VENKATACHALIAH, J. ( 1 ) THESE writ petitions are amongst the batch of writ petitions challenging the levy of an additional tax on turnover under S. 6-B of the Karnataka Sales- tax Act, 1957 (as substituted by S. 3 of the Karnataka Sales-Tax (Amendment) Act, 1981 Karnataka Act 7 of 1981 ). As the contentions urged are common, all the writ-petitions were heard together so that all the learned counsel appearing in the cases are afforded an opportunity of being heard. The writ-petitions now disposed of by this order are, so far as the contentions raised and urged are concerned, representative of the batch. The other petitions in the batch will be disposed of in convenient batches following this pronouncement. ( 2 ) PETITIONERS are 'dealers' registered under the Karnataka Sales-Tax act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the 'act' ). S. 6-B of the 'act', as it presently obtains, was substitute 1 in place of the old) section 6-B, by S. 3 of the Karnataka Act 7 of 1981. 6-B of the 'act' as it earlier stood envisaged and provided for an additional tax: levied on and collected from every dealer liable to pay tax under S. 5 or under S. 6 at the rate of 10 paise in the rupee on the sales-tax or purchase tax or both payable, as the case may be, by such dealer. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 6b provided that the provisions of the Art and the Rules made thereunder including those relating to refund or exemption from tax shall, in so far as may be apply in relation to the levy, assess ment and collection of such additional tax as they apply in relation to the levy, assessment and collection of sales tax or purchase tax under the 'act'. This provision was substituted by S. 3 of Karnataka Act 7 of 1981. There is material difference between the provisions of the earlier sub-section (1) and the substituted sub-section. While the earlier provisions envisaged an additional levy on a dealer calculated at 10 paise in the rupee on the amount of sales-tax or purchase-tax or both payable by him, the present sub-sec. (1) envisages a levy at /2 per cent on the total turnover of a dealer whose 'total turn-over" in a year exceeds rupees one lakh. While the earlier provisions envisaged an additional levy on a dealer calculated at 10 paise in the rupee on the amount of sales-tax or purchase-tax or both payable by him, the present sub-sec. (1) envisages a levy at /2 per cent on the total turnover of a dealer whose 'total turn-over" in a year exceeds rupees one lakh. S. 6b as it now stands reads :"6b Levy of turn-over tax - (1) every dealer whose total turn-over in a year exceeds rupees one lakh shall, in additioh to the tax payable, if any. under other provisions of this act, pay tax at the rate of one-half per cent of his total turn-over : provided that no tax under this sub-section shall be payable on any part of such turn-over which relates to,- (i) sale or purchase of goods specified in the Fifth Schedule ; (ii) Sale or purchase of goods specified in the Fourth Schedule; (iii) Sale or purchase of goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce; (iv) sale or purchase of goods in the course of export out-side the territory of India or sale or purchase in the course of import into the territory of India, and (v) all amounts collected by way of tax under the provisions of this act or the Central Sales Tax act, 1956 (Central Act No. 74 of 1956) (2) The provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder including those relating to refund or exemption from tax shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to the levy, assessment and collection or the tax payable under sub-section (1), as they apply in relation to the Levy, assessment and collection of sales tax or purchase tax under this act". ( 3 ) THE amending Act received the assent of the Governor on 4. 4. 1981. However, by virtue of the requisite legislative declaration contained in the Bill the provisions of the 'act' became enforceable from the date of the introduction of the, Bill as provided by the, Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1974. We may now set-out the facts of some of the cases, which are typical and illustrative of the position of the petitioners in this batch of writ petitions, to show how the provisions of the substituted S. 6b are construed by the authorities to affect the dealers. We may now set-out the facts of some of the cases, which are typical and illustrative of the position of the petitioners in this batch of writ petitions, to show how the provisions of the substituted S. 6b are construed by the authorities to affect the dealers. ( 4 ) IN W. P. No. 32906/81, the petitioner a public Limited Company carries on the business of hire-purchase financiers of motor-vehicles. In respect of the assessment year 1980-81, the petitioner submitted its annual return in form No. 4 in regard to its turnover. "motor vehicles" dealt with by the petitioners falling as they do under Entry-71 of the II Sch. are, in respect of their sales, exigible to a single point levy at the point of first sale, i. e, at the point of sale by the automobile dealer in favour of the petitioners. As the motor-vehicles constituting the subject-matter of the hire-purchase agreements suffer tax at the point of first sale by the Automobile-Dealers in favour of the petitioner, the sales that the hire-purchase agreement might eventually culminate; in as between the petitioner and the hirers in terms of the agreements became second-sales and exempt from levy of tax under S. 5 (1) by virtue of S. 5 (3) (a) of the 'act'. However, the assessing Authority, upon a construction of the provisions of S. 6b, has held that notwithstanding the circumstance that, the turnover of the second-sales by the petitioner is not exigible to tax under S. 5 (1) of the 'act', the turnover of such second-sales, nevertheless, attracts levy under S. 6b. Petitioner's turn-over for the two working days that fell between 29. 3. 1981 and 31. 3. 1981 was Rs. 2,37,000 and turnover-tax at per cent under Section 6b amounting to Rs. 1,185 is demanded from the petitioner under the demand notice dated 17. 9. 1981 (Annexure-'c') The legality of this demand is challenged by the petitioner. In W. P. No. 11889/81 and 11890/81, petitioners are second-dealers in Automobile Chassis and Automobile; spare- parts in the State of Karnataka. They say that the quantum of their turnover of taxable sales is almost negligible in the State of Karnataka. A major part of their turnover, it is stated, represented second-sales of merchandise included in the II Sch. In W. P. No. 11889/81 and 11890/81, petitioners are second-dealers in Automobile Chassis and Automobile; spare- parts in the State of Karnataka. They say that the quantum of their turnover of taxable sales is almost negligible in the State of Karnataka. A major part of their turnover, it is stated, represented second-sales of merchandise included in the II Sch. which, by virtue of S. 5 (3) (a) of the 'act', are exempt from levy under S. 5 (1) of the 'act'. The Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Belgaum has caused the issue of a notice dated 1. 6. 1981 (as per annexure 'a' appended to the memorandum of writ-petition in W. P. No. 11889/81) requiring the petitioners to pay turn-over-tax at per cent, under s. 6b on the turn-over of Rs. 36, 47, 537-10 for the period between 1. 4. 1981 and 30. 6. 1981 though in respect of this turn-over petitioners as the second- dealers in the II schedule goods are exempt from levy under Sec. 5 (1 ). The Assessing-authority construing s. 6-B as enabling such a levy has called upon the first-petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 18,237-68 by way of turn-over tax. The legality of this notice is challenged by the petitioners. In W. Ps. Nos. 23916 to 23921/81, the petitioners are dealers in petroleum and petroleum-products including kerosene, which are goods listed in the II Schedlue to the 'act'. ' Their taxable turn-over liable to tax under s. 5 (1) is stated to be negligible and the bulk of their turnover is as seconddealers in these goods respecting which they are exempt from tax by virtue of S. 5 (3) (a ). They say that S. 6b does not authorise a levy on such second-sales and any construction placed upon the provision as supporting the levy would render the provision itself unconstitutional. ( 5 ) INDEED the respondents have not filed their returns in this batch of writ-petitions. However, since the question is one of law and of interpretation, we told the learned Advocate-General that we will take notice of the submissions made in the course arguments in reply to the contentions urged in the petitions. We also told the learned Advocate-General that he could formulate his contentions in the form of a memo so that the contentions urged by him may go on record. We also told the learned Advocate-General that he could formulate his contentions in the form of a memo so that the contentions urged by him may go on record. We have heard Sri K. Srinivasam sri Indrakumar, Sri B. V. Katgeri, Sri Sarangan, Sri Channabasappa, Sri Kashinatha Rao patl, Sri Devanathan, learned counsel who addressed arguments for the petitioners and the learned Advocate- general and Sri M. R. Achar, learned high Court Government Advocate for the respondents. ( 6 ) A number of contentions are taken in the memorandum of writ petitions. Initially, the submission of counsel for petitioners was that in view of S. 6b (1), including inter-State and export turn-over within the concept of "total-turn-over", as defined in S. 2 (u-2) of the 'act', was unconstitutional as offending Art 286 of the Constitution, but this line of argument was not pursued and Sri K. Srinivasan stated - and this submission was adopted by all other learned counsel - that he would not urge the question of constitutionality, but would rest his case an a point of construction, and would urge that the expression "total-turn-over" occurring in S. 6b (1) should be understood to mean a turn-over excluding the inter-State and import and export turn-over. It may be pointed out here that S. 2 (u-2) of the 'act' defines "total turn-over" to meain the aggregate turn-over in all goods of a dealer whether or not the whole or any part of it is liable to tax including the turn-over relating to sales in the course of inter-State trade or of export or import. On the basis of the contentions actually urged at the hearing, the controversy in the matter admits of being identified and formulated thus: (A) The expression "total turnover" in the clause "whose total turn-over in the year exceeds Rs. 1,00,000" in S. 6b (1) ought not to be read with the dfefinition of "total turn-over" under S. 2 (u-2); but must be so understood as to exclude inter-State sales and) export-sales, as else S. 6b (1) would render itself susceptible to the vice of unconsti- tutionality by taking inito account the quantum of turn-over of inter- state sales and export-eales in selecting "dealers" for the levy of the addititnal tax under Section 6b. (B) Section 6b brings about an unconstitutional discrimination, vio- lative of the constitutional pledge of equality, by making the classification between persons brought within the net of the levy under S. 6b and those exclucded from it, dependent upon the quantum of turn-over which includes sales and purchases in the course of inter-State trade and commerce and export, a differetia, which has no rational (nexus to the objects of the Legislation. (C) The State Legislature has no competence to levy a tax on the 'turn-over' and as such the levy under S. 6b would not be tax under Entry 54 List II. (D) That S. 6b, as substituted by karnataka Act 7 of 1981, imposes restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse within the meaning of Art. 304 (b) of the Constitution and the Legislative measure, not having been introduced or moved in the Legislature with the previous sanction of the President of India, is unconstitutional. (E) Even if S. 6b is valid, by virtue of the provisions of S. 6b (2), the exemptions under S. 5 (3) (a) and (b) are also attracted for computation of taxable turn-over and that the turn-over exigible to tax under s. 6b (2) would stand, pro-taato, reduced. ( 7 ) THE main thrust of the argument is that the expression "total turn-over" in the clause "every dealer whose total turn-over in an year exceeds Rs. 1,00,000" in the first part of S. 6b (1) of the 'act' cannot be read with the statutory definition of "total turn-over" in S. 2 (u-2) of the 'act', but must be understood only as such turn-over respecting which the State Legislature has competence to levy tax and so understood the line of demarcation of dealers in whose cases the levy under S. 6b (1) is attracted would depend upon the quantum of total turn-over excluding the transactions of inter-State sales and' purchases and sales and purchases in the course of export and import. The argument for the Revenue is that the first part of S. 6b (1) is not a provision for levy or imposition of the tax; that it merely specifies the class of dealers whose turn-over in, intra- state transactions is liable to turn-over tax under S. 6b (1) and that it was only for that limited purpose the total turn-over, including inter-State and import and export turn-over, is taken into account. But the levy of turn-over tax, under S. 6b (1) was, so proceeds the argument, only on such turn-over respecting which the State legislature had competence to levy tax, as is evident from the proviso to S. 6b (1) and, therefore, it is not impermissible to give to the expression 'total-turn-over' in the first part of S' 6b (1) the same meaning as in S, 2 (u-2) of the 'act'. ( 8 ) IN support of their interpretation, the learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in A. V. Fernandez v. The State of Kerala (1 ). In that case appellant A. V. Fernandez, a registered manufacturer of coconut-oil and oil-cake in the S'taie of kerala had purchased, during the period between 1-4-1951 and 31-3-1952, copra of the value of Rs. 7,16,048-1-4 and after manufacturing oil thereirom in his Oil Mills sold the oil partly in the Kerala State and partly out-side it. The oil-cake produced, of a value of Rs. 67,155-15-5, was sold entirely within the State. The total value of the oil sold was Rs. 6,76,719-0-11 comprised of inter-State sales of Rs. 3,67,816-10-1 and, intra-State sales to the extent of the balance of Rs. 3,08,902-6-10. The gross-turn-over for the year, which included both the purchase of Copra and sale of oil and oilcake, was Rs. 14,59,923-1-8. Rule 7 (1) (k) of the Rules framed under the travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax. Act, 1125 entitled the appellant to deduct from his gross-turn-over the entire purchase turn-over of Copra provided the entire-turn-over of the Oil manufactured out of that Copra was included in the gross-turn-over. Appellant, therefore, 'claimed to be entitled to deduct the whole purchase turn-over of Copra out of the gross turn-over of the sales of coconut-oil, which included the inter-State sales turn-over of coconut oil amounting to rs. 3,67,816-10-1. The case of the appellant was that as the entire purchase turn-over ot copra was part of his gross turn-over and as he had manufactured coconutoil out of the entire quantity of Copra so purchased and sold it, irrcspectue of the fact a part of it was sold out-sid the State, he was entitled, in terms of rule 7 (1) (k) to add the entire sales turn-over ot coconut-oil in the gross turn-over and to claim the deduction oi the entire purchase turn-over of copra. His further case was that he was also not libale to pay tax to the state on the inter-State sales turn-over of coconut-oil in view of Section 26 of that Act read with Article 286 of the constitution. The stand of the authorities, however, was that since, in view of Art. 286 and S. 26 introduced into the Act no tax could be levied on the interstate sales turn-over, the 'turn-over of the appellant relating to coconul-oil and out-side the State could not be included, either in the total turn-over or taxable turn-over In this view of the matter they excluded the inter-State sales turn-over of coconut-oil to the extent of Rs. 3,67,316-10-1, both from the gross turn-over and taxable turn over. Consequently only that part oi the purchase turn-over of Copra corresponding to the intra-State sales turn-over of oil was permitted to be excluded from the gross turn-over so arrived at, for purposes of Rule 7 (1) (k ). Consequently deduction, only to the extent of the purchase turn-over of Copra, as was attributable to the oil manufactured and sold within the state out of the gross turn-over, was given. Both the High Court and the Supreme Court upheld the stand of the revenue. The Supreme Court hold that the effect of S. 26, introduced in the Travancore-Cochin General Sales- tax Act, 1125, a pro-constitutional law so as to bring that law in conformity with the requirements of Article 286 of the Constitution, was, in so far as categories of sales falling within art. 286 of the Constitution were concerned, the "setting at nought and of obliterating the provisions containted in the Act relating to the imposition of tax on sale or purchase of such goods". Section 26 was in terms similar to Art. 286. It was, therefore, held that the turn-over of inter-Si ate sales could neither be included in the gross turn-over nor in the net taxable turnover. The Supreme Court, referring to tax effect of and the limitation on legislative power implicit in Art. 286 said:". . . . So far as sales falling with in the categories specified in Art. 286 of the Constitution and the corresponding Sec. 26 of the Act are concerned, they are, as it were, taken out of the purview of the Act and no effect is to be given to those provisions. . . . . . . . So far as sales falling with in the categories specified in Art. 286 of the Constitution and the corresponding Sec. 26 of the Act are concerned, they are, as it were, taken out of the purview of the Act and no effect is to be given to those provisions. . . . . If these provisions of the act and the rules made thereunder do not apply to the sales falling within those categories, the value thereof cannot be included in the turn-over of the dealer. "the Supreme Court, pointing out the essential distinction and the consequences stemming from the recognition of that distinction between cases where there was a mere statutory exemption and cases of non-liability, observed:"there is a broad distinction between the provisions contained in the statute in regard to the exemption of tax or refund or rebate of tax on the one hand and in regard to the nonliability to tax or non-imposition of tax on the other. In the former case, but for the provisions as regards the exemptions or refund or rebate oi tax, the sales or purchases would have to be included in the gross turn-over of the dealer because they are prima-faeie liable to tax and the only thing which the dealer is entitled to in respect thereof is the deduction from the gross turn-over in order to arrive at the net turn-over on which the tax can be imposed. In the latter case, the sales or purchases are exempted from taxation altogether. The Legislature cannot enact a law imposing or authorising the imposition of a tax thereupon and they are not liable to any such imposition of tax If they are thus not liable to tax, no tax can be levied or imposed on them and they do not come within the purview of the Act at all. The very fact of their non-liability to tax is sufficient to exclude them from the calculation of the gross turnover as well as the net turn-over on which sales tax can be levied or imposed " (emphasis supplied) learned counsel for the petitioners placed strong reliance on the underlined portion of the above excerpt and urged that consistent with this pronouncement no part of the turnover relating to inter-State or export transactions could be included in the expression "total turn-over" occurning in the first part of Section 6b (1 ). ( 9 ) LEARNED counsel for petitioners stated that the principle of the above pronouncement of the Supreme Court could well be illustrated by the way it was understood and applied In two cases, one of the Madras High Court in t. A. Kumaraswamy Pathar v. State of Madras (2) and the other a Full bench decision of the Allahabad High court in Commr. Sales Tax, U. P. v allied Chemicals, (3 ). ( 10 ) IN T. A. Kumarswamy Father's case (2) the facts were these: S 3 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959 imposed a tax on every dealer "whose total turn-over for a year was not less than Rs. 10,000". The turnover respecting intra-State sales of 'the as cssee in that case was estimated by the authorities at Rs. 8,935-40. The turn-over of inter-State sales of the assessee was Rs. 12,421-12. The two together amounted to Rs. 21,356-52. The question was whether for purposes of ascertainment of the cut-off line of Rs. 10,000 the inter-State sales turn-over could, as the authorities did, be taken into account. If the turn-over of inter-State sales of Rs. 12,421-12 could not be included for the purpose, the assessee's turn-over would obviously fall below the statutory minimum of Rs. 10,000/-; otherwise he would become assessable. Veeraswami, J. (as His Lordship then was,), who spoke for the Division Bench, noticing that the Act itself confined the charge, as it should, to local sales or purchases, observed that the expression "sale" as defined in the Act should be taken to be the local sale or purchase. The learned Judge relying upon Fernandez's (1) case proceeded to say :"if that be so, turn-over and total turn-over can only relate to such sales or purchases and cannot include what is an inter-State sale or export or import sale. It is true that in the definition of "total turnover" it is said to include turnover whether or not the whole or any portion of such turnover is liable to tax. This has no reference to inter-State sales which are out-side the scope of the Act but has reference only to sales which are normally chargeable to tax under the Act but due to exemption are not subject to tax. This has no reference to inter-State sales which are out-side the scope of the Act but has reference only to sales which are normally chargeable to tax under the Act but due to exemption are not subject to tax. "the definition of "total turn-over'' under the Madras Act, unlike the Karnataka Act, did not expressly refer to and include sales or purchase in the course or inter-State trade and export. The Madras High Court read down the expression "total turn-over" to. mean turn-over excluding such inter-State and export turn-over respecting which the State-Legislature had no competence to tax. It is no doubt true that, as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners, had the definition of "total turn-over" in the Madras Act been on the lines of its Kamataka counter-part, then, consistent with the reasoning in Kumarswamy Pathar's case (2) its constitutional validity might well be expected to have been held against. ( 11 ) IN the Full Bench of the allahabad High Court in Commr. , sales Tax, U. P. v. Allied Chemicals, (3) Pathak, J. (as his Lordship then was) after referring to and setting out the observations of the Supreme Court in Fernandez's (1) case, proceeded to say :"these observations, to my mind completely suppprt the conclusion that the sales made out-side Uttar pradesh by the assessee cannot be taken into account at all in the assessment proceedings against it those sales cannot be taken into consideration when applying the first proviso to Section 3 (1) and that is so whether what is contemplated by that proviso is the gross turn-over or net turn-over. "gulati, J. in his concurring opinion referred to a contention similar to the one urged by the State in this case that as long as inter-State sales and export sales were not ultimately subjected to tax, there was indeed no exceeding of the constitutional lis tation in Art. 286, observed : the argument proceeded that so long as such sales were not subjected to tax, the mandate contained in art. 286 could not be said to have been violated merely because suel- sales were included in the gross turnover of a dealer in order to determine as to whether or not he was liable to pay tax in respect of his other sales. 286 could not be said to have been violated merely because suel- sales were included in the gross turnover of a dealer in order to determine as to whether or not he was liable to pay tax in respect of his other sales. The State was not bound to provide that a dealer shall not be liable to tax if his turn-over did not exceedl a particular limit, but if it did provide a minimum limit, it was open to the Legislature to further provide that the minimum turn-over so provided would include such sales as were not liable to tax. The argument is attractive indeed, but cannot be accepted in view of the clear pronouncement of the Supreme court in the case of A. V. Fernandez v. State of Kerala. It was ruled in that case :"the very fact of their non-liability to tax is sufficient to exclude them from the calculation of the gross turn-over as well as the net turnover on which sales tax can be levied or imposed. " ( 12 ) INDEED, in Kumarswamy Pathar's (2) case, the Madras High Court, while dealing with a provision analogous to s. 5 (5) of the 'act', took the view that even for purposes of the minimum turn-over prescribed in the Act for bringing a dealer within the purview of the Act, the expressions such as "total turn-over", "gross turn-over etc. , ought not to take into account the turn-over of inter-State and export transactions. The Full Bench opinion of the Allahabad High Court would also show that for purposes of sales-Tax laws of the State, no part of the inter-State or export turn-over should be included in the gross turnover for any purpose. Both the madras and the Allahabad High Courts have reached this conclusion solely on the basis of the pronoucement of the supreme Court in Fernandez's (1) case. The question is whether the observations in Fernandez's (1) case support this conclusion that even for the purpose of the classification of the dealers, the turn-over in inter-State and export transactions should not be reckoned ? Or whether such exclusion is only in relation to turn-over "on which sales tax can be levied or imposed" ? The question is whether the observations in Fernandez's (1) case support this conclusion that even for the purpose of the classification of the dealers, the turn-over in inter-State and export transactions should not be reckoned ? Or whether such exclusion is only in relation to turn-over "on which sales tax can be levied or imposed" ? Learned Advocate General says that Fernandez's (1) case actuallv supports the stand of the Revenup and the understanding of its effect in kumaraswamy Pathar's (2) case and allied Chemical's (3) case is not correct. ( 13 ) LEARNED Advocate-General says that on the language of the interpretation-clause in S. 2 (u-2) of the 'act' and the use of the expression total turn-over" in two places in S. 6b (1) for two different purposes, one for the purpose of identification of dealers liable to turn-over tax and the other read with the proviso to that sub-section for the purpose of actual impost makes for a substantial difference The statutory definition of the expression "total turn-over occurring in S 2 (u-2) provides : "total turn-over" means the aggregate turn-over in all goods of a dealer at all places of business in the State whether or not the whole or any portion of such turnover is liable to tax, including the turnover of purchase or sale in the course inter-State trade or commerce or in the course of export of the goods out of the territory of India or in the course of import of the goods into the territory of India. " learned Advocate-General says it is a sound rule of construction to give the same meaning to the same words occurring in different parts of the same section unless sufficient reasons can be assigned. But a word in one part of a section may have to be understood in a different sense from that which it bears in another part or to give a meaning different from the one given in the definition section if the context so requires. Here the expression "total turn-over" in the two places in Section 6b (1) of the 'act', says learned Advocate-General, are used in different contexts and that the expressions in the clause "every dealer whose total turn-over in a year exceeds rupees one lakh" cannot be qualified and controlled by the proviso to sub-section (1) of S. 6b (1) as suggested by the learned counsel for petitioners. It is further urged that the Supreme Court in Fernandez's (1) case read down the, meaning of the expression "total turn-over" to exclude the inter-State and export turn-over in the context of "gross turn-over" libale to tax under the Act. Such turn-over in inter-State and export transactions are to be excluded in any provision of law imposing or authosing the imposition of tax for the reason that the provisions of the 'act', so far as such inter-State sales or purchases are concerned, are set at nought and obliterated being over-borne by the constitutional provisions. Referring to the contention of the petitioners that the provisions of the 'act' prescribing the quantum of turnover which makes the cut-off line between dealers included in the net of taxation under Sec. 6b (1) and those excluded therefrom is part of the law imposing or authorising the imposition of tax and that the turn-over of inter-State and export transactions respecting which the State Legislature has no competence to legislate cannot be included in such turn-over, learned advocate-General says that having regard to the context in which the expression "total turn-over" occurs i e , in a clause which lays down the line of classification and demarcation with reference to the "total turn-over" of the dealers, it cannot be regarded as a provision imposing or authorising the imposition of a tax. Learned Advocate-General referred to S. 5 (5) of the 'act' providing the line of demarcation between the dealers liable to pay tax on their turn-over under S. 5 (1) and those who are not, which is in similar terms and has like effect. The expression "laws imposing taxation" should, says learned Advocate-General, receive a limited construction, Every provision of a law dealing with taxation is not necessarily a provision imposing taxation. It all depends upon the purport of the provision in the scheme of taxation. Reference, in this behalf, was made to Chettiar and Co , v. Dy c. T. Officer. (4) ( 14 ) LEARNED Advocate-Genaral further says that the Supreme Court in fernandez's (1) case emphasised this distinction by the following observational :"this position is not at all affected by the provisions with regard to registration and submissions of returns of the sales-tax by the dealers under the Act. (4) ( 14 ) LEARNED Advocate-Genaral further says that the Supreme Court in fernandez's (1) case emphasised this distinction by the following observational :"this position is not at all affected by the provisions with regard to registration and submissions of returns of the sales-tax by the dealers under the Act. The Legislature inspite of its disability in the matter of the imposition of sales tax by virtue of the provisions of Article 286 of the Constitution, may for the purpose of the registration of a dealer and submission of the returns of sales-tax include these transactions in the dealer's turn-over Such inclusion, however, for the purposes aforesaid would not affect the nonliability of these transactions to levy or imposition of sales tax by virtue of the provisions of Article 286 of the constitution and the corresponding law enacted in the Act, as above"indeed, says the learned Advocate general the very passage relied upon by the petitioners in Fernandez's 0) case furnishes the answer. Supreme court said: the very fact of their non-liability to tax is sufficient to exclude them from the calculation of the gross turn-over as well as the net- turn-over on which sales tax can be levied or imposed. In a taxing law the question as to which part of it is a provision which imposes a tax must needs depend on the contevt in which and the purposes for which the provision occurs. It is no doubt true, as observed by the madras High Court in the case of chettiar and Co. , (4) that fulfilment of a condition would be a constituent fact in the emergence of tax liability and therefore an essential element in the imposition of the tax. But learned Advocate General says in the present case the provision for differentiation and classification of dealers on the basis of their "total turn-over" is not one such condition. On a careful consideration of the matter, we find it difficult to reject the case of the Revenue that the expression "total turnover" occurring in the first part of Sec. 6b (1) requires to be read in terms of Sec. 2 (u-2) and should not be confined to a turn-over in respect of which the State Legislature is competent to impose a tax. We accordingly hold and answer point (A) against the petitioners. ( 15 ) IT is, alternativelv. We accordingly hold and answer point (A) against the petitioners. ( 15 ) IT is, alternativelv. contended bv the petitioners that if the expression "total turn-over" occurring in the first part of S. 6b (1) is construed co-extensively with the definition of "total turn-over" in S 2 (u-2) of the 'act', it would lead to discriminatory results violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Several illustrative examples were given in support of this argument It was staged that where a dealer who has an intra- state sales turn-over of Rs. 2,000/-but has an inter-State turn-over of Rs. 99,000/- would become liable to pay tax on his intra-State sales turn-over of Rs. 2,000/-under S. 6b (1), while a dealer who had a turn-over of intra- state sales of Rs. 99,900/-and had no inter-State sales would escape from the met of fax under Section 6b (1 ). ( 16 ) IT is no doubt true that tax laws are as much subject to Art. 14 as any other law. But in the matter of tax-ation the Legislature, having regard to the innate complexities besetting the policy of a tax and the diverse and varied economic criteria that go in the formulation of any policy of taxation enjoys a very wide latitude in the matter of choice of persens and things for the purposes of taxation. A State, it is said, does not have to tax everything in order to tax something. It is allowed to pick and choose districts, objects, persons, methods and even rates for -taxation, if it does so reasonably. In matters of taxation, the Court cannot meticulously scrutinise the impact of the burden of a tax-law on different persons or interests, but can only strike down, if the Court is satisfied that the method adopted is arbitrary, capricious, fanciful or clearly unjust if the Legislature has adopted one method for imposition of tax burden, the court cannot strike-down the law on the ground that the Legislature should have adopted another method which, in the opinion of the court, is more reasonable. In view of the intrinsic complexity of fiscal ad justments of diverse elements, there is considerable wide discretion in the matter of classification for taxation purposes. In view of the intrinsic complexity of fiscal ad justments of diverse elements, there is considerable wide discretion in the matter of classification for taxation purposes. If the classification by a taxing statute is a reasonable one, it is not vulnerable on the ground of discrination merely because it taxes, or exempts from tax, some income or objects and not others. ( 17 ) IN Twyford Tea Co. v. Kerala state, (7) Supreme Court said :"there is a wide range of selection and freedom in appraisal not only in the objects of taxation and in the manner of taxation, but also in the determination of the rate or rates applicable. The burden of proving discrimination is always heavy and heavier still when a taxing statute is under attack, and it is on the person complaining of discrimiatian. The burden is proving not possible 'inequality' but hostile "unequal" treatment this is more so when uniform taxes are levied. When the legislature reasonably applies an uniform rate after equalising matters between diversely situated persons, differences in treatment must be capable of being reasonably explained in the light of the object for which the particular legislation is undertaken. This must be based on some reasonable distinction between the cases differentially treated. To be able to succeed in the charge of discrimination, a person must establish conclusively that persons equally circumstanced have been treated unequally and vice versa". Even if there is a doubt in the mind of the Court in regard to a question of constitutionality it must be resolvedl by upholding constitutionality. Thomas Cooley says :"it has been said by an eminent jurist, that when Courts are called upon to pronounce the invalidity of an Act of Legislation, passed with all the forms and ceremonies requisite to give it the force of law, they will approach the question with great caution, examine it in every possible aspect, and ponder upon it as long as deliberation and patient attention can throw any new light upon the subject and never declare a statute, void, unless the nullity and invalidity of the Act are placed, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt must be solved in favour of the Legislative action, and the Act be sustained. " ( 18 ) NOW turning to the actual effect of the provision, it is seen that dealers, whose total turn-over in a year exceeds Rs. A reasonable doubt must be solved in favour of the Legislative action, and the Act be sustained. " ( 18 ) NOW turning to the actual effect of the provision, it is seen that dealers, whose total turn-over in a year exceeds Rs. 1,00,000 are chossn for the levy of the additional tax under S. 6b (1 ). In this classification no one, whose turn-over exceeds Rs. 1,00,000 is left out and amongst those whose turn-over is less than a lakh of rupees no one is included So far as the rationality and intelligibility of the differentia are concerned, learned counsel do not have much to say. The classification is quite intelligible and proceeds on well defined and clear- cut lines. The classification is, apparently on the assumption as to the capacity of those whose total turnover is over a lakh of rupees to bear the burden of the additional tax. That capacity is being judged by a common yard-sick. The emphasis of the argument of learned counsel for petitioners is somewhat on the lines that there is no rational nexus between the classification and the objects of the legislation. The distinction between intra- state sales and inter-State sales will undoubtedly assume materiality in rer gard to the power of the State to impose tax on such sales. Indeed a close parallel and close analogy is furnished by s. 5 (5) of the 'act' which is in the 'act' over the years unchallenged. It reads: "a dealer whose total turn-over in any year is less than twenty-live thousand rupees shall not be liable to pay tax for that year. " the meaning of the expression 'total turn-over" in that provision also cannot be diferet either and must draw the implications from S. 2 (u-2 ). on course, counsel now say that it s. of (1) is constitutionally bad, S. 5 (o) could be no better. But what is On importance is both under S. 5 (b) and S. bb (1) the total turn-over, including inter-State and. import ana export turn-over on which it is not competent lor the State Legislature to levy tax, has been taken only lor the purpose of identifying the dealers and the actual levy under both the sections is only on intra-State, turnover. The classification proceeds on a rational basis. import ana export turn-over on which it is not competent lor the State Legislature to levy tax, has been taken only lor the purpose of identifying the dealers and the actual levy under both the sections is only on intra-State, turnover. The classification proceeds on a rational basis. Therefore, we are ot the view that even though the word 'total turnover used in the first part of S. bb (1), includes inter-State sales, it would not bring about any hostile discrimination against any class of dealers. Indeed the proportion ol intra-State and inter- state trasactions in the turn-over oi a dealer may itself vary from year to year and the provision prescribing a 'total turn-over of Rs. 1,00,000 as tne cut-oft line cannot be termed irrational and therefore cannot be said to suffer from the vice of hostile discrimination and therefore, to be unconstitutional. We accordingly answer Point (B) against the petitioners. ( 19 ) THE contention is that the State Legislature, in exertion of its legislative power under Entry 54 of the List II has no competence to levy a tax on the "turn-over" as, according to the argument, such a tax would not be a tax either on sale or purchase of goods within the meaning of the said entry. This argument was addressed by Sri B. V. Katageri and Sri K. Channa basappa appearing for some of the petitioners. This argument has no merit. It is no doubt true that the power to tax is available in relation to a 'sale' or purchase as recognised by the general law and transactions which are not really sales or purchases according to the established concepts cannot be subjected to tax. But a tax on "turn-over" is in reality a tax on the aggregate of the sales or purchases, as the case may be,, of a dealer during a year. ( 20 ) INDEED a similar argument was considered by the Supreme Court in ms. But a tax on "turn-over" is in reality a tax on the aggregate of the sales or purchases, as the case may be,, of a dealer during a year. ( 20 ) INDEED a similar argument was considered by the Supreme Court in ms. S. Kodor v. State of Kerala (8), where the constitutional validity of s. 2 (1) of the Tamil Nadu Additional sales Tax Act, 1970 (Act No. 14 of 1970) which provided that the tax payable by dealers under the Tamil nadu Sales Tax Act, 1959, shall, in the case of dealers whose total turn-over for a year exceeded 10 lakhs of rupees be increased by additional tax at the rate of 5 per cent of the tax, was challenged on the ground that a tax on turn-over was no tax on sales. The Supreme Court repelling the contention said :"as regards the contention that the state Legislature has no power to pass the measure, we are of the view that additional tax is really as a tax on the sale of goods. . . . . . . . It is in reality a, tax on the aggregate of sales effected by a dealer during a year. . . . . . . . . . . . . So the contention of the appellants that the additional sales tax is not a tax on sales but on the income of the dealer is without any basis. " (Vide para-9) we, accordingly, hold and answer point (C) against the petitioners. ( 21 ) THE argument on this point was advanced by Sri Kashinath rao Patil, learned counsel lor some of the petitioners. Apart from raising the contention, he did not make any submission in substantiation of it. We may however examine the merits oi the contention. the contention is that S. 6b o the 'act', as substituted by Karnataka Act. 7 of 1981, imposes unreasonable restrictions on the ireedom of trade, commerce and intercourse and therefore, violative of Art. 301 of the Constitution. Even it the restrictions can be said to be reasonable, argument proceeds, the legislative measure, not having been introduced with the previous sanction of the President, is unconstitutional. It is no doubt true that taxation laws are not out-side Part XIII of the constitution. But as observed by the supreme Court in Atibari Tea Co. , ltd. Even it the restrictions can be said to be reasonable, argument proceeds, the legislative measure, not having been introduced with the previous sanction of the President, is unconstitutional. It is no doubt true that taxation laws are not out-side Part XIII of the constitution. But as observed by the supreme Court in Atibari Tea Co. , ltd. , v. Stale of Assam (9) that it would be reasonable and proper to hold that restrictions, freedom from which is guaranteed under Art. 301, would be such restrictions as directly and immediately restrict or impede the free now or movement of trade. But the mere imposition of tax simpliciter on sales does not by itself imply any restriction on or hampering of trade. In atiabari's (9) case, the Supreme Court observed :"taxes may and do amount to restriction ; but it is only such taxes as directly and immediately restrict trade that would fall within the purview of Article 301. The argument that all taxes should be governed by article 301 whether or not their impact on trade is immediate or mediate, direct or remote, adopts, in our opim'on, an extreme approach which cannot be upheld. "in Andra Sugars Ltd. , v. State of a. P. , (10) the Supreme Court referring to the observations of Gajendragadkar, j. (as His Lordship then was) in Aliaban's (9) case stated that this interpretation of Art. 301 was not dissented irom in Automobile Transport (Rajastan Ltd. , v. State of Rajaslan (1 ). Normally a tax which is non-discriminatory and, in relation to goods used in inter-State Trade-commerce, not so excessive or prohibitive as to become a direct and immediate impediment in the free flow of trade and commerce, on sale of goods does not violate Art. 301. Sri Kashinath Rao did not even indicate in what manner the present taxing measure was violative of Art. 301. In view of the nature of the tax envisaged by S. 6b (1), we do not think that any case of violation of the right guaranteed under Art. 301 is made out. We accordingly answer point (D) also against the petitioners. ( 22 ) THIS question turns upon the construction of sub-section (2) of S. 6b. In view of the nature of the tax envisaged by S. 6b (1), we do not think that any case of violation of the right guaranteed under Art. 301 is made out. We accordingly answer point (D) also against the petitioners. ( 22 ) THIS question turns upon the construction of sub-section (2) of S. 6b. The controversy is in this area : Whether the cases of exemption from and non-liability to tax, under S. 6b (i), enumerated in the proviso to s. 6b (1) are exhaustive or whether having regard to the express language of S. 6b (2) the exemptions, not expressly enumerated in the proviso but available under S. 5 (3) (a) and (b) of the Act in respect of tax leviable under the Act generally, are also attracted in computing the turn-over for purposes of the levy of turn-over tax under S. 6b (1 ). ( 23 ) IT is useful to recapitulate the scheme in regard to exemptions under the 'act'. S. 5 (1) of the 'act' is the charging section so far as the main impost under the 'act' is concerned. It provides that every dealer shall pay, for each year, tax in his taxable turnover at the rate of 4 per cent of such turn-over. Sub-sec. (3) of S. 5 says that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1) of S. 5, no tax under the 'act' shall be levied : (a) In the case of sale of goods mentioned in column (2) of the Second Schedule at the rate specified in the corresponding entry in column (3) of that schedule payable by the first or the earliest of successive dealers in the State who is liable to tax on the taxable turn over of sales : (b) Similarly, in the case ol purchase of any goods mentioned in column (2) of the Third Schedule at the rate and only at the point specified in the corresponding entries in columns (4) and (3) of that schedule, payable by the dealer liable to pay tax under this Act on the taxable turn-over of purchases. S. 5 (4) provides that the tax under the 'act' in respect of sale or purchase of any of the declared goods mentioned in column (2) of the Fourth schedule shall be at the rate and only at the point specified in the corresponding entries at columns (4) and (3) of the Fourth Schedule. S. 8 provides for exemption of tax respecting goods specified in the Fifth schedule, subject to the conditions and exemptions, if any, set-out therein. Section 8a empowers the State Govt. to provide by notification, an exemption or for reduction in the rate, in respect of any tax payable under the act. Let us see how many of these exemptions are enumerated in the proviso to s. 6b (1 ). Exemptions in S. 8 and s. 5 (4) are the subject-matter of exemptions under Clauses (i) and (ii) respectively, of the proviso to S. 6b (1 ). So far as the exemptions under S. 8a are concerned, it is common ground that any exemptions granted under Section 8a, to the extent they are not otherwise and specifically excluded for purposes of the levy under Section 6b, are attracted to the levy under Section 6b. The exemptions envisaged in Clauses (iii) and (iv) of the proviso relate to the inter-State and export or import transactions. Really they are not instances of exemptions, but cases of nonliability ; they are instances of legislative recognition of constitutional immunity from tax. ( 24 ) THE real controversy is whether the exemptions under S. 5 (3) (a) and (b) which are not expressly enumerated in the proviso to S. SB (1) are also attracted to the levy under S. 6b (1 ). The petitioners contend that by virtue of S. 6b (2), these exemptions are also attracted while the Revenue contends that S. 6b (2) is purely a machinery and procedural provision and the exemptions envisaged in the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6b art exhaustive. Petitioners say that section 6b (2) is not merely a procedural provision ; but acts as a conduit to attract exemptions other than those expressly enumerated in the proviso to S. 6b (1 ). We may here recapitulate sub-section (2) of S.-6b. Petitioners say that section 6b (2) is not merely a procedural provision ; but acts as a conduit to attract exemptions other than those expressly enumerated in the proviso to S. 6b (1 ). We may here recapitulate sub-section (2) of S.-6b. It reads :"the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder including those relating to refund or exemption from tax shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to the levy, assessment and collection of the tax payable under sub-section (1), as they apply in relation to the levy, assessment and collection of sales tax or purchase tax under this Act". ( 25 ) RELIANCE was placed by petitioners on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Musore v. Yaddalam Laxminrasimaiah setty (12) in which provisions of S. 9 (1) and (2) of the Central Sales Tax act came in for interpretation. The relevant facts of that case and the precise question which arose for consideration in that case are -" (I) S. 6 of the Central Sales tax Act was the charging section. It provided for the levy of Central sales-tax by any dealer in any State on all sales effected by him in the the course of inter-State transactions. Sub-section (2) of S. 8 provided that the rate of tax payable on such inter-State sales shall be the same as fixed under the Sales-tax law of the appropriate State. S. 9 (1) of the Central Sales-tax Act provided that the tax payable under that Act shall be levied and collected in the appropriate State by the Government of India in the manner provided in sub-section (2) of S. 9. Sub-sec. (2), inter. alia, provided that the authorities empowered to assess, collect and enforce payment of the state's General Sales-tax Law shall assess, collect and enforce payment of the Central Sales-tax on behalf of the Government of India in the same manner as the tax on the sale or purchase of goods under the State law is assessed, paid and collected. (ii) The respondent in that case was a dealer in handloom and powerloom cloth. He had effected interstate sales of those goods. Those goods were among the goods specified in the Second Schedule to the act. (ii) The respondent in that case was a dealer in handloom and powerloom cloth. He had effected interstate sales of those goods. Those goods were among the goods specified in the Second Schedule to the act. Consequently in view of S.-5 (3) (a) of the Act, the levy of tax under the Act was at single point at the hands of the first dealer. Admittedly the respondent in that case was not a first dealer. He was called upon to pay Central sales-tax on his inter-State sales turnover. (iii) The stand of the respondent- assessee was that, as - (a) S. 9 (1) provided that the Central Sales-tax shall be levied and collected as provided in Section 9 (2) ; (b) S. 9 (2) in turn provided that the assessment and collection shall be made in accordance with the sales-tax law of the appropriate State : and (c) Under the sales-tax law of this state there could be only a single point levy on the sales of handloom and powerloom cloth, in view of S. 5 (3) (a) read with the relevant entry in the second Schedule. no tax was leviable under the State act as he was not the first-dealer and that, consequently, no tax could be levied on such inter-State sales also, in view of Section 9 (1) and (2) of the central Act. "the Supreme Court held that S. 9 of the Central Act providing as it did, that the tax imposed under S. 6 shall be levied, assessed and collected in the same manner as the turn-over of sales and purchases of State tax is assessed, brought within its sweep the provisions of the State law regarding the exemptions also. The Supreme Court observed :"'the expression 'in the manner' may give rise to two conficting views, namely, (i) it is concerned only with the calculation, of the tax, and (ii) it deals not only with the calculation of the rates but also the manner of levy of the tax, But sec. 9 (1) dispels the ambiguity, for it says that the tax payable by any dealer under the Central Act shall be levied and collected in the appropriate State by the Government of India in the manner provided in sub-sec. (2 ). . . . 9 (1) dispels the ambiguity, for it says that the tax payable by any dealer under the Central Act shall be levied and collected in the appropriate State by the Government of India in the manner provided in sub-sec. (2 ). . . . The expression 'levy' means "impose under S. 5 (3) (a) of the Mysore sales Tax Act, 1975, hereinafter called the Slate Act, tax shall be levied in the case of the sale of any of the goods mentioned in col. (2) of the second Schedule by the first 01 the earliest of successive dealers in the State, who is liable to tax under that section, a tax at the rate specified in the corresponding entry of column (3) of the said Schedule on the turn-over of sales of such dealer in each year rela'ting to such goods. When S 9 (1) savs that under the central Act tax shall be levied in the same manner as the tax on the sale or purchase of goods under the general Sales Tax law of the State is assessed, paid and collected, it is reasonable to hold that the expression levied in S. 9 (1) of the Central act refers to the expression 'levied' in Section 5 (3) (a) of the state Act. . . . . . "relying on the aforesaid view, the petitioners contend that the wording of S. 6b (2) being similar to S 9 (1) and (2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, it must receive the same construction and have the same significance, in the matter of assessment on turn-over tax under S. 6b (1) of the 'act' and, therefore, it should be held that the provisions of S. 6b (2) of the 'act' attract the exemptions under S. 5 (3) (a) and (b) of the 'act'. ( 26 ) LEARNED Advocate-General's first contention on this aspect is that Section 6b (2) was merely a machinery provision. This contention cannot be accepted. In fact similar contention raised in the matter of construction of S. 9 (2) of the Central bales-Tax Act, which was similarly worded was rejected by the Supreme court having regard to the use of the word 'levied' in S. 9 (1) of the Central sales Tax Act. This contention cannot be accepted. In fact similar contention raised in the matter of construction of S. 9 (2) of the Central bales-Tax Act, which was similarly worded was rejected by the Supreme court having regard to the use of the word 'levied' in S. 9 (1) of the Central sales Tax Act. Next, learned Advocate-General asked us to distinguish the ratio of that judgment on the ground that in S. 6b (1), unlike S. 9 (1) and 9 (2) of the Central Sales-Tax Act, there are ample intrinsic aids which compel the view that the exemptions enumerated in the proviso to S. 6b (1) are exhaustive and that no other exemptions could be imported into section 6b (1 ). He contended that in Yaddalam's (12) case the Supreme Court was persuaded to the view it took because there was no indication in the 'act' to the contrary. He referred to the following observations in Yaddalam's (12) case :"there is no reason why the central Act made a departure in the manner of levy of tax on the specified goods which are taxed only at a single point under the State Act ; if any such radical departure was intended, the Central Act would have expressly stated so. "and sought to distinguish that case on the ground that S. 6b expressly, and by necessary implication, provides for the exclusion of the exemptions under S. 5 (3) (a) and (b) of the 'act'. Formulating the reasons which, according to him, indicate that S. 6b (2) should not be given this significance, he stated : (a) That S. 6b (1) requires that every dealer shall in addition to the tax payable if any, under other provisions of the Act pay the additional tax, clearly making manifest the legislative intent that the levy under s. 6b (1) is attracted to turn-over irrespective of the consideration that, that turn-over was otherwise exempt for the purposes of S. 5 (1) or 6, as the case may be. If exemptions under Section 5 (3) (a) and (b) are brought in through sub-sec. If exemptions under Section 5 (3) (a) and (b) are brought in through sub-sec. (2) there will be no instance where a turn-over otherwise exempt would be taxable under S. 6b (1) and in such an event the expression "if any" in S. 6b (1) which was intended to emphasise that there is a 'turn-over' taxable under Sec. 6b (1) which may not be taxable under Section 5 (1) would be rendered nugatory ; (b) That the proviso to Section 6b (1) exhaustively enumerates and was intended to exhaust all the exemptions in relation to the levy under Section 6 (b) and the scheme of andi the need for the enumeration would be rendered nugatory if S. 6b (2) is given the meaning which petitioners impute to it and would detract from thq exhaustiveness, legislatively intended, for, the construction suggested by the petitioners would have the effect of re-writing the proviso by adding to it what was, as a legislative policy, omitted from it ; (c) That no construction of S. 6b (2) which would militate against the scheme and clear intent of S. 6b (1) should be permitted ; and (d) That the expression "so far as may be" in S. 6b (2) was intended to avoid such a construction of that sub-section and the construction suggested by petitioners would ignore this expression. ( 27 ) AFTER a careful consideration of the matter, it appears to us that even if what is urged by the learned advocate-General was the intention in the mind of the law-makers, the language of sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 6b does not advance and effectuate that intention. If the legislative intention is not manifest in the language of the statute it is nowhere else. In a taxing provision one has look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment ; there is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in ; nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used. If in some cases the letter of the law is disregarded, it is on account, as a necessary implication, of the other statutory language. Learned Advocate-General relied on certain observations of the Supreme court in Sudhir Chandra Nawn v. Wealth-Tax Officer, Calcutta (13), muralilal Mahabirprasad v. B. R. Vad: (14) and D. G. Ghouse and Co. If in some cases the letter of the law is disregarded, it is on account, as a necessary implication, of the other statutory language. Learned Advocate-General relied on certain observations of the Supreme court in Sudhir Chandra Nawn v. Wealth-Tax Officer, Calcutta (13), muralilal Mahabirprasad v. B. R. Vad: (14) and D. G. Ghouse and Co. , v. State of Kerala (15 ). These authorities have no bearing on the question under consideration and do not advance the argument any further. The argumen of the learned Advocate-General, pushed to its logical conclusion is that the scheme said to be implicit in sub-sec. (1) of Section 6b must whittle-down the effect of section 6b (2 ). There appears to be no justification to do that particularly as this is a taxing statute. In F L. Smidth and Co. , v. F. Greenwood (16) it was said :"it is important to remember the rule, which the Courts ought to obey, that, when it is desired to impose a new burden by way of taxation, it is essential that this intention should be stated in plain terms. The courts cannot assent to the view that, if a section in a taxing statute is of doubtful and ambiguous meaning, it is possible out of that ambiguity to extract a new and added obligation not formerly cast upon the tax payer. "if, as contended by the learned Advocate General, the Legislature evidenced an express intention to exclude the benefit of the other exemptions of the Act, it ought to have said so in as many and plain words. If the other exemptions were intended to be excluded, it would be reasonable to expect the Legislature to have omited the references both to the "levy" and "exemptions'' in Section 6b (2 ). W. In Polestar Electronic (P) ltd. , v. Addl. Commissioner, Sales- tax, (17) the Supreme Court said :"it is a well settled rule of inter-pretation that where there are two expressions which might have been used to convey a certain intention, but one of those expressions will convey that intention more clearly than the other, it is proper to conclude that, if 1he legislature used that one of the two expressions which would convey the intention less clearly, it does not intend (o convey that intention at all. . . . . . . The'legislature would have expressed itself clearly and not let its intention to be gathered by doubtful implication from other provisions of the act". The implication of the words 'in addition to the tax payable if any' in S. 6b (1) of the 'act' may very well be that the Legislature conceived the possibility of a transaction respecting which the dealer may not be liable under S. 5 (1) but vet may be liable under Section 6b. But it is an altogether different thing to say that what is exempt under S. 5 (1) must necesarily be subject to tax under S. 6b (1) or that the Court of construction ought to find out some residual positions where necessarily some turn-over exempt under S. 5 (1) ought to be exipible to the impost under S. 6b (1) such intention is neither express and, to the extent it is said to be implied, cannot prevail as it militates against the express wording of S. 6b (2 ). The clear and unambiguous language of S. 6b (2) and the inescapable effect of it, as indicated by the ratio in yaddalam's (12) case cannot be whittled dpwn and made to yield to the doubtful and supposed intention of section 6b (1 ). ( 28 ) IT would be useful to compare the language of S. 25b (4) of the 'act' with that of S. 6b (2 ). S. 25b (4) is a special provision in regard to levy of tax on purchase of sugarcane. S. 25b (1) is the charging section. Sub-sec. (4) of S. 25b reads:"the provisions of this Act relating to assessment, payment and recovery, appeal and revision shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of tax payable under this Act for purchase of sugarcane. "a comparison of S. 6b (2) with S. 25b (4) would bring out the difference which is material in guiding whothe the former is merely procedural. S. 25b (4) being a machinery or procedural provision, does not use the words 'levy,' or' exemption' whereas s. 6b (2) does, which indicates that the latter is not merely a machinery or procedural provision. S. 25b (4) being a machinery or procedural provision, does not use the words 'levy,' or' exemption' whereas s. 6b (2) does, which indicates that the latter is not merely a machinery or procedural provision. Reliance on the expression "so far as may be" use' in Sec. 6b (2) cannot also advance the argument of the Revenue any further as there are many other provisions in the Act which, ex-facie, are not attracted to the proceedings of levy, assessment and collection of turn-over tax under Section 6b (1) and the expression ''so far as may be" can be regarded as referring to such provisions. Learned Advocate-General comparing the language of S. 8a on the one hand and S. 5 (3) (a) and 5 (3) (b) on the other urged that while the former speaks of exemption the latter is only a case of non-levy on subsequent sales, or purchases, as the case may be. and not cases of exemption and therefore, cannot be brought within the rubric of 'exemption' under S. 6b (2 ). There appears to be a fallacy in this reasoning. S. 5 (1) of the 'act' is the charging provision. Having regard to the language of Sec. 5 (1) the effect of S. 5 (3) (a) and (b) is to expressly exempt what would otherwise fall within the scope of S. 5 (1 ). An exemption can arise only when there is a levy otherwise attracted to the case covered by the exemption. That apart Rules to which s. 6b expressly alludes, provide in rules 6 (4) and 6 (4) (i) thus: rule 6 (4): "in determining the taxable turn-over, the amount specified in clauses (a) to (k) shall subject to the conditions specified therein, be deducted from the total turnover as determined under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-rule (1 ). Rule 6 (4) (i): All amounts for which the goods specified in the second, Third and Fourth Schedules are sold or purchased by a dealer when such sales or purchases are exempt from tax leviable under any of the provisions of the Act. " this would make it clear that Ss. 5 (3) (a) and (b) refer to and provide for exemptions. " this would make it clear that Ss. 5 (3) (a) and (b) refer to and provide for exemptions. ( 29 ) IT was next urged by the learned Advocate-General that if we give the meaning that the petitioners want to give to S. 6b (2), the expression "total turn-over" in the second part of S. 6b (1) would really be read as "taxable turn-over". This consequence appears to us not to have been altogether unintended by the amendmen having regard to the speech of the hon'ble Finance Minister on the Floor, of the Legislature. Referring to the objects and purposes of the amendment, the Hon'ble Finance Minister said:"as an experimental measure, we propose to do away with the, additional tax and concurrently introduce a half per cent turn-over tax to be levied on the lines of a similar levy which is in force in andhra for over a decade. On this account the net increase in revenue is anticipated at rupees three crores. "a speech by a mover of a Bill is one of the external aids to construction see K. P. Varghese v. ITO Ernakulam (18 ). The speech of the Finance- minister would show that what was intended by Section 6b was in substance an additional impost on the lines imposed by the, Andhra Pradesh law. It is seen that in Andhra Pradesh additional tax is levied under S. 5a of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales tax 1957 which reads: 5a: "levy of additional tax on turn-over:- Every dealer who is liable to pay tax under Section 5 shall in addition to the tax payable under that section pay for each year a tax at the rate of one-four in paisa on every rupee of his turnover liable to tax if his total turnover for that year is rupees three lakhs or more. " what is subjected to additional tax under S. 5a of the Andhra Act is the taxable turn-over of the deader having an overall turn-over of rupees three lakhs or more. The additional tax proposed to be levied under S. 6b (1) oi the 'act' as stated by the Finance minister being similar to the Andhra levy, was also apparently intendec to be a tax on the taxable turn-over under S. 5 (1 ). The additional tax proposed to be levied under S. 6b (1) oi the 'act' as stated by the Finance minister being similar to the Andhra levy, was also apparently intendec to be a tax on the taxable turn-over under S. 5 (1 ). The only difference is that in regard to the choice of the persons on whom tax is levied under s. 6b the State Legislature has selected dealers whose turn-over Including import and export sales turn-over is one lakh or more. ( 30 ) IT is no doubt true that in the task of interpretation of statutes the "surest index of a mature and developed jurisprudende is not to make a fortress out of the dictionary but to remember that statutes always have some object to accomplish whose sympathetjc and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning. ' indeed in Seajord Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher (19) Lord Denning observed: "it would certainly save the judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears a" judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work in the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament. . . . . . A Judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A Judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases. But we are dealing with a taxation measure and permissible limits of interpretation cannot allow the view urged for the Revenue to prevail. ( 31 ) IN view of the foregoing discussion, we hold and answer Point (E) in favour of the petitioners and against the Revenue. We hold that the exemptions provided under S. 5 (3) (a) and 5 (3) (b), to the levy under Ss. 5 (1) and 6 of the 'act', are, by virtue of S. 6b (2) of the 'act', also attracted to the levy under S. 6b (1 ). We hold that the exemptions provided under S. 5 (3) (a) and 5 (3) (b), to the levy under Ss. 5 (1) and 6 of the 'act', are, by virtue of S. 6b (2) of the 'act', also attracted to the levy under S. 6b (1 ). ( 32 ) BEFORE we dispose of these petitions by appropriate directions, our attention was invited to a batch of caseis included in this order in which Court- fee paid is insufficient. We direict that the deficit Court-fee in these petitions shall be made-good by the petitioners, failing which the same shall be recovered in accordance with law. ( 33 ) IN the result, for the reasons aforesaid, we make the following order : (1) The writ-petitions are allowed in part. (2) Writs of Mandamus shall issue to the respondents restraining them from levying turn-over tax under S. 6b of the Karnataka Sales-Tax Act, 1957 (as substituted by Karnataka Act 7 of 1981) on turn-over which are exempt from levy of tax under the Act by virtue of S. 5 (3) (a) and 5 (3) (b) of the 'act'. (3) (i) Wherever assessments have been completed on the petitioners under s. 6b (1), including the turn-over exempt from tax under Ss. 5 (3) (a) and 5 (3) (b), the said assessments are 'to that extent, quashed ; (ii) If any turn-over tax under s. 6b was recovered pursuant to such assessments, the same shall, to the extent the tax relates to turn-over exempt under Section 5 (3) (3) and (b), be refunded to the petitioners concerned; and (iii) Wherever assassments are not completed but payments were made towards turn-over tax under Section 6b, by the petitioners, in respect of the turn-over exempt from tax under Ss. 5 (3) (a), and 5 (3) (b) the same shall be refunded to the petitioners concerned. (4) In the Writ-petitions Nos. 24216/81, 16275/81, 17729|81, 20428|81, 21074/81, 22357|81 and 14892/81, referred to in Para-33, the petitioners are directed to make-good the deficit court-fee within six weeks from to-day failing which the same shall be recovered from them in accordance with law. (5) In all the Writ petitions disposed of by the main and subsequent orders relating to the challenge to S. 6b of the Kar. (5) In all the Writ petitions disposed of by the main and subsequent orders relating to the challenge to S. 6b of the Kar. Sales-Tax Act, 1957, we direct the Office, in relaxation of the rules regarding issue of writs, that, a common writ with short cause-title of the first case in the batch, shall be issued to the 'state and the commissioner of Commercial Taxes. It shall not be necessary to issue individual writs. A copy of the writ shall also be furinishedl to Sri M. R. Achar, learned government Advocate. (6) In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear and pay their own costs in all these petitions. At the conclusion of the above order, learned counsel for petitioners made oral applications under Article 134-A of the Constitution for Certificates of fitness under Art. 133 to appeal to the supreme Court from this order. The case, in our opinion, does involve substantial questions of law of general importance needing to be decided by the supreme Court. We accordingly grant certificates of Fitness prayed for. --- *** --- .