly brought within the municipal limits these transactions would be subject to the provisions of secs. 1 to 87 of the Act as the earlier notification which may be styled as parent notification under sec. 88 (1) (b) would only apply to lands situated within the municipal limits as existing at the time when such notification under sec. 88 (1) (b) was issued. If the first proviso alone had held the field it could have been easily seen that the transactions pertaining to lands situated in the added areas which were subsequently brought within the municipal limits would have remained affected by the entire machinery of sections 1 to 87 of the Act. But the legislature simultaneously considered the fact situations which had taken place during the intervening period that is from the time the parent notification under sec. 88 (1) (b) was issued till 29-10-1964 when the clarificatory notification was issued by the Government specifying that the parent notification under sec. 88 (1) (b) would cover only those areas which were included within the municipal limits as existing at the time when the parent notification was issued. It was obvious that such clarificatory notification was issued years afterwards and in the meanwhile the concerned parties might have entered into the transaction with regard to lands in the added areas being guided by the then existing legal interpretation of sec. 88 (1) (b) notification as rendered by various tenancy authorities including the Tribunal. It was obvious that such clarificatory notification was issued years afterwards and in the meanwhile the concerned parties might have entered into the transaction with regard to lands in the added areas being guided by the then existing legal interpretation of sec. 88 (1) (b) notification as rendered by various tenancy authorities including the Tribunal. In order to protect such transactions from the sweep of the first proviso that the second proviso was simultaneously enacted The second proviso in terms provides that if any land so added has been transferred or acquired after issuance of the notification referred to in the first proviso that is-parent notification under sec 88 (1) (b) which in the present case is dated 29-5-1968 but before 29-10-1964 (which is clarificatory notification issued by the State of Gujarat under sec. 88 (1) (b) indicating limited scope of 29-5-1958 notification and making it applicable only to the areas within the municipal limits as existing in May 1958) such transfer or acquisition of the concerned lands shall have effect as if it were made in the area to which this clause meaning thereby sec. 88 (1) (b) applies. Thus what is provided by the second proviso is to the effect that if any transaction has taken place with respect to any land in the added area between two terminal dates viz. date of the parent notification-29 in the present case and 29-10-1964 such transaction would remain effective as if sec. 88 (1) (b) main clause applied to the concerned land which was subjected to such transaction. Accordingly the effect and operation of the first proviso was whittled down or curtailed by the enactment of the second proviso. It is therefore obvious that the second proviso is an exception to the first proviso to the limited extent contemplated by clear wording of the said proviso. The second proviso carves out an exception to the operation of the first proviso to the following extent :1 If any land in the added area has been transferred or acquired between 29 and 29-10-1964 the provision of secs. 1 to 87 would not automatically apply by virtue of the parent notification under sec. 88 (1) (b) to such transaction pertaining to the concerned land and the transaction in question will be saved from the sweep of secs. 1 to 87 would not automatically apply by virtue of the parent notification under sec. 88 (1) (b) to such transaction pertaining to the concerned land and the transaction in question will be saved from the sweep of secs. 1 to 87 of the Tenancy Act meaning thereby that to such a transaction Tenancy Act will not apply. However it is equally obvious that on any other aspects the concerned land would not get excluded from the operation of secs. 1 to 87. If for example the land in question is not subjected to any acquisition or transfer between the aforesaid dates such land would remain within the sweep of sections 1 to 87 of the Tenancy Act. If there is a tenant on such land he would get the benefit of deemed purchase provision of sec. 32 of the Act as on 1-4-1957 all tenants of agricultural lands were made deemed purchasers of the concerned agricultural lands held by them as tenants. In short only genuine and otherwise legally operative transactions of acquisition and transfer of such lands during the relevant period would get insulated from the sweep of secs. 1 to 87 of the Tenancy Act. 2 Even the aforesaid protection afforded by the second proviso to the concerned transaction would not be available after 29-10-1964. If the transaction in question has taken place after that date concerning the land in such added areas such a transaction would not be protected and would squarely fall within the sweep of the first proviso. ( 8 ) IT is in the background of the aforesaid scheme of the two provisos added by the Gujarat Act 36/65 to sec 88 (1) (b) that the main controversy posed for my consideration has to be resolved. ( 9 ) TO recapitulate the following conditions will have to be satisfied before the second proviso can be pressed in service. 1 The transaction in question viz. transfer or acquisition must be of any land in the area which gets added within the municipal limits;2 Such transfer or acquisition of the concerned land must take place between the two terminal dates viz. 1 The transaction in question viz. transfer or acquisition must be of any land in the area which gets added within the municipal limits;2 Such transfer or acquisition of the concerned land must take place between the two terminal dates viz. 29-5-1958 and 1964if these two conditions are satisfied the second proviso would apply of its own and would whittle down to that limited extent the operation of the first proviso and would insulate the concerned transaction from the operation of the first proviso meaning thereby that if two conditions are satisfied the concerned transaction would be saved from the operation of secs. 1 to 87 of the Act. So far as the aforesaid two conditions are concerned there is no dispute between the parties that the second condition is satisfied. The sale transaction in question took place on 24 The said date squarely falls within the two terminal dates viz. 29 and 29-10-1964. But the real dispute between the parties centres round the applicability of the first condition. Mr. J. M. Patel for the petitioner submits that before the first condition as laid down by the second proviso can apply it must be shown that the transaction pertained to any land in the area which was added to the municipal limits meaning thereby that the transaction must take place at a point of time when the concerned land was already added within the municipal limits while Mr. S. R. Shah for the respondents submits that the second condition of the second proviso would be satisfied even if the concerned land was first transferred or acquired between the two terminal dates and thereafter was subsequently brought within the municipal limits. The aforesaid heated controversy has arisen between the parties in view of the fact situation in the present case viz. that the sale transaction regarding the concerned lands of village Jetalpur took place on 24-1-1962 and after two years of the said sale these concerned lands were included within the municipal limits of Baroda Municipal Borough by notification dated 22-6-1964 Annexure `c to the petition. that the sale transaction regarding the concerned lands of village Jetalpur took place on 24-1-1962 and after two years of the said sale these concerned lands were included within the municipal limits of Baroda Municipal Borough by notification dated 22-6-1964 Annexure `c to the petition. Before I proceed to deal with the aforesaid moot questioh posed for my consideration I may profitably refer to a Division Bench judgment of this court in the case of Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli v. The Revenue Tribunal and Others in Special Civil Application No. 551 of 1972 decided by S. Obul Reddi C. J. (as he then was) and M. C. Trivedi J. (as he then was) on 3-2-1977. The Division Bench of this court in the aforesaid decision was directly concerned with the construction and interpretation of the second proviso to sec. 88 (1) (b) which has fallen for my consideration in the present proceedings. But the only difference between the facts of the case before the Division Bench and the facts before me in the present proceedings is that the transaction in question before the Division Bench had taken place with respect to the land brought within the municipal limits after the concerned land was so brought within the municipal limits that is-the concerned land was transferred after it was added within the municipal limits; while in the present case before me the transaction regarding the lands in question preceded their actual inclusion within the municipal limits. In the submission of Mr. Patel this difference in fact situation in the present case makes the ratio of the Division Bench judgment inapplicable to the facts of the present case. Before I proceed to decide this question it is necessary to note what the Division Bench had considered and what was decided by it. M. C. Trivedi J. (as he then was) speaking for the Division Bench in the aforesaid case posed the moot question which arose for consideration i. e. whether the sale transaction pertaining to the land in question would be covered by the second proviso to sec. 88 (1) (b) of the Act. Sec. 88 (1) was quoted alongwith the concerned two provisos. 88 (1) (b) of the Act. Sec. 88 (1) was quoted alongwith the concerned two provisos. Thereafter the Division Bench considered the second proviso and in that connection M. C. Trivedi J. observed as under :-"this second proviso seeks to protect the transfers and acquisition of land effected after the issue of notification referred to in the first proviso but before 29-10-1964 which is the date on which the above referred notification dated 17-10-1964 was published in the Government gazette. Miss Shah for the petitioner has argued that this second proviso does not take out the lands under reference from the operation of sec. 88 (1) (b) and transfer of the lands in question effected by respondent No. 2 in favour of respondent No. 3 is not validated. We are unable to accept her argument because the intention of the Legislature in introducing the second proviso to sec. 88 (1) (b) is quite clear". Thereafter the court considered in detail the reasons underlying the introduction of the concerned two provisos by the Amending Act 36/65. ( 10 ) IT would be profitable to look at the reasons underlying the introduction of the concerned two provisos as reproduced in the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench. The said objects and reasons have been stated in the statement of objects and reasons published in the Gujarat Government Gazette of the relevant year and they read as under:" (1 ). Under sec. 88b of the Act lands held or leased by a local authority are exempt from certain provisions of the Act. It is considered necessary to except such lands from all the provisions of the Act and item (i) of sub-clause (1) of this clause provides accordingly. (2 ). According to clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 88 the provisions of the Act do not apply to an area notified by Government as being reserved for non-agricultural or industrial development. Under this provision the areas within the limits of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and the Surat Municipality were notified in 1957 and the areas within the limits of the Baroda Municipality were notified in 1958 In the case of the areas subsequently added to the areas so notified the aforesaid reservation would not normally apply in the absence of a specific notification in that behalf. However in one case the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal has held that the reservation would apply to such added area also. It being necessary to clarify the position by item (ii) of sub-clause (1) of this clause two provisos are added to clause (b) of sub-clause (1) of sec. 88 so as to provide that the reservation would not automatically apply to the added area and to validate the transfer of land already made during the intervening period. The aforesaid objects and reasons clearly show that both the concerned provisos were added to sec. 88 (1) (b) with a view to clarifying that the newly added areas within the municipal limits would not get by their mere inclusion the benefit of the parent provisions of the earlier notification issued under sec. 88 (1) (b) exempting the lands situate within the municipal limits then existing from the provisions of secs. 1 to 87 of the Tenancy Act. But at the same time the transactions concerning the lands within the added area effected during the intervening period between the date of the initial notification under sec. 88 (1) (b) and the date of the clarificatory notification viz. 29-10-1964 were given immunity from the operation of secs. 1 to 87 of the Act as these transactions appear to have taken place under a bona fide impression that the areas added to the municipal limits would also get exemption from the operation of secs. 1 to 87 almost automatically as was the view taken by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in these days and which was holding the field till quite some time. The ratio of the decision of the Division Bench in Tribhovandass case (supra) is to the effect that if the transaction pertaining to the lands in the added area had taken place during the intervening period between 29 and 29-10-1968 the same will continue to be governed by the exemption from the operation of secs. 1 to 87 of the Tenancy Act by virtue of the second proviso to sec. 88 (1) (b ). It must be recalled at this stage that the facts of the case before the Division Bench were that the notification under sec. 88 (1) (b) was issued in 1958 while the land in question was brought within the municipal limits on 2-7-1964 and thereafter it was subject to a transaction of sale on 19-8-1964. 88 (1) (b ). It must be recalled at this stage that the facts of the case before the Division Bench were that the notification under sec. 88 (1) (b) was issued in 1958 while the land in question was brought within the municipal limits on 2-7-1964 and thereafter it was subject to a transaction of sale on 19-8-1964. It is in the background of the said factual position that the Division Bench took the view that the transaction was squarely covered by the second proviso of sec. 88 (1) (b) as it satisfied both the requirements for operation of the said proviso which I have detained above viz. that the transaction in question must take place with regard to the given piece of land which is added within the municipal limits and secondly that the said transaction must take place between the two terminal dates viz. 21-5-1958 and 29-10-1964. The Division Bench of this court in the aforesaid case was not concerned with the fact situations in which the sale transaction regarding the land in question might have taken place prior to its inclusion within tha municipal limits even though the said transaction might fall within two terminal dates aforesaid. Consequently the question which has been posed for my consideration by Mr. Patel regarding applicability of the first condition for attracting the second proviso to sec. 88 (1) (b) did not fall for consideration before the Division Bench. That question will have to be decided on its merits and for the same the aforesaid Division Bench judgment cannot obviously render any assistance. I have therefore to consider the aforesaid moot question on merits as it is clearly res-integra and not covered by any decision of this court much less by decision of the Division Bench as seen above. ( 11 ) MR. J. M. Patel learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that it is true that the transaction of the lands in question did take place between the two terminal dates of 21-5-1958 and 29-10-1964 as provided by the second proviso to sec. ( 11 ) MR. J. M. Patel learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that it is true that the transaction of the lands in question did take place between the two terminal dates of 21-5-1958 and 29-10-1964 as provided by the second proviso to sec. 88 (1) (b) but the first condition for applicability of the proviso is wanting in the present case as on the date of the transaction way back on 24-1-1962 the lands in question were not forming part and parcel of the added municipal limits of the Baroda city and they were brought within the municipal limits in 1964 two years after the sale and consequently the second proviso of sec. 88 (1) (b) was wrongly applied to the facts of the present case by the Revenue Tribunal. In order to appreciate the aforesaid contention of Mr. Patel it is necessary to keep in view the objects and reasons underlying the legislative enactment of these two provisos and which objects and reasons have already been extracted by me earlier. But even apart from the objects and reasons it appears clear that the language in which the second proviso is couched clearly indicates toe legislative intent that a limited exception was sought to be carved out from the operation of the first proviso to the extent that only transfers or acquisition of lands in added areas were to be insulated from the operation of the provisions of secs. 1 to 87 of the Tenancy Act if these transactions were effected between the two relevant dates of 29-5-1950 and 29-10-1964. It is not possible to agree with the submission of Mr. St. R. Shah learned Advocate for the other side that even if at the time of the concerned transaction the lands in question might not have been included or added in the municipal limits only because the transaction in question occurred during the relevant time ranging from 29-5-1958 to 29 the said transaction would be covered by the second proviso. On the clear language of the second proviso it appears that only those transactions regarding the concerned lands were sought to be covered by the second proviso which pertained to lands in the added area. Thus at the time when the transaction in question took place the concerned lands ought to have been included within the added areas of the muni cipal limits. Thus at the time when the transaction in question took place the concerned lands ought to have been included within the added areas of the muni cipal limits. The phraseology employed by the legislature in enacting the second proviso to sec. 88 (1) (b) viz. if any land in the area so added has been transferred or acquired leaves no room for doubt that the concerned transfer or acquisition of the given lands must have fallen place at apoint of time when such concerned lands were actually situated in the area so added meaning thereby that the transaction must take place at the time when the concerned lands were already forming part of the extended area of the given municipal limits. If at the time of the transaction of sale or acquisition the concerned land was not situated within the added municipal limits the transaction of transfer regarding such land would not answer the description of the said land being in the added area as contemplated by the second proviso. It is therefore obvious that before the benefit of the second proviso can be pressed in service by the parties seeking the same it must be shown that the concerned transaction regarding the lands in question had taken place when the said lands were actually situated on the added area and further such transaction did take place within the period contemplated by the second proviso viz. between 29-5-1958 and 29-10-1964. In the present case it is found that the second condition for operation of the proviso regarding the transaction having taken place during the relevant period is not in dispute. But so far as the first condition is concerned it is found to be lacking. While construing the second proviso it must be kept in view that the said proviso seeks to carve out an exception from the operation of the first proviso as the second proviso by its own operation seeks to whittle down the effect of the preceding first proviso and as it seeks to insulate transactions pertaining to the concerned agricultural lands from the operation of the beneficial provisions of secs. 1 to 87 of the Tenancy Act the second proviso will have to be construed strictly. It cannot be gainsaid that the Tenancy Act is a piece of beneficial legislation meant for protection of the rights of tenants and cultivators of agricultural lands. 1 to 87 of the Tenancy Act the second proviso will have to be construed strictly. It cannot be gainsaid that the Tenancy Act is a piece of beneficial legislation meant for protection of the rights of tenants and cultivators of agricultural lands. Any statutory provision which seeks to carve out an exception to the operation of this beneficial provision will have to be construed strictly. The effect of the first proviso to sec. 88 (1) (b) is to confirm the application of beneficial provisions of the Tenancy Act to newly added areas to the municipal limits after the original notification under sec. 88 (1) (b) as issued in 1958 removed the protection of the provisions of secs. 1 to 87 of the the Tenancy Act so far as lands then situated within municipal limits of notified cities were concerned. The first proviso to sec. 88 (1) (b) is therefore a beneficial provision confirming the applicability of Tenancy Act to such agricultural lands subsequently brought within municipal limits and it seeks to protect the tenancy rights of the tenants of such lands. ( 12 ) THE statutory effect of the 1st proviso to sec. 8 (b) has been considered by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Navinchandra Ramlal v. Kalidas Bhudarbhai and Another A. I. R. 1979 S. C. 1055 wherein D. A. Desai J. speaking for the Supreme Court had to consider the question of the applicability of the beneficial provisions of Tenancy Act making tiller of the soil the statutory owner thereof on tillers day i. e. 1 in the light of the further question about the effect of the concerned agricultural land S. No. 165 of village Acher subsequently getting included within the extended limits of Ahmedabad municipal corporation. In this connection the following partinent observations have been made by the Supreme Court :"12 By Bombay Act 13 of 1956 a revolutionary amendment of far-reaching consequence was made in the Tenancy Act of 1948 and the amended Act came into force with effect from 1/08/1956. The most important provision of the Amending Act was sec. 32 as amended by the Amending Act which provided for transfer of the ownership of land by operation of law from the landlord to the tenant. The most important provision of the Amending Act was sec. 32 as amended by the Amending Act which provided for transfer of the ownership of land by operation of law from the landlord to the tenant. The title to the land which vested in the landlord on 1/04/1957 the tillers day passed to the tenant by operation of law. What is the effect of this transfer of title was examined by this court in Sri Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay (1959) Suppl. 1 SCR 489 : ( AIR 1959 SC 459 ). The court held as under (at p. 4720 of AIR)". THE title of the landlord to the land passes immediately to the tenant on the tillers day and there is a completed purchase or sale thereof as between the landlord and the tenant. The tenant is no doubt given a locus poenitentiae and an option of declaring whether he is or is not willing to purchase the land held by him as a tenant. If he fails to appear or makes a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land the Tribunal shall by an order in writing declare that such tenant is not willing to purchase the land and that the purchase is ineffective. It is only by such a declaration by the Tribunal that the purchase becomes ineffective If no such declaration is made by the Tribunal the purchase would stand as statutorily effected on the tillers day and will continue to be operative the only obligation on the tenant then being the payment of price in the mode determined by the Tribunal. If the tenant commits default in the payment of such price either in lump or by installments as determined by the Tribunal sec. 32 (4) declares the purchase to be ineffective but in that event the land shall then be at the disposal of the Collector to be disposed of by him in the manner provided therein. Here also the purchase continues to be effective as from the tillers day until such default is committed and there is no question of a conditional purchase or sale taking place between the landlord and tenant. The tillers to the land which was vested originally in the landlord passes to the tenant on the tillers day for the alternative period prescribed in that behalf. The tillers to the land which was vested originally in the landlord passes to the tenant on the tillers day for the alternative period prescribed in that behalf. This title is defeasible only in the event of the tenant failing to appear or making a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land or committing default in payment of the price thereof as determined by the Tribunal. The tenant gets a vested interest in the land defeasible only in either of those cases and it cannot therefore be said that the title of landlord to the land is suspended for any period definite or indefinite". ( 13 ) IF the effect of the land being governed by sec. 3z on Tillers day is to transfer the title of the landlord to the tenant by operation of law defeasible only in the event of tenant declining to purchase the land or committing default in payment of price as determined by the Tribunal the next question is: if the land is subsequently brought within the municipal corporation area which area enjoys the exemption under sec. 88 (1) (b) would the vested title be divested: ( 14 ) THIS question can be answered shortly by referring to the amended sec. 43c and sec. 88 (1) (b) with its proviso both of which clearly assert that the exemption granted under sec. 88 (1) (b) by a notification issued by the Government would ensure for the benefit of the land which was within the municipal corporation area on 1/08/1956 and in no case the additional area which may be included within the municipal corporation area after 1/08/1956 would enjoy the exemption granted by the notification unless a fresh notification is issued. Admittedly since 14/02/1957 no fresh notification is issued. The land bearing survey no. 165 was not within the municipal corporation area either on 14/02/1957 the day on which exemption was granted or on 1/08/1956 when Bombay Act XIII of 1956 was put into operation or on 1/04/1957 the tillers day when title to land would stand transferred to the tenant by sheer operation of law without anything more Therefore the notification dated 14/02/1957 would not cover the land which was at the date of the issue of the notification not included in Ahmedabad Municipal corporation area. Subsequent extension of the area of municipal corporation would not enjoy the benefit of exemption in view of the proviso to sec. 88 (1) (b) and the opening words of sec. 43c both of which clearly recite that the exemption would apply to the land included in the municipal corporation area on 1/08/1956 the day on which Bombay Act 18 of 1956 came into force and not to any subsequently added area to the area of municipal corporation. Land bearing survey No. 165 was brought within the municipal corporation after 1/08/1956 and therefore the notification dated 14/02/1957 would not cover such added or extended area and there would be no exemption under the notification for the land in the extended area". ( 15 ) THE second proviso to sec. 88 (1) (b) however seeks to curtail the operation of the aforesaid beneficial provisions and seeks to carve out an area of its own wherein beneficial provision of secs. 1 to 87 of the Act would get excluded qua the transactions pertaining to concerned agricultural lands as contemplated by the second proviso. The scope and ambit of such a provision will have to be ascertained by adopting the rule of strict construction in the light of series of judgments pertaining to the interpartition of statutes in such cases. I shall briefly prefer to a few of them at this stage. In Jnan Ranjan Sen Gupta and Others v. Arun kumar Bose A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 1994. P. K. Goswami J speaking for the Supreme Court had to consider the scope and ambit of sec. 2 (5) of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act. While construing the provisions it has been observed :"the Act is for making better provision relating to the law of landlord and tenant in respect of thika tenancies in Calcutta. It is a piece of beneficial legislation conferring certain rights upon the tenants. In dealing with such a provision of law court cannot read into the definition something which is not already there and the introduction of which will lead to imposing a restriction upon the rights of this class of tenants by judicial interpretation. This is not permissible in absence of express words to that effect or necessary manifest intendments". In dealing with such a provision of law court cannot read into the definition something which is not already there and the introduction of which will lead to imposing a restriction upon the rights of this class of tenants by judicial interpretation. This is not permissible in absence of express words to that effect or necessary manifest intendments". The Supreme Court in case of Jivabhai Purshottam v. Chhagan Karson and Others A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 1491 had to construe the scope and effect of sec. 34 (2a) of the present Tenancy Act. Under sec. 34 (2a) it was contemplated that the landlord should serve a notice to the tenant declaring his intention to terminate the tenancy of the tenant. The legislature amended the said provision by inserting sub-sec. (2a ). By that provision. certain fetters were imposed on the landlords rights to terminate tenancy While interpreting this amended provision of sec. 34 Wanchhoo J. speaking for the Supreme Court observed:"the amending Act being a piece of beneficent legislation meant for the protection of tenants if there is any doubt about the meaning of sub-sec. (2a) that doubt should be resolved in favour of the tenant for whose benefit the Amending Act was passed. In this view it is obvious that the legislature could not have intended that the benefit of this beneficent measure should not be extended to tenants in whose case the tenancy had not yet terminated though notices had been given when the further restrictions were being put on the right to terminate the tenancy ". So far as construction of the proviso is concerned it may be profitable to have a look at two decisions of the Supreme Court. In T. Devadasan v. Union of India and Another A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 179 majority of the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court speaking through Mudholkar J. was required to consider the scope of Art. 16 (4) of the Constitution. In that connection it was observed in the majority decision as under:-"further this court has already held that clause (4) of Art. 16 is by way of a proviso or an exception to clause (1 ). A proviso or an exception cannot be so interpreted as to nullify or destroy the main provisions. In that connection it was observed in the majority decision as under:-"further this court has already held that clause (4) of Art. 16 is by way of a proviso or an exception to clause (1 ). A proviso or an exception cannot be so interpreted as to nullify or destroy the main provisions. In Commissioner of Income-tax Madras v. The Ajax Product Ltd. A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 135 K. Subba Rao J. speaking for the Supreme Court made the following pertinent observations:" Whether a proviso is construed as restricting the main provision or as a substantive clause it cannot be divorced from the provision to which it stands as a proviso. It must be construed harmoniously with the main enactment". In the light of the aforesaid settled rules of construction the second proviso to sec. 88 (1) (b) will have to be construed and interpreted. The construction canvassed by Mr. Patel to the effect that the transaction regarding the lands in question would be exempt from the provisions of secs. 1 to 87 provided the lands in question at the relevant time were included within the added municipal limits furthers the intention of the legislature in enacting the beneficial Provision of the Tenancy Act while the rival construction canvassed by Mr. Shah for the other side cuts across the said legislative intent. If Mr. Shahs construction was correct the second proviso would destroy the applicability of the beneficial provision of secs. 1 to 87 of the Tenancy Act to transactions pertaining to agricultural lands during the relevant period from 29-5-1958 to 29-10-1964 even when such agricultural lands were not part and parcel of the extended municipal limits and were otherwise squarely governed by secs. 1 to 87 of the Act being agricultural lands situated in rural areas where the Tenancy Act applied on its own force. Thus even assuming that two constructions of the said second proviso are reasonably possible the court should accept that construction which advances the main purpose of the legislation in question rather than lean in favour of the construction which destroys its main purpose though in the present case I find that on the express language of the second proviso the construction canvassed by Mr. Patel appears to be the only plausible one viz. Patel appears to be the only plausible one viz. that the transaction must have been effected for the lands in question which by the time of the transaction must have got included in the added areas comprising the extended municipal limits. This construction also fits in with the legislative intent to protect transactions regarding such lands already included within municipal limits when the vendor and the vendee woule be bona fide entertaining the belief that secs. 1 to 87 of the Tenancy Act would not apply to such transactions as the concerned lands were already included within municipal limits though after the date of the main notification under sec. 88 (1) (b) dated 29-5-1958. The concerned parties would be justified in entertaining such belief in the light of decisions of tenancy authorities and the Revenue Tribunal which then held the field. It is easy to visualise that such a belief could never have been entertained by any one with respect to transactions pertaining to agricultural lands which by the time of transactions were admittedly beyond the municipal limits and were squarely governed by the Tenancy Act. For such lands there was not the remotest possibility of any one entertaining any doubt about the applicability of the Tenancy Act. Such doubt would arise only if the land in question first got included in municipal limits and then was subjected to a transaction of sale or acquisition. Consequently it is apparent that second proviso to sec. 88 (1) (b) was meant to give statutory recognition to the doubts about applicability of the Tenancy Act entertained by parties to transactions regarding agricultural lands which were already brought within extended municipal limits. If agricultural lands at the time of transactions pertaining to them were outside the municipal limits no question of doubt in the minds of parties to these transactions about applicability of Tenancy Act would arise as neither the vendor nor the vendee-of such lands could have imagined that in future at some uncertain date these lands would get included within the extended municipal limits of nearby metropolis. Consequently second proviso to sec. 88 (1) (b) was out of picture in such cases as it was not meant to cover such transactions. Consequently second proviso to sec. 88 (1) (b) was out of picture in such cases as it was not meant to cover such transactions. As in the facts of the present case it is found as an admitted position that the lands in question were sold by the petitioner to respondent No. 1 on 24-1-1962 two years prior to their subsequent inclusion within the added municipal limits of the Baroda city the first condition for applicability of the second proviso was not satisfied though the second condition was satisfied viz. the transaction regarding the concerned lands did take place between the two terminal dates of 29-5-1958 and 29-10-1964. Consequently the second proviso could not be pressed In service by respondent No. 1 so far as the sale transaction in question was concerned. To that extent the Revenue Tribunal must be held to have committed a patent error of law when it took a contrary view against the petitioner. It may be noted at this stage that the Revenue Tribunal while arriving at its conclusion that the second proviso to sec. 88 applied to the facts of the present case heavily relied upon its earlier decision in Sharadchandras case (supra ). I have gone through the said decision and I find that in that decision the Revenue Tribunal had only emphasised the second condition for applicability of the second proviso viz. the transaction in question must take place between the two terminal dates but so far as the first condition was concerned viz. whether the concerned land which was subjected to transfer bad by that time got included within the added municipal limits was neither canvassed before the Tribunal nor was it noticed and therefore the said decision on the applicability of the first condition for attracting the second proviso to sec. 88 (1) (b) is found to have suffered from the infirmity of being sub-silentio. It is true that the facts of the case before the Tribunal in Sharadchandras case (supra) were parallel to the facts of the present case in the sense that the transaction regarding the land in the added areas did take place prior to the actual inclusion of the concerned land within the municipal limits. But as the reasoning of the Tribunal runs counter to the clear language of the second proviso to sec. But as the reasoning of the Tribunal runs counter to the clear language of the second proviso to sec. 88 (1) (b) it must be held that the aforesaid decision of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal was not correctly decided. ( 16 ) NOW remains the question as to what proper orders should be passed in the present petition. Mr. J. M. Patel is right when he contended that the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal has dismissed the revision application only on the short ground that the second proviso to sec. 88 (1) (b) applied to the facts of the present case and hence the proceedings under sec. 84c could not have been taken out and as I am accepting the contention of Mr. Patel that the second proviso to sec. 88 (1) (b) does not apply to the facts of the present case the matter submitted Mr. Patel should be remanded to the Tribunal for a decision on merits. It is not possible for me to agree with the aforesaid contention of Mr. Patel for obvious reasons which are clearly borne out on the record of this case. . . . . . . . . . . The appellate order of the Assistant Collector shows that the petitioner who was the original vendor had no cause of complaint and could not have preferred any appeal before the Assistant Collector challenging the order of the Mamlatdar refusing to invoke his suo motu powers under sec. 84c for invalidating the transaction to which the petitioner was a party being the vendor. It is an admitted position on the record of this case that the petitioner had not initiated any proceedings under sec. 84c. She had not challenged the transaction by which she herself had sold the lands in question years back in 1961 to respondent No. 1 having taken Rs. 1 0 0 from it. It was the Mamlatdar who initiated the suo motu proceedings first in 1974 and then in 1980 on the second occasion on the supposition that the said transaction was violative of sec. 84c. 1 0 0 from it. It was the Mamlatdar who initiated the suo motu proceedings first in 1974 and then in 1980 on the second occasion on the supposition that the said transaction was violative of sec. 84c. If for any reason the authority had sought to reinvoke suo motu powers even when there was no occasion for him to exercise such suo motu powers and had therefore subsequently dropped the suo motu proceedings realizing the futility thereof it passes ones comprehension how the party in whose favour such decision is rendered by the Mamlatdar can approach the appellate authority alleging to be an aggrieved party. By the order of the Mamlatdar even on the second occasion the notice issued suo motu calling upon the petitioner to show cause why her transaction with respondent No. 1 should not be declared invalid came to be discharged. Result was that the petitioners sale transaction with respondent No. 1 was not declared invalid and it remained untouched. Thereafter the petitioner could never be said to be a party aggrieved which would be entitled to carry the matter in appeal. It is pertinent to note that the State of Gujarat has not challenged the order of the Mamlatdar by which the Mamlatdar had refused to exercise suo motu powers under section 84c. The State would have been the proper party which could have felt aggrieved if at all by the order of the Mamlatdar. Under the scheme of section 84c (1) and (2) if a transaction pertaining to any agricultural land is found to be invalid and if the parties to the proceedings are not willing to restore status suo ante the concerned lands would vest in the State Government. Mr. S. R. Shah learned Advocate appearing for respondents Nos. 1 and 3 made it clear that these respondents are not willing to get status quo ante restored 60 far as the lands in question are concerned. In such an eventuality the only order which could have followed would have been the order of the Mamlatdar vesting the lands in the State. Such an order would never have benefited the petitioner in the least. The State which could have got these lands vested in it by any effective exercise of suo motu powers by the Mamlatdar under sec. 84c did not think it proper to challenge his order refusing to take such action. Such an order would never have benefited the petitioner in the least. The State which could have got these lands vested in it by any effective exercise of suo motu powers by the Mamlatdar under sec. 84c did not think it proper to challenge his order refusing to take such action. In these circumstances it is difficult to appreciate how the petitioner-original vendor of the lands felt aggrieved by the decision of the Mamlatdar who had refused to set aside petitioners sale transaction of 1962 in favour of respondent No. 1. The Assistant Collector as a court of appeal was justified when he took the view that the petitioners appeal itself before the appellate authority under the Tenancy Act was not maintainable. This is the additional reason why no useful purpose can be served by remanding these proceedings for a fresh decision at the instance of the petitioner. It appears that the petitioner having pocketed Rs. 1 0 0 years back in 1962 is trying to catch at a straw and is practically indulging in the policy of dog in the manger by seeing that the banging sword of the present litigation lingers on so that at sometime respondents Nos. 1 and 3 may come round and may give some added financial advantage to the petitioner by way of bargain and if the present Proceedings are kept pending such oblique intention of the petitioner may get fructified. The court obviously cannot be a party to such a design. When the petitioner is not a legally aggrieved party it is impossible to give her any relief in the present proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution by restoring these proceedings to the file of the Tribunal so that the transaction entered into by the petitioner in favour of respondent No. 1 years back in 1962 may once again be brought in the melting pot. [the rest of the judgment is not material for the reports. ] petition dismissed .