JUDGMENT 1. This writ petition is directed against the judgment of the Board of Revenue dated 29-4-1981. 2. The brief facts of the case which are relevant for the disposal of this writ petition are that Khem Chand, respondent No. 2 and Rawati Lal, respondent No. 3 filed a suit under Section 1 83 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) against Banshi, now deceased, the ancestor of the present petitioners for his ejectment from the agricultural lands bearing Khasra Nos. 617, 618, 619, 620, 859, 862 and 863 measuring 18 big has 15 biswas situated in village Pai, tehsil Kama, District Bharatpur. The contention of the plaintiffs-respondents was that they were khatedar-tenants of the lands in dispute and that Banshi had illegally trespassed upon the aforesaid lands in Samvat Year 2014. The plaint was presented on 15/4/1968. Baishi deceased, the predecessor-in-interest of the present petitioners in the written statement denied the aforesaid allegations and, on the contrary, averred that he was in possession of the aforesaid lands as a tenant from S.Y. 2000 and even before as the plaintiffs were in Government service and were not in a position to cultivate the lands in dispute personally. It was further contended that the plaintiffs in S.Y. 2014 executed a document and admitted the sub-tenancy of Banshi. It was therefore, contended that the plaintiffs-respondents are now estopped from asserting that Banshi was a trespasser on the laid in dispute. The suit was tried by the Assistant Collector, Bharatpur, who after framing issues and recording the evidence of the parties dismissed the plaintiff's suit on 16-8-1969. The plaintiffs feeling aggrieved filed an appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Alwar who also dismissed the appeal on 29-11-1971. The Revenue Appellate Authority held that the plaintiffs themselves admitted that they never paid the land revenue to the State after S.Y. 2014, but it was Banshi who had paid the land revenue to the State. It was also held that Ex. D/1 which is written by Khern Chand plaintiff himself reveals that Khem Chand did not have any source to cultivate the land and, therefore, he gave the laid to Banshi as sub-tenant. The Revenue Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that by virtue of Section 19(1)(a) of the Act Banshi had become a khatedar tenant. Madan Lal Patwari and Chaturbhuj. Office Kanungo corroborated the statement of Banshi. The Revenue Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that by virtue of Section 19(1)(a) of the Act Banshi had become a khatedar tenant. Madan Lal Patwari and Chaturbhuj. Office Kanungo corroborated the statement of Banshi. 3. The plaintiffs feeling aggrieved filed a second appeal before the Board of Revenue for Rajastha Ajmer. After hearing the parties the Board of Revenue framed an additional issue and remitted the same for finding to the trial Court. The issue framed was as under:- -Whether the plaintiffs are khatedar tenants and entitled to bring the suit for ejectment ?" 4. The Board of Revenue vide its order dated 20/12/76, remitted this issue to the Asstt. Collector, Bharatpur. The Asstt. Collector after recording the evidence field that Ex. D/1 was not genuine and that Banshi was a trespasser and was never given land as sub-tenant, by his order dated 22/2/1980. After recording this finding the Asstt. Collector, Bharatpur sent the record to the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue allowed the plaintiff's appeal and set aside the judgments and decrees of both the learned lower Courts and decreed the plaintiff's suit by order dated 29-4-1981. It was held by the Board of Revenue that Banshi, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, was admitted as a sub-tenant from S.Y. 20 14 and after the expiry of five years by virtue of Section 45 of the Act he had become a trespasser and was thus liable to be ejected under the provisions of Section 183 of the Act. 5. Feeling aggrieved against the judgment and decree of the Board of Revenue dated 29/4/1981, the present writ petition has been filed. It has bee, contended on behalf of the petitioners that the Board of Revenue erred in making out a new case which was not set in the plaint. It was contended that in the plaint the specific case of the plaintiff was that Barshi, the predecessor-in-title of the petitioners, was a rank trespasser and was not admitted on the land in dispute as sub-tenant. It was contended that the Board of Revenue has seriously erred in law in making out a new case that Banshi was admitted as sub-tenant in S. Y. 2014 and that as he had remained on the land for a period exceeding five years as a sub-tenant, he had become a trespasser by virtue of the provisions of Section 5 of the Act. It was also contended that Ex. D/1 describes Bannshi as a subtenant and, as such, the plaintiffs were debarred and estopped from taking a stand which is inconsistent with the contents of Ex. D 1. It was also contended that the Board of Revenue seriously erred in law in ignoring the fact that the petitioners had become khatedar tenants by virtue of the provisions of Section 9(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. It was also contended that by the execution of document Ex. D/1 the plaintiffs surrendered all their rights that they had ceased to be khatedars of the lands in dispute. 6. On behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents, it was contended that the best case of Banshi and now of the present petitioners could be that Banshi was admitted as sub-tenant on the lands in dispute in S.Y. 2014 under the provisions of Section 45 of the Act. A khatedar-tenant could not admit a sub-tenant after a period exceeding 5 years. Even if a document is executed whereby a sub-tenant is admitted on a holding by the khatedar-tenant for a period exceeding five years, then such document would be hit by the provisions of Section 45 of the Act and the person who has been admitted as sub-tenant shall become a trespasser after the expiry of five years and when the person who admitted him as a tenant has asked him to vacate the land in his possession. 7. Section 45 of the Act reads as under:- "45. Restrictions on letting and sub-letting.-(I) No holder of Khudkasht shall let and no Khatedar tenant or his mortgagee shall sub-let the whole or any part of his holding at any one time for a term exceeding five years. (2) Where a lease or sub-lease has once been granted for any term under sub-section (1) no further lease or sub-lease, as the case may be, in respect of the same land shall be granted within two years of the expiry of the first mentioned lease or sub-lease. (3) No Ghair Khatedar tenant shall sub-let the whole or any part of his holding for a term exceeding one year. (4) No sub-tenant or tenant of Khudkasht shall sub-let the whole or any part of his holding except in circumstances mentioned in Section 46." 8. Respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties have been considered and the record of the case carefully perused. (4) No sub-tenant or tenant of Khudkasht shall sub-let the whole or any part of his holding except in circumstances mentioned in Section 46." 8. Respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties have been considered and the record of the case carefully perused. 9. Reliance has been placed on Bhinka V. Charan Singh, (1) AIR 1959 SC 960 , wherein it has been held as under:- "Under Section 130, a person entitled to admit another to a plot of land can file a suit in a Revenue Court to eject him. The latter can defend the suit only on two grounds, namely, (I) that he has taken possession or retained possession of the said plot with the consent of the former: and (2) that he took possession or retained possession in accordance with the provisions of law for the time being in force. If no suit was brought against the occupier or if the decree obtained against him was not executed, he would become a hereditary tenant after the period of limitation prescribed in the fourth Schedule to the Act. The dichotomy between taking and retaining indicates that they are mutually exclusive and apply to two different situations. The word "taking" applies to a person taking possession of a land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law, while the word "retaining" applies to a person taking possession in accordance with the provisions of the law but subsequently retaining the same illegally. Where therefore the possession of the parties is illegal from the inception, they could not he described as persons retaining possession of the said lands in accordance with the provisions of any law for the time being in force, so as to be outside the scope of Section 180." 10. Reliance has been placed on Bhalla v. Mst. Where therefore the possession of the parties is illegal from the inception, they could not he described as persons retaining possession of the said lands in accordance with the provisions of any law for the time being in force, so as to be outside the scope of Section 180." 10. Reliance has been placed on Bhalla v. Mst. Gulab Kanwar & Others (2) 1974 RRD 281 , wherein it has been held as under:- "In suit u/s 183 plaintiff claimed that 1 /5th share belonging to her in disputed holding was let out to defendants for one year who refused to vacate after expiry of lease and that they became trespassers, liable to be ejected u/s 183- Whether tenant after expiry of lease is a trespasser or a tenant holding over and whether 1961 RRD 109 (F.B.) affirmed by H.C. in 1968 RRD 11 lost significance after amendment of Section 80 (1) (b) by Act No. 5 of 62 - Provisions of Chap. 5 Transfer of Property Act, not applicable to leases of Agri. holdings in Raj. since no notification as provided by Section 17, issued by Govt. so far-Leases of Agri. Lands, governed by R.T Act--According to Section (43) contracts can be express or implied and tenant, bound to pay rent and would be liable to pay such rent even when contract is implied-Tenant includes a sub-tenant but not a trespasser-Section (43) makes it clear that if a tenant continues to hold possession after expiry of lease, he does not fall within definition of trespasser u/s 5 (44)- Distinction between tenant and trespasser is that tenant enters in a lawful manner with consent of landlord and there is definite contract between parties for a particular term of lease and rent payable by tenant but such is not the position in respect of trespasser -- Presumption of Section 06, Transfer of Property Act, not applicable to Agri. tenancies- No provision in R.T. Act like Section 08 Transfer of Property Act-According to Section 3 (1) (b) a tenant who entered lawfully can either surrender or abandon after expiry of lease or before it but if he continues to occupy tenancy after efflux or determination or expiry of tenancy it cannot become extinct except by ejectment of tenant in accordance with provisions of R.T. Act- Provisions of Section 3 apply with full vigour where question of holding over after expiry of lease, involved-Tenant, liable to ejectment only in accordance with provisions of Section 61 and not otherwise - A tenant or sub-tenant holding from year to year can be ejected after determination of lease or sub-lease ups 180 - According to Expl. added to Section 80 (1) (b) a tenant or sub-tenant holding over after expiry of lease does not lose his status or character as a tenant or sub-tenant and he does not become a trespasser-Hence 1961 RID 109 (F.B.) applied with full vigour - No provision for extinction of tenancy by efflux of time or expiry of term of lease under R.T. Act like Section 11 of Transfer of Property Act, not applicable to Agri. tenancies in Raj.-1961 RRD 109, confirmed by H.C.-in 1968 RRD 11 and Board not competent to review decision of H.C.-Hence following 1961 RRD 109 and 1968 RRD I I a tenant or sub-tenant holding over is not a trespasser and has to be ejected u/s 180 and not u/s 183 - A.I.R. 1964 All. 498 (FB) and 1963 RRD 250 (H.C.), discussed and followed - Expl. added to Section 80 (1) (b), not enlarged scope of the section but merely explained scope of original section as held in A.I.R. 1951 All. 155 (F.B.). Provisions of Transfer of Property Act, held cannot be applied to Agri. tenancies in Raj. in view of clear provisions of R.T. Act." 11. Reliance has been placed on Kalwa v. Board of Revenue (3) 1962 RRD 36 , wherein it has been held as under:- "The clauses (a) (b), (c) and (d) of sub-section (1) are disjunctive and not cumulative or conjunctive. In other words, if a khatedar is able to bring his case within one or the other of these clauses, he would he entitled to evict, and it is not contemplated that he should necessarily bring his case within all of these clauses. In other words, if a khatedar is able to bring his case within one or the other of these clauses, he would he entitled to evict, and it is not contemplated that he should necessarily bring his case within all of these clauses. It is enough for a landholder to be entitled to relief under this section that he should bring his case within any one of the various clauses, read with their relevant provisions, and it is not necessary that he should satisfy the conditions of each of the clauses read together. Secondly, the varioas clauses have not been designed so as to be mutually exclusive. At least two of then, are partly over-lapping namely, (b) and (c) and they are also contradictory inasmuch as while the second part of clause (b) does not require the element of personal cultivation of the land-holder to entitle him to relief under that clause, clause (c) definitely prescribes it, although both these provisions seem equally to come into play where a lease or sub- lease has been granted after the commencement of the Act u,'s 45 and such lease or sub-lease has expired. Hence the language of this section is far from happy, and the section seems to call for a suitable legislative amendment." 12. Reliance has been placed on Raj Ram Tran. v. Mrs. Hill (4) AIR 1949 FB 135 , wherein it has been held as under:- "The words of a remedial statute must be construed so far as they reasonably admit so as to secure that the relief contemplated by the statute shall not be denied to the persons intended to be relieved. ' 13. v. Mrs. Hill (4) AIR 1949 FB 135 , wherein it has been held as under:- "The words of a remedial statute must be construed so far as they reasonably admit so as to secure that the relief contemplated by the statute shall not be denied to the persons intended to be relieved. ' 13. Reliance has been placed on Jodha v. Board of Revenue (5) 1979 RRD 160 , wherein it has been held as under:- Ejectment of sub-tenant as trespasser-Suit u/s 180(1)(b), filed by Khatedar tenant against sub-tenant, decreed by R.A.A. in appeal-Decree for ejectment, upheld by Board holding that sub-tenants in possession after expiry of sub-lease became trespassers, liable to ejectment u/s 183- Whether sub-tenants continuing in possession after expiry of tenancy without assent of tenant and without payment or acceptance of rent, could not become trespassers but were merely tenants at sufferance-If applicants continued in possession as tenants holding over from year to year after expiry of sub-lease, suit u/s 180( 1)(b) could be properly maintained- According to 1963 RRD 250 (HC) position of tenant or sub-tenant for a fixed tern is that of a tenant holding over after expiry of lease and land. not vacated-1961 RRD 100 (FB), approved in 1968 RRD 1 l (HCI- Relief of ejectment could be granted against sub-tenants u/ s 180 (1 )(b) if they claimed to be sub-tenants holding over from year to year--If even after expiry of lease, a person initially admitted as tenant for fixed term of years, continues to occupy land, he shall be termed as tenant holding over because his tenancy not determined in accordance with Section 3 as held in 1963 RRD 250 -If possession of applicants, considered as sub- tenants holding over from year to year, suit for ejectment u.s 180(1 )(b) could be filed-Decree for ejectment, upheld whether applicant were trespassers or sub-tenants holding over from year to year since suit, filed u/s 180(1 )(b)." 14. Reliance has been placed on Ramdeo v. Board of Revenue (6) 1968 RRD 11 , wherein it has been held as under:- "Sub-tenant not recorded as such in Annual Register at commencement of Act-Nor obtained necessary declaration-Held not entitled to any benefit under Sec." 15. Reliance has been placed on Ramdeo v. Board of Revenue (6) 1968 RRD 11 , wherein it has been held as under:- "Sub-tenant not recorded as such in Annual Register at commencement of Act-Nor obtained necessary declaration-Held not entitled to any benefit under Sec." 15. Reliance has been placed on Prabhu v. Ramdeo (7) AIR 1966 SC 1721 , wherein it has been held as under:- "Persons inducted into agricultural land as tenants by usufructuary mortgage and who have become entitled to rights of Khatedar tenants by virtue of Section 15 cannot be ejected by mortgagor on ground that mortgage of land has been redeemed -Rights of tenants inducted by mortgagee in possession, under provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, may conceivably be improved by statutory provisions which may meanwhile come into operation." 16. Reliance has been placed on Nandgir v. Board of Revenue (8) 1963 RRD 250 , wherein it has been held as under : "It was not open to the land holder in April, 1955 to make a demand from the tenant for surrender of land in view of provisions of R.P.T.O. which put a clog on the right of the landholder to get back his holding from his tenant by ejecting him in any other manner except as provided therein. Under the circumstances when there was a statutory bar for a landholder to eject his tenant, it cannot be deemed that the tenant who held the land after the expiry of the period of lease was holding it without the authority of the landholder and thereto, authority of the landholder to retain land shall have to be presumed in favour of the tenant by virtue of the provisions of R.P.T.O. which was then in force. The tenant shall, therefore, be deemed to be within his right to retain the possession of the land even after the fixed term in of his lease and his status would be that of a tenant holding over and not of a trespasser. 17. Reliance has also been placed on Pyar Chand v. Surajmal (9) 1965 RRD 1 , wherein it has been held as under:- "Person whose possession not justified in law and includes person, who enters upon land under some title, subsequently loses right and does not vacate when asked by landholder." 18. This is not challenged that the plaintiffs are the Khatedar-tenants of the lands in dispute. This is not challenged that the plaintiffs are the Khatedar-tenants of the lands in dispute. The best case of the present petitioners is that Banshi was admitted as sub-tenant on the lands in dispute in S.Y. 2014. Their contention is that by virtue of Section 19(1 )(a) and (b) Banshi became a Khatedar-tenant. On the contrary, the Board of Revenue held that a sub-tenant can continue as such only for a period of five years and not after that. If a sub-tenant continues beyond a period of five years and he is called upon to vacate the lad in dispute, his possession becomes that of a trespasser. Sub-section (2) of Section 19 provides that every tenant of Khudkasht or sub-tenant referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) claiming that the rights mentioned in that sub-section accrued to him on the appointed date in the whole or any part of his holding shall, within two years of that date and on payment of a court-fee of twenty-five naya paise, apply to the Assistant Collector having jurisdiction, praying for a declaration that such rights accrued to him as aforesaid, and the provisions of sub- section (5) of Section 15 shall apply to such application and such tenant of Khudkasht or stab-tenant shall not be regarded to have become the Khatedar tenant of his holding or part, as the case may be, until he has obtained the declaration so prayed for. 19. The Board of Revenue has held that though Banshi was admitted lawfully as a sub-tenant in S.Y. 2014, but his possession became that of a trespasser when the permissible limit under Section 45 of the Act was exceeded and the Khatedar tenant who had admitted him as a sub-tenant had called upon him to vacate the land in question. The view taken by the Board of Revenue is legal and correct and does not call for any interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 20. For the reasons stated above, there is no force in this writ petition which is hereby dismissed. 21. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. *******