Modi Steel v. Manmohanlal Agrawal — 1982 DIGILAW 420 (RAJ)

K.S. Sidhu, J.—The plaintiffs (respondents herein) brought a suit against the defendants (petitioners herein) for recovery of possession of a house on the revetments that the defendants were in occupation of the house as tenants on a rental of Rs 200/- per mensem and that they were liable to be evicted because hey had made material alterations in the building and also because the plaintiffs enquired the premises reasonably and bone fide for their own use and occupation. The plaintiffs also mentioned that the defendants were in arrears of rent to the extent of Rs. 500/- and prayed for recovery of this amount. The suit was valued for purposes of court fee and jurisdiction at (i) Rs. 2400/-(one years rent as per the requirement of section 41 (2) of the Rajasthan Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1961) in respect of the relief of possession based on the cause of action of a suit for eviction by a landlord against his tenant and (ii) Rs. 500/- in respect of the cause of action for recovery of rent. The consolidated plaint praying for the twin relief of possession & recovery of money was instituted in the court of lowest grade (i. e. Munsif) having a pecuniary jurisdiction extending upto a maximum amount of Rs. 5,000/-. 2. During the pendency of the suit, the defendants ran into arrears of rent from April 16, 1976 to December 31, 1979. The plaintiffs sought and obtained from the Munsif an order under Order VI Rule 17 C. P. C. granting leave to the plaintiffs to amend the plaint adding therein an additional ground of eviction, viz., non-payment of rent for a period of more than 6 months, and recovery of additional arrears of rent for the aforementioned period amounting to Rs. 8900/-. The valuation clause in the plaint was also amended in respect of the relief of recovery of money inasmuch as the valuation in that behalf was altered from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 9400/-and aggregate valuation was thus increased to Rs. 2400/- + Rs. 9400, in all Rs. 11800/-. The amended plaint was filed on December 22,1979. 3. 8900/-. The valuation clause in the plaint was also amended in respect of the relief of recovery of money inasmuch as the valuation in that behalf was altered from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 9400/-and aggregate valuation was thus increased to Rs. 2400/- + Rs. 9400, in all Rs. 11800/-. The amended plaint was filed on December 22,1979. 3. On July 7,1980, the defendants filed their written statement in answer to the amended plaint and the Munsif made an order under section 13 (3), Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, provisionally determining the rent from February 1,1976 to July 31, 1980, at the rate of Rs. 200/- per mensem (total Rs. 10800/-). and interest thereon at Rs. 1431/-, in all Rs. 12231/- . The defendants deposited this amount in the court as required by law and thus finished the ground of eviction based on non-payment of arrears of rent for 6 months or more. 4. The plaintiffs obtained leave for the second time to amend the plaint with a view to adding another ground, viz., subletting, for an order of eviction against the defendants. The second amended plaint was filed on August 10,1981. 5. On November 25, 1981, the defendants made an application for leave to amend the written statement so that they could add therein an objection as to the lack of pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif to entertain the amended plaint filed on and court 22, 1979, in which the aggregated value for purposes of jurisdiction December fees had been stated as Rs. 2400/- for eviction and Rs. 9400/- for recovery of money in all Rs. 11,800/-. The defendants filed still another application on July 15, 1981, for summary dismissal of the suit on the ground that it was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court of the Munsif before him it was pending. 6. By his order, dated, July 15, 1982, the learned Munsif dismissed both the applications of the defendants mainly on the ground that the plaintiffs had given up their claim for recovery of money and that they were electing to prosecute only one of the two causes of action, that is, for eviction of the defendants from the premises in suit. Learned Munsif arrived at this conclusion on the strength of the authority of this Court reported as Smt. Uma-Gupta vs. Ramesh Chandra (1). Learned Munsif arrived at this conclusion on the strength of the authority of this Court reported as Smt. Uma-Gupta vs. Ramesh Chandra (1). This is what the court held in the cited case :— "I am, therefore, of the opinion that a suit purely on the ground set forth in section 13 (1) (a) of the Act for eviction is maintainable and it is not necessary also to sue for arrears of rent relating to which the default is alleged to be committed by the tenant. In such a suit it is the duty of the court under Sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act to provisionally determine the amount of rent to be deposited in court or to be paid to the land- lord by the tenant, and if the tenant fails to deposit or pay the amount as aforesaid the landlord will be entitled for an order of eviction. No doubt the plaintiff-tenant will get the arrears of rent without paying the requisite court fee, but it is for the legislature to see." 7. Aggrieved by the order dated, July 15, 1982, passed by the Munsif, the defendants have filed this petition for revision under section 115 C.P.C. for its reversal and for an order directing the trial court to return the amended plaint to the plaintiffs for presentation to the proper court. 8. Mr. Bhandari, learned counsel for the plaintiffs entered a caveat on behalf of the plaintiffs. 9. After hearing both sides, I am of opinion that the learned Munsif has committed no error of jurisdiction in dismissing the defendants applications aforementioned. As already indicated, the plaintiffs have abandoned their suit claim based on the second cause of action for recovery of arrears of rent with the result that the plaint, as laid, now survives only for the first cause of action for eviction. The value for purposes of court fees and jurisdiction for this cause of action is admittedly Rs. 2400/- which is the amount of rent for one year. The learned Munsif is certainly possessed of the pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and decide a suit of the valuation of Rs. 2400/- for the limit of such jurisdiction vesting in him under law extends to Rs. 5000/-. 10. Mr. 2400/- which is the amount of rent for one year. The learned Munsif is certainly possessed of the pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and decide a suit of the valuation of Rs. 2400/- for the limit of such jurisdiction vesting in him under law extends to Rs. 5000/-. 10. Mr. Agarwal, learned counsel for the defendants argued that by amending the plaint on December 22, 1979, and praying therein for a decree for recovery of possession of the demised premise, on the ground of nonpayment of rent, the plaintiffs were able to obtain from the court an order under section 13 (3) of the Act determining the arrears of rent provisionally and directing the defendants to pay such arrears on pain of their defence being struck out. Counsel submitted that but for the prayer for recovery of money the court would not have passed the order, under section 13 (3) and thus compelled the defendants to deposit such a huge amount of arrears as Rs. 12, 231/-. This argument does not hold good in view of the holding in Uma Guptas case (supra) which has been extracted in an earlier part of this judgment. It has been made clear by the court in the cited judgment that in order to sustain a suit for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent as set forth in section 13 (1) (a) of the Act, it is not necessary for the landlord to sue for recovery of arrears of rent as part of the same cause of action. This Court further held that regardless of the fact whether a landlord who sues his tenant for eviction under Sec. 13 (l)(a) sues the tenant for recovery of arrears of rent or not a duty is nonetheless cast on the court under section 13(3) to provisionally determine the amount of rent to be deposited in court or paid to the landlord by the tenant and if the tenant fails to deposit or pay the amount as aforesaid, the landlord will be entitled to have the defence against eviction to be struck out. This being the position of law, it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to sue for recovery of arrears of rent in order to sustain their plea for eviction on the ground of nonpayment of rent under section 13 (l)(a) of the Act. 11. Mr. This being the position of law, it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to sue for recovery of arrears of rent in order to sustain their plea for eviction on the ground of nonpayment of rent under section 13 (l)(a) of the Act. 11. Mr. Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioners, cited Ganga Bux vs. Ayodhya Prasad (2) and contended on the basis of this ruling that whether or not it was necessary for the plaintiffs to sue for recovery of money to sustain their claim for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent under section 13 (1) (a) of the Act, the fact remains that the plaintiffs had amended their plaint and prayed for recovery of Rs. 9400/- and that since the amended plaint is to be treated as the original plaint in the suit, it is not legally permissible for the plaintiffs to abandon the money cause of action and revert to the eviction cause of action alone. 12. I have carefully considered the cited case and find it has no application to the facts of this cause. As already stated, the plaint in the instant case consists of two separate and distinct causes of action each one of which can be independently prosecuted without the aid of the other. That being so, the plaintiff is free to jettison either of these two causes of action at any stage of the suit without in any way affecting the maintainability of the suit based on the other cause of action which he may choose to prosecute. The learned judge who decided Ganga Buxs case (supra) was dealing with a suit involving a single cause of action for recovery of money and since the plaint, as originally laid was for recovery of an amount which was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court concerned, it was held that the plaintiff could not be granted leave by that court to amend the plaint relinquishing a part of his claim so as to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of that court. If the original plaint covered a single cause of action involving a valuation exceeding the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court in which the plaint is instituted, the said court has no jurisdiction, so the ratio of the cited case runs, to grant leave to amend the plaint to bring it within its jurisdiction. If the original plaint covered a single cause of action involving a valuation exceeding the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court in which the plaint is instituted, the said court has no jurisdiction, so the ratio of the cited case runs, to grant leave to amend the plaint to bring it within its jurisdiction. The only course open to such a court is to return the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation to the court of competent jurisdiction. Obviously, this ruling has no bearing on the facts of the present case. 13. Mr. Agarwal laid great stress on the provisions of section 48, Rajas-than Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1961, and argued that since no specific provision is made in the said Act for valuation of such suits as the present one for purposes of jurisdiction, such valuation is necessary the same as the value for purposes of court fee. I do not see how section 48 can help the defendants. 1 have already mentioned that this plaint, as amended on December 22, 1979, involved two separate and distinct causes of action. Each of the cause of action is provided for in the said Act for its value for purposes of court fee. Even assuming that section 48 applies, valuation for purposes of jurisdiction will have to be determined separately for each cause of action. If the plaintiff abandons one of them, the suit has to be valued for purposes of court fee and jurisdiction only with reference to the surviving cause of action. 14. For all these reasons, I do not find any merit in this petition of revision. The same is therefore dismissed in limine.