JUDGMENT R.B. Lal J. - Jamil Ahmad has filed this appeal against the order and judgment dated 27-1-81 passed by Sri S. K. Misra Additional Special Judge, Azamgarh, convicting him of offences under S. 161 I. P. C. and S. 5(1) (d) read with S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (briefly the Act) and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and pay a fine of Rs. 595.35p. under the first count and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year under the second count. Both the substantive sentence of imprisonment to run concurrently. 2. Jamil Ahmad was a Junior Engineer in the Employ of the U. P. State Electricity Board (briefly the Board) and was posted as Line Inspector of Mahmudabad district Azamgarh. He was under the control and subordination of the Assistant Engineer, Electricity Distribution Division Mau. Village Khairabad was within the jurisdiction of this Distribution Division. As a Line Inspector, it was the duty of the appellant to draw electricity lines and give connections for new power connections. 3. Dina Nath Jaiswal complainant (PW 1) had applied for grant of a new three horse-power connection for industrial purposes to run power-loom in his village Khairabad. This connection was sanctioned. The Assistant Engineer of the Electricity Distribution Division, Mau, informed, the appellant that connection had been sanctioned and all the formalities had been completed and power connection should be given to the complainant. The complainant also met the appellant and apprised him of this position and requested him to give power connection, but the latter demanded a sum of Rs. 200/- as illegal gratification from the complainant for giving the power connection. The work order issued from the office of the Electricity Distribution Division was also handed over to the appellant of 10-8-77 authorising him to give the power connections to the complainant, still the appellant told the complainant that he would not give the connection unless he (complainant) paid him Rs. 200/- as illegal gratification. The appellant told the complainant that in case he was not available at Mahmudabad on 17-8-77 he would be available in Mau Electricity Colony on 18-8-77 and he (Complainant) should bring money there. When the complainant felt that the appellant would not give him connection without payment of illegal gratification, he (complainant) made an application dated 16-8-77 to the District Magistrate, Azamagarh, complaining of the conduct of the appellant. When the complainant felt that the appellant would not give him connection without payment of illegal gratification, he (complainant) made an application dated 16-8-77 to the District Magistrate, Azamagarh, complaining of the conduct of the appellant. The application was presented before the District Magistrate at Azamgarh on 17-8-77 and that very day the District Magistrate directed Shri Surendra Nath Sinha, Inspector Vigilance (PW-2), to lay a trap for the appellant. 4. On 17-8-77 Shri Sinha recorded the statement of the complainant at Azamgarh and thereafter, he along with the complainant and some other members of the Vigilance Department went to Mahmudabad Gohana. There he learnt that the appellant had gone to Mau and would be available at Mau on 18-8-77. The party stayed at Mahmudabad Gohana for the night. Next day at about 8 a.m. Shri Sinha called two public witnesses from the roadways bus-stand and Surya Nath Misra and Shyam Sundar were brought to him. The complainant produced G. C. notes worth Rs. 200/- before Shri Sinha and the latter noted down their numbers and affixed his initials on them and also treated them with phenolphthalein power and handed them back to the complainant with the direction that these notes may be handed over to the appellant if demanded. The hand wash of the complainant, which turned pink, was placed in a sealed bottle and a fard was prepared. Thereafter the party including the two public witnesses, came to Mau Hydel colony at about 10-15 a.m. At that time the appellant was seen going inside the office of the Junior Engineer (Stores). Shri Sinha asked the complainant to go and meet the appellant and talk about the giving of power connection. He himself stood by the side of the northern Jungle of the office wherefrom he could see and hear what transpired between the appellant and the complainant. The complainant went inside the office and met the appellant. The appellant asked the complainant if he had brought the money and also told him that he would not give the connection till the amount was paid. The complainant paid the treated G.C. notes worth Rs. 200/- to the appellant who kept them in the frong right pocket of his pant. The appellant asked the complainant if he had brought the money and also told him that he would not give the connection till the amount was paid. The complainant paid the treated G.C. notes worth Rs. 200/- to the appellant who kept them in the frong right pocket of his pant. On hearing and seeing all this, Shri Sinha and his companions went inside the office and Shri Sinha disclosed his identity and asked the appellant if he had accepted illegal gratification. The appellant became nervous and did not give any reply. On search the treated G.C. Notes were found in the front right pocket of the pant of the appellant. These G.C. notes bore the initials of Shri Sinha and their numbers also tallied with numbers noted by him. From the back right pocket of the pant a sum of Rs. 595.35p. were recovered. The hand and the front right pocket of the pant of the appellant were washed separately in sodium carbonate solution and both the washes turned pink. Those washes were sealed in separate bottles. The pant of the appellant was also taken into possession by Sri Sinha and made into a sealed bundle. The recovered G.C. notes were also sealed in two separate bundles. The usual recovery memos were also prepared. Shri Sinha took the appellant and the bundles of the recovered articles to police station, Mau where he lodged a report at 3.15 p.m. The investigation of this case was done by Shri Haribans Singh, Inspector Vigilance, Gorakhpur (PW.9) He also sent the three sealed bottles of hand wash to the Chemical Examiner. The Chemical examiner reported that each pink liquid contained a mixture of phenolphthalein and sodium carbonate. The Investigating Officer applies to the Board for grant of sanction for the prosecution of the appellant. The Board accorded the necessary sanction and thereafter charge-sheet was submitted in this case. 5. The accused admitted that he was a Junior Engineer in the employ of the Board and was working as a line Inspector in the Electrical Division, Mau. He denied knowledge of the fact that a power connection was sanctioned to the complainant and also of the fact that he had demanded any illegal gratification from the complainant for giving the power connection. He denied receipt of the work order. He denied knowledge of the fact that a power connection was sanctioned to the complainant and also of the fact that he had demanded any illegal gratification from the complainant for giving the power connection. He denied receipt of the work order. He contended that he was called from Mau colony to the police station and falsely implicated in this case. He did not adduce any evidence in defence. 6. The learned Additional Special Judge found the prosecution evidence worthy of reliance and he, therefore, convicted and sentenced the appellant. Hence this appeal. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant assailed the sanction for prosecution (Ex. Ka. 19) granted by the Board and he urged that the Chief Engineer who was the authority competent to remove the appellant from service, alone could grant sanction for prosecution. The prosecution of the appellant in the absence of a valid sanction was vitiated and the conviction was not sustainable. The sanction Ex. Ka. 19 was not assailed before the trial court on any ground and from the record it was not clear why the Board had accorded sanction instead of the Chief Engineer, and, therefore, I thought it fit to summon the Secretary of the Board to point out the relevant provision. 8. Sri Kailash Behari Mathur, Secretary of the Board appeared before me on 21-12-81 and his statement was recorded. He stated that the appellant was appointed as a Junior Engineer by Shri Som Gupta, Chief Engineer (Hydel) of the Board. He referred to the U. P. State Electricity Board subordinate Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Service Regulations 1972 (briefly the 1972 Regulations) and the U. P. State Electricity Board (Officers and Servants) (Conditions of Service) Regulations 1975 (briefly the 1975 Regulations) and specially referred to cl. 31 of the 1972 Regulations and Cl. 1-A of the 1975 Regulations. He also stated that in Civil Misc. Writ petn. No.7055 of 1974 Abdul Shakoor Hashmi v. U. P. State Electricity Board decided on 31-1-1977, a division Bench of this Court had ruled that the Board was not competent to confer powers of appointment and punishment of its employees on subordinate authorities different from the Board itself. The Board had preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court against that decision but the decision was in force in the year 1978 when the sanction was granted by the Board for prosecution of the appellant. The Board had preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court against that decision but the decision was in force in the year 1978 when the sanction was granted by the Board for prosecution of the appellant. He pointed out/ that the Supreme Court had reversed the above view of the Division Bench of this Court in the decision U.P. State Electricity Board v. Abdul Shakoor Hashmi. ( AIR 1981 SC 1708 ). For all these reasons the Board had accorded sanction for prosecution of the appellant. 9. Copies of the two judgments and the 1972 Regulations and the 1975 Regulations, mentioned in the statement of Shri Kailash Behari Mathur, along with the copies of the relevant Notifications concerning these Regulations, were filed by Shri S. C. Budhwar, Standing Counsel for the Board. In this appeal and copies thereof were also supplied to the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned A. G. A. 10. Shri S. C. Budhwar sought my permission to make his submissions on the question of validity of the sanction as the decision on this point could have a reaching consequences and implications for the Board. With the consent of the learned counsel for the appellant, Shri Budhwar was allowed to address arguments on this aspect of the case. Thereafter, Shri C. S. Saran, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri S. P. Gupta, Senior Advocate made their submissions on the question of the validity of the sanction in the light of the statement of Shri K. B. Mathur, Secretary and the arguments advanced by Shri Budhwar. 11. S. 15 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 empowers the Board to make appointment of its officers and employees to carry out its functions. The section reads thus : "The Board may appoint a Secretary and such other officers and employees as may be required to enable the Board to carry out its functions under the Act Provided that the appointment of the Secretary shall be subject to the approval of the State Government." 12. S. 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 empowers the Board to make regulations in regard to matters enumerated therein Cl. (k) of this section runs as under "(k) Any other matter arising Out of the Board's functions under this Act for which it is necessary or expedient to make Regulations." 13. S. 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 empowers the Board to make regulations in regard to matters enumerated therein Cl. (k) of this section runs as under "(k) Any other matter arising Out of the Board's functions under this Act for which it is necessary or expedient to make Regulations." 13. In the decision U. P. State Electricity Board v. Abdul Sakoor Hashmi, AIR 1981 SC 1708 (supra), their Lordships reversed the finding of the Division Bench that the Board was not competent to confer power of appointment and punishment in regard to different categories of employees on its various officers, and held that the residuary provision contained in S. 79 (k) empowered the Board to make Regulations in regard to its functions. It is undoubtedly a clear function of the Board under S. 15 to make appointments of its officers and employees and the power of appointment by necessary implication carries with it the power also to take disciplinary action or to terminate employment. Therefore the Board could under S. 79 (k) make regulations on such matters as well. The pragmatics of the situation also reinforce this view. It would be impossible for the Board, who has over a lakh of employees under it, to take disciplinary action against every employee by itself. 14. The 1972 Regulations deal with the subject of appointment of the member of the Subordinate Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Service (briefly the Service) and lay down, inter-alia, the qualifications and the procedure for selection of Apprentice Supervisors who on completion of training, are to be appointed as Junior Engineers. Cl. 19 of these regulations lays down that "the Appointing Authority of the Member of the Service shall be the Chief Engineer." CL 31 of these Regulations contains relaxation and runs as under : - "31. Relaxation - (1) Nothing in these regulations shall be construed to limit or abridge the power of the Board to deal with the case of any person or class of persons governed by these regulations in such manner as may appear to the Board to be just and equitable. Provided that, where any of the foregoing regulations is applicable to the case of any person or class of persons, the case shall not be dealt with in a manner less favourable to him or to that class than that provided by that regulations. Provided that, where any of the foregoing regulations is applicable to the case of any person or class of persons, the case shall not be dealt with in a manner less favourable to him or to that class than that provided by that regulations. (2) When in the opinion of the Board it appears necessary to do so, the Board may make any appointment or appointments to m the Service in relaxation of these Regulations and in the case of any such appointment which is not in strict accordance with these Regulations, the Board shall be deemed to have made the appointment in relaxation of these regulations." 15. Subject of the 1975 Regulations is clear from its title and Cl. 1-A of these, Regulations indicates the authority who can award punishment of dismissal, removal and reduction in rank. This clause is as under : - "1-A. The Authority who is empowered by or under any of the Boards Regulations for the time being in force to appoint an officer or servant of the Board shall be the competent authority to dismiss, remove, reduce in rank or compulsorily retire such M officer or servant." 16. Now the position is that under section 15 of the Electricity (Supply) Act 1948, the Board is the Appointing Authority of all its officers and servants (including Junior Engineers) and is also by implication the authority competent to remove them from their office; but under the 1972 and 1975 Regulations, the Chief Engineer is the authority competent to appoint as well as competent to remove the Members of the Service from their office. 17. Here it may also be pointed out that the appellant was appointed as Member of the Service by the Chief Engineer and, therefore, in view of cl. 1-A of 1975 Regulations, the Chief Engineer is an authority competent to remove him from his office. For purpose of S. 6(1 )(c) of the Act, the Chl)(c) of the Act, the Chief Engineer could grant sanction for prosecution of the appellant. Now the question arises whether during the continuance of the 1972 and 1975 Regulations, the Board could grant sanction for the prosecution of the appellant or it was the Chief Engineer along who could have granted that sanction. 18. It will be convenient to consider the legal nature and effect of the Regulations at this stage. Now the question arises whether during the continuance of the 1972 and 1975 Regulations, the Board could grant sanction for the prosecution of the appellant or it was the Chief Engineer along who could have granted that sanction. 18. It will be convenient to consider the legal nature and effect of the Regulations at this stage. The Board is a Statutory Body created under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Under this Act certain Executive and Legislative powers have been conferred on the Board. Section 79 of this Act confers limited legislative powers on the Board and in exercise of the same the Board can make regulations. These regulations, if validly made,have the force and effect of the Act passed by competent Legislature,. The Regulations bind the Board as well as the public,; and in exercise of its executive power the Board is to act within the four comers of the Regulations where ever they are applicable. This character of the Regulations made by Statutory or public Bodies under the powers conferred on them by statute, has been decided by the Supreme Court in the decision Sukhadeo Singh v. Bhagat Ram, AIR 1975 SC 1331 . 19. The contention of Shri S.P. Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant, is that the power of appointment or removal from service of a Member of Service to be exercised by Chief Engineer under the 1972 and 1975 Regulations, is not a delegated power derived from the Board. By making the Regulations the Board did not merely delegate its powers of appointment and removal of the staff of the rank of Junior Engineer to the Chief Engineer, but conferred full authority on the Chief Engineer. The result of this conferment of authority was that the Chief Engineer became a total substitute for the Board in regard to these powers. In support of this proposition the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision A. Sanjeevi Naidu v. State of Madras, AIR 1970 SC 1102 . The learned counsel has also urged that there is nothing in section 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, to indicate.that the powers to be conferred by the Board on a subordinate officer, were to be by way of delegation. 20. The learned counsel has also urged that there is nothing in section 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, to indicate.that the powers to be conferred by the Board on a subordinate officer, were to be by way of delegation. 20. The submission of Shri S. C. Budhwar, learned counsel for the Board, on the other hand, is that under section 15 of the Electricity (Supply) Act 1948, the Board is the repository of power of appointment and removal of its staff and it is for the sake of convenient functioning that this power in respect of certain classes of the staff, has been given to certain officers subordinate to the Board by making regulations and this is nothing but a delegation of these powers by the Board to authorities subordinate to it. The Act of delegation does not denude the Board of those powers and the Board can exercise those powers notwithstanding the delegation. Only where the delegate has exhausted the power in a particular case by virtue of the authority vested in him, the principal i.e. the delegator may not exercise that power. The learned counsel has cited the decisions in Gwalior Rayon Mills v. Asst. Commr., Sales Tax, AIR 1974 SC 1660 and Karnail Singh v. State of Punjab 1975 (1) SLR 105 : (1975 Lab IC 646) (FB) (Punj & Har) to indicate the nature of delegation and its incidents. 21. In Gwalior Rayon Mills' case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court explained the concept of delegation in these words (at p. 1673) : "Delegation is not the complete handing over or transference of a power from one person or body of persons to another. Delegation may be defined as the entrusting, by a person or body of persons, of the exercise of a power residing in that person or body of persons, to another person or body of persons, with complete power of revocation or amendment remaining in the grantor or delegator. It is important to grasp the implications of this, for much confusion of thought has unfortunately resulted from assuming that delegation involves, or may involve, the complete abdication or abrogation of a power. This is precluded by the definition. Delegation often involves the granting of discretionary authority to another, but such authority is purely derivative. The ultimate power always remains in the delegator and is never renounced." 22. This is precluded by the definition. Delegation often involves the granting of discretionary authority to another, but such authority is purely derivative. The ultimate power always remains in the delegator and is never renounced." 22. In Karnail Singh's case (1975 Lab IC 1331) the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court referred to the above observations of the Supreme Court and further observed "It is well known that the delegation of the principal's authority to his agent does not by itself result in the abdication of the principal's power in favour of the agent. Even after a principal delegates his power to an agent., he can nevertheless exercise the same himself unless the agent has already exhausted the power by virtue of the authority vested in him by the principal". The Full Bench further observed "Similarly an authority competent to appoint a person (which is the meaning give to the expression 'appointing authority') does not cease to be the appointing authority by merely authorising a lower officer to make the appointment." 23. In the instant case, the statute namely the Electricity (Supply) Act 1948 conferred power of appointment of its officers and employees on the Board and it also conferred power on the Board to make Regulations in respect of certain matters including matters arising out of its functions under that Act, for which it may be necessary and expedient to make Regulations. Since a large staff comprising of various grades of officers and employees, is in the employ of the Board, it became necessary for the Board to hand over its powers of appointment and removal of certain classes of staff to officers subordinate to it, for the sake of convenience and efficient and smooth working. This kind of handing over of power to subordinate authorities is, in my opinion,^ nothing but delegation of the particular power by the Board to the subordinate authorities concerned. The fact that the word delegation has not been used in section 79 is not sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the handing over of the power could not amount to delegation. The real nature of transference of power should be looked into to find out if it amounts to delegation. The power of cancellation of Regulations wholly or in part remains in the Board. The real nature of transference of power should be looked into to find out if it amounts to delegation. The power of cancellation of Regulations wholly or in part remains in the Board. It is also open to the Board to change the subordinate authority who may exercise a particular delegated power. Clause (31) of the 1972 Regulations is in the nature of a Saving clause. The transference of power in the instant case cannot be treated at par with the conferment of a statutory power by legislature on a particular authority, either existing or newly created. The mere fact that the regulations made by a Statutory Body have the same effect as an Act of a competent legislature and are binding on that body, cannot raise the act of transference of the power by making regulations to the status of a stature of a legislature which confers powers on an authority. 24. The case of A. Sanjeevi Naidu, ( AIR 1970 SC 1102 ) relied upon by Shri S. P. Gupta is distinguishable. In that case a notification was issued under S. 68(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act. That section required that the State Transport Undertaking must form the opinion contemplated therein before issuing notification. The Secretary in the Transport Department had formed the requisite opinion and thereafter the notification was issued. The notification was challenged on the ground that the State Transport Undertaking was department of the State Government and the requisite opinion should have been formed by the State Government and the opinion formed by the Secretary, who was merely an official and not even Head of Department, could not be treated as the opinion of the State Government. This contention was repelled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. Their Lordships discussed the working of the administration of State run by the Council of Ministers and pointed out that in the very nature of things it is not possible for the Council of Ministers to deal with each and every matter that comes before the Government and in order to obviate that difficulty the Constitution has authorised the Governor under sub-article (3) of Article 166 to make rules for the more convenient transaction of business of the Government of the State and for the allocation amongst its Ministers the business of the Government. Their Lordships observed that the Governor cannot only allocate the various subjects amongst the Ministers but may go further and designate a particular official to discharge any particular function but this can be done only on the advice of the Council of Ministers. When such an official discharges the function allotted to him he is doing so as a limb of the Government and not as a person to whom the power of the Government has been delegated. Thus A. Sanjeevi Naidu's case deals with the principles that govern the administration of State run by the Council of Ministers and allocation of business amongst the Ministers and other officials working under their control. These are special principles and cannot be extended to the case of a Statutory or Public Body carrying on its functions with the aid of its officers and employees. This decision cannot, therefore, help the appellant. 25. Thus, the position remains that the transference of the powers of appointment and removal of the members of the Service to the Chief Engineer, was nothing but delegations of those powers by the Board to the Chief Engineer. Such delegation did not have the effect of denuding the Board of its powers in respect of the members of the Service and the ultimate powers continued in the Board. Thus, the Board was also an authority competent to remove the appellant from his office. 26. Shri S. P. Gupta learned counsel has next urged that since the 1972 and 1975 Regulations had the force of law, the power of appointment or removal of the members of the Service could be exercised strictly in accordance with those regulations, and in no other manner, because the rule is that "when power is given under a statute to do certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all." He has urged that this principle covers both the procedure to be followed while exercising that power and also the authority which has to exercise that power. This principle extends even where the authority on whom power has been conferred by Statute., is subordinate to and under the control of the State Government. The State Government cannot substitute itself for that particular authority so long as the statutory provision in favour of that subordinate authority exists. This principle extends even where the authority on whom power has been conferred by Statute., is subordinate to and under the control of the State Government. The State Government cannot substitute itself for that particular authority so long as the statutory provision in favour of that subordinate authority exists. In support of these submissions the learned counsel has relied on the observations of the Supreme Court made in the decision State of Gujarat v. Shanti Lal; AIR 1969 SC 634 (on page 654 col.1 middle). He has also cited the following decisions by way of illustrations in support of his aforesaid submissions : - 1. Commr. of Police v. Gordhandas; AIR 1952 SC 16 2. H.R. Sugar Factory v. State of U. P.; 1970 ALL LJ 768 3. Nanak Saran Srivastava v. State of U. P.; 1970 ALL LJ 1288 : (1971 Lab IC 508) 4. Parmanand Dass v. State of A.P., AIR 1978 SC 1745 5. State of Punjab v. Hari Kishan; AIR 1966 SC 1081 6. Purtabpur Co. Ltd. v. Cane Commr., Bihar AIR 1970 SC 1896 . 27. In the case of Commr. of Police v. Gordhandas (supra) the facts were, in brief, these. Under the rules framed under S. 22 of the City of Bombay Police Act (4 of 1902) the only person vested with authority to grant or refuse a licence for the erection of building to be used for purposes of amusement was the Commissioner of Police. That Officer also had the authority to cancel a licence already issued. The Commissioner of police had issued a licence to the respondent Gordhandas for the erection of a Cinema house. This licence was later on cancelled by the Commissioner under orders of the State Government. The communication sent by the Commissioner was in the following words "I am directed by Government to inform you that the permission to erect a Cinema at the above site granted to you under this office letter dated 16th July 1947 is hereby cancelled." Their Lordships held the power of cancellation of a licence vested in the Commissioner of Police and not in the State Government and could only be exercised by him at his discretion. 28. 28. In H. R. S. Factory's case (1970 All LJ 768) (supra) certain amounts were due from certain sugar factories and certificates for the recovery of the same were issued to the Collector Bareilly for recovery of the amounts as arrears of land revenue. The State Government directed the Collector to appoint receiver for recovery of the dues. The collector complied. The appointment of receiver was challenged before this Court. S. 279(1) of the U. P. Z. A. & L. R. Act provides the various processes which may be used for recovery of an amount as arrear of land revenue. One of the processes is "by appointment of a receiver of any property movable or immovable of the defaulter". Section 286-A empowers the Collector to use the process of appointment of a receiver in addition to or instead of any other process. Thus, the Collector, Bareilly could appoint a receiver for recovery of the amounts in exercise of his own individual discretion. In that case, the Collector appointed the receiver on the dictation of the State Government without exercising his individual discretion. This Court observed that "where a statute casts a duty upon a particular officer or invests him with the exercise of discretion then that duty must be performed and that discretion exercised by that officer and by no one else." This Court also observed that the direction given by the State Government was not in exercise of its revisional power which vested in it under section 219 U. P. Land Revenue Act. Hence the order of appointment of receiver was held illegal. 29. In Nanak Saran's case (1971 Lab IC 508) (All) (supra) the Chairman, Legislative Council, U. P. had issued a notice of compulsory retirement to Shri Nanak Saran who was serving as Superintendent in the Legislative Council Secretariat. This notice was held illegal by this court on the ground that the Secretary Legislature and not the Chairman, was the appointing authority of Sri Nanak Saran and under Fundamental Rule 56 he (Secretary Legislature) alone could give the notice of retirement to the Government servant concerned. This Court also observed that it was not material that the Chairman was superior in rank to the Secretary Legislature. This Court also observed that it was not material that the Chairman was superior in rank to the Secretary Legislature. This Court also observed "when the power has been given only to the appointing authority, it cannot be exercised by any one else on the ground that he is superior in status or is the superior officer of the appointing authority. It is well settled that if a thing is required to be done in a particular manner it must be done in that manner alone". 30. In Parmanand Dass's case ( AIR 1978 SC 1745 ) (supra) a special officer was appointed under Section 2 of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1970, to exercise the powers, to perform the duties and discharge the functions, inter alia, of the Standing Committee of Hyderabad Municipal Corporation. Parmanand Dass was said to have received illegal gratification and the question of sanction for prosecution came up for consideration. The Standing Committee considered the matter and resolved that Parmanand should be prosecuted and it authorised the Special Officer to sign the sanction order. The special officer did accordingly. The sanction was challenged as invalid on the ground that the Special Officer acting as Standing Committee should have given the sanction himself, but in this case, he signed the sanction order in compliance with the direction of the Standing Committee which was illegal. This objection was upheld by the Supreme Court and the sanction was held to be invalid. 31. In the case of State of Punjab v. Hari Kishan ( AIR 1966 SC 1081 ) (supra), section 5 of the Punjab Cinemas (Regulation) Act provided that the Licencing Authority may grant licence subject to certain conditions and subject to the control of the Government. The Act also provided an appeal to the State Government. The State Government, however, directed the Licencing Authority to forward to it all applications received for grant of licences and it assumed power and authority to deal with the said applications on the merits for itself,in the first instance. Their Lordships held that the State Government could not in this way completely oust the Licencing Authority and itself usurp his function. The fact that the Licencing Authority was subject to the control of the Government did not justify the issue of such directions of complete ouster. Their Lordships held that the State Government could not in this way completely oust the Licencing Authority and itself usurp his function. The fact that the Licencing Authority was subject to the control of the Government did not justify the issue of such directions of complete ouster. The Government would have been justified to issue general instructions and directions for the guidance of the Licencing Authority, but could not usurp his functions totally. The Licencing Authority was reduced to the status of post office. 32. In Purtabpur Company's case, ( AIR 1970 SC 1896 ) the Central Government had under cl. 11 of the Sugar Cane (Control) Order 1966, delegated its powers under cl. (6) of the order to the State Government of Bihar as well as to the Cane Commissioner, Bihar, for determination of reserved area for a sugar factory. Thus, Cane Commissioner and the State Government had concurrent authority in the matter of determination of reserved area for a sugar factory. The Cane Commissioner reserved an area for Purtabpur Company (Sugar Factory). The Chief Minister wanted that the reserved area should be divided into two portions and only one portion should be allotted to that sugar factory and the other portion should be allotted to another sugar factory. The cane Commissioner was of the opinion that the reservation made by him in favour of Purtabpur Company was correct and it should not be disturbed but the Chief Minister insisted that the reserved area should be divided. The Cane Commissioner prepared two lists and submitted them for the orders of the Chief Minister and in accordance with the orders of the Chief Minister he allotted the area in one List to Purtabpur Company and the area under the other list to the other factory. This was struck down by the Supreme Court on the ground that the power exercisable by the Cane Commissioner was statutory power and while exercising that power he could not abdicate his responsibility in favour of any one, not even in favour of the State Government or the Chief Minister. The Chief Minister was not an authority recognised by cl. (6) of the Order. 33. I have carefully considered these decisions. In all of them, the powers to be exercised were statutory powers and specific authorities were named, who could exercise those powers. The Chief Minister was not an authority recognised by cl. (6) of the Order. 33. I have carefully considered these decisions. In all of them, the powers to be exercised were statutory powers and specific authorities were named, who could exercise those powers. In five cases (except the case of Nanak Saran Srivastava) (1970 All LJ 1288) those statutory powers were exercised by those authorities in accordance with the directions of their superior authorities or the State Government without exercising their own individual discretion and in that context it was held that the powers could be exercised by the named authorities alone in the exercise of their individual discretion and they could not surrender their discretion to their superior authorities or the State Government and could not merely rubber stamp the directions given by the superior authorities or the State Government, or could not act merely as post office. In Nanak Saran Srivastava's case the power was sought to be exercised by a superior authority of the appointing authority, though under the statutory rules that superior authority, did not have that power. That distinction has been clearly brought out in the Full Bench decision of Karnail Singh (supra). None of these cases was a case of delegation of powers by an authority to its subordinate authority. The above principle which the learned counsel for the appellant has pressed in his submissions, cannot be taken to cover the case of the exercise of power by the delegator during the period when the delegation is in force but the delegate has not exercised the power delegated to him in relation to that particular case. I am, therefore, clearly of the view that the principle relied upon by the learned counsel cannot be pressed into service in the instant case. The question for consideration before me is not covered under the principles laid down in these decisions. The two decisions cited by the learned counsel for the Board namely Gwalior Rayon Mill's case ( AIR 1974 SC 1660 ) and Karnail Singh's case (1975 Lab IC 646) (FB) (supra) have direct application to the facts of the instant case. The question for consideration before me is not covered under the principles laid down in these decisions. The two decisions cited by the learned counsel for the Board namely Gwalior Rayon Mill's case ( AIR 1974 SC 1660 ) and Karnail Singh's case (1975 Lab IC 646) (FB) (supra) have direct application to the facts of the instant case. For these reasons, I repel the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that during the continuance of the 1972 and 1975 Regulations the Board could not exercise the power of removal of any member of the Service from his office and only the Chief Engineer could exercise that power and he alone could, therefore,grant the sanction under S. 6(1) (c) of the Act. 34. I hold that Notwithstanding the 1972 and 1975 Regulations, the Board continued to have the power to appoint or remove the members of the Service, and, therefore, the sanction dated 8-11-1978 granted by it for the prosecution of the appellant as required under S. 6(l)(c) of the Act, is perfectly valid. 35. Now proceed to consider the appeal on merits. 36. The statement of Sri O. N. Singh, Assistant Engineer Electricity Distribution Division, Mau, proves that a power connection was sanctioned to the complainant and he (complainant) had completed all the required formalities in that connection. On 10-8-77 a work order was also issued directing the appellant to give connection. He also proved that the information of the sanction of power connection was given to the complainant in June 1976. This witness added that the appellant could not have given the connection unless he had received the work order along with load form and copy of sanction estimate. This witness could not say if the work order issued to the appellant on 10-8-77 was actually handed over to the appellant. 37. Ram Prakash Gupta (PW 8) was a Clerk in the Electricity Distribution Division, Mau, and he was dealing with the case of the power connection of the complainant. This witness stated that on 10-8-77 he had at the request of the complainant, handed over the work order to him (complainant) for being carried to the appellant and in token of the handing over of the work order, had obtained the signature of the complainant in the despatch register. The witness proved the relevant entry No. 1522 and it was marked ex. The witness proved the relevant entry No. 1522 and it was marked ex. Ka 26-A. He added that he had handed over this work order to the complainant at about 11.30 a. m. and at about 3 or 3.30 p. m. the complainant came back and informed him (witness) that he had handed over the work order to Jamil Ahmad. This witness was subjected to a searching cross examination on this part of his statement. The stand of the defence was that the story given out by this witness was false and it was not the practice of the office to hand over work orders to the parties concerned for being taken to the Junior Engineers concerned. There was no other entry of a similar nature in the dispatch register. The defence also gave the suggestion that the work order had not reached the appellant. Before me it was also argued that in a span of about four hours the complainant could not have taken the work order from Mau to Mahmudabad and returned back to convey the information of delivery to Ram Prakash Gupta. It is true that this witness (Ram Prakash Gupta) could not show any other entry in the despatch register where the work order had been handed over to the party concerned for being taken to Junior Engineer, but this is, in my opinion, not sufficient to discredit the statement of this witness. The material on the record shows that the application for grant of power connection was made more than a year before August 1977 and the complainant was making all efforts to get power connection at an early date. The formalities for actual giving of power connection were completed in April 1977. The work order was issued thereafter and it was actually issued from the office of the Assistant Engineer on 10-8-1977. The complainant could request the Clerk concerned, namely Ram Prakash Gupta, to hand over the work order to him so that he may take it to the appellant the same day without loss of further time. The enrty No. 1522 in the despatch register bears the signature of the complainant, there could be no reason for Ram Prakash Gupta to make a false entry in the despatch register and to give a false statement against the appellant. Mahmudabad 3 is 46 kilo meters away from Mau. The enrty No. 1522 in the despatch register bears the signature of the complainant, there could be no reason for Ram Prakash Gupta to make a false entry in the despatch register and to give a false statement against the appellant. Mahmudabad 3 is 46 kilo meters away from Mau. This distance could be covered in a bus in about hours, at the most. One could, therefore, easily come back to Mau in four hours after visiting Mahmudabad. The statement of Ram Prakash ' that the complainant had K informed him at about 3.30 p. m. that he had handed over the work order to the appellant, cannot, therefore, be doubted. The complainant did not say specifically in his statement that on 10-8-77 he had taken the work order from the office of the Assistant Engineer and handed it over to the appellant the same day. He generally stated A that he had met the appellant several times and requested him to give connection but he (appellant) always replied that he would not give connection unless he was paid a sum of Rs. 200/-. It was not put to the complainant that the appellant was not in a position to give power connection because he had not received the work order. If such a question had been put, the complainant would have, in all probability, pointed out that he had handed over the work order to the appellant on 10-8-77. It appears that the fact that the appellant had not received the work order and was, therefore, unable to give the connection, had been emphasised at the time of trial after the statement of the complainant was over. In the circumstances of the case, I am not prepared to disbelieve the statement of Ram Prakash Gupta (PW 8) notwithstanding the fact that no other similar entry existed in the despatch register. I am inclined to take the view that the work order had reached the appellant on 10-8-77. Since the appellant had received the papers without giving written acknowledgment for the same, he was in a position to turn back and say that he had not received the work order and was, therefore, not in a position to give the power connection to the complainant. Perhaps this led the appellant to persist in his demand of illegal gratification from the complainant. 38. Perhaps this led the appellant to persist in his demand of illegal gratification from the complainant. 38. The prosecution examined four witnesses on facts, namely Dina Nath Jaiswal (PW 1) Sri Surendra Nath Sinha, Inspector Vigilance (PW 2), Shyam Sundar (PW 3) and S. I. B. N. Pandey, a member of the trap party (PW 5) to prove that the appellant had accepted a sum of Rs. 200/-from the complainant as illegal gratification and the same amount was recovered from the possession of the appellant. The complainant gave out the entire prosecution story. He stated how the appellant had refused to give him power connection without payment of Rs. 200/- as illegal gratification and how a trap was laid for him (appellant). He also gave out the details of the trap, payment of Rs. 200/- as illegal gratification to the appellant and recovery of the same amount from his (appellant's) possession. Shri S. N. Sinha Vigilance Inspector was the leader of the trap party and he narrated the prosecution story from the stage of his being deputed by the District Magistrate to lay a trap till the lodging of the report at all police station after the arrest of the appellant and recovery of G.C. notes worth . Rs.200/- from his possession. S. I. B. N. Pandey also supported this part of the prosecution story. Shyam Sundar was present at the bus-stand at Mahmudabad at 8 a.m. on 18-8-77 and was called by Shri Sinha to be a member of the trap party. This witness gave out the facts from this stage onwards and supported the main occurrence regarding the trap and recovery of G. C. notes worth Rs.200/- from the possession of the appellant. These witnesses were subjected to a searching cross-examination but could not be shaken in any manner. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to point out any discrepancy or other disconcerting feature in the statements of these witnesses. The statements of these witnesses are quite cogent, convincing and worthy of reliance. The two police officers had no animus against the appellant so as to concoct a false case against him. The complainant too had no animus. The contention of the defence that the complainant had animus against the appellant because he considered that the appellant was responsible for the delay in giving power connection to him, is not well-founded. The two police officers had no animus against the appellant so as to concoct a false case against him. The complainant too had no animus. The contention of the defence that the complainant had animus against the appellant because he considered that the appellant was responsible for the delay in giving power connection to him, is not well-founded. This argument is in a way arguing in a circle. As discussed earlier, the evidence shows that the delay after 10th August 1977 was deliberate on the part of the appellant because he wanted to extort illegal gratification from the complainant. If the complainant did not succumb to such a pressure and proceeded to inform the authorities, it cannot fairly be said that he was inimical towards the appellant. Shyam Sundar too had no animus against the appellant. No doubt he is a resident of the village of the complainant and also a neighbour but on account of that he cannot be treated as an interested or partisan witness. He had no enmity with the appellant. There is nothing to show that this witness was under the influence of the complainant and could join him in concocting a false case. The learned trial judge did not consider, Shyam Sundar as a reliable witness but the reason given by him for dubbing this witness as unworthy of belief, is not well-founded and overlooks one important circumstance. The learned trial judge observed that the prosecution story that Shyam Sundar had come by chance was not believable. While taking this view the learned Judge overlooked the fact that the trap party had stayed at Mahmudabad on the night of 17-8-77 and this witness was available to the trap leader on the morning of 18-8-77. Further the evidence was that Mahmudabad was at a short distance from the village of the witness and one had to come to Mahmudabad to take a bus for going to another place. It was, therefore, not unnatural if this witness was present at the bus stand at Mahmudabad at about 8 a. m. It is natural to prefer a known person than an unknown person to be a witness of a trap or some recovery. As observed earlier, the witness is not to be regarded as partisan or interested simply because he was a neighbour of the complainant. 39. As observed earlier, the witness is not to be regarded as partisan or interested simply because he was a neighbour of the complainant. 39. In the instant case the complainant cannot be regarded as an accomplice on account of the fact that he paid a sum of Rs. 200/- as illegal gratification to the appellant at the time of the trap. The evidence amply shows that the complainant had not offered from his side to pay any amount to the appellant in order to expedite the giving of the connection. On the other hand, it was the appellant who pressed the complainant to pay illegal gratification to him for giving the power connection, which should have in the ordinary course, been given latest by 15-8-77. It is on the record that the orders of the superior officers of the appellant were categorical and to the effect that the power connection should be given to the complainant latest by 15-8-77. The appellant was misusing his authority and was delaying giving of power connection in order to coerce the complainant to pay illegal gratification to him (appellant).The complainant did not give into this coercion and instead of paying the demanded amount to the appellant to obtain the power connection, he preferred to approach the District Magistrate with a complaint against the appellant. In these circumstances, the complainant cannot be regarded as an accomplice. In this connection I may refer to certain observations of the Supreme Court in the decision Dalpat Singh v. State of Rajasthan; AIR 1969 SC 17 . Their Lordships observed that those who gave illegal gratification under coercion could not be regarded as accomplices and their evidence did not require any corroboration. 40. The evidence of the two police officers too is not to be treated on the same footing as evidence of an accomplice. In the decision Hazari Lal v. State (Delhi Administration) AIR 1980 SC 873 , their Lordships observed "We, however wish to say that the evidence of PW 8 is entirely trustworthy and there is no need to seek any corroboration. We are not prepared to accept the submission of Shri Frank Anthony that he is the very Police Officer who laid the trap should be sufficient for us to insist upon corroboration. We are not prepared to accept the submission of Shri Frank Anthony that he is the very Police Officer who laid the trap should be sufficient for us to insist upon corroboration. We do wish to say that there is no rule of prudence which has crystallised into a rule of law, nor indeed any rule of prudence, which requires that the evidence of such officers should be treated on the same footing as evidence of accomplices and there should be insistence on corroboration. In the facts and circumstances of a particular case a Court may be disinclined to act upon the evidence of such an officer without corroboration, but,equally, in the facts and circumstances of another case, the Court may unhesitatingly accept the evidence of such an officer. It is all a matter of appreciation of evidence and on such matters there can be no hard and fast rule, nor can there be any precedential guidance." The learned counsel for the appellant has not pointed out anything which would go to show that the position of the two police officers in this case was no better than that of accomplices. He has also not pointed out any other facts and circumstances which would justify looking for corroboration of the evidence of these officers. 41. The learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the aforesaid four witnesses were interested witnesses because they were all interested in the success of the trap and therefore, their evidence should not be accepted without close and careful scrutiny. There can be no dispute with the general proposition that the evidence of an interested witness should be subjected to a dose and careful scrutiny before acceptance, but it is not correct to say that the four witnesses examined in this case fall in the category of interested witnesses. It will not be reasonable and fair to treat the four witnesses in the instant case as interested merely because they were members of the trap party. The learned counsel has not been able to point out anything else which would go to show that they were interested in any manner. As said earlier, they had no animus against the appellant and no reason to concoct a false case. The learned counsel has not been able to point out anything else which would go to show that they were interested in any manner. As said earlier, they had no animus against the appellant and no reason to concoct a false case. On a careful consideration of the evidence of the four witnesses and the facts and circumstances of this case I am satisfied that their statements are wholly reliable. The evidence of these witnesses goes to establish the prosecution case in a very cogent and convincing manner beyond all reasonable doubt The facts established in this case go to make out offences under section 161 I.P.C. and S. 5(1 )(d) read with S. 5(2) of the Act. The learned counsel has not argued that the facts established would not go to make out these offences or any one of them. The conviction of the appellant under these sections is, there fore, we 11 founded, and deserves to be upheld. 42. The sentence awarded to the appellant does not err on the side of severity and there is no reason to interfere with it. 43. In the result this appeal has no merit and is accordingly dismissed. The conviction and sentences of Jamil Ahmad appellant are maintained and upheld. The appellant is on bail. He shall surrender his bail bonds to serve out the sentences according to law.