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1982 DIGILAW 438 (ALL)

Shivraj Singh v. Devji Mal and Asha Ram Paliwal

1982-03-23

A.N.VERMA, SATISH CHANDRA

body1982
JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, C.J. - The learned single Judge referred to a larger Bench the following questions of law for opinion : - (1) Whether acceptance by the managing committee is necessary before the resignation becomes effective in law under Regulations 29 and 30 of the Regulations framed under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921? (2) Whether even if no acceptance is required under the Regulations mentioned above, what would be the dale on which resignation would become effective when a notice of resignation is given under Regulation 29? (3) Whether the teacher has right to withdraw the resignation before the effective date? 2. The plaintiff-appellant brought his suit for declaration that the resolution of the Managing Committee of the College passed on Oct. 24, 1971 accepting the plaintiff-appellant's resignation from service as a Teacher in the College was void and ineffective and that the plaintiff appellant continued in the service of the college as a teacher. 3. The facts are that the plaintiff on Oct. 16, 1971 submitted his resignation to the Manager of the institution. The Assistant Manager on receipt of the resignation letter accepted it subject to the approval of the Managing Committee. On Oct. 19, 1971 the plaintiff sent a telegram withdrawing his resignation which was followed by a letter dated 21st Oct., 1971 .sent by the plaintiff to all the members of the Managing Committee confirming the telegram dated 19th Oct., 1971. The letter was received by the President of the Managing Committee of the College on Oct. 22, 1971. 4. The Managing Committee met on 24th Oct., 1971 and passed the resolution accepting the plaintiffs resignation. 5. Disputes having arisen, the plaintiff filed the suit, out of which the present second appeal has arisen. 6. The trial Court held that the plaintiff appellant was pressurised by undue influence in giving his resignation which was invalid and could not be validly accepted by the Managing Committee. On these findings the suit was decreed. 7. On appeal the decree was reversed. The appellate Court held that no undue influence was brought about on the plaintiff to submit his resignation and the plaintiff could not in law withdraw his resignation after it once having been submitted. The withdrawal hence was held to be invalid. The suit was dismissed. The plaintiff has come to this Court in Second Appeal. 8. The appellate Court held that no undue influence was brought about on the plaintiff to submit his resignation and the plaintiff could not in law withdraw his resignation after it once having been submitted. The withdrawal hence was held to be invalid. The suit was dismissed. The plaintiff has come to this Court in Second Appeal. 8. Regulations 26, 29 and 30 are material and relevant. Regulation 26 reads : "26. (1) The services of a permanent employee may be terminated by giving him three months notice or three months' pay in lieu thereof, on the ground of the abolition of the post which the employee is holding. The abolition may be due to one of the following reasons : (a) Retrenchment decided upon for reasons of financial stringency. (b) Abolition of a subject. (c) Abolition of section or class. (2) For the purpose of computing the period of notice mentioned in clause (1) or for determining the amount to be paid in lieu thereof the period of summer vacation shall be excluded." Regulations 29 and 30 provide : "29 Any employee may resign by giving a notice or pay in lieu thereof to which he would have been entitled in case of termination of his services by the management : Provided that - (i) no employee shall give notice expiring in the month of January, February or March : (ii) Summer vacation may be included in the period of the notice : (iii) an employee selected for appointment in Government service or in the service of any local body shall not be required to give due notice and shall be required to resign from service in time to join the new appointment if the application for the post had been made through proper channel. (iv) It will be open to the management to waive its claim to the notice. 30. No employee shall be allowed to resign if disciplinary proceedings are pending against him unless specifically permitted by the Managing Committee to do so." 9. The statutory regulations framed under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 control both the management's as well as the teacher's right to terminate or resign from service. Regn. 26 is in positive terms. Under it the management can terminate the service of a permanent employee by giving him three months' notice or three months' pay in lieu thereof. The statutory regulations framed under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 control both the management's as well as the teacher's right to terminate or resign from service. Regn. 26 is in positive terms. Under it the management can terminate the service of a permanent employee by giving him three months' notice or three months' pay in lieu thereof. Giving of the three months' notice or pay in lieu thereof is a condition precedent for the management to exercise its right to terminate the service of an employee. Regn. 29 enables an employee to resign either by giving notice or pay in lieu thereof. The notice or pay refers to the notice or pay to which he would have been entitled in case of termination by the management. In other words, Regn. 29 refers back to Regn. 26 in so far as the period of notice or pay is concerned. Accordingly an employee can resign only by giving a notice of three months or pay in lieu thereof. This shows that an employee has no unfettered right to resign. He can exercise the right of resignation only in accordance with the provisions of Regns. 29 and 30. 10. The proviso to Regn. 29 further restricts the right of an employee to resign by providing that no employee shall give notice expiring in the month of Jan., Feb. or March. The proviso is in positive and Mandatory terms. It suffers from no exception. It gives no discretion to the employee. 11. In our view the main thrust of Regn. 29 is to give to the employee a discretion to give to the management pay in lieu of the period of notice. He is, however, not bound to pay. What is required is that if he (employee) does not give payment as required under Regn. 29, his resignation can be valid only if he gives the requisite notice. In other words, the employee can either give three months pay in lieu of the notice or else his resignation will be valid only if a three months' notice is given. 12. Now what would be the situation in case an employee may not have indicated either of the modes i.e. he neither gives payment of three months pay nor expressly gives three months notice. 12. Now what would be the situation in case an employee may not have indicated either of the modes i.e. he neither gives payment of three months pay nor expressly gives three months notice. In our opinion in such a case where the employee has not exercised his discretion by not actually paying the three months pay or giving the 3 months notice of resignation as required by Regn. 29 read with Regn. 26, the resignation cannot be termed as a valid resignation before the expiry of three months from the date of lodging of the resignation letter itself. The resignation would be deemed to be ineffective before the expiry of three months from the date on which the resignation was lodged with the management. 13. If the letter of resignation in any manner indicates that the employee wishes to be exempted from the period of notice without paying the pay in lieu thereof, the resignation letter would be invalid and void. In order to treat it as a valid resignation it would be deemed that he proposes to give the statutory three months notice from the day when the resignation letter itself is lodged with the management. Thus the resignation would be deemed effective in law on the expiry of the period, of the three months. 14. In the present case the resignation letter was lodged with the management on Oct. 16, 1971. It would become effective on the expiry of three months' period of notice, namely, on Jan. 16, 1972. Resignation being effective in the month of January attracts the first proviso to regn. 29. Under it no employee shall give notice expiring in the month of Jan., Feb. or Mar. In view of this proviso as the notice deemed to have been given by the plaintiff appellant by his resignation letter dated Oct. 16, 1971 will be invalid since it expired in the month of Jan., 1972. The resignation was hence ab initio void and could not rupture the relationship between the parties. In this view the resolution passed on Oct. 24, 1971, by the Managing Committee lost its utility and could have no legal effect. 15. Since the resignation itself remained a dead letter, the question whether a resignation by a teacher requires acceptance by the Managing Committee before it becomes effective in law is merely an academic one on the facts of the present case. 24, 1971, by the Managing Committee lost its utility and could have no legal effect. 15. Since the resignation itself remained a dead letter, the question whether a resignation by a teacher requires acceptance by the Managing Committee before it becomes effective in law is merely an academic one on the facts of the present case. The other questions referred to us are equally immaterial. 16. Our attention was invited to Cl. (iv) to Regn. 29, which says that it would be open to the management to waive its claim to the notice. This clause will apply where the management can possibly waive a claim. It can do so by expressly saying or permitting the employee to resign without giving notice. But Cl. (iv) cannot override cl. (i) to Regn. 29, which prohibits the giving of notice expiring in the month of Jan., Feb. or March. If an employee is prohibited from giving notice expiring in these three months, it cannot be said that the management can waive its claim to any such notice. The question of waiver of notice can arise where an employer has a right to receive any particular kind of notice. On the facts of present case there was no question of attracting or applying of the provisions of Clause (iv) aforesaid. 17. We. therefore, return the reference unanswered along with this opinion. The papers may be placed before the learned single Judge for disposal of the appeal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above.