Das, J.- By this common judgment, 1 propose to dispose of Civil Revision Nos. 195 and 196 of 1981 as common questions of law and facts are involved in both these Civil Revisions. Both the Civil Revisions under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code are directed against the judgment and orders of the learned Assistant District Judge No. 1. Cachar at Silchar. dated 29.8.81 passed in Misc. case No. 26 of 1981 and 20 of 1981. Both the Misc. cases arose out of Misc. Case No. 3/81 pending in the Court of Sadar munsiff No. 4, Silchar and Misc. Case No. 3/81 pending in the Court of Sadar Munsiff No. 3. at Silchar. Both the case arose out of S.T. No. 70/81 pending in the Court of Sadar Munsiff No. 4 at Silchar and S.T. No. 69/81 pending in the Court of Sadar Munsiff No. 3 at Silchar respectively. Title Suit No. 59 of 1981 and 70 of 1981 were instituted by the plain­tiffs-opposite parties for grant of permanant injunctions against the defendants-petitioners in respect of an area of land measur­ing 6b-9k-4 and 4b-18k-10 Chataks, respectively. The plain­tiffs-opposite parties claimed no other relief in the aforesaid suits. 2. The plaintiffs' case, inter alia, is that the lands belon­ged to them and they are in possession of the same for more than 12 years. According to the plaintiff, the said land belonged to them by right of inheritance and purchase. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants Nos. 1 to 5 sold their entire Maliki right to them and subsequently the defendants Nos. 1 to 5 sold some lands to defendant Nos. 7 to 11 after the sale to the plain­tiffs. It was further stated that the defendants No. 8 and 9 were alleged to have purchased jote right from one Dilahar Ali although he had no tenancy right. On or about 12.4.81, the defendants alleged to have tried to disposses the plaintiffs for­cibly from the suit land and, as such, the plaintiffs had to file the aforesaid suits praying for grant of permanant injunc­tion restraining the defendants not to disturb the possession of the plaintiffs. On or about 12.4.81, the defendants alleged to have tried to disposses the plaintiffs for­cibly from the suit land and, as such, the plaintiffs had to file the aforesaid suits praying for grant of permanant injunc­tion restraining the defendants not to disturb the possession of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, on such institution of the suits, filed applications under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Pro­cedure Code praying for granting temporary injunction restrain­ing the defendants not to interfere with the plaintiffs' possession in respect of the land till disposal of the suits. On the prayer of the pliantiffs, the learned Munsiffs No. 3, Silchar by the order dated 25.5.81 and learned Munsiff No. 4, Silchar by the order dated 25.4 81 granted ad-interim temporary injunction against the defendants and issued notices upon the defendants to show cause against the order of injunction. The defendants on coming to know about the order of injunction, did not appear before the learned Munsiffs Nos. 3 and 4 at Silchar but preferred two appeals before the learned Assistant District Judge No. 1 at Silchar. The learned appellate Court, however, admitted the appeal but did not pass any stay order of injunction as against which the petitioners (Defendants) came to this Court in revi­sion. However, the applications of the petitioners were rejected but a direction was made to the learned Assistant District Judge to dispose of stay matter. The lower appellate Court, however, finally heard the stey applications on 25.8.81, along with the appeal and by its order dated 29.8.81 dismissed both the appeals. It is against these orders, the petitioners (Defendants) have come up in revision to this Court. 3. Mr. A. M. Majumdar, learned Advocate General who appears on behalf of the petitioners has submitted the following: (a) the learned appellate Court below while disposing the appeals failed to consider the relevant documents submitted by the petitioners which ought to have been considered by the lower appellate Court which, according to Mr. Mijumdar. 3. Mr. A. M. Majumdar, learned Advocate General who appears on behalf of the petitioners has submitted the following: (a) the learned appellate Court below while disposing the appeals failed to consider the relevant documents submitted by the petitioners which ought to have been considered by the lower appellate Court which, according to Mr. Mijumdar. were rele­vant for the purpose of disposal of both the cases: (b) the learned lower appellate Court did not consider the legality and propriety of the two orders passed by the learned Munsiffs granting ex-parte ad-interim injunction; (c) the plaintiffs and the defendants being the co-sharers no such injunction ought to have been granted as a co-sharer cannot restrain the other co-sharer from entering into the lands in question; (d) the suit being itself not maintainable in law, the learned trial Court was not correct in holding that there was prima facie case as made out by the plaintiffs to justify the issue of such injunction and (e) while passing the respective orders by the learned trial Court, the mandatory provisions of Order 39, Rule 3 and its proviso was not followed and, as such both the orders are legally untenable and the learned lower appellate Court ought to have set aside both the orders passed by the respective learned trial Court. 4. Mr. S.N. Medhi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs-opposite parties has submitted before me that issuance of ad interim injunction is a discretionary matter and the trial Court while passing the exparte order granting ad-interim injunction considered the case of the plaintiffs, the relevant docu­ments and being satisfied about the existence of prima facie case, balance of convenience and the injury that may cause irreparable loss, passed the order, which was considered by the lower appellate Court to be just, proper and valid. He further submits that the learned Munsiff while passing the exparte order must have considered the mandatory provisions of law under order 39. Civil Procedure Code and having felt that the nature of prayer of the plaintiffs was such that if an injunc­tion would not be granted prior to issue of notice as per proviso to Rule 3, Order 39, of C. P. C. the purpose of issue of injunction would be frustrated and/or defeated by delay. This fact, according to the learned Counsel, was considered by the lower appellate Court. 5. This fact, according to the learned Counsel, was considered by the lower appellate Court. 5. Before considering the rival contentions of the Parties, it will be necessary to discuss the relevant provisions of order 39 of the Civil procedure Code and the mandates to be follo­wed by a Court before issue of such injunction. On parusal of the provisions, it appears that order 39 provides for issue of injunction, but the power is discretionary and can be issued upon any party to the suit if the Court finds the existence of the following circumstances: (a) There must be a prima facie case and the existence of legal rights to be decided by the Court between the parties; (b) the balance of convenience is in favour of granting injunction against the party and (c) if injunction is not granted it would cause irreparable injury to the party praying for injunction, which will not be com­pensated in terms of money. On the prayer of injunction, the Court is to be satisfied as to whether the aforesaid conditions exist. If the Court is satisfied then the next question comes as to whether before issue of such injunction the Court is to issue notice as provided under Rule 3 of Order 39, Civil procedure Code or the Court should issue straightway injunc­tion giving its reasons as to why the said provision was not followed. The only cause not to follow the mandate of the Rule is itself enumerated in the proviso, which requires i.e. reasoned order to be recorded for non-compliance of the proviso was not followed. The Court is to keep it in min d that while exercising its jurisdiction for issue of interlocutory injunction it has to act upon the principle of preventing irreparable injury. If the Court is satisfied that in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise that any property in dispute is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit and of that party is to be restrained from committing such injury relating to the property or right, the Court can exercise its jurisdiction to issue temporary injunction. However, where a doubt exists as to the right specially when an injunction will cause great hardship on the party against whom injunction is to be granted, such interlocutory order of injunction may be refused. 6. Mr. However, where a doubt exists as to the right specially when an injunction will cause great hardship on the party against whom injunction is to be granted, such interlocutory order of injunction may be refused. 6. Mr. Majumdar, learned Advocate General, Assam, while referring to the above points has urged before me that on a bare perusal of both the orders passed by the respective learned trial Court, it appears that the mandatory provision of law was not followed and no such reason has been r-corded as to why the Court avoided to follow the Proviso to Rule 3 of order 39, Civil Procedure Code. That being the position, the learned Counsel submits that the learned lower appellate Court ought to have set aside both the orders passed by the learned Munsiffs. In this connection, the learned Counsel placed before me a decision of the Madras High Court reported in AIR 1936 Madras page 936 relating to the maintainability of the suit and the alleged threat to possession. I refrain from expre­ssing any opinion in this context as the matter relates to ori­ginal trial of the suit to be decided by the trial Court. 7. The next submission of Mr. Mazumdar is that it was incumbent upon the learned lower appellate Court to consider the documents as submitted by the petitioners before it. To support his above contention, the learned Counsel has referred to me two decisions of this Court rendered in Civil Revision No. 32 of 1978 (Maji Matasin Ali vs. Nazafat Ali) disposed of on 2.9.81 and Civil Revision No. 173 of 1979 (Sukhlal Ray vs. Falua Mia) disposed of on 3.6.80. The aforesaid Civil Revi­sions came up before the Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. Lahiri. In Civil Revision No- 32 of 1978, it was observed as follows:- "The power of the trial Court under Order 39 is dis­cretionary. Appeals against discretionary powers should be exercised by the appellate authority with care, caution and circumspection and only when the appellate Court concludes that the discretion exercised by the Court below is not in accordance with justice and law and/or that it is a purported exercise of discretion 'that' the appellate Court should interfere with the order". In Civil Revision No. 173 of 1979 it was held:- "The law is well settled that when documents are filed, the courts cannot ignore them, give a decision brushing them aside". In Civil Revision No. 173 of 1979 it was held:- "The law is well settled that when documents are filed, the courts cannot ignore them, give a decision brushing them aside". There is yet another case decided by this Court reported in (1981) 1 Gauhati Law Reports 231, B.N. Singh vs. Sundarmal Hindi High School, which came up before the Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.N. Saikia wherein it has been held that the power of appellate Court in the matter of injunction is rather circumscribed and the appellate Court would be slow to interfere with exercise of discretion and would normally not be justified in in­terfering with the exercise of the discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it may have come to a contrary conclusion. If it appears to the appellate Court that in exercising its discretion, the trial Court has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant facts then it would certainly be open to the appe­llate court to interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion. 8. On perusal of the judgment of the learned appellate Court, it appears, that the original order of the learned trial Court was considered and found that while passing the original order of issue of injunction the trial court had considered the implications of the principles governing issue of injunction in arriving at the decision. The lower appellate Court further found that the trial Court has taken into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case before passing the aforesaid order of injunction. The relevant documents as referred to me by the learned Counsel for the petitioner are not with the records. But it appears that those documents were submitted before the lower appellate Court as there is a list showing submission of those documents and the same is tagged with the file maintained by the lower appellate Court. Therefore, it is not possible to say as to what should be the consideration of these documents and as to what the learned lower appellate Court omitted to consider. 9. Mr. S. N. Medhi, learned Counsel for the opposite parties -(plaintiffs) has referred to me a decision of the Supreme Court in Delhi Municipality vs. Sureah Chandra, AIR 1976 SC 2621 . 9. Mr. S. N. Medhi, learned Counsel for the opposite parties -(plaintiffs) has referred to me a decision of the Supreme Court in Delhi Municipality vs. Sureah Chandra, AIR 1976 SC 2621 . That was a case relating to interim injunction and of concurrent findings of the trial court as well as of first appellate court. The High Court in exercising its jurisdiction under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code interfered with the order. In that case their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the interference by the High Court with the concu­rrent findings was unjustified and the High Court had over­looked the principles governing interference under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. In Hindusthan Aeronautics, Ltd. vs. Ajit Prasad AIR 1973 SC 16 their Lordships of the Supreme Court while considering the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 114 of the Code held: "In our opinion the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first appellate Court. It is not the conclusion of the High Court that the first appe­llate Court had no jurisdiction to make the order that it made. The order of the first appellate Court may be right or wrong, may be in accordance with law, or may not be in accordance with law, but one thing is clear that it had jurisdiction to mike that order. It is not the case that the first appellate Court exercised its juridiction either illegally or with material irregularity. That being so, the High Court could not have invoked its jurisdiction under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code." The above principle of law enunciated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court is binding on me and the same cannot be lost sight of while deciding a petition under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Cole. I have perused the order of the lower appellate Court and I do not find any jurisdictional error in it and as such the same cannot be interfered with. 10. The petitions are without merit and they are dismissed as such. Both the Rules are discharged. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Send down the records immediately. Learned Trial Courts are directed to dispose of both the suits as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of four months giving over­riding priority.