JUDGMENT 1. These four revision petitions arise out of the same matter and against the very same order passed by the District Judge, Bikaner as such they are disposed of by a common order. 2. Asha Ram was working as Purchase Supervisor with the Rajasthan Cooperative Dairy Federation Ltd., Bikaner (hereinafter to be referred to as the Federation'). He was suspended with immediate effect by the order of the Managing Director of the Federation dated August 7, 1979. The suspension order was served upon Asharam on September 12, 1979 , while conveying the order of suspension the Manager of the Bikaner Unit of the Federation directed the petitioner to present himself in the office everyday and to mark It is attendance in the attendance register kept for the purpose Asharam marked his attendance from September 12, 1979 upto October 17, 1979, but thereafter he did not present himself in the office nor marked his attendance in the attendance register. 3. Ashararn filed five claim petitions before the Authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act at Bikaner in respect of different periods from August 1, 1979 to January 31, 1980. The Payment of Wages Authority, Bikaner allowed all the applications and passed orders for payment of arrears of wages at the full rate after deducting the amount which was already paid. On appeal by the Federation, the learned District Judge, Bikaner by his order dated April 28, 1982 modified the orders passed by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act dated November 26, 1980 and December 16, 1980 to the effect that Asharam was entitled to wages to the full extent only for a period of 29 daily, on the ground that Asharam presented himself at the place of work and marked his attendance only during a period of 29 days, out of the entire period from August 1, 1979 to April 30, 1981. The learned District judge held that model standing orders issued under the Rajasthan Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules were applicable to the employees of the Federation, but under para 4 of the Model Standing Orders an employee could be suspended only for a period of four days: as such the order of suspension of Asharam was apparently illegal and void. The learned District judge held that model standing orders issued under the Rajasthan Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules were applicable to the employees of the Federation, but under para 4 of the Model Standing Orders an employee could be suspended only for a period of four days: as such the order of suspension of Asharam was apparently illegal and void. He further held that it was incumbent upon the employee to present himself at the place of work and he could not have absented himself and claimed wages at the same time. In these circumstances, the learned District Judge came to the conclusion that out of the period from August 1, 1979 to January 31, 1980 Asharam had presented himself at the place of his work only during a period of 29 days, as such he was entitled to get full wages for the said period of 29 days. 4. Both parties have filed revision petitions in this Court against the aforesaid order passed by the learned District Judge, Bikaner dated April 28, 1982. While learned counsel for Asharam argued that the employee was entitled to wages for the entire period from August 1, 1979 to, January 31, 1980 at the rate admissible according to the rules, learned counsel for the Federation submitted that the learned District Judge erred in holding that the Managing Director of the Federation had no power to suspend the concerned employee and that wages should not have been allowed by the learned District judge at the full rate for the period of 29 days, but Asharam was entitled only to subsistence allowance for 29 days at the rate provided in the Model Standing Order. 5. Learned District Judge held that there were no bye-laws applicable to the workmen employed in the industrial establishment, as such the Rajasthan Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as at the 1963 Rules") were applicable to Asharam on account of the provisions of Section 12-A of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. The Model Standing orders set out in Schedule I in the Rules of 1963 are applicable to workmen employed in an industrial establishment until the Standing Orders certified under Rule 7 of the 1963 Rules are made applicable. The Model Standing orders set out in Schedule I in the Rules of 1963 are applicable to workmen employed in an industrial establishment until the Standing Orders certified under Rule 7 of the 1963 Rules are made applicable. Sub-clause (3) (a) of clause (18) of the Model Standing Orders authorises the authority empowered to take disciplinary proceedings against the workmen to place a workman tinder suspension, if on a complaint of misconduct against him disciplinary proceedings are contemplated or are pending or where a case in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial against him and the employer is satisfied that it was necessary or desirable to place the concerned workman under suspension. The employer may serve an order in waiting to the workman concerned placing him under suspension. The learned District judge was, therefore completely in error in holding that there was no power of suspension vested in the employer or even under para 11 of the Model Standing Orders the power of suspension is limited to a period of only four days. It may be pointed out that under sub-clause (3) (c) of para 18 suspension for a period of 10 days or for a shorter period may be awarded by way of punishment, if the workman is found guilty of the charges and if it is considered that the order of suspension would meet the ends of justice. The learned District judge failed to appreciate the distinction between suspension during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings or when such proceedings are contemplated and suspension is being awarded by way of punishment, as a result of the workman being found guilty of the charges on the completion of the disciplinary proceedings. It may be observed to at the learned District judge appears to have referred to the earlier provisions contained in clause (3) of para 18 of the Model Standing Orders, as they existed prior to December 19, 1958, which did not provide for suspension before or during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings but only allowed 4 days suspension of the employee by way of punishment. It is regretable that the Model Standing Orders in force at the relevant time were not brought to the notice of the learned District Judge however, both the learned counsel for the parties agreed before me that at the relevant time the employer had the power of placing a workman under suspension either if disciplinary proceedings were contemplated or if they had commenced and were pending against such workman. The bye-law 24 of the Federation provides that the Managing Director of the Federation shall be the chief executive officer thereof. It has also been provided in bye-law 24(2) (i) that the Managing Director has subject to such modification as may be made by the Board of Directors from time to time, the power to appoint, suspend, dismiss, remove or transfer and punish salaried employees of the Federation as per rules and the powers delegated by the Board. Even though the Rules have not been framed by the Federation, yet the procedure for suspension or of taking disciplinary proceedings against a workman employed by the Federation would be governed by the Model Standing Orders, contained in Schedule I annexed to the 1963 Rules. Thus, the Managing Director of the Federation had the requisite power to suspend an employee pending determination of disciplinary proceedings against him and the learned District judge was in error in holding that suspension could be awarded only as a punishment and that too for a period of four days. 6. Thus it is fully established that the Managing Director of the Federation could have have passed an order of suspension in the case of Aslnanam, in exercise of the power conferred upon him under Sub-clause (3) (a) of para 18 of the Model Standing orders read with clause 24. 2 (i) of the bye-laws of the Federation and such an order of suspension could have been passed while disciplinary proceedings were pending. to last until the decision of the disciplinary proceedings. It may also be pointed out that the present case is not one where suspension of the employee was ordered as a punishment after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, but suspension of Asharam was ordered during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings. 7. to last until the decision of the disciplinary proceedings. It may also be pointed out that the present case is not one where suspension of the employee was ordered as a punishment after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, but suspension of Asharam was ordered during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings. 7. Another argument which was advanced by the learned counsel for Asharam was that the General Manager of the Federation had no power to impose a condition upon the employee that he should present himself in the office and mark his attendance in the register kept in the office for the purpose. According to the learned counsel for the employee, such an order could have been passed only by the Managing Director of the Federation, if it could at all have been passed. It appears that the Managing Director, while passing an order of suspension, did not give any further direction except that the order shall come into force with immediate effect. But while conveying the order passed by the Managing Director to Asharam, the General Manager of the Federation imposed a condition that the concerned employee should present himself in the office every day and should also mark his attendance in the Register kept in the office for the purpose. As under bye-law 24. 2 (i) of the Federation, the power to suspend a salaried employee. subject to the Rules of the Federation and the powers delegated by Board, vests in the Managing Director, any condition relating to tile suspension of the employee could also have been imposed by the very same authority who had the power to place him under suspension, Thus, only the Managing Director who had placed Asharam under suspension, alone could have imposed any condition in respect of his suspension. The Managing Director did not impose any such condition in the instant case about daily presence in the office or marking attendance in the register, and as such it is not necessary for inc to consider in the present case the general question as to whether any such condition could at all be imposed even by the authority who was competent to pass an order of suspension. 8. 8. It appears that in the absence of a rule or a bye-law or a general order, the authority suspending an employee could not have directed him to render any service of perform any duties and attending the office every day may amount to rendering service or performing a duty by the employee. 9. In V.P. Gindronia v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another ( AIR 1970 SC 1494 ) , it was observed that three kinds of suspension arc known to law. A public servant could be suspended as a mode of punishment or penalty or he may be suspended during the pendency of an enquiry, if the order appointing him or the statutory provisions governing his service provide for such suspension. Thirdly an employee may merely he forbidden from discharging his ditties during the pendency of any enquiry against him. The right to suspend an employee as a measure of punishment as well as the right to suspend the contract of service during the pendency of an enquiry are both regulated either by the contract of employment or by the statutory provisions regulating the conditions of service. 10. In Chittaranjan Ghosh v. I.G. of Police W.B. and others 1979 (2) SLR 194 , it was held by a learned judge of the Calcutta High Court that in the case of suspension pending enquiry, the employee concerned is not liable to render any service and he is prevented from performing the duties of his office. It was held by the learned Judge that if a police officer, who was placed under suspension pending enquiry, was compelled to attend the roll call then it amounted to a direction to the employee concerned to perform a part of his duties. An order of suspension amounts to a direction to the employee that he should not do service required of him during the period he is placed tinder suspension and he could not be called upon to attend the roll call, as attending a roll call by a police personnel is a part of his duty. 11. An order of suspension amounts to a direction to the employee that he should not do service required of him during the period he is placed tinder suspension and he could not be called upon to attend the roll call, as attending a roll call by a police personnel is a part of his duty. 11. In Zonal Manager, Food Corporation of India and others v. Khaleel Ahmed Siddiqui (1982 Lab.I.C. 1140) , it was held by a bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court that suspension pending enquiry against a public servant in accordance with the provisions of staff regulations does not contemplate attendance of the employee at the office and his marking attendance daily. Alladi Kuppuswami Chief,Justice, speaking for the bench, observed as under: "The expression '-suspension" means debarring an employee from service temporarily. We fail to understand how when an employee is debarred temporily from service, he could be compelled to attend office and mark his attendance daily and also be visited with penalty if he does not mark his attendance....... This clearly indicates that a person under suspension is not expected to attend office or claim conveyance for his attendance. Further in Reg. 66(8) it is also provided that ultimately if the suspension of an employee is held to be unjustified or not wholly justified, or when an employee who has been dismissed or suspended is reinstated, the disciplinary, appellate or reviewing authority, as the case may be, may if he is honorably acquitted grant to him the full pay and allowances other than conveyance allowance to which he would have been entitled, if he had not been dismissed or suspended. These provisions clearly point to the conclusion that suspension by its very nature does not contemplate attendance of the employee at the office and marking his attendance daily." 12. In the present case, I am of the view that the General Manager had no power to modify the order passed by the Managing Director and to impose a condition upon the employee that he shall attend the office daily and mark his attendance every day in the register kept for the purpose, during the period of suspension. As the Managing Director did not impose any such condition, the condition imposed by the General Manager was illegal and without any legal authority. As the Managing Director did not impose any such condition, the condition imposed by the General Manager was illegal and without any legal authority. The learned District judge did not examine this aspect of the matter, but merely observed that the employee was entitled to get wages only for the period during which he masked his attendance in the Register kept in the office for the purpose. In my view, as no such condition was imposed by the Managing Director, the employee was entitled to subsistence allowance with effect from September 12, 1979. Moreover, in the very nature of things suspension from service amounts to suspension of the contract of service; the employer is under no obligation to make payment of wages during that period while the employee is under no obligation to work or attend his duties. The employer is required by the relevant Rules to pay only the subsistence allowance to the employee during the period of suspension and the employee cannot take up employment elsewhere during that period. Subsistence allowance is meant only for the purpose of providing maintenance to the employee for himself and his fancily and is granted in lieu of the fact that the employee is debarred from taking up employment elsewhere during the period of suspension. 13. The next point urged was that the employee was not entitled to get wages at the full rate during the period of his suspension, but he could only get subsistence allowance in accordance with the provisions of the Rules. The learned District Judge has awarded the employee wages at the full rate for a period of 29 days on the ground that the order of suspension was void and invalid. But as I have already observed above, the order of suspension in the instant case was perfectly valid and was passed in accordance: with law by the competent authority, namely the Managing Director of the Federation, as such the employee was only entitled to subsistence allowance in accordance with the relevant provisions contained in sub-para (3) (b) of Para 18 of the Model Standing Orders. it has been provided therein that for the first 90 days of suspension, during the pendency of a departmental enquiry, the employee is entitled to get subsistence allowance equal to 1/2 of his wages as defined in the Payment of Wages Act, 1936; but if the departmental enquiry is prolonged beyond the period of 90 days, the subsistence allowance shall be paid at the rate of 3/4 of the wages. However, if the enquiry is delayed beyond 90 days on account of reasons directly attributable to the employee, then the subsistence allowance shall be reduced 1/4 of the wages. The authority under the Payment of Wages Act calculated the amount payable to the employee by way of subsistence allowance at the full rate, on the basis of an erroneous finding that the Model Standing Orders did not make any provision for payment of subsistence allowance. But as I have already mentioned above, the provisions of sub-para (3) (b) of Para 18 of the Model Standing Orders were applicable to the concerned employee because no certified standing order had come into existence during the relevant time, in respect of the employees of the Federation. The authority under the Payment of Wages Act observed that the Federation was unable to produce any order by which it was entitled to deduct any part of the wages during the suspension period. It appears that the relevant provisions of the Model Standing Orders were not brought to the notice of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act and as such the employee's claim was not considered by the said Authority in accordance with the provisions of sub- para (3) (b) of para 18 of the Model Standing Orders. 14. Another argument advanced by the learned counsel for the Federation was that the employee would not be entitled to payment of wages for the pniod during which he remained under suspension, without ascertaining as to whether Asharam was not employed elsewhere during the period of his suspension. No such plea was ever raised on behalf of the Federation, either before the payment of Wages Authority or before the learned District judge and such a new plea regarding a question of fact cannot be allowed to be raised now at this stage. It was not the case of the Federation that Asharam was employed elsewhere during the period of his suspension. It was not the case of the Federation that Asharam was employed elsewhere during the period of his suspension. A flesh investigation into a new question of fact cannot be allowed now at the revisional stage. 15. It was then argued by the learned counsel for the Federation that after an order regarding payment of arrears of wages was passed by the authority under the Payment of Wages Act, the disciplinary enquiry has been completed and Asharam has been dismissed from service on November 30, 1981. It has been stated at the Bar that the order of dismissal has been challenged by Asharam by means of a writ petition, which is pending in this court. In any view of the matter, Asharam is entitled to obtain subsistence allowance up to the date when the order of his dismissal from service was pared in the five claim petition which are subject-matter of the present proceedings, Asharam had claimed wages from August 1, 1979 to April 30, 1981, during which period he remained under suspension pending disciplinary enquiry. As such, authority under the Payment of Wages Act was justified in granting arrears of subsistence allowance for the entire period from August 1, 1979 to April 30, 1981. But the only error committed by that authority was that it had allowed the employee Asharam subsistence allowance at the full rate, although the employee was entitled to receive subsistence allowance only at the rate specified in sub-pars (3) (b) of Para 18 of the Model Standing Orders Thus, it can no longer be disputed that subsistence allowance was payable to Asharam in these proceedings front August 1, 1979 to April 30, 1981. 16. Yet a formidable argument advanced by the learned counsel for the Federation was that the subsistence allowance payable during the period of suspension did not fall within the expression -wages' and the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act had no jurisdiction to pass an award in favour of the employee in respect of the said amount. 16. Yet a formidable argument advanced by the learned counsel for the Federation was that the subsistence allowance payable during the period of suspension did not fall within the expression -wages' and the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act had no jurisdiction to pass an award in favour of the employee in respect of the said amount. The term wages' has been defined in clause (6) of Section 2 of the Payment of Wages Act as all remuneration whether by way of salary, allowance or otherwise expressed in terms of money or capable of being so expressed which would, if the terms of employment, express or implied, were fulfiled, be payable to a person employed, in respect of his employment or work done in such employment." 17. Learned counsel for the Federation, Mr. Balia, contends that subsistence allowance was not remuneration and that it was not paid in respect of his employment. It was submitted that in order that the employee could be entitled to remuneration, there must be quid pro quo meaning thereby that remuneration is the consideration which a person -gets for rendering services.17A. In Accountant General, Bihar and another v. N. Bakshi ( AIR 1962 SC 505 ) , it was observed that the expression 'remuneration' to its ordinary connotation means -reward, recompense, pay wages or salary for service rendered." It was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case that as the expression 'remuneration' was not defined in the Constitution of India, it should be used in a wide connotation. The question which arose before their Lordships of the Supreme Court related to the right of passage benefits awarded to the Members of the Indian Civil Services and it was held that the same formed part of the salary or remuneration earned by the members of the Indian Civil Services, in accordance with the conditions of their service. 18. It may be observed that in clause (6) of Section 2, the expression remuneration has been used in a wider sense and it has been clarified that it includes not only salary and allowance but also the amount payable to the employee 'otherwise'. 18. It may be observed that in clause (6) of Section 2, the expression remuneration has been used in a wider sense and it has been clarified that it includes not only salary and allowance but also the amount payable to the employee 'otherwise'. Ordinarily an employee is entitled to salary or wages in respect of his employment, but on account of his suspension the concerned employee is not entitled to wages in respect of his employment but he is only entitled to an allowance, in accordance with the provisions of sub-para (3) of para 18 of the Model Standing Orders. It may be noted that sub-para (3) (f) of para 18 of the Model Standing Orders provides that the, payment of subsistence allowance shall be subject to the person concerned not taking any employment during the period of his suspension. Thus the employee is prohibited from taking up any other employment during the period of his suspension, otherwise he would not be entitled to any amount by way of subsistence allowance. It cannot be held in these circumstance that subsistence allowance does not fall within, the wide definition of remuneration contained in the Payment of Wages Act. 19. The expression in respect of' means 'relating to' or 'with reference to' as observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Tolaram Relumal and another v. The State of Bombay ( AIR 1954 SC 496 ) , applying the analogy of the relationship of landlord and tenant and the contract of lease. There is ample justification for holding that the relationship of employer and employee does not come into existence until the contract of service comes into existence. It must also be held, in a similar manner that the relationship of employer and employee comes to an and only when the contract of service comes to an end; either by the acceptance of the resignation of the employee or by dismissal, removal or discharge of the employee from service. So long as the contract of service continues the relationship of employer and employee would also continue and the employee would be entitled to get remuncration, subject to the conditions of service governing the contract of employment. 20. In Khemchand v. Union of India and others ( AIR 1963 SC 687 ) . So long as the contract of service continues the relationship of employer and employee would also continue and the employee would be entitled to get remuncration, subject to the conditions of service governing the contract of employment. 20. In Khemchand v. Union of India and others ( AIR 1963 SC 687 ) . their Lordships while dealing with question of suspension, observed as under:- "The real effect of the order of suspension is that though he continues to be a member of the Government service he was not permitted to work, and further, during the period of his suspension he was paid only some allowance-generally called "subsistence allowance"-which is normally less than his salary-instead of the pay and allowances he would have been entitled to if he had not been suspended. There is no doubt that the order of suspension affects a Government servant injuriously. There is no basis for thinking however that because of the order of suspension he ceases to be a member of the service." 21. In V.P. Gindronia's case their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under:- "The general principle is that an employer can suspend an employee of his pending an enquiry into his misconduct and the only question that can arise in such a suspension will relate to the payment of' his wages during the period of such suspension. It is now well settled that the power to suspend, in the sense of a right to forbid a employee to work, is not an implied term in an ordinary contract between master and servant, and that such a power can only be the creature either of a statute governing the contract, or an express term in the contract itself. Ordinarily, therefore, the absence of such a power either as an express term in the contract or in the rules framed ceder some statute could mean that an employer would have no power to suspend an employee of his and even if he does so in the sense that he forbids the employee to work, he will have to pay the employee's wages during the period of suspension. Where, however, there is power to suspend either in the contract of employment or in the statute or the rules framed thereunder, the order of suspension has the effect of temporarily suspending the relationship of master and with the consequence that the servant is not bound to render service and the master is not bound to pay. It is equally well settled that an order of interim suspension can be passed against the employee while an enquiry is pending into his conduct even though there is no such term in the contract of employment or in the rules, but in such a case the employee would be entitled to his remuneration for the period of suspension if there is no statute or ruler under which, it could be withheld. The distinction between suspending the contract of service of a servant and suspending him from performing the duties of his office on the basis that the contract is subsisting is important. "The suspension in the latter case is always an implied term in every contract of service. When an employee is suspended in this sense, it means that the employer merely issues a direction to him that he should not do the service required of him during a particular period. In other words the employer is regarded as issuing an order to the employee which because the contract is subsisting, the employee must obey." (emphasis added) 22. In Chintaman Rao and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh ( AIR 1958 SC 388 ) , it was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the concept of employment involves three ingredients : (1) employer (2) employee and (3) the contract of employment. The employment is the contract of service between the employer and the employee, whereunder the employee agrees to serve the employer subject to his control and supervision. 23. The employment is the contract of service between the employer and the employee, whereunder the employee agrees to serve the employer subject to his control and supervision. 23. In the Vice Chancellor, Jammu University and another v. Dushinant Kumar Rampal (AIR 1977 SG 1146) , their Lordships of the Supreme Court, relying upon the observations made in V.P. Gindronia's case (1) observed as under : " It will, therefore, be seen that where there is power conferred on the employer either by an express term in the contract or by the rules governing the terms and conditions of service to Suspend an employee, the order of suspension has the effect of temporarily suspending the relation of master and servant with consequence that the employee is not bound to render service and the employer is not bound to pay. In such a case the employee would not be entitled to receive any payment at all from the employer, unless the contract of employment or the rules governing the terms and conditions of service provide for payment of some subsistence allowance." (emphasis added) 24. Thus, it will be seen that the effect of an order of suspension is that the contract of service is temporarily suspended during such period and neither the employee is liable to perform any duty nor the employer is liable for payment of wages or salary but if the contract of employment or the rules governing the terms and conditions of service provide for the payment of subsistence allowance, then the employee would be entitled to obtain the same from the employer during the period he remains under suspension and not otherwise. But the contact of service is merely temporarily suspended and it does not come to an end. The relationship of master and servant therefore, continues and does not cease to exist that is why the employee, who is in receipt of subsistence allowance, is prohibited from taking up employment elsewhere during the period of suspension. 25. In the State of Madhya Pradesh v. The State of Maharashtra and others ( AIR 1977 SC 1466 ) , their Lordships of the Supreme Court re-emphasised that the order of suspension did not put to an end to the service of the employee, as suspension merely suspended the claim to salary, but the employee was entitled to payment of subsistence allowance in accordance with the rules. It was held that the real effect of the order of suspension was that though the civil servant continues to be a member of the service he is not permitted to work and is paid only subsistence allowance in accordance with the rules. It was pointed out that under Fundamental Rule 52 the pay and allowance of' a Government servant ceases only on dismissal or removal from service, from the date of his removal or dismissal. 26. In The Divisional Superintendent Northern Railway Delhi Division v. Mukand lal (AIR 1957 Punj 130) , a Full Bench of the Punjab High Court held that during the period of suspension the relationship of master and servant remains in abeyance and according to the terms and conditions of the contract of service, the employee is entitled to receive a small amount during the period of suspension which is called compensatory or subsistence allowance. It was held in that case that the employs can recover subsistence allowance if he goes to the authority under the Payment of Wages Act, because it falls under the definition of 'wages' under the Act. 27. In Andhra Pradesh Road Transport Corporation Hydrabad v. Payment of wages Authority and another (1970(1) L.L.J. 700 ), it was held that the employee was entitled to claim payment of subsistence allowance pending departmental enquiry and such subsistence allowance was included in the definition of 'wages' contained in Section 2 (6) of the Payment of Wages Act. It was observed by a learned judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the aforesaid raise that a close reading of the definition of wages contained it, Section 2 (6) indicates that it is not an exhaustive definition, but it is inclusive one, as certain items apart from the general language used in the main definition have born added and it also excluded certain items specified therein. The learned Judge held that the subsistence allowance, paid to the employee in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract of service or according to the statutory rules, falls within the term 'wages', as defined in Section 2 (6) of the Payment of Wages Act. 28. The learned Judge held that the subsistence allowance, paid to the employee in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract of service or according to the statutory rules, falls within the term 'wages', as defined in Section 2 (6) of the Payment of Wages Act. 28. A similar vide was taken in General Superintendent, P.W.D. Workshops, Hydrabad v. D.Prabhakar Chetty and another (1978 India, Factories Journal 357) , and it was held that authority under the Payment of Wages Act has authority to entertain a claim for payment of subsistence allowance, payable to the employee during the period of suspension in accordance with the rules. It was observed that the definition of 'wages' includes allowances and subsistence allowance was one of such allowances which was provided by the conditions of service. 29. The aforesaid decisions clearly lead to the conclusion that subsistence allowance, which an employee is entitled to receive during the period of suspension in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract of service or according to the statutory provisions, falls within the definition of 'wages' as contained in Section 2(6) of the Payment of Wages Act as it is an allowance, which is payable to the person employed relating to his employment. The suspension of the employee merely suspends the contract of service but the same still subsists and is not put to an end. It is because the contract of service still continues to exist that the employer is made liable under the relevant Rules to pay subsistence allowance to the employee placed under suspension, who is debarred from taking up another employment during the period of his suspension and is entitled merely to an allowance. If a different view is taken then it would naturally cause considerable hardship to the employees placed under suspension, in accordance with the power vested in the competent authority under the terms and conditions of employment or under the Rules. As observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the term, wages' should be construed in the wider sense and it cannot be forgotten that the Payment of Wages Act is a beneficial legislation enacted for the benefit of the workmen. As observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the term, wages' should be construed in the wider sense and it cannot be forgotten that the Payment of Wages Act is a beneficial legislation enacted for the benefit of the workmen. The court should put such a construction on the term 'wages', contained in Section 2 (6) of the Act which shall advance the remedy and suppress the mischief I am, therefore clearly of the view that subsistence allowance payable to the employees during the period of his suspension, in accordance with the statutory provisions or under the contract of employment falls within the definition of wages' as contained in Section 2 (6) of the Payment of Wages Act and the authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act has jurisdiction to entertain a claim in respect of payment of arrears of subsistence allowance. 30. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the employee that penalty was imposed upon the Federation to the full extent by the authority under the Payment of Wages Act as subsistence allowance was not paid to the employee at the proper time, but the penalty was set aside by the learned District judge on the ground that there was a bona fide dispute between the parties. As serious questions of law have been raised about the meaning and content of subsistence allowance and about the same being included in the term 'wages' contained in Section 2(6) of the Payment of Wages Act and about the jurisdiction of the authority under the Payment of Wages Act to entertain a claim petition in respect of arrears of subsistence allowance, in my view, the learned District judge was justified in setting aside the penalty on the ground that there was a bona fide dispute between the parties. However, in view of my findings given above, the employee Asharam is entitled to payment of subsistence allowance by the Federation for the period from August 1, 1979 to April 30, 1981, in accordance with the provisions contained in sub-para (3)(b) of para 18 of' the Model Standing Orders. 31. Now, the only question, which remains is to make an arithmentical calculation of the amount payable to the employee in accordance with the provisions of sub-para (3)(b) of para 18 of the Model Standing Orders for the aforesaid period. 31. Now, the only question, which remains is to make an arithmentical calculation of the amount payable to the employee in accordance with the provisions of sub-para (3)(b) of para 18 of the Model Standing Orders for the aforesaid period. The authority under the Payment of Wages Act should make the necessary calculation of the amount of arrears of subsistence allowance payable to the employee, in view of the aforesaid findings. In the result all the revision petitions are partly allowed and the orders passed by the learned District Judge and the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act are set aside. The Payment of Wages Authority is directed to make arithmetical calculation of the amount payable to the employee Asharam for the period from August 1, 1979 to April 30, 1981, in accordance with the provisions of sub-para 3(b) of Para 18 of the Model Standing Orders and to quantify the amount which has already paid, if any. The Payment of Wages Authority is directed to pass consequential orders in all the claim petitions filed by the employee before him in the light of observations made above within a period of six months. The parties are left to bear their own cost. *******