JUDGMENT : N.H. Bhatt, J. This is a Revision Application brought to this Court by the original plaintiffs of the Special Civil Suit no. 80 of 1977 pending in the Court of the Civil Judge (S. D.) at Jamnagar who was pleased to reject their application Ex. 25 given for the amendment of the plaint. 2. The plaintiffs had filed the aforesaid suit in June 1977 for realising Rs. 30,000/- being the amount of earnest money given by the plaintiffs to the defendant in a contract of sale dated 21-5-1975. The defendant had on that day entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land with some structures on some part thereof for the sum of Rs. 1,80,000/-. As per the agreement the plaintiffs were to take the sale deed from the defendant by 20th November, 1974. It was the say of the plaintiffs that though they were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract, the performance could not be had because of the intervention of the Urban Land Ceiling Act and because of the permission to sell having been not obtained by the plaintiffs. Ultimately the plaintiffs gave notice to the defendant on 5-11-76 terminating the contract and calling upon the defendant to return the amount of Rs. 39,000/-. In paragraph 5 of the plaint, it is the say of the plaintiffs that the defendant had also agreed to return this money but, in fact, did not pay anything towards that amount and hence they filed the suit for realising Rs. 30,000/- with 12% running interest from the date of the suit till realisation. 3. The defendant filed the written statement and complained that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and despite the time being extended upto 30th June 1975, the plaintiffs could not make provision for the moneys; that in the meantime the defendant bad sold some plots to the plaintiff no. 3 and others as per the say of the plaintiffs and that it was the plaintiffs who could not arrange for the money and, therefore, the contract could not be performed. 3 and others as per the say of the plaintiffs and that it was the plaintiffs who could not arrange for the money and, therefore, the contract could not be performed. It was alleged that the Urban Land Ceiling Act came into force only in the year 1976 but the contract had come to an end because of the inability of the plaintiffs to make provision for the remainder of the consideration even by 30th June, 1975, or soon thereafter. The defendant also admitted that the contract stood terminated; but, according to the defendant, he was not liable to return the amount of consideration which stood forfeited to the defendant and that the plaintiffs were liable to compensate the defendant for the loss occasioned to him. In other words, the suit was hotly contested. 4. Thereafter the application for amendment Ex. 25 came to be given by the plaintiffs on 14-7-81, (four years after institution) seeking the amendment of the plaint so as to permit the plaintiffs to get a decree for specific performance of the original contract. The learned trial Judge by his impugned order held, inter alia, as follows :- "Now the price of the land has risen and the claim of specific performance of contract is barred by law of limitation, as limitation to file the suit for specific performance of contract is three years and that time has already been over. Both the parties have believed till filing of the amendment application that contract is terminated and defendant has acted upon that bona fide belief and has sold some land after termination of contract; so defendant will be put in gross loss if amendment is allowed and the nature of the suit also will be changed. Though the Court has wide power to amend the plaint under Order 6, Rule 17, C.P'.Code, but.. ... ... ... ... as decided by ... ... amendment taking away right accrued to a party by lapse of time cannot be allowed .... ... ... ... There is no force in the argument of the learned plaintiffs' Advocate Mr. Badiyani that character of the suit is not changed and claim for specific performance is not time-barred. ... ... ... ... as decided by ... ... amendment taking away right accrued to a party by lapse of time cannot be allowed .... ... ... ... There is no force in the argument of the learned plaintiffs' Advocate Mr. Badiyani that character of the suit is not changed and claim for specific performance is not time-barred. When plaintiff himself has given notice Mark 412 and terminated contract in the year 1976 and deliberately has chosen to file the suit only for recovery of earnest money, if amendment is allowed, definitely the character of this suit will be changed and the claim for specific performance is time-barred... ... ...... 5. Being aggrieved by the said rejection of their application Ex. 25, the original plaintiffs have invoked this High Court's revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. From what has been stated by me above and from what has been found by the learned trial Judge, on the facts which are admitted or not controverted, it is clear that the plaintiffs as the basis of their suit had the termination or rescission of contract as a fail accompli. Had they not treated the contract as put an end to as beck as in 1976 as per the notice Mark 4/2, they would not have filed the suit for return of the earnest money. The learned trial Judge, therefore, appears to be right in his say that the defendant on that assumption sold thereafter some parcels of land and has materially altered his position and if the plaint is allowed to be so amended, it would work great prejudice on him. Not only that, but it would create complications in respect of those third parties who have figured on the scene on the assumption that the defendant had a right to transfer those parcels of land. Mr. Shah, the learned Advocate for the plaintiffs, was not right in submitting that those purchasers can be suitably dealt with by being made parties to the suit and compensated in terms of money. In that situation, they would be innocent sufferers. 6. Mr. Shah submitted that the amendment can be allowed if the amendment sought for, if it was there originally, could not have been objected to as the part of the initial plaint. No such broad proposition of law can be canvassed. In that situation, they would be innocent sufferers. 6. Mr. Shah submitted that the amendment can be allowed if the amendment sought for, if it was there originally, could not have been objected to as the part of the initial plaint. No such broad proposition of law can be canvassed. Each case will present its own peculiar situation which is to be dealt with individually. 7. Mr. Shah also was not right when he submitted that the defendant would not suffer any irreparable hardship. If the suit is now ex post facto treated as the suit for specific performance of the contract of sale of property, the defendant will be highly prejudiced because of being called upon to answer those people who have purchased various parcels from him by paying different prices. If the decree comes to be granted, all the colossal cost and hardship the defendant would be put to is a matter of patent inference. 8. In this view of the matter, I hold that the learned trial Judge was eminently right in refusing to exercise discretion in favour of the plaintiffs and grant them amendment at a time when the prayer now sought for was obviously time-barred, with the intervening period having created equities in favour of the defendant and many innocent outsiders. 9. The result is that the Revision Application fails. Rule stands discharged with costs. Interim stay granted stands vacated. Application dismissed.