ORDER S.C. Mathur, J. - This is a plaintiffs writ petition arising from suit for ejectment filed by Dr. A. S. Raj, petitioner, hereinafter referred to as the landlord, against Sri. Surendra Kumar Jain, Opposite party no. 3, hereinafter referred to as the tenant The relief for ejectment was claimed on the basis that the premises in dispute were constructed in the year 1967 and were assessed also to house tax and water tax by the Nagar Mahapalika, Lucknow, for the first time in the year 1967 and, therefore, they were exempt from the purview of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, No. XIII of 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The petition has arisen in the circumstances, hereinafter, indicated. 2. The facts on which there is no dispute between the parties are these : On 17-6-75 the landlord issued a notice to the tenant terminating his tenancy on the expiry of thirty days from the date of service of the notice. In this notice neither the provision of law, under which notice was given, was indicated nor the reason for termination of tenancy was disclosed. This notice was served upon the tenant on 21-6-75. The tenant replied to the notice on 15-7-1975. In the reply the tenant asserted that the premises in dispute had been constructed in the year 1964. Even after making this averment it was pleaded in para 3 of the notice that the premises in dispute were governed by the Act. On 22nd Aug., 1975 the landlord filed suit for ejectment only against the tenant. In the plaint of the suit it was claimed that the landlord was entitled to the decree for ejectment in view of this fact that tenancy had already been terminated and the restrictions imposed against eviction under the Act were not applicable. The tenant, in his written statement dated 9-3-1976, did not dispute the service of the notice. He asserted that in his reply to the notice the year of construction of the premises had been wrongly mentioned as 1964 and that it should be reads as 1958. On this basis it was pleaded that the Act was applicable. It was also stated on behalf of the tenant that he was not the tenant of Dr. A. S, Raj but was the tenant of his wife Smt. Raj Kumari Raj. On this basis it was pleaded that the Act was applicable. It was also stated on behalf of the tenant that he was not the tenant of Dr. A. S, Raj but was the tenant of his wife Smt. Raj Kumari Raj. The trial Court by its judgment dated 21-11-1976, dismissed the suit on the basis that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It, however, upheld the landlord's claim that the premises had been constructed in the year 1967 and therefore the Act was not applicable. The notice of termination of tenancy was held to be invalid on the ground that the plaintiff was not the landlord of the premises in dispute. The landlord assailed the dismissal of the suit by filing revision under S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, before the District Judge on 6-12-76. On 1-11-77 when the revision was pending before the learned District Judge, an application was moved by the tenant under O. 6 R. 17, Civil P. C. seeking permission to amend the written statement. Through this application para 18 was sought to be added in the written statement. Through para 18 it was sought to be pleaded that the tenant had deposited the entire amount contemplated under S. 39 Of the Act and, therefore, he was entitled to be relieved from the liability of ejectment under the said Section read with S. 40 of the Act. The trial Court ordered that the application shall be disposed of along with the revision itself. By its judgment dated 19-12-1977 the revisional Court allowed the amendment application and maintained the decree of dismissal of suit on the ground that the tenant was entitled to be relieved from the liability of ejectment on account of deposit made by him of the amounts contemplated under S. 39 of the Act. The revisional Court directed that amount deposited by the tenant may be paid to the landlord. On 29th Mar., 1978 the landlord sent a notice to the tenant pointing out therein that he had denied his (landlord's) title in suit No. 1590 of 1975 (Dr. A. S. Raj v. Yourself ) decided by Sri K. D. Sahi, on 12-11-76 and this conduct of the tenant had not been condoned by the landlord. On 29th Mar., 1978 the landlord sent a notice to the tenant pointing out therein that he had denied his (landlord's) title in suit No. 1590 of 1975 (Dr. A. S. Raj v. Yourself ) decided by Sri K. D. Sahi, on 12-11-76 and this conduct of the tenant had not been condoned by the landlord. The notice went on to recite that as a consequence the tenancy of the tenant was terminated and he was required to quit and deliver vacant possession of the premises by 31st Mar, 1978. On the third day of the issue of notice dated 20th Mar., 1978, that is on 23rd Mar, 1978, the landlord filed revision in this Court under S. 115, Civil P. C. After filing the revision, the landlord, on 4th April 1978, issued another notice to the tenant reminding him that his tenancy had already been terminated and requiring him to vacate the premises amicably on 30th April, 1978. This notice dated 4-4-1978 was replied to by the tenant on 30th April, 1978. In this reply it was asserted by the tenant that he had never denied ownership of the landlord. It was also asserted by him that he did not deny that he was the tenant of the premises occupied by him. K. N. (3oyal, J. before whom the landlord's revision came up for hearing, all the same by his judgment dated 7-8-1979. Before Goyal, J. it was pressed on behalf of the landlord that the tenant had denied the landlord's title through averments made in the written statement and therefore he was not entitled to the benefit of S. 39 read with S. 40 of the Act. It further appears that on behalf of the landlord it was pressed that the learned District Judge should have afforded him opportunity to make suitable amendment in his plaint. Goyal, J. accepted the plea of the landlord that opportunity to amend the plaint should have been afforded to him and he accordingly, allowed the revision and set aside the decree of dismissal of the suit for ejectment and remanded the case of the District Judge requiring him to allow the parties to amend the pleadings. After remand, the landlord moved an application for amendment on 3-9-1979. After remand, the landlord moved an application for amendment on 3-9-1979. Through this amendment the landlord shought leave to plead that the tenant had denied his title in the following ways and he was, therefore, entitled to press his claim to ejectment. (1) he remitted rent by two money orders to Smt. Raj Kumari Raj : (2) he set up title in Smt. Raj Kumari Raj in his reply to the landlords notice; and by making averments in paras 9 and 18 of the written statement. It was also sought to be pleaded that at no point of time the landlord had condoned the conduct of the tenant. This amendment was allowed and the tenant filed additional written statement on 14-4-1980. In the additional written statement remittance of money through money orders to Smt. Raj was denied. He further asserted that he did not deny the landlord's title in his reply to notice. With regard to the avernments made in the written statement it was pleaded that the tenant had no intention to deny the title of the landlord. It was further stated that the tenant admitted that the plaintiff was his landlord. In the alternative, it was pleaded that on the basis of the denial made in the written statement filed in this very suit, the claim for ' ejectment could not be maintained. It was further pleaded that the notice dated 17-6-75, on the basis of which the suit was filed, stood waived because after disposal of the suit the landlord served another notice upon the tenant terminating his tenancy. After the pleadings had thus been amended some evidence was recorded by the revisional court and thereafter, by its judgment dated 9-3-1981 the revisional court maintained the decree for ejectment. After the pleadings had thus been amended some evidence was recorded by the revisional court and thereafter, by its judgment dated 9-3-1981 the revisional court maintained the decree for ejectment. While maintaining the decree for ejectment, the revisional court recorded these findings (1) Remittance of rent by the tenant to Smt. Raj through money orders had not been proved; (2) In his reply to the landlord's notice the tenant did not deny the title of the landlord; (3) The averments made in the written statement by the tenant do amount to denial of landlord's title; (4) The right of re-entry, which accrued to the plaintiff through notice dated 17-6-1975 was waived by service of notice dated 20th March, 1978 and therefore in spite of denial of title in the written statement no decree for ejectment could be passed against the tenant. This judgment of the learned District Judge has been assailed by the landlord by filing the present petition. 3. In support of the petition 1 - have heard Sri. K. B. Sinha. The petition has been opposed on behalf of the tenant by Sri. S. D. Misra. On the basis of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties the first question that arises for determination is whether the finding recorded by the learned District Judge on the question of denial of title by the tenant is sustainable. According to Sri Sinha, the learned District Judge committed manifest error in holding that the reply to the notice did not contain any denial of landlord's title. The learned counsel pressed that the reply to the notice had to be read in conjunction with the averments made in the written statement. I am unable to agree with the submission of the learned counsel that the averments made in reply to the notice have to be interpreted with the aid of the averments made in the written statement. Whether the tenant denied the title of the landlord in his reply to the notice has to be determined with reference to the contents of the reply itself. The copy of the notice issued by the landlord is Annexure-1 and the reply thereof is Annexure-2. in para 1 of the notice the following averment was made. Whether the tenant denied the title of the landlord in his reply to the notice has to be determined with reference to the contents of the reply itself. The copy of the notice issued by the landlord is Annexure-1 and the reply thereof is Annexure-2. in para 1 of the notice the following averment was made. "That you are occupying as tenant a portion of my client's house No. B-958 Sector-A Manage, Lucknow." From the above, it would be seen that the only averment made was that the tenant was occupying the premises in dispute as tenant and that notice giver was the owner of the premises. There was no assertion in the notice that the tenant was occupying the premises in dispute on behalf of the notice giver. In para 1 of his reply the tenant did not dispute the fact that he was occupying the premises in dispute as a tenant. The reply contains three more paras and in none of the paras he asserted that he was not the tenant of Dr. A. S. Raj. In the circumstances, I am not of the opinion that the learned District Judge was correct in holding that the tenant did not deny the title of the landlord through the reply sent by him to the landlord's notice. 4. The finding of the court below that there was denial of the title through the averments made in the written statement has been challenged by Sri. S. D. Misra. According to the learned counsel there was no unequivocal denial of the landlord's title and therefore the averments made in the written statement did not amount to denial of title so as to attract Cl (f) of sub-s. (2) of S. 20 of the Act. The averments in the written statement relied upon by the landlord are as follows 1. That the contents of para 1 of the plaint as stated are denied. The fact is that the defendant is the tenant of Smt. Raj Kumari Raj, wife of the plaintiff." 9. That the defendant took the premises in question on rent of Rs.200/- per month from Smt. Raj Kumari Raj wife of the plaintiff. No recepits ever have been issued to the defendant. T he plaintiff is not the defendant's landlord." (emphasis supplied) (Emphasis not found in the judgment copy - Ed). 18. That the defendant took the premises in question on rent of Rs.200/- per month from Smt. Raj Kumari Raj wife of the plaintiff. No recepits ever have been issued to the defendant. T he plaintiff is not the defendant's landlord." (emphasis supplied) (Emphasis not found in the judgment copy - Ed). 18. That the defendant by way of abundant precaution and without admitting that the plaintiff was his landlord in the alternative deposited a sum of Rs.7900/- to avail the benefit of S. 39/40 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 ...... The suit for ejectment even if it be held that the applicant was the landlord is liable to be dismissed." Paragraph 18 reproduced above was added through the amendment application moved by the tenant before the learned District Judge when the revision was pending before him prior to remand order of this court. In my opinion the averments made above do amount to unequivocal denial of the landlord's title and the finding recorded by the learned District Judge does not suffer from any apparent error, even while claiming benefit of section 39/40 of the Act the tenant maintained that he was not admitting that the plaintiff was his landlord. Nothing could be more unequivocal than the statement contained in para 18 of the amended written statement. The averments made in paras 1 and 9 of the written statement are also unequivocal so far as the denial of the landlord's title is concerned, particularly the underlined portion of para 9. 5. The question that arises for determination is whether the landlord can take advantage of the above denial so as to press his claim for ejectment through the present suit itself.The answer to the question depends upon the interpretation of Sections 39 and 20 of the Act. Section 39 provides as follows : - "39. Pending suits for eviction relating to buildings brought under regulation for the first time. Section 39 provides as follows : - "39. Pending suits for eviction relating to buildings brought under regulation for the first time. In any suit for eviction of a tenant from any building to which the old Act did not apply, pending on the date of commencement of this Act, where the tenant within one month from such date of commencement or from the date of his knowledge of the pendency of the suit, whichever be later, deposits in the court before which the suit is pending, the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and the landlord's full costs of the suit, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on any of the grounds mentioned in the proviso to sub-s. (1) or in Cls. (b) to (g) of Sub-s. (2) of S. 20, and the parties shall be entitled to make necessary amendment in their pleadings and to adduce additional evidence where necessary." 6. The above section comprises of two portions. The first portion of the Section grants relief to the tenant while the second portion grants relief to the landlord. Under the first portion if the tenant complies with the requirements of the Section by making the necessary deposits he is relieved from the liability of ejectment. Under the second portion the landlord's claim for ejectment would not fail in spite of the deposit made by the tenant if the conditions mentioned in the second portion exist. The conditions mentioned in the second portion are (1) any of the grounds mentioned in clauses (b) to (g) of sub-s. (2) of section 20 for claiming ejectment should exist; and (2) the plaintiff should make amendment in his plaint so as to claim benefit under the said clause. S. 20 (2) (f) provides as follows : - "(2) A suit for the eviction of a tenant from a building after the determination of his tenancy may be instituted on one or more of the following grounds : (f) that the tenant has renounced his character as such or denied the title of the landlord, and the latter has not waived his right of reentry or condoned the conduct of the tenant:...... (emphasis supplied) (Emphasis not found in the judgment copy-Ed). I have already held above that the tenant denied the tide of the landlord. After this condition is fulfilled the landlord will lose right to eject if either of the two conditions mentioned hereinafter is satisfied. Firstly if the right of re-entry is waived and secondly, if the conduct of the tenant is condoned. In the present case there is nothing to indicate that the petitioner condoned the conduct of the tenant. In the notice dated 20th Mar. 1978 it was specifically stated on behalf of the landlord that he did not condone the conduct of the tenant. The same assertion was made when leave was sought to amend the plaint in pursuance of the demand order of this court. On behalf of the defendant also there is no pleading that the conduct was condoned by the landlord. The question now remains whether the landlord can be said to have waived his right of re-entry. I am reserving my observation in this regard to be made a little latter. At this stage I hold that cl.(f) of sub-s.(2) of S. 20 was attracted inasmuch as the tenant denied the title of the landlord and the landlord did not condone the conduct of the tenant. Assuming that all the ingredients of cl. (f) are satisfied in the present case in favour of the landlord the question arises whether these conditions should exist at the time of the institution of the suit or they may come into existence subsequent to the filing of the suit. This question has to be determined with reference to the purpose and scope of the second part of S. 39. 7. The second part of S. 39 is in the nature of a saving clause. The purpose of this clause is to preserve the suit which has already been filed. Such clause has to be interpreted in a manner which will preserve the suit and not in a manner which will defeat the suit. The use of the word instituted in sub-s.(2) of S. 20 indicates that the grounds mentioned in cls. (a) to (g) the roof should exist at the time of the institution of the suit but where the suit is preserved under a saving the existence of the condition prior to the institution of the suit cannot be insisted upon. The use of the word instituted in sub-s.(2) of S. 20 indicates that the grounds mentioned in cls. (a) to (g) the roof should exist at the time of the institution of the suit but where the suit is preserved under a saving the existence of the condition prior to the institution of the suit cannot be insisted upon. In my opinion, therefore, in cases governed by the second part of S. 39 the conditions prescribed in cls. (b) to (g) of sub-s (2) of S. 20 need not exist at the time of the institution of the suit and may come into existence subsequent thereto. Therefore, if the right of re-entry has not been waived by the landlord, he will be entitled to decree for ejectment under cl. (f) on the basis of the denial of landlord's title made in the written statement of the present suit itself. While taking this view I am conscious of the principle of interpretation that a saving clause does not confer new rights but merely saves the existing right. In the present case the right to claim ejectment on the basis of denial had already accrued to the landlord prior to the first part of S. 39 becoming applicable to the1 case and therefore my view does not militate against the principle of interpretation. On behalf of the tenant certain authorities were cited in support of the proposition that the denial of title made in the written statement cannot be taken advantage of in that suit itself. These cases may now be noticed In Jagdish Prasad Gupta v. Smt. Kanti Devi (1981 All LJ 173) :(1980 All W. C. 720) :(1981 AIR Summary of Cases, item 14) R. R. Rastogi, J. observed in para 10 of the judgment thus "And apart from that the denial of tenant's title in the written statement cannot lead to termination of lease by forfeiture of rights."This observation does render support to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the tenant, but this observation is orbiter in view of the fact that the finding recorded in this case was that there was no denial of title at all. The ratio of this decision is that where the tenant puts the plaintiff, who is a transferee from the original landlord, to proof of his title, the denial of title is not unequivocal and, therefore, on the basis of such denial eviction cannot be claimed under sub-s. (2) of S. 20. In Gyasi Ram v. Ram Chandra Singh ( AIR 1978 All 376 ) Mehrotra, J. was dealing with a case in which evictions claimed on the basis of material alteration and default in payment of rent. In the written statement the defendants denied the ownership of the plaintiff. The suit for ejectment was decreed by the trial court as well as by the first appellate court. Before Mehrotra, J. on behalf of the plaintiff it was pressed that he was entitled to decree for ejectment also on the basis of denial of title made by the defendant in the written statement. After reviewing several decisions including decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court, it was held that denial of title must precede the institution of the suit. Mehrotra, J., was dealing with a suit in which the property, from which ejectment was sought, was already governed by the Rent Control Act. He was not dealing with ambit and scope of S. 39 of the Act. This judgment is, therefore, not an authority for the proposition that even in a case governed by the second part of S. 39, denial must precede the institution of the suit. 8. Now it may be considered whether the landlord has waived his right of re-entry. On behalf of the tenant it was pressed that by issuing the notice dated 20th Mar, 1978 the landlord waived the notice dated 17-6-75 by which he had terminated the tenancy and on the basis of which the suit for ejectment had been filed, and therefore the right of reentry stood waived. It has been held in several decisions of this court that waiver is a conscious act and waiver cannot be inferred from mere acceptance of rent after issue for service of the notice of termination of tenancy. In Kamlapat Sahai v. Mt. Manho Bibi (AIR 1948 oudh 127) Kidwai J. observed as follows : - ".......... It has been held in several decisions of this court that waiver is a conscious act and waiver cannot be inferred from mere acceptance of rent after issue for service of the notice of termination of tenancy. In Kamlapat Sahai v. Mt. Manho Bibi (AIR 1948 oudh 127) Kidwai J. observed as follows : - ".......... once a suit for ejectment has been instituted it cannot possibly be said that any act of the lessor shows an intention to treat the lease as subsisting unless he withdraws the suit. He may renew the lease, in which case it would not be a question of waiver but a question of fresh lease. Where not only had the lessor instituted the suit but he had obtained a decree for ejectment and he had attempted to execute that decree, and he did not withdraw his suit nor did he withdraw the execution proceedings, it could not be said that his action in receiving that money due for the use and occupation of the rooms during pendency of appeal in suit indicated an intention to waive the notice which had already merged in a decree of Court, though in the receipts the word "rent" had been used instead of the words "damages for use and occupation." Elaborating the judgment in the above case the same learned Judge in Khaumani v. Saktry Lal ( AIR 1952 All 579 ) observed at page 580 as follows : - "It has, however, been held by me in Kamlapat v. Mt. Manho Bibi, 1947 O. W. N. C. C 522 : (AIR 1948 Oudh 127) disagreeing with the decision in Manicklal v. Kadambini, AIR 1926 Cal. Manho Bibi, 1947 O. W. N. C. C 522 : (AIR 1948 Oudh 127) disagreeing with the decision in Manicklal v. Kadambini, AIR 1926 Cal. 763, that if the landlord actively continues the prosecution of the case or appeal with regard to the ejectment of the tenant mere acceptance of rent by him cannot be treated as waiver so as to deprive him of the right of ejectment in pursuance of the decree which he had obtained " In Moti Lal v. Basant Lal ( AIR 1956 All 175 ) Chaturvedi, J. observed in para 10 of the judgment as follows : - " As will appear from the language of S. 113 a waiver can be brought about by the -action of the landlord if after determining the tenancy by notice the landlord chooses to accept rent again from the tenant In such an event under S. 113 T. P. Act, a notice for determination of the lease already given by the landlord to the tenant will be deemed to have been waived. No question of waiver arises after the landlord has brought a suit on the basis of a valid notice given for determination of the lease. After such a suit has been brought there can be no waiver though it is always open to the landlord to renew the lease at any time he pleases. I do not therefore think that any question of waiver arises in this case." The above decisions are based on S. 113 of the T. P. Act which provides as follows: - "A notice given under S. Ill, cl. (h) is waived, with the express or implied consent of the person to whom it is given, by any act on the part of the person giving it showing an intention to treat the lease as subsisting." Under the above clause only that action of the landlord amounts to waiver of notice which shows his intention to treat the lease as subsisting. Therefore, the action of the landlord on the basis of which the plea of waiver is raised must show an unequivocal intention of the landlord to treat the lease as subsisting. Once the landlord files suit for ejectment after issuing notice of termination of tenancy something more than mere acceptance of rent is required to indicate that the landlord accepted the rent with a view to treat the lease as subsisting. Once the landlord files suit for ejectment after issuing notice of termination of tenancy something more than mere acceptance of rent is required to indicate that the landlord accepted the rent with a view to treat the lease as subsisting. In the present case no such intention of the landlord can be inferred. Far from treating the lease as subsisting, the landlord persisted in claiming that he was entitled to decree for ejectment. So far as waiver arising from forfeiture is concerned the provision is made in S. 112, T. P. Act, which is in the following terms : - "A forfeiture under S. Ill, cl.(g), is waived by acceptance of rent which has become due since the forfeiture, or by distance for such rent, or by any other act on the part of the lessor showing an intention to treat lease as subsisting. Provided that the lessor is aware that the forfeiture has been incurred. Provided also that, where rent is accepted after the institution of a suit to eject the lessee on the ground of forfeiture, such acceptance is not a waiver." (emphasis supplied) (Emphasis not given in original - Ed). 9. In the present case The landlord is now claiming ejectment of the tenant on the basis of forfeiture and therefore the question of waiver has to be determined with reference to S. 112 reproduced above. The second proviso to the section specifically provides that acceptance of rent after the institution of the suit will not amount to waiver of the forfeiture. It does not provide that the forfeiture may be waived by issuance of any notice. The language of S. 112 also indicates that there should be intention on the part of the landlord to waive his right of ejectment. In my opinion, therefore, merely from the fact of issuing notice dated 20th Mar, 1978 it cannot be said that the landlord waived the notice of termination of tenancy served by him on 17-6-1975. In taking this view I am supported by a Division Bench decision of the Punjab High Court-Basheshar Nath v. Delhi Improvement Trust (AIR 1953 Punjab 243) (at p. 244) : "(7) It is then submitted by Mr. Mahajan that the first notice should be taken to have been waived because a second notice was given by the Trust. I am unable to agree with this submission also. Mahajan that the first notice should be taken to have been waived because a second notice was given by the Trust. I am unable to agree with this submission also. 6y giving three months' notice which ended on 30-4-1946, the tenancy was terminated and the letter of 13-5-1946, was not really a notice but it was a reply to the request of the lessee for one year's grace which was refused and fifteen days were given to the lessee to quit. This does not constitute new tenancy but it was merely a period of grace given to the. Defendant to remove his fixures. (see (1947) 1 All ER 116)." A perusal of para 7 of the judgment shows that the argument relied on behalf of the plaintiff that the second no ace to quit, issued after the service of the earlier notice to quit could not be said to have waived the earlier notice unless circumstances existed from which it could be inferred that a new tenancy had been created was accepted, It is therefore, apparent that merely on the basis of the second notice issued while the plaintiff was actively pursuing his remedy of ejectment the notice on the basis of which the suit was filed, cannot be said to have been waived. The element of intention to waive the determination of tenancy is (completely lacking in the present case. 9-A. In support of the proposition that the second notice waived the earlier notice the learned counsel relied upon an unreported decision of this court in Abrar Husain v. Mohd. Ishaq Civil revision No. 100 of 1975 decided on 31-3-1976. In this case Prem Prakash, J. as he then was, was dealing with a case where the trial court dismissed the suit for ejectment on account of the deposit of rent under S. 39 against which decision the landlord filed revision and during the pendency of the revision the landlord served a notice stating that if the premises were not vacated on the expiry of 30 days, he would take proceedings under S. 21, U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. In this case the landlord had clearly indicated his intention to the tenant that in case he did not vacate the premises on the expiry of the period of 30 days he would take proceeding under S. 21 of the Act. In this case the landlord had clearly indicated his intention to the tenant that in case he did not vacate the premises on the expiry of the period of 30 days he would take proceeding under S. 21 of the Act. Section 21 of the Act contemplates an entirely different type of proceeding for eviction. Therefore from the second notice it was apparent that the landlord did not intend to pursue the remedy based upon the first notice of termination of tenancy.This decision is, therefore, of no assistance to the opposite parties. 10. It was also argued that unless a notice was given under S. Ill cl.(g) T. P. Act relief of ejectment on the basis of denial of title could not be claimed and since in the present case such a notice was given only after the institution of the suit and not prior thereto the plaintiff could not in the present suit get a decree for ejectment. Section 111(g) provides as follows: - A lease of immovable property determines- ..............(g) by forfeiture; that is to say,- (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that, on breach thereof, the lessor may re-enter; or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself; or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event; and in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intentions to determine the lease:" The above provision only requires that before the relief of ejectment is claimed on the basis of forfeiture there must be determination of lease. It does not require that the notice itself must indicate that determination of tenancy is made on the ground of forfeiture. A simple notice under S. 106, T. P. Act is enough to claim ejectment on the basis of forfeiture under Cl. (g) of S. 111. In taking this view I am supported by the decision of M. N. Shukla, J. in Smt. Chanda Devi v. Dr. Tara Pad. Sinha ( AIR 1980 All 270 ). In this case a simple notice of termination of tenancy was given by the landlord. In reply to the notice the tenancy denied the title of the landlord. In taking this view I am supported by the decision of M. N. Shukla, J. in Smt. Chanda Devi v. Dr. Tara Pad. Sinha ( AIR 1980 All 270 ). In this case a simple notice of termination of tenancy was given by the landlord. In reply to the notice the tenancy denied the title of the landlord. Without giving further notice of termination of lease the landlord filed suit for ejectment and claimed ejectment also on the ground of denial of his title. It was observed by M. N. Shukla,'J. thus in para 4: - "In fact, the last sentence of cl.(g) of S. Ill, T. P. Act which is the foundation of the whole edifice of the appellants' argument, itself does not say that the ground for forfeiture of the tenancy on account of the denial of title must be made the basis of the notice. It merely provides that the intention to determine the lease i.e. not to continue the tenancy of the tenant must be communicated to the lessee by actually determining his tenancy by a notice. The underlying principle is obvious. If the tenancy is not terminated it would not be possible to evict the lessee. After all, where the forfeiture is incurred by reason of an act or omission on the part of the lessee, the lessor has an option to take advantage of it or to waive it. Hence, he must so act evidencing his intention to determine the lease and once the notice had been served terminating the tenancy' simpliciter there is no impediment left for the lessor in instituting a suit for ejectment on the plea of S. 111(g)..... Even without going to that length, it would suffice to say that once the tenancy of the lessee has been duly terminated by a notice, it would be wholly redundant to require a second notice to be given to the lessee expressly mentioning the ground of forfetiure occasioned by denial of title " In view of the above legal position it was not necessary for the plaintiff to issue notice dated 20th Mar, 1978 and the said notice was entirely redundant. 11. 11. The learned counsel for the opposite parties, however, argued that the only inference that can be drawn from the notice dated 20th Mar, 1978 is that the landlord intended to continue tenancy up to the date it was sought to be terminated through the said notice, and therefore, the earlier notice stands waived and the suit for ejectment on the basis of the earlier notice cannot be decreed. The language employed in the notice is as follows : - "that you denied the title of my client in Suit No. 1590 of 1975 (Dr.A. S. Raj v. Yourself) of the court of Additional Judge Small Cause Court, Lucknow, decided by Sri. K. D. Shahi on 12-11-1976. And my client does not condone this conduct of yours. Consequently, I hereby, on my client's behalf terminate your tenancy and request you to quit and deliver vacant possession of the above premises by the end of the current month of tenancy that is by 31-3-1978, on or by which date your tenancy shall cease and absolutely determine. ^ If you do not vacate by the said time, my client will eject you through Court when you shall be liable to pay damages and the cost of litigation " 12. On the basis of the above passage in the notice it was argued that the landlord himself continued the tenancy up to 31st Mar, 1978 and, therefore, if up to 31st Mar, 1978 the tenant continued to be the tenant it is not possible to contend by the plaintiff that the tenancy stood terminated on the expiry of the period mentioned in the notice dated 17-6-75. I have already held above that the service of second notice to quit during the pendency of the suit does not amount to waiver of the earlier notice. Therefore by merely saying that the tenant's tenancy will stand determined on 31st Mar, 1978, the landlord cannot be said to have waived the earlier notice. 13. In view of the above, the petition deserves to be allowed. The petition is accordingly, allowed and the judgment dated 9-3-1981, Annexure-18, passed by the learned District Judge, Lunknow, is hereby quashed. The learned District Judge shall decide the landlord's revision in the light of the observation made hereinabove. The petitioner shall be entitled to recover his costs from opposite party 3.