JUDGMENT R.M. Sahai, J. - In this petition directed against order of Deputy Director of Consolidation apart from the controversy whether a female in possession on the date of vesting over Sir and Khudkasht land, allotted to her in lieu of maintenance in a compromise, acquired bhumidhari rights under section 18 or Asami under section 11 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act of 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the question to be decided is binding effect of decision given by Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India irrespective of it being based on omission to notice certain provisions of the Act. 2. The petitioners are transferees from one Smt. Phoola, wife of Sehti, who it, has been found died in state of jointness in the year 1911. A few months thereafter his only brother also died and when in 1931 Smt. Murtana, mother-in-law of Smt. Phoola died, she filed an application for mutation which was compromised on 8-2-1932 and it was agreed that although predecessor in interest of opposite parties who were member of joint family of Sehti shall be the owners but she being a widow of the family, her maintenance was their responsibility, therefore, it was necessary to get her name mutated in revenue records so that in case of default she could enter into possession and maintain her-self. But she was not given any right of transfer and it was provided that after her death the property shall revert to opposite parties. Unfortunately for opposite parties Smt. Phoola survived till after the date of vesting and on, 6-4-1956 she sold the disputed plots to petitioners giving rise to series of litigation which, however, did not finalise either because suits were withdrawn or proceedings were abated due to enforcement of consolidation. After notification under section 4 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was issued, opposite parties filed objection under section 9A against basic year entry in favour of petitioner which was rejected by the consolidation officer and the order was up-held in appeal. In revision the orders were set aside and it was found that after enforcement of Act Smt. Phoola did not become bhumidhar but only Asami under section 11 of the Act. She, therefore, did not have any transferable right and the sale deed executed by her in favour of petitioner was contrary to the provisions of law. 3. In revision the orders were set aside and it was found that after enforcement of Act Smt. Phoola did not become bhumidhar but only Asami under section 11 of the Act. She, therefore, did not have any transferable right and the sale deed executed by her in favour of petitioner was contrary to the provisions of law. 3. For acquisition of Bhumidhari rights under section 18 of the Act a person had to belong to one of the classes mentioned in it. It does not distinguish between male and female tenure-holder. A female, therefore, holding the land as one of the class of persons mentioned in it would become bhumidhar whether the female was holding the land in that capacity would depend on the nature of right which she had on the date of vesting. If the female was in possession as limited owner, in lieu of maintenance as widow, then it shall have to be seen whether her possession was in capacity of one of the classes mentioned in Section 18 or she had no right or title as a person of that class but was holding land only for the purposes of maintenance or for cultivation. Succession or devolution to a person, mentioned in Section 18, before the date of vesting was governed by personal law. The nature of right therefore, which a female had shall have to be examined in the light of personal law which applies-to her. In Tulsamma v. Sista Reddi (A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944) Mr. Justice Fazal Ali on careful consideration and detailed analysis of various authorities textual and judicial in relation to incidence of a Hindu widows' right to maintenance, found it to be personal obligation of husband and if the husband had property then the right became an equitable charge and any person who succeeded to the property carried it with the legal obligation to maintain the widow, who by virtue of her right became a sort of co-owner in the property of her husband though her co-ownership was of subordinate nature. The authority, therefore, is a sett-leer so far the nature of females right in property held by her in lieu of maintenance is concerned. That the right existed even prior to the Act of 1937 is further clear by following observation in the same decision at page 1957. The authority, therefore, is a sett-leer so far the nature of females right in property held by her in lieu of maintenance is concerned. That the right existed even prior to the Act of 1937 is further clear by following observation in the same decision at page 1957. "this was the result of Hindu Shastric law and that it was not affected by Hindu Women's right to Property Act Right of maintenance of a Hindu widow was recognised even before the Hindu law was amended and rights were conferred on Hindu widows" 4. A female tenure-holder, therefore, holding the land in lieu of maintenance is a co-owner. Her right and possession over land is not permissive or by way of consolation. 5. It was urged by learned counsel for opposite parties that having regard to the terms of the compromise Smt. Phoola could not be considered to be the owner as right of transfer or heritability the two essential ingredients were missing. Inspiration of this in fact was drawn from a Division Bench of this Court in Basudev v. D.D.C. (1970 R.D. 75) but these observations were made in different context. On behalf of female in that case it was urged that as she was intermediary she became Bhumidhar. The Bench did not agree us while conveying the meaning of intermediary and Proprietor it was a held that a person could not be the owner unless the requisites of transfer and inheritance were there. Here rights depend not on whether Smt. Phoola was owner but whether she could be considered to be a Sir or Khudkasht holder on the date of vesting. It has been seen above that under Hindu law a widow or limited owner was always deemed to be the owner in her life time may be of subordinate type because she had no right to transfer and the property after her death did not devolve on her heirs but on the heirs of last male tenant. This authority, therefore, cannot be of any help. 6. This authority, therefore, cannot be of any help. 6. It was then urged that assuming it to be so the principle is not helpful in view of statutory provision contained in Section 11 of the Act which confers rights of an Asami, where Sir or Khudkast has been allotted by the Sir or Khudkast in lieu of maintenance allowance This provisions is in nature of an exception or provision to Section 18, therefore, it has to be construed strictly in favour of the subject whose rights are curtailed by it in Tulsama' case (Supra) it was held, at page 1976. "Thus the nature and extent of the right of the widow to claim maintenance is undoubtedly a pre-existing right and it is wrong to say that such a right comes into existence only if the property is allotted, to the widow in lieu of maintenance and not otherwise." 7. If the right of ownership flows from the Shastric law then its allotment to a widow in a compromise or by deed is of no consequence and she acquired right under section 18 by operation of law. The argument of learned counsel for opposite party that such interpretation shall render Section 11 as abuse cannot be accepted. In Tulsamma's case the Hon'ble Supreme Court while construing sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14 drew a distinction in property acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any preexisting right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property, and otherwise. It was held that if property was held in pre-existing right then the female became absolute owner under sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) was confined to only those cases where rights were granted to female for the first time. On the same parity of reasoning Section 11 has to be confined to those limited cases where Sir and Khudkasht was allotted for the first time by Sir or Khudkasht holder as a grant and not in recognition of pre-existing right. As Smt. Phoola was allotted Sir and Khudkasht land in recognition of her pre-existing right as widow of Sehti she became Bhumidhar on 1st July, 1952. 8. As Smt. Phoola was allotted Sir and Khudkasht land in recognition of her pre-existing right as widow of Sehti she became Bhumidhar on 1st July, 1952. 8. Learned counsel for opposite party relied on Prem Devi v. D.D.C., A.I.R. 1978 239 and Ram Jag Misra v. D.D.C., A.I.R. 1975 Allahabad 151 and urged that two division Benches of this Court have held that a female holding sir and Khudkasht land in lieu of maintenance acquired Asami right u/s 11 only the decision in Ram Jag Misra' case has been over-ruled by Supreme Court in Tussamma's case. It is true that over-ruling was mainly of that part of the judgment which dealt with Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. But the principle evolved in respect of a female in possession in lieu of maintenance clearly militates against the decision given by these division benches whatever doubt could have been there, was removed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vishwa Nath v. Badam Koer, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1329. It may be that Section 11 of the Act might not have been brought to the notice of Hon'ble Court but in B.M. Laxmi v. Malkapur University, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1002 it was observed : "the decision was binding on High Court and the High Court could not ignore it because they thought, that relevant provisions were not brought to the notice of the Court." 9. Reliance was placed by learned counsel on an unreported decision in Ramadhari Shukla v. Pandey, Second Appeal No. 2437 of 1977 decided on 24.9.1981 wherein the above-Court decision was ground that question of applicability of Hindu Succession Act was not raised and the decision given by this Court in Prem Devi's case (supra) holding the provisions of Hindu Succession Act were not applicable remained unaffected. By sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Succession Act it has not been made applicable to tenancy land but its applicability is not ruled out in land other than tenancy land. In Supreme Court decision it was a case of proprietor. A Sir or Khudkasht holder is also a proprietor and not a tenant. By sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Succession Act it has not been made applicable to tenancy land but its applicability is not ruled out in land other than tenancy land. In Supreme Court decision it was a case of proprietor. A Sir or Khudkasht holder is also a proprietor and not a tenant. To such a person the provisions of Succession Act are applicable and, therefore, the Supreme Court appears to have made these observations, it was pleaded by revisioner that mutation was only by way of consolation without any rights in the property which were to go to her collateral's namely, the respondents. This statement was made at the time when neither U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act was passed nor the Hindu Succession Act came into force. At the time when the matter was decided by the Deputy Director of Consolidation both the Acts have been passed which confer absolute proprietary rights on Smt. Badami Koer who is still alive,' The last sentence quoted above that Badami Koer became absolute owner under both the Acts i.e. Z.A. & L.R. Act and Hindu Succession Act cannot be considered to be by way of mere observation. In Ram Adhar's case (supra) it is not clear whether Laxmina Koer was the proprietor on the date of vesting or a tenant. 10. In the result this petition succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is quashed. The parties shall bear their own costs.