This revision application under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code raises important questions concerning the Court's perimeter to interprete the provisions of section 5(1)(c) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1967-(Shortly 'the Act") which confers jurisdiction upon the Court to pass a decree for eviction of the tenant from the premises of the landlord in a legal action for eviction 2. The plaintiff opposite party sought for eviction of defen­dant petitioner from the premises as describad in schedule to the plaint and instituted a Title Suit No. 25 of 1971 in the Court of Munsiff at Jorhat. The Defendant-petitioner contested the claim of the plaintiff-opposite party but it was in vain. On contest, the defendant lost his stand in the suit. Consequent thereof, the decree or eviction was passed against him. He then preferred an appeal in the Court of the Assistant District Judge at Jorhat which was numbered as Title Appeal No. 12 of 1973 questioning the validity and legality of the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. The defendant had to face the same fate as the learned appellant Court dismissed appeal. The defendant did not lose be confidence. He has preferred this revision application under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code and sought for an Interference by this Court. The plain­tiff is the opposite party in this revision application before this Court. The law as to the limitation of revisional power of the High Court is well settled. The revisional power is limited. The High Court cannot interfere even if the Court below com­mits an error of law or facts. But the High Court certainly can lay its hand upon any decision and order of the Court below if in deciding a matter, the lower court or the appellate court, as the case may be, decides it in eclear breach of pro­vision of law or commits a procedural error. Mr. J.P. Bhatta-charjee, the learned Advocate General of Nagaland who represents the petitioner in this court has urged that the lower appellate Court has comitted two illegalities, namely, decided tie case again n the petitioner by committing a breach of statutory pro­vision of law and has also committed an error in violation of the established and settled principle of procedure. Mr. J.P. Bhatta-charjee, the learned Advocate General of Nagaland who represents the petitioner in this court has urged that the lower appellate Court has comitted two illegalities, namely, decided tie case again n the petitioner by committing a breach of statutory pro­vision of law and has also committed an error in violation of the established and settled principle of procedure. The learned Counsel has further urged that on a procedural error coupled with wrong interpretation of law the High Court in exercising the revisional jurisdiction can certainly set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court. 3. In this petition, the petitioner has challenged the legality of the judgment and decree of the learned first appellate Court passed in Title Appeal No. 12 of 1973, dated 19.3.76 on the ground of wrong interpretation of law amounting to illegal exercise of jurisdiction not vested in it under the provisions of law. 4. To appreciate the contentions of the halted Counsel as well as the rival contentions of Mr. B. Sarma, the learned Counsel for the opposite party, it would be necessary to set out briefly the respective cases of the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff's case in brief is that the premises as described in schedule of the plaint was let out to the defendant as a monthly tenant. The defendant had been possessing the suit premises on and from the commencement of tenancy which ultimately expired by 31st January, 1971. The plaintiff requested the defendant to vacate the premises but as he failed to do so a notice was served upon him asking him to vacate the premises by expiry of 28.2.71. On receipt of the notice the defendant sent a reply denying the allegations made therein. The ground for asking the defendant to vacate the premises was to the effect that the premises in question was required by the plaintiff for his own use and purpose. Reply of the defendant was also to the effect that the above assertion made by the plaintiff ID the notice was not correct and the defendant denied the need of the premises by the plaintiff. The plaintiff being dissatisfied on the defendant's refusal to vacate the premises, brought a suit as narrated above against the defendant praying for khas possession by evicting the defendant there from and claimed a compensation of Rs. The plaintiff being dissatisfied on the defendant's refusal to vacate the premises, brought a suit as narrated above against the defendant praying for khas possession by evicting the defendant there from and claimed a compensation of Rs. 562.50 for a period from 1.2.71 to the date till filing of the suit. On such institution of the suit against the defendant a written statement was submitted by the defendant, in reply to the allegation made in the plaint and by denying the plaintiff's allegations. The defendant challenged the validity and legality of the notice and denied that he was never a defaulter. The defendant, stated in his written statement that there was no electric fittings in the premises and on the basis of the plantiff's words to allow him to stay so long he desires, be spent about Rs. 2,500/- in the electric fittings to run his business where he is said to have been carrying on the studio business. His further allegation was that he spent about Rs. 6,000/- for imporvement of the house, such as, by construction of a show room, dark room etc., of course with the consent of the plaintiff. His strong allegation was that the suit house was not required by the plaintiff either for his own use and occupation or for any business purpose. But on the other hand as alleged by the defendant the plaintiff has brought this suit only with a view to enhance the rent and to let out the same to others. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the respective parties, the learned trial court framed as many as 14 issues, out of which Issue No. 3 could be said to be the main issue, the decision of which would give the final result of the whole suit either in favour or against a party to the suit. Issue No. 3 runs as under: "3. whether there is bonafide requirement of the plaintiff for his own use and occupation of the suit house ?" The learned appellate Court below agreed to the findings of the learned Munsiff in respect of Issue No. 3 as decided against the defendant and held that it was difficult to refute the contention of the plaintiff as to the bonafide requirement of the house for his own use and occupation. 6. 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has made the grievance that this vital issue has not been properly decided on evidence on record or by applying strict principle of law either by trial Court or by first appellate Court. In criticising the finding on issue No. 3 of the first appellate Court, the learned Counsel has drawn my attention to the ratio of the findings of the learned first appellate Court. The contention of the learned Counsel is that it was obligatory on the part of the learned first appellate Court to discuss the evidence on record as a court of fact. But, in the instant case, while deciding Issue No. 3, the learned appellate court neither discussed the evidence nor followed the legal principles in coming to the conclusion as to whether there was a 'bonafide requirement' of the suit premises for the own use and occupation of the plaintiff. The learned Counsel has submitted to me that the entire approach of the first appellate Court, while deciding issue No. 3, in respect of its legal requirement was erroneous and therefore it attracts the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court to Interfere with those findings of the court below. The learned first appellate Court, according to the learned counsel, concluded the findings in Issue No. 3 on the principle that the plaintiff while prayed for eviction of the defendant on the ground that he requires the suit pre­mises bonofide for his own use and occupation, the defendant as well as the court become helpless. The main ground of attack in this revision application rests entirely on the findings of Issue No. 3. The learned counsel has laid stress on the following observations and concluded findings of the learned appellate Court which has been quoted below: "The clause in the Act is arbitrarily in favour of the landlord. When a landlord claims the rented house he can use the word of his own use and occupation. The landlord can very easily use and occupy the bouse for six months and then use it otherwise. Here the tenant is helpless. When a landlord claims the rented house he can use the word of his own use and occupation. The landlord can very easily use and occupy the bouse for six months and then use it otherwise. Here the tenant is helpless. * * * * * * * * In this Instant case although the plaintiff has one photo business 15'x20' apart from the suit house and one glass business just contiguous to the suit house and a godown contiguous to his glass business and he has some vacant land behind the premises, yet when he claims the suit house for his own use and occupation to extend and enlarge his glass business. Defendant and Court become helpless. Only consolation is that if he does not do so within six months, the defendant can come to Court for restoration. But this restoration clause can be defeated easily by doing some act for six months by the plaintiff. In this instant case although plaintiff has three business having no able son to help he wants to extend his glass business and St is difficult to refute his contention or desire to do so." The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the entire approach of the learned appellate court in coming to the conclusion on the issue of 'bo nafide requirement' was erroneous and on wrong interpretation of the provision of section 5(1)(c) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act. 1967 (Assam Act II of 1967). The proof of requirements enumerated under section 5 of the act is a condition precedent to pass a decree for ejectment. Only upon fulfilment of conditions, the Court would be empowered to pass a decree. Section 5(1)(c) of the Act runs as follows : "5(1). No order or decree for the recovery of posses­sion of any house shall be made or executed by any Court so long as the tenant pays rent to the full extent allowable under this Act and performs the conditions of the tenancy. Section 5(1)(c) of the Act runs as follows : "5(1). No order or decree for the recovery of posses­sion of any house shall be made or executed by any Court so long as the tenant pays rent to the full extent allowable under this Act and performs the conditions of the tenancy. Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply in a suit or proceedings for eviction of the tenant from the house : - (a) * * (b) * * (c) where the house is bonafide required by the landlord either for purposes of repairs or rebuilding, or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house is held, or where the landlord can show any other cause which may be deemed satisfactory by the Court", or 7. The plaintiff's suit was based on the ground that he requires the premises' 'bonafide' for extension of his glass business which is stated to be contiguous to the suit premises. Therefore, a question poses : What is the test to consider the bonafide requirement ? Is it sufficient to hold that the plaintiff requires the house bonafide, as because he has made a mere assertion in a plain way in his plaint ? or whether a cogent, sufficient and reliable evidence is necessary to conclude that in fact, the plaintiff requires the Premises for his 'genuine need'. A mere desire on the part of the landlord is certainty not enough without showing the elements of need and genuine requirements. The learned Counsel has referred to me a decision of the Supreme Court Mattulal vs. Radhelal reported in AIR 1974 SC 1596 . In para 12 of the judgment, their Lordships held : X X X X X X X X X X "The word 'required' signifies that mere desire on the part of landlord is not enough but there should be an element of need and the landlord must show-the burden being upon him-that the genuinely requires the non-residen­tial accommodation for the purpose of starting or conti­nuing his own business." 8. On a bare perusal of findings on issue No. 3, it is apparent that while deciding the said issue, the learned first appellate Court made certain comments (which I do not like to repeat) on the statute and its object. On a bare perusal of findings on issue No. 3, it is apparent that while deciding the said issue, the learned first appellate Court made certain comments (which I do not like to repeat) on the statute and its object. The learned appellate Court worked under assumption that while the statute provides the right of the plaintiff to get a decree for ejectment on any of the grounds as enumerated under section 5 of the Act, and if the plaintiff desires to evict the defendant only by stating any of the grounds stated therein asking for a decree for eviction of the defendant on the basis of that ground, the Court cannot have any say but to admit the contentions or the desire of the plaintiff. On mere allegation of the plaintiff as to his bonafide requirement, the Court as well as the defendant be­come helpless and the Court is to pass decree in favour of the plaintiff. It is very difficult to swallow the reason stated by the learned appellate Court below in the manner as stated in the impugned judgment. The finding is not based on evidence on record but merely on a wrong approach in interpreting the statutory provisions of law. There is not even a single sentence in the entire judgment as to satisfaction of the Court about the plaintiff's 'genuine need' for his non-residential accommoda­tion and that the need was 'banafide to justify the Court to pass a decree for eviction on that ground. There being no finding to this effect, the learned Counsel contended, that it is a fit case for interference by this Court and to give a direction to the lower appellate Court for a fresh finding on issue No. 3 and to decide the case on its merit on the basis of evidence on record. The contention appears to be sound, substantial and forceful. 9. Mr. B. Sarma, the learned Counsel for the opposite party has vehemently objected to the above submissions raised by the learned Advocate General for the petitioner. The main plank of contention of Mr. Sarma is, that the findings as to the "bonafide requirement' is a 'finding of fact" and the revisional Court shall not interfere with these findings how soever erroneous it may be. Mr. The main plank of contention of Mr. Sarma is, that the findings as to the "bonafide requirement' is a 'finding of fact" and the revisional Court shall not interfere with these findings how soever erroneous it may be. Mr. Sarma has referred to me AIR 1976 SC 1341 Sher singh vs. Joint Director of Consolidation where it has been held by their Lordships "erroneous decision on a question of fact or law Having no relation to question of jurisdiction of subordinate officer cannot be corrected." In para 6 of the judgment, their Lordships have held :- "......It is now well settled that the revisional jurisdic­tion of the High Court is confined to case or illegal assumption of the jurisdiction by the subordinate courts. If a Subordinate court is found to possess the jurisdiction to decide a matter, it cannot be said to exercise it illegally or with material Irregularity even if it decides the matter wrongly. In other words, it is not open to the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under section 115 of the Civil Proce­dure Code to correct errors of fact howsoever gross or even errors of law unless the errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself." 10. Undoubtly, the High Court is bound to obey the above mandate of the Supreme Court in exercising its revisional jurisdiction. It is now settled law as to when, how and where the High Court is empowered to exercise jurisdiction in dealing with a revision application to interfere with the decision of the subordinate Courts. The next question which is very much pertinent to be taken into consideration as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner is the question as to whether the findings as to the 'bonafide requirement' is a "mixed question of law and facts" or purely a "finding of fact". Conflict of decisions apparently come to my notice on this point. It appears that by now the law is settled on this point. It is a finding of fact and not a mixed question of law and facts. I venture to refer few decisions of the Supreme Court on this point. 11. Conflict of decisions apparently come to my notice on this point. It appears that by now the law is settled on this point. It is a finding of fact and not a mixed question of law and facts. I venture to refer few decisions of the Supreme Court on this point. 11. In Smt. Kamala Sonivs. Ruplal Mehra, C. A. No. 2150 of 1966 disposed on 25.9.69 (reported in AIR 1969 SC 186) their Lordships have observed as to whether the, requirement of the landlord is bonafide within the meaning of section 14(1) (c) of the Delhi Rent Control Act and held that "It is a finding of mixed question of law and fact". In Madanlal Puri vs, Sain Das Berry, AIR 1973 SC 583, their Lordships have held that it was within the jurisdiction of the High Court in Second Appeal to examine the correctness of the findings as to the bonafide requirement of the premises by the landlord as the question was a mixed question of law and fact. In Mattulal vs. Radhelal (supra) their Lordships towards the conclu­ding portion of paragraph 11 held : (Passage from Smti Kamal Sonfs case) "The argument that the learned Judges of the High Court exceed their jurisdiction under S. 39(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, when they reversed the finding of bonafide requirement of the appellant, has no substance. Whether on the facts proved the requirement of the landlord is bonafide within the meaning of section 14(1)(e) is a findings on a mixed question of law and fact. In inference that the requirement of the appellant in the present case was bonafide could not be regarded as conclusive." "Now there can be no doubt that these observations made in Smt. Kamala Soni's case, C. A. No. 2150 of 1966 D/26.9.69 (reported in AIR 1969 SC186) are plainly in contradiction of what was said by this Court earlier in Sarvate T.B.'s case 1966 MPL J 26. It is obvious that the decision in Sarvate T. B.'s case 1966 M.P.LJ 26 was not brought to the notice of this Court while deciding Smt. Kamala Sonfs case C. A. No. 2150 of 1966, D/ 26.9.1969 (reported in AIR 1969 SC 186) or else this Court would not have landed itself in such patent contradiction. It is obvious that the decision in Sarvate T. B.'s case 1966 M.P.LJ 26 was not brought to the notice of this Court while deciding Smt. Kamala Sonfs case C. A. No. 2150 of 1966, D/ 26.9.1969 (reported in AIR 1969 SC 186) or else this Court would not have landed itself in such patent contradiction. But whatever be the reason, it cannot be gain-said that it is not possible to reconcile the observation in these two decisions. That being so, we must prefer to follow the decision in Sarvate T.B.'s case as against the decision in Smt. Kamala Soni's case, as the former is a decision of a large Bench than the latter. Moreover on principle, the view taken in Sarvate T. B.'s case commends itself to us and we think that is the right view. We must therefore, hold that the finding to the Additional District Judge that the respondent did not bonafide required the Lohi Bazar shop for the purpose of starting business as a dealer in iron and steel materials was a finding of fact and not a finding of mixed law and fact." In this instant case, it is very difficult to find as to how the learned first appellate Court came to the conclusion about the element of need and the bonafide requirement of the plaintiff as held by the learned first appellate Court. While decided Issue No. 3, the learned 1st. appellate Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff requires the premises in question as it was his real need and a "bonafide” requirement. The jurisdic­tion of the Court to pass a decree for eviction is subject to its factual satisfaction as to the existence of any of the grounds enumerated in section 5 of the Act. The Court must be satis­fied on the basis of evidence on record. Similarly, in the present case, the trial Court shall have jurisdiction under section 5 of the Rent Control Act to pass a decree only when the Court is satisfied on evidence on record that the landlord requires the premises bonafide as stated under section 5(1 )(c) of the Act. Similarly, in the present case, the trial Court shall have jurisdiction under section 5 of the Rent Control Act to pass a decree only when the Court is satisfied on evidence on record that the landlord requires the premises bonafide as stated under section 5(1 )(c) of the Act. I have already narrated in earlier part of my judg­ment as to how thair Lordships of the Supreme Court interpreted the word 'bonafide required." If the trial Court comes to a wrong conclusion on the basic principle of law, it cannot get its jurisdiction to pass a decree of eviction. Therefore such decision on jurisdictional fact can be rectified by the revisional Court if there would be an error. If the Court finds that there is no bonafide requirement, and that the plaintiff could not prove his 'genuine need", the Court cannot get any jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction of the defendant in view of the provisions of section 5(1) of the Act. On going through the findings on issue No. 3, it is very diffi­cult to draw any conclusion that such aspect of the matter was considered by the learned first appellate Court. Had there been any discussion on evidence on record in the light it was to be done, the matter would have been otherwise for its con­clusion. The entire approach of the first appellate Court as to the requirement as provided under section 5(1)(c) of the Act appears to be erroneous. The decision on issue No. 3 touches the jurisdiction of the Court as to whether the Court is empowered to pass a decree under the provisions of section 5(1)(c) of the Act or such jurisdiction to pass a decree is restricted because of the failure of the plaintiff to prove his 'bonafide requirement'. Therefore, the entire matter touches the jurisdiction of the Court to deal under Section 5(1)(c) of the Act to get Its jurisdiction to pass a decree in accordance with law. If the provision of section 5(1)(c) is not satisfied on evi­dence on record, the Court cannot have any jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction of the defendant. Therefore, the entire matter touches the jurisdiction of the Court to deal under Section 5(1)(c) of the Act to get Its jurisdiction to pass a decree in accordance with law. If the provision of section 5(1)(c) is not satisfied on evi­dence on record, the Court cannot have any jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction of the defendant. Therefore, this Court can Interfere with the judgment and order of the learned appellate Court below under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code as it affects the jurisdiction of the Court, Coupled with commission of illegality and material irregelarity in deciding a case touching the jurisdiction of the Court either to pass or not to pass a decree in the case, under the provision of Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act. This is certainly a jurisdictional error to pass a decree without any findings as to the proof of genuine need of the landlord for the premises. Therefore, in my opinion, the finding of the learned appellate Court below cannot sustain and is liable to be set aside. Consequently, the judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate Court below are hereby set aside. There is no other ground raised as enumerated in the provision of section 5 of the Act except the ground on "bona-fide requirement". 12. In the result, the petition is allowed and the Rule is made absolute. The judgment and decree of the learned appe­llate Court below are set aside. The case is remanded to the learned first appellate Court to decide the entire appeal of the petitioner a fresh on merit. The learned appellate Court is directed to decide the case (appeal) within a period of 4 (four) months from the date of receipt of the records from this Court after hearing both the parties. The parties will appear through their Counsel if they so desire, in the appellate Court below OB 15.5.82 on which date the learned Court below shall pass nece­ssary order. On the facts and circumstances of the case, I pass no order as to costs. Send down the records immediately.