Singh, J.- This Criminal Revision raises an important question on the interpretation and scope of Sections 18 and 19 of the Assam Games and Betting Act, 1970 (hereinafter called the Act). The material facts which give rise to this revision may be briefly stated. 2. Shri Bhola Nath Bhuyan, C.I.D. Sub-Inspector of Police, P.W. 4, arrested the accused, Moni Kanta Gogoi, on 5.12.74, while the latter was selling 'Teer' tickets in a pan-goomti at Dispur. Shri Birendra Chandra Mohanta, another C.I.D. Sub-Inspector of Police, and some others of his staff accompanied P.W. 4, Shri Bhola Nath Bhuyan. Shri Bhuyan seized the following articles by preparing a seizure memo in presence of witnesses from the possession of the accused. The articles are: (i) one dot pen ; (ii) One small book of size 3½” x 2" ; (iii) One piece of carban paper of the same size ; and (iv) Cash amount of Rs. 109.35 P.W. 2, Jabed Ali, a student, P.W. 3, Reba Saikia, Sub-Inspec­tor of Police, and two others signed the seizure memo as witnesses. After taking the accused into his custody, Shri Bhola Nath Bhuyan lodged on thj same day a report to the Officer-in -Charge Dispur Police Outpost, to register a case under Section 14 of the Act against the accused. The report was forwarded to the Officer-in-Charge, Gauhati Police Station, stating that Shri Bhola Nath Bhuyan, C.I.D. Sub-Inspector, had already taken up investigation. A case was registered against the accused under Section 14 of the Act. On completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted against the accused to stand his trial before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, Gauhati, Shri P.C. Barthakur. 3. Before the trial court, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. Prosecution examined four witnesses to prove its case. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, accepting the case of the prosecution, convicted the accused for an offence under Section 14 of the Act with which he was charged and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to- pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-; and, in default, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for two months. The accused west in appeal to the Sessions Judge, Kamrup, Gauhati, in Criminal Appeal No. 40 (K-2)/76; but the appeal was dismi­ssed. Hence this revision. 4. 1,000/-; and, in default, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for two months. The accused west in appeal to the Sessions Judge, Kamrup, Gauhati, in Criminal Appeal No. 40 (K-2)/76; but the appeal was dismi­ssed. Hence this revision. 4. Before me two questions were canvassed by the counsel for the petitioner : (1) Assuming that the factum of recovery of the articles above from the prosession of the accused is established, in the absence of evidence or finding that (a) 'Teer' is a betting game or sport within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 2 of the Act and (b) that the fact so established has neither relevancy nor has it a natural and inherent probative or persuasive value is proof of the fact that the articles found and seized are Instruments of betting' and 'records of betting', as defined in clause (d) and (e) of Section 2 of the Act, no legal presump­tions under Sections 18 and 19 of the Act can be raised. Conviction is as such not sustainable in law. (2) The seizure of the articles has been made according to law; the finding that the articles were recovered from the possession of the accused, is manifestly erroneous not being supported by legal evidence, and perverse. No conviction as such can be sustained. 5. Conviction is as such not sustainable in law. (2) The seizure of the articles has been made according to law; the finding that the articles were recovered from the possession of the accused, is manifestly erroneous not being supported by legal evidence, and perverse. No conviction as such can be sustained. 5. To appreciate the arguments of the counsel of the parties, it will be relevant to refer to clauses (a), (d) and (e) of the definition in Section 2 of the Act : "(a) "bet" with all its grammatical variations means any money or a valuable security or thing staked by a person on behalf of himself or on behalf of any other person, by himself or through any agent or any person procured or employed acting for or on his behalf, to be lost or won on the happening or determination of an unascertained thing, event or contingency of or in relation to a game or sport and shall include acceptance of a bet.” "(b) "instruments of betting" includes any board, table, tickets, tokens, coupons, book, khatas, slips and all other things which are used in bettings or to facilitate betting on a game or sport." "(c) "records of betting" includes any table, board, cloth writing materials, accounts and account-books, slips, paper, books, khatas, receipts, coupons and all other things which contain or may indicate to have any relation to record of betting " 6. The preamble to the Act provides for punishment of gambling and betting on games and sports which have widely spread throughout the State causing debasement of public mora­lity and wide-spread exploitation and threat to peace and order. It is to achieve the public policy above which is apparent from the recitals to the preamble that the Act was enacted, in con­struing the provision of the Act the public policy above is to be taken into consideration ; but the danger in such cases is also to be borne in mind: 'Public policy is always an unsafe and treacherous ground for judicial decision' (Janson vs. Driefonteir Consolidated Mines, Ltd., 1902 A.C. 483) and also dictum of Burroughs J. in Fauntleroy's case : "Public policy is a restive horse, and when you get astride of it, there is no knowing where it will carry you', In Hardy vs. Pother gilt, (1888) 13 App Cas. 351, Lord Selborne thus stated the proper course to be adopted: "It is not, I conceive, for your lord-ships or for any other court to decide such questions as this under the influence of considerations of policy, except so far as the policy may be apparent from, or at least consistent with, the language of the legislature in the statute or statutes upon which the question depends'. See Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edition page 176. 7. General words, such as, any ticket, token etc., any cloth, writing materials and account-books etc. are used in both Sections 18 and 19 of the Act which are under consideration. Limitation has, therefore, to be put on the construction of these wide terms. Lord Haldane said in Watney Combe, Reid & Co. Ltd. vs. Berners, 1915) A. C. 885: "The inten­tion must be found in the language finally adopted in the statutes under consideration and in that language alone. No doubt general words may in certain cases properly be interpre­ted as having a meaning or scope other than the literal or usual meaning. They may be so interpreted where the scheme appear­ing from the language of the legislature, read in its entirety, points to consistency as requiring the modification of what would be the meaning apart from any context, or apart from the purpose of the legislature as appearing from the words which the legislature has used, or apart from the general law.' See Craies on Statute Law of the same edition at page 177. 8. Bearing in mind the principles above, I proceed to examine the first proposition raised by the counsel for the petitioner. Sections 18 and 19 of the Act are in the following terms : "Sec. 18. Presumption and evidence in respect of instrument of betting and taking part in betting. Any ticket, token, receipt, coupon or counterfoil and such other things found and seized on or about a person apprehended or taken into custody under any pro­vision of this Act or found and seized in and from the possession of a person shall be evidence in the trial of such person for an offence under this Act and unless the contrary is proved, shall be presumed that the person concerned had taken part in betting." "Sec. 19. Presumption and evidence in respect of records of betting. Presumption and evidence in respect of records of betting. Any cloth, writing materials, books, khatas, registers, ledgers, accounts and account books which may indicate to have any relation to betting, if found on or about the person who has been appre­hended or taken into custody under any provision of this Act or found and seized in and from the possession of any person shall be evidence at the trial of such person for an offence under this Act and shall be presumed to be records of betting unless the contrary is proved by the accused person." 9. Sections 18 and 19 of the Act set out the circumstances under which rebuttable presumption of law shall be raised, unless the contrary is proved by the accused from whose custody and possession the articles mentioned therein are seized. In exa­mining the meaning and scope of Sections 18 and 19 of the Act, it is essential to bear in mind the import of the words 'shall be presumed, employed therein. In Ishar Ahmad Khan and others vs. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1052 , the Supreme Court considered in depth the meaning of the words 'shall be presumed, and 'shall be conclusive.' In that case, the validity of Rule 3 of the Citizenship Rules, 1956, framed under the Citi­zenship Act, 1955, was challenged. Rule 3 reads as : "The fact that a citizen of India has obtained on any date a passport from the Government of any other country shall be conclusive proof of his having voluntarily acquired the citizenship of the country before that date." At page 1060, it observed : "The term "presumption' in its largest and most comprehensive signification, may be defined to be an inference, affirmative or disaffirmative of the truth or false-hood of a doubtful fact or proposition drawn by a process of probable reasoning from something proved or taken for granted. Thus, according to Best, when the rules of evidence provide for the raising of a rebuttable or irrebutable presumption, they are merely attempting to assist the judicial mind in the matter of weighing the probative or persuasive force of certain facts proved in relation to other facts presumed or inferred." At Page 1062, it further observed : "It is necessary to analyse what the rule about the rebuttable presumption really means. A fact A which has relevance in the proof of fact B and inherently has some degree of probative or persuasive value in that behalf nay be weighed by a judicial mind after it is proved and before a conclusion is reached as to whether fact B is proved or not. When the law of evidence makes a rule providing for a rebuttable presumption that on proof of act A, fact B shall b; deemed to be proved unless the contrary is est­ablish d, what the rule purports to do is to regulate the judicial process of appreciating evidence and to provide that the said appreciation will draw the inference from the proof of fact A that fact B has also been proved unless the contrary is established. In other words, the rule takes away judicial discre­tion either to attach the due probative value of fact A or not and requires prima facie the due proba­tive value to be attached in the matter of the inference as to the existence of fact B, subject, of course to the said presumption being rebutted by proof to the contrary." (Underlining supplied) 10. In the trial of the petitioner before me for the offence under Section 14 of the Act, to invoke the provision of rebuttal legal presumptions under Sections 18 and 19 of the Act, prosecution has to prove the following : (a) 'Teer' is a betting game or sport, as contemplated by the Act; (b) The articles or things seized and the accompanying facts are inherently relevant, and to any rational mind, they would bear a probative or persuasive value in proof of the facts, viz., those articles or things are 'instruments of batting' and 'records of bettings', as defined in clauses (d) and (e) of Section 2 of the Act, and the petitioner had taken part in betting. 11. Under section 21 of the Act, all offences under the Act are cognizable; and any Police Officer may apprehend any person found betting or having in his possession any 'instrument of betting' or 'records of betting' found on or about a person so apprehended under Section 14 of the Act. It implies that the Police Officer will have authority to apprehend a person if 'Teer' game or sport is a betting, within the mischief of the Act. It implies that the Police Officer will have authority to apprehend a person if 'Teer' game or sport is a betting, within the mischief of the Act. As the Police Officer apprehends a person in the view-that 'Teer' game or sport is a betting, prosecution is to lead evide­nce to establish this fact. Prosecution is also to adduce evide­nce which would lead to the inference that the articles in question are relatable to betting as 'instruments of betting' or 'records of betting'. It must be shown that they inherently relevant and have inherently a probative or persuasive value in prov­ing that they are the 'instruments of betting' or 'records of betting'. If the things or articles are innocuous by themselves, which have no relevancy, probative or persuasive value, no legal pre­sumption under Sections 18 and 19 of the Act can be raised as 'instruments of betting' and 'records of betting'. The legal presumption being an inference to be drawn, it must, to a rational mind, bear a probative or persuasive value and thereby establish the existence of the other facts, that they are 'instruments of betting' or 'records of betting' and that the accused had taken part in betting. The prosecution is not here relieved of its duty to discharge the burden of proof of existence of req­uisite facts from which a rebuttable inference r f the existence of other facts, shall be drawn, on the consideration that the Act intended to suppress the evils of betting as a public policy. 12. In Anil Krishna Kundu vs. State of Assam, Criminal Revision No. 120 of 1976 of this Court, (unreported), Lahiri, J. had occasion to consider this question. Lahiri, J. observed : "..........Therefore, records and instruments of betting must have some nexus or casual connection with betting. ............As such, mere recovery of some tickets, books, tokens, coupons does not bring home a charge or posse­ssion of instrument of betting or records of betting. Nor does it bring into operation the presumption under sections 18 and 19 of "the Act". Only upon proof that some instruments of betting or records of betting were found with the accused, the presumptions under those Sections shall be drawn. Nor does it bring into operation the presumption under sections 18 and 19 of "the Act". Only upon proof that some instruments of betting or records of betting were found with the accused, the presumptions under those Sections shall be drawn. When such a case is established, the" instruments of betting found with and seized from the possession of the person, they shall be evidence and those shall be presumed to be instruments or records of betting and that the person concerned had taken part in betting. Once the prosecution discharges its burden that the articles or things are instruments or records of betting, they shall form a part of the record as evidence and it will not be necessary for the prosecution to formally prove the writ-Sags, contents etc. and the burden shall automatically shift on the accused to establish that those are not the ins­truments or records of betting.'' 13. The learned Judge clarified his earlier observation made in Kaliprasanna Das vs. State of Assam, 1976 ALR 187: "It is true that if the contents of the paragraphs are read in isolation, an impression might be created that production of any innocuous tickets, book etc. is enough to bring into operation the provisions of section 18 of 'the Act'. However, that was not my opinion". 14. In my opinion, Lahiri, J., in that case, has stated corre­ctly the principle of law in regard to legal presumptions to be raised under Sections 18 and 19 of the Act, in the trial of persons for an offence under Section 14 of the Act. With respect, I am entirely in agreement with this view. 15. In the case before me, no evidence has been led by the prosecution to prove that 'Teer' game is a betting, as defined in the Act. P.W.1 and P.W.4, on whose testimony the prosecution case was built, used loosely the words 'Teer' ticket, without describing what 'Teer' ticket, meant by and how they have described the book seized as 'Teer' ticket receipt book. P.W. 4, in the seizure memo, described the book as 'Teer' betting ticket book -'Teer' betting. In the book, at few pages, there are some entries in Carbon copy which might be indicative of the corresponding original pages being torn off. There are some numerical figures also with corresponding entries, such as, -25, 50, and at some pages, only numerical figures. In the book, at few pages, there are some entries in Carbon copy which might be indicative of the corresponding original pages being torn off. There are some numerical figures also with corresponding entries, such as, -25, 50, and at some pages, only numerical figures. I am unable to find any rational relationship between these articles or things seized, and 'Teer' game or sport, as a betting within the mischief of the Act. Evidence in this respect is lacking in the case. Sec­tions 18 and 19 of the Act cannot, in the circumstances of the case, and in the absence of other evidence, be stressed to cover possession of such articles. Innocent persons may be roped in if Sections 18 and 19 of the Act are stressed too much to a breaking point. In this case, the prosecution has failed to prove that the seized articles are 'instruments of betting' and 'records of betting', as defined in clauses (d) and (e) of section 2 of the petitioner had taken part in betting. 16. Coming to the second question, this Court in its re vi­sional jurisdiction does not ordinarily interfere with finding of facts except in special circumstances, where there is a manifest error which leads to miscarriage of justice or where the Courts below overlooked essential part of evidence, by not applying their mind to the evidence, resulting in failure of justice. In the case before me, on the fact of seizure, all the four PWs gave evi­dence. Three of them-P.W. 1, Birendra Chandra Mahanta, P.W.3, Reba Saikia, and P.W. 4, Bhola Nath Bhuyan, are Police personnel, and P.W. 2, Jabed Ali, is a student. According to the testimony of P.W.1, Birendra Chandra Mohanta, while going to Dispur he saw selling of 'Teer' tickets in a Goomti shop on the road side. Shri Bhola Nath Bhuyan, P.W. 4 also accompa­nied him. Though he claimed to have seen sale of tickets, in cross-examination, he stated that he had not seen any tickets in the hands of any of the persons assembled there, who disappeared on their approach. His statement of having seen the sale of tickets carries no weight. He is also not a seizure wit­ness. His evidence on seizure of the articles is therefore, nil. His statement of having seen the sale of tickets carries no weight. He is also not a seizure wit­ness. His evidence on seizure of the articles is therefore, nil. P.W 3, Reba Saikia, Sub-Inspector of Police, testified that though he was a seizure witness he had not actually seen seizure of the materials from the possession of the accused, and he could not say wherefrom the materials were 'recovered'. On that day he entered the shop of the accussed to take betel-nuts, when some C.I.D Officers went to the Goomti shop of the accused and arrested him and subsequently he learnt that the accused sold 'Teer' tickes. He simply signed the seizure memo. Similar is the testimony of P W.2, Jabed Ali, who deposed that on that day he saw some people in front of the shop of the accused and asked the accused as to what had happened. He put signature on a blank sheet of paper as asked by the police. Both these witnesses were not declared hostile by the prosecution On reading the evidence of the PWs as a whole, it is manifestly clear that there is no evidence to support the finding that the articles or materials were seized from the possession of the accused in the manner as deposed to by P.W.4, Bhola Nath Bhuyan, C.I.D. Sub-Inspector. The finding is patently erroneous. It appears that the Court has overlooked the salient feature in the case. This finding of fact cannot as such stand. 17. In conclusion, the prosecution has failed to bring home the charge against the accused petitioner. He is entitled to be acquitted. The conviction and sentence are set aside and he is acquitted of the offence under Section 14 of the Act. The peti­tion is allowed. It is ordered that the seized articles and the cash money be returned to the person from whom they were seized.