JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, C.J. - The dispute in the present writ petition relates to the Management of Islamia Inter College, Firozabad. District Agra According to the petitioners, petitioner no. 3 Mohd. Azim is the Manager-cum Secretary of the College while petitioner no. 4 is the President. The matter was decided by the District Inspector of Schools by ah order dated 23rd June, 1981 whereby he held in substance that the Managing Committee of which Sri Rafi Uddin respondent no. 2 was the Manager, the only elected and was in actual control of the institution and he, therefore, attested Sri Raft Uddins signatures. 2. In the petition, the inspectors order has been challenged on a variety of ground. In the first place the learned counsel admitted that the Inspector of schools had no jurisdiction to decide this dispute became by sub-sect,on (7) to section 16 A of the U.P. Intermediate Education A-t, the jurisdiction has been conferred on the Regional Deputy Director of Education. This subsection came on the statute book by U.P. Act no. 1 of 1981 which crime into force on 11th February, 1981. Thus long prior to the date of the decision by the Inspector, he had lost jurisdiction to decide the controversy between the parties. For the respondents it has been submitted that the elections of Che Managing Committee of the College were held on 16th July, 1980. Disputes having arises, they were referred to the District Inspector of Schools. Since respondent no. 2 felt that the Inspector was not rendering his decision, he filed a writ petition no. 8608 of 1980 in this Court for a mandamus directing the District Inspector of schools to recognise him as Manager. In that writ petition a learned single Judge of this Court on 12.5.1981 passed an order indicating that the question whether the elections held on 6ch July, 1980 were valid, was pending decision. There was no interim order directing the District Inspector of Schools not to decide the said matter and mere seemed to be no justification in keeping the matter pending the Standing Counsel stated that he would see to it that the matter was decided by the District Inspector of Schools within six weeks. This led the Inspector to consider the matter a id lie passed the impugned order on 23rd June, 1981. 3. This led the Inspector to consider the matter a id lie passed the impugned order on 23rd June, 1981. 3. It is, thus, apparent that the District Inspector of Schools was seized of the matter soon after the alleged election in July 1980 were held since the Inspector was not deciding the matter speedily. The respondents side came to this Court a-id this Court also indicated that the Inspector should decide the dispute within six weeks. In this situation it is clear that the dispute with respect to the management of this institution was pending deposal before the Inspector since before the coming into force of subsection (7) of section 16A. On its language, sub-section (7) is not retrospective in operation. There in nothing in it to indicate that the pending dispute should be transferred to the Regional Depute Director for adjudication. In our opinion sub-section (7) of section 16-A is not attracted to the present case. 4. Learned counsel then submitted shat the order passed by the Inspector was without any material and unsustainable. This Court is Committee of Management-through its Manager and another v. District Inspector of Schools, Meerut and another, 1978 ALR 122 has held that the District Inspector of Schools has jurisdiction to prima facie consider as to which party was in actual control so that he may deal with that party in the day to day affairs of the institution Any decision given by the District Inspector of schools is subject to decision by a competent court. The petitioners have adequate remedy of challenging the decision of the Inspector by way of a suit in the Civil Courts. For this reason it is not proper for this Court to enter into its merits. Learned counsel, however, invited us to go through the order, and has made documents on its findings. After discussion of the view points of the rival portion, the Inspector has come to the conclusion that Rafi Uddin. Manager of the Managing Committee was in actual control and that the Principal, teachers and the workers were obeying the orders passed by that Managing Committee. For that reason he held that it appears that that Committee was in actual control. He further held that the elections held on 6th July, 1980 were acceptable. Manager of the Managing Committee was in actual control and that the Principal, teachers and the workers were obeying the orders passed by that Managing Committee. For that reason he held that it appears that that Committee was in actual control. He further held that the elections held on 6th July, 1980 were acceptable. Learned counsel for the petitioners was at paine to emphasise that there was no finding as to who convened the meeting held on 6th July, 1980 at which the elections were supposed to have been held. He relied upon certain decided cases that only the Manager can convene the meeting and the President aor e has a right to fix date for the meeting. Neither the Manager nor the President have been found to have convened the meeting. Be that as it may, we need not express any opinion on that. Even if the finding that the election held on 6th July, 1980 were acceptable, is ignored yet the finding of fact recorded by the Inspector that the Managing Committee headed by Rafi Uddin appears to be actual control for the reason that the Principal, teachers and workers obey their orders, by itself is enough to enable him to deal with the Managing Committee in the day to day affairs of the institution as contemplated by the decision of this Court referred to above. The entire matter is subject to being adjudicated in the Civil Courts. Consequently it is neither fit nor proper for this Court to make why comments such loss interfere with it. The learned counsel also emphasised that in the body of its order the Inspector has held that the elections held in 1974 and 1977 were illegal. That finding was neither called for nor is supported by any evidence on the record. It may be so but it is immemorial for the purposes of this writ petition. The entire matter can be gone into by the Civil Courts. In the circumstances we do not find that this is a fit case for interference. The petition is accordingly dismissed with costs.