Judgment :- 1. The respondent-landlord in this revision petition sought eviction of the tenant-revision petitioner on twin grounds, arrears of rent and bona fide requirement for starting a business for her husband Both claims were contested by the tenant. 2.As quite often happens, the details of the business proposed to be conducted in the building the eviction of which was sought, had not been indicated in the petition. The defect, a serious one, as would be discussed in greater detail later, was, however, sought to be rectified at the evidence stage. The petitioner did not enter the witness box but her husband did; and was examined as pw. 1. He attempted to elucidate the averment in the petition by stating that the business which he proposed to conduct was that of a dealer in rubber. The source for the capital was found by him in the twenty five sovereigns which his wife owned and which, according to him, were sufficient as resource mobilisation for the business. 3. The claim for eviction on grounds of arrears of rent was negatived by the Rent Controller noting that the entire arrears had been paid. This claim does not survive for decision in this revision. 4. The Rent Controller, however, ordered eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord, the requirement being the starting of a business by her husband. The contention of the tenant about the dependence on the building for making out a livelihood of the tenant from the income therefrom was negatived, and correctly, on the ground that no such plea was raised in the objection filed by the tenant and that there was no evidence in support thereof. 5. The order of the Rent Controller was challenged in appeal. The absence of a plea that the petitioner's husband was depending on her for financial help to start the business, the omission of the petitioner in entering the witness box and giving her evidence to establish her bona fides and the paucity of funds which would be required for starting a business in rubber and the admission of pw 1 about his lacking in the necessary capital required for investment in the business which he proposed to carry on, were all highlighted in the appeal before the appellate authority. The appellate authority however, felt that pw 1 did not own or possess any building in Calicut City and in that sense was depending on his wife for a building to carry on his business. The building in question, the appellate authority observed, was suitable for the trade in rubber and this fact had not been disputed. It felt that the evidence of pw.1 indicated that the ornaments of the wife could be used for raising funds to start the business and in that view of the matter the criticism about pw.1 lacking in funds for the business proposed to be set up was without much substance. The further reasoning relating to the lack of bona fides based on the assumed absence of funds for starting the business was accordingly repelled. 6. The appellate authority also did not appear to have had any clear idea about the requirements of a business in rubber, about the formalities to be gone through before a person could become a dealer in rubber and a fair substantial investment that would be necessary for running such a business. 7. The contentions raised before the revisional authority also were unsuccessful. The revisional authority was disinclined to upset the findings entered by the Rent Controller and the appellate authority It, however, evinced a realistic approach when it considered the question about the lack of necessary funds for starting the business in question. The revisional authority observed, and according to me, correctly as follows: "The contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that a man can think of starting a business only if he has got ready cash with him cannot be accepted in view of the various loan-schemes available now-a-days. The business field has undergone substantial changes in these days and one would be able to start or carry on a business with the help of loans from Banks and such other institutions. So the mere fact that pw.1 has not got cash in his hands cannot be used as a sufficient circumstance to hold that the courts below have gone perversely wrong in upholding the bona fides of the claim set up by the landlord." 8. So the mere fact that pw.1 has not got cash in his hands cannot be used as a sufficient circumstance to hold that the courts below have gone perversely wrong in upholding the bona fides of the claim set up by the landlord." 8. A further contention that the father of the landlord was in possession of another building and as such eviction of tenant herein was unjustified was negatived by the revisional authority on the ground that the Rent Controller had found that pw. 1's father-in law himself was a tenant under another landlord in respect of that building and consequently he could not afford to part with the possession of that building without running risk of facing an eviction on ground of parting with his possession of the building. The revisional authority also entertained a new contention, as it indicated a subsequent event affecting the landlord's claim. The contention raised on the basis of I.A. No 2178 of 1981 filed before that court related to the acquisition by the landlord of a property under a deed dated 15-5-1979, a registration copy of which had been produced along with the interlocutory application. The answer of the landlord was that the building so acquired was a residential building and that it had been acquired in the the name of father-in-law, his son and the landlord. The revisional authority was prepared to consider the contention seriously, if the tenant established the fact that the building so acquired was suitable for the conduct of the trade in question. It is seen that the revisional authority suggested taking out a commission for the ascertainment of the suitability of the building for the trade purpose in question. This offer (according to me correctly and properly made by revisional authority) was, however, spurned by counsel for the revision petitioner. In that view of the matter the revisional authority proceeded on the footing that the version of the landlord that the newly acquired building was a residential one was correct and as such that subsequent event could not disturb the concurrent findings of the authorities below. In the result, the revision petition was dismissed. 9. In that view of the matter the revisional authority proceeded on the footing that the version of the landlord that the newly acquired building was a residential one was correct and as such that subsequent event could not disturb the concurrent findings of the authorities below. In the result, the revision petition was dismissed. 9. Counsel for the revision petitioner confronted with these concurrent findings of three authorities below, advisedly concentrated his efforts to make out that the approach of the authorities suffered from a fundamental legal defect and as such, despite the seeming concurrent findings of fact, this court would be justified in interfering with these orders. He emphasised that the allegation regarding the requirement for eviction was denuded of relevant particulars. A failure to disclose the particulars relating to the business proposed to be set up, was fatal to such a petition. In order to effectively meet the case relating to the bona fides of the requirement, the tenant must be in a position to know such details, as otherwise it will not be possible for him to establish the hollowness of the contention of the landlord. It is not enough for a landlord to make a bald statement in the petition and thereafter leisurely develop the case relating to the exact business proposed to be set up in the building in question. Yet another factor which justifies the courts in insisting on the landlord-petitioner giving such particulars in the petition itself is the requirement of a court to know such particulars in order to evaluate the bona fides of the landlord. It cannot be gainsaid that in the present day circumstances, accommodation, residential and non-residential, having become extremely costly and not easily available, eviction of a tenant and the consequential uprooting of his business or habitation entails very serious consequences and repercussions. Equally important is the safeguarding of the interest of an owner of a building, who genuinely and honestly requires it for bis own purposes as indicated in the statute. Pleadings in such a litigation, which have grave consequences on either party, should therefore be specific and clear. The tendency generally noticed in many of the rent control cases, of having pleadings of a vague and general character, had been condemned by judicial decisions, even though too much of meticulousness had not been insisted upon in the matter. Pleadings in such a litigation, which have grave consequences on either party, should therefore be specific and clear. The tendency generally noticed in many of the rent control cases, of having pleadings of a vague and general character, had been condemned by judicial decisions, even though too much of meticulousness had not been insisted upon in the matter. This court had occasion to consider such a question in Kamaladharan v. Sarada Bai, where Viswanatha Iyer, J. observed as follows: "No doubt it is not sufficient for the landlord to state that be or she requires the building for starting a business. Unless the nature of the business or the purpose for which the building is required is disclosed it may not be possible for the court to judge whether the requirement is bona fide or reasonable. Mere assertion on the part of the landlord that the premises is required for his own use or business is not sufficient. The nature of the requirement must be disclosed so that not only the tenant may have the opportunity to rebut it, but the court may also in the light of the circumstances of each case be able to put it to the test of reasonableness and bona fide." See unreported judgment in C.R.P. No. 841 of 1978-E dated 13-12-1978. The decision of the Rajasthan High Court reported in Bridhichand v. Ram Parshed,1970 R. C. R.442, was referred to with approval by the learned judge in the above said decision. The same view is expressed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the decision reported in Tiruveedhi Ramanjanevulu v. Arveti Venkata Subbamma,1981 (1) R. C. J. 719. The fallowing passage gives the reasoning of that court: "The sub-clause says that the Controller must be satisfied that the landlord requires the premises for the purpose of 'a business' which he bona fide proposes to commence. Now, how will a Rent Controller, form the requisite opinion? Obviously, on the'. basis of the facts placed before him. A mere general and vague allegation that the landlord proposes to commence some unspecified business hardly enables the Controller to form the opinion. He must be told what type of business the landlord or a member of his family, as the case may be, proposes to commence in the premises. Obviously, on the'. basis of the facts placed before him. A mere general and vague allegation that the landlord proposes to commence some unspecified business hardly enables the Controller to form the opinion. He must be told what type of business the landlord or a member of his family, as the case may be, proposes to commence in the premises. The Controller, will then see whether, having regard to the circumstances of the landlord, the type of proposed business, and the location and type of the premises concerned, the proposal is bona fide, or not. In other words, the opinion had to be formed, in a given case, in the particular facts and circumstances of the case. A general averment that'I want to do business in the premises', can never be sufficient, and no Controller can reasonably say that he was satisfied about the bona fides of the landlord's requirement on the basis of such a general, vague allegation. In the light of the specific language of the enactment, it must be held that the petition for eviction should itself specify the particular business, which the landlord proposes to commence in the premises concerned. Such a requirement is also necessary so that the other side has an opportunity to meet and rebut it." I had also occasion to consider these decisions and have taken the view that specific and clear pleadings are necessary in a petition by a landlord seeking eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the building, (vide judgment in CRP. 196/80). 10. In this view of the legal position, this court would have been justified in seriously considering the contentions of the revision petitioner on this aspect of the case. The facts of the present case will themselves illustrate the indisputable necessity for such specific and clear pleadings relating to the business proposed to be set up in the premises. If, for example, the idea of setting up the business in rubber had been indicated in the petition, that would have enabled the tenant to place before the court such particulars and evidence as are necessary to establish the improbability, if not impossibility of the landlord starting such a business, in view of the compliance with the statutory requirements which have to be fulfilled before a person could set up business as a dealer in rubber. It is not as if that one could be a dealer in rubber if be has the capital and a place of business. Trade and other dealings in rubber are regulated by the Rubber Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Elaborate and strict conditions are to be satisfied before a person could obtain licence to deal in rubber. Some of those aspects peculiar to the rubber business had been indicated in the decision of Janaki Amma J. in Cherian v. Jose, 1980 KLT. 661, which arose out of a petition for eviction of a building with the ground of a bona fide requirement to start business in rubber: "The petitioner produced in support of his claim for bona fide requirement Ext. Al a receipt for payment of Rs.100/-for obtaining a dealer's licence from the Rubber Board. This receipt is dated 19-10-1971. It appears that he put in an application to the Rubber Board for a licence to deal with in rubber on 20-10-1972. Ext. A2 is a letter from the Secretary, Rubber Board, calling upon the petitioner to produce solvency certificate preferably obtained from Revenue Authorities to prove his financial suitability to deal in rubber. Ext. A2 is dated 20-1-1973. The petitioner has no case that in pursuance of the above order he produced the solvency certificate. It is argued on behalf of the respondents, that under the Rubber Act and the rules thereunder a dealer's licence is issued only in case the person concerned satisfies the Rubber Board of his financial solvency. There is some weight in the contention. Under S.39 of the Rubber Act a person who wants a special licence to deal in rubber should apply for licence in Form B and if the Board is satisfied with regard to the suitability of the applicant a licence will be issued in Form C. One of the columns in Form B referred to above deals with invested capital or the financial standing of the firm." In addition to the rules already noted above, there are other matters too under the Rubber Act and rules to be complied with before one could set up a business in rubber. It is not, however, necessary to consider those details in this, revision petition. It is not, however, necessary to consider those details in this, revision petition. Suffice it to say, the peculiarity of the business proposed by P. W.1 to be conducted in the building in question, to a large extent justifies the contention of the revision petitioner that he had been seriously prejudiced in the present case by the absence of the necessary pleadings on the point. There appears to be a deflection of the course of justice, the courts below not having given due attention on this aspect of the matter. It may be, of course, unjustified for this court to criticise the authorities below for their omission to consider these aspects, as apparently the provisions of the Rubber Act and the Rules, and the peculiarity of the business of a dealer in rubber bad not been highlighted before those authorities. Though a ground had been taken in the memorandum of appeal about the petition itself being defective, for the reason that necessary and sufficient particulars relating to the business proposed to be set up had not been indicated in the petition, it does not appear to have been effectively urged at the time of hearing. At any rate there is no indication from the order of the appellate authority that any such contention was put forward before it. There has not been any criticism before the revisional authority that the appellate authority omitted to consider a contention raised in the appeal and urged at the time of hearing. I would, therefore, assume that the contention, though raised, bad not been urged at the time of arguments before the appellate authority. Nor is there any indication of such a contention of inadequacy in pleadings having been raised before the revisional authority. In these circumstances, this court may not be fully justified in reversing the orders of the three authorities below on the basis of a finding in which all of them agreed. At the same time the landlord cannot with any semblance of justification claim immediate eviction when, indubitably under the statutory requirements, he has to take many more steps to be armed with licence to deal in rubber. At the same time the landlord cannot with any semblance of justification claim immediate eviction when, indubitably under the statutory requirements, he has to take many more steps to be armed with licence to deal in rubber. In these circumstances I feel that the interests of justice will be met, if, a direction is made that the actual eviction of the premises will take effect only after pw.1 obtains the requisite licence from the Rubber Board to deal in rubber in the premises in question. I would, therefore, dismiss the revision petition, but with the direction that the revision petitioner need surrender the building to the landlord only on his being intimated about the issue of the licence in favour of pw. I to deal in rubber in the premises in question. The petitioner in the rent control petition may intimate the revision petitioner by a registered letter addressed to the revision petitioner about the issue of such a licence and on receipt thereof, the revision petitioner-tenant shall surrender the building within a period of one month from the date of receipt of such intimation from the landlord. In case of default on the part of the revision petitioner to surrender the building within the said period of one month, the landlord will be entitled to obtain eviction of the building by executing the order of eviction now obtained in her favour. 11. The revision petition is disposed of in the above terms. I direct the parties to suffer the costs.