JUDGMENT 1. This revision petition is directed against the order dated September 21, 1981 passed by learned Additional District Judge, No.1, Hanumangarh, whereby the petitioner's appeal against the order dated December 4, 1980 of the learned Additional Civil Judge, Hanumangarh was dismissed. 2. The learned Additional Civil Judge, Hanumangarh by his order dated December 4, 1980 struck off the defence of the petitioner on the ground that the rent for the month commencing from jeth (first) Sudil 1 of S.Y. 2037 to jeth(Second) Budi 15(Punam) of S.Y. 2037 which became payable on the 15th day of the succeeding month namely: on jeth Sudi 14 of S.Y 2037 corresponding to June 27 1980 was paid to the respondent on June 29, 1980 i.e. two days late. 3. In a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment, the learned trial court determined the provisional rent on May 9, 1980 and ordered that the provisional rent together with interest thereon be either paid or deposited before the next date i.e. July 8, 1980. Before the next date, one month's rent had become due as stated above, so an application was filed by the plaintiff on July 16, 1980 for striking off the defence of the petitioner. The learned trial court after hearing the arguments, on this application, allowed the same and struck off the defence of the petitioner. The reason assigned by the learned Additional Civil judge is that the defendant- petitioner opted for payment of rent to the party instead of depositing the rent in court. so the defendant-petitioner cannot say that the delay was caused in payment of rent on account of vacation of the court. It was stated by the learned Additional Civil Judge that the defendant-petitioner did not move any application for condonation of delay. It was further recorded by the learned Additional Civil judge that the defendant does not want to submit an application for condo- nation of delay as it has been urged on his behalf that there is no need for condonation of delay. Aggrieved against the order of the learned Additional Civil Judge, the defendant went in appeal Before the appellate Court, an application was moved on September 7, 1981 for condonation of delay. Aggrieved against the order of the learned Additional Civil Judge, the defendant went in appeal Before the appellate Court, an application was moved on September 7, 1981 for condonation of delay. The learned appellate Court declined to condone the delay on the ground that no affidavit has been filed along with the application and no ground has been given by the defendant for condonation of delay. The learned appellate court affirmed the view taken by the learned Additional Civil Judge that when the defendant has opted to make payment to the plaintiff, it was his duty to make the payment within 15 days. 4. It is-satisfied with the order of the learned Additional District judge, the defendant has preferred this revision petition. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that this revision petition must succeed. On behalf of the plaint 1ff.respondent, Mr. Bhandari, learned counsel for the respondent contended that though there is a discretion vested in the court to extend the time upto 15 days under sub-section(4) of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act'), but the discretion has to be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily. Both the courts below have exercised the discretion most judicially as the defendant-petitioner did not come forward with any cause whatsoever. So both the courts below were right in refusing to condone two days' delay caused by the petitioner in making payment of rent. He urged that in the trial court, no application for condonation of delay was moved and even in the first appellate court, the application was not accompanied with any affidavit and this could not constitute any ground that the rent could be deposited on the opening of the Court and so, on that basis, two days' delay caused in making payment of rent deserves to be condoned. 6. For appreciation of the controversy, it would be proper to reproduce Sec. 13(4) of the Act, which reads as under:- "Sec. 13 Eviction of tenants- 1. ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ... 2. ...... ...... ... ... ... ... ... 3. .... .... .... ... ... ... ... ... 4. 6. For appreciation of the controversy, it would be proper to reproduce Sec. 13(4) of the Act, which reads as under:- "Sec. 13 Eviction of tenants- 1. ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ... 2. ...... ...... ... ... ... ... ... 3. .... .... .... ... ... ... ... ... 4. The tenant shall deposit in court or pay to the land-lord the amount determined by the 'court under sub-section(3) within fifteen days from the date of such determination, or within such further time, not exceeding 'three months, as may be extended by the court. The tenant shall also continue to deposit in 'court or pay to the landlord, month by month the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which determination has been made, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month or within such further time, not exceeding fifteen days' as may be extended by the court, at the monthly rate at which the rent was determined by the court under sub-section (3).'' 7. A bare perusal of sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act would show that the Court has ample power to extend the period upto fifteen days and beyond fifteen days time cannot be extended. But upto fifteen days, the court has full powers to extend the time. The time can be extended by the court taking an over all view of the facts and circumstances placed by the defendant before the court. It is true that under sub-sec.(4) of Section 13 of the Act, the tenant is required to make payment of rent mouth by month by the 15th day of each succeeding month. He can make payment to the landlord and he has another option that he may deposit the amount of rent in the court. The tenant has made the payment to the counsel of the landlord. The court opened on,June 30, 1980. When the counsel for the landlord accepted the amount of rent on,June 29, 1980, there did not remain any need to deposit the rent in the court and payment was made by him to the counsel bona fide. In my opinion, the circumstances, in which the payment was made, were sufficient to extend two days delay caused in making the payment of rent. Instead of making payment of rent, had he deposited the rent in court on the opening day, it would have been within time. In my opinion, the circumstances, in which the payment was made, were sufficient to extend two days delay caused in making the payment of rent. Instead of making payment of rent, had he deposited the rent in court on the opening day, it would have been within time. When the counsel for the plaintiff agreed to accept the rent, the same was paid to him and in such a situation, the courts below ought to have extended the time of two days. Section 13(4) of the Act had come up for construction by this Court on several occasions and it has been observed by this Court that the provision contained in sub-sec.(4) of Section 13 of the Act being a beneficial provision, should be liberally construed in favour of the tenant. For any reason, if payment could be made by the 15th day of each succeeding month, a power has been conferred on the court to extend the period upto 15 days and this power should be liberally exercised. It is significant to note that sub-sec.(4) of Section 13 of the Act does not lay down that the time can be extended only when sufficient cause is shown. Generally, in such provisions, the legislature introduces the expression 'sufficient cause'. But there is a significant omission of such an expression in sub-sec.(4) and that gives its clearly the legislative intent. The legislative intent appears to be that power of extension should vest in the court to be exercised liberally. It may be stated that I do not mean to express that the tenants may take it to be their right that they may pay or deposit the amount of rent beyond the 15th day of each succeeding month at their sweet will within 15 days upto which the power of extension is vested in the court. But the tenant on account of forgetfulness or for any other reasons may not be able to comply with the provision contained in sub-sec.(4) of Section 13 of the Act, in that situation, the court has power to extend the time upto fifteen days. How and in what manner the provision has been construed, for that, reference may be made to the decisions of this court in Lalchand v. Santram (1970 R.L.W. 119) , Jagatnath v. Jodharam (1980 R.L.W. 42) and Ramkishore v. Roopesh Kumar (1982 R.L.W. 176 : 1982 RLR 283 ) . 8. How and in what manner the provision has been construed, for that, reference may be made to the decisions of this court in Lalchand v. Santram (1970 R.L.W. 119) , Jagatnath v. Jodharam (1980 R.L.W. 42) and Ramkishore v. Roopesh Kumar (1982 R.L.W. 176 : 1982 RLR 283 ) . 8. In Lalchand's case Supra it was observed as under:- "The power of the Court to extend the time under the aforesaid provision is restricted only to the extent that the Court cannot allow extension for a period exceeding 15 days. beyond the period of 15 days from the date of expiry of the month, within that limit and subject to the aforesaid condition, the Court has complete discretion in the matter of extension of time for depositing or making payment of monthly rent during the pendency of the suit." 9. In jagannath's case supra, it was observed as under:- "When the legislature has allowed discretion to court to allow maximum 3 months time under section 13 (4) of the Act for depositing the amount of arrears of rent, the court should not be conservative and strict, by depriving tenant of this benefit for doing social justice. Unless in a given case, exceptional reasons warrant it, invariably and generally the Court should allow maximum time by extending it on the slightest bonafide ground." 10. In Ramkishore's case supra it was observed as under : "The power to extend 15 days time is given for the benefit of a tenant who on account of unavoidable reasons may seek extension upto 15 days from a court. Such beneficial provision should always be construed in favour of the defendant-tenant, as this provision is beneficial legislation for a tenant. It cannot be disputed that the defendant-tenant was entitled to deposit the rent on the opening (sic) day of the courts i.e. on 27.6 77. If he was unable to deposit the same on account of illness then in my view the court was entitled to grant further 15 days time from that day in case the court was satisfied about the ground of illness. The power to extend 15 days time is contained in sub-sec. (4) of Section 13 of tho Act and this should be counted as 15 days from the opening day of the court and not from 15th June, 1977 as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner." 11. The power to extend 15 days time is contained in sub-sec. (4) of Section 13 of tho Act and this should be counted as 15 days from the opening day of the court and not from 15th June, 1977 as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner." 11. In the above view of the matter, I am of the opinion, this revision petition deserves to be allowed. 12. Accordingly, the revision petition is allowed and two days' delay is condoned. Consequently, the impugned orders of the courts-below are set side. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs. *******