JUDGMENT 1. - This revision is directed against the order dated 4.2.1962, passed by the Additional District ,Judge No. 2, ,Jodhpur, whereby i.e dismissed the judgment-debtor petitioner's objections under Or. 21, Rule 22, C. P. C. 2. A few material facts may be noticed in order to adjudicate the controversy, which has reason between the parties in the present matter. 3. In Civil Suit No. 20 of 1966 a decree was passed on 20.1.1967 for a sum of Rs. 10, 8003/-. An application for execution was moved by the decree- holder on 31.10 1969 In that application, a compromise was arrived at between the parties on 14.2.1970, whereby the decree-holder relinquished the claim of an amount of costs Rs. 958/-and further the judgment-debtor agreed to make payment of the decretal amount in annual instalments of Rs. 1,500/-. The first instalment was to be paid on 1.12.1970 and further instalments were agreed to he paid on the 1st August every year. It was also agreed between the parties that in case of default of payment of two instalments, the decree-holder will have a right to execute the decree for the balance of the decretal amount. It was prayed in the application that the compromise may be verified and recorded and thereafter the execution may be consigned to record. The compromise was verified and recorded and after recording of the compromise in the order sheet the final order was drawn as under:- 14&2&70 odhy fMdzhnkj Fkh tloUrjkt VkVh;k gkftjA en;wuk :idaoj gkftjA odhy fMdzhnkj o en;wuk us jkthukek is'k fd;k ftl ij fely vkt is'kh esa yh xbZA jkthekuk rLnhd fd;k tkdj jsdkMZ fd;k x;kA odhy fMdzhnkj dh bLrnqck gS fd os btjk; dks fQygky pykuk ugh pkgrs gS vkSj ck:bZ jkthukek [kkfjt djkuk pkgrs gSA vr% btjk; [kkfjt dh tkrh gSA fely 'kqekj Qslyk gksdj nkf[ky nQrj gksA ,l0 Mh0@& ,l0 Mh0@& ts0 vkj0 VkVh;k vxzasth esa ,l0Mh0@& :i daoj fgUnh esa It would appear from the above order that the execution was dismissed in view of the compromise between the paries. 4. A fresh application for execution was presented by the decree-holder on 19.8. 1980, in which it was stated that judgment debtor did not make payment in terms of the compromise and the decree-holder levied execution for the recovery of Rs. 17,200/- including interest. Notices under Or. 21, R. 22, C. P. C. were issued to the judgment-debtor. 4. A fresh application for execution was presented by the decree-holder on 19.8. 1980, in which it was stated that judgment debtor did not make payment in terms of the compromise and the decree-holder levied execution for the recovery of Rs. 17,200/- including interest. Notices under Or. 21, R. 22, C. P. C. were issued to the judgment-debtor. Thereupon the judgment-debtor submitted.her objections. One of the objections raised by the judgment-debtor was that the application for execution is barred by time, as from the date of the decree the execution application was beyond 12 years. The 12 years' period expired on 20.1.1973, whereas the application for execution was presented on 19. 8. 1980. The learned Additional District Judge No. 2, jodhpur, negatived this objection and held that the execution application is within time. lie considered that the order dated 14.2.1970, whereby the compromise was verified and recorded, amounts to a "subsequent order" under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, so the time for 12 years would run from the date of default and from the date of default, the application for execution is within time. As no other objection, were raised before the learned Additional District Judge, so the objections filed by the judgment-debtor under Or. 21, Rule 22, C.P.C., were rejected. Dissatisfied with the order of the learned Additional District judge, the judgment-debtor has preferred this revision petition. 5. I have heard Shri G. R. Singhvi, assisted by Shri Ramgopal Purohit. Advocate, for the jndgment-debtor-petitioner and Shri J. R. Tatia, learned counsel for the decree-holder-non-petitioner. 6. The only question, which requires consideration in the present revision petition, is as to whether the application for execution presented on 19.8.1980 is within time and for determination of that question the controversy between the parties rests on the question as to whether the order recorded in the order-sheet of the earlier execution application on 14.2.1970 is a "subsequent order within the meaning of Article 136. column three, whereunder the 12 years' period would run when default in making the payment or delivery of any property, in respect of which execution is sought, takes place. Article 136 of the Limitation Act is as under:- 136. for the execution of Twelve years any decree order than a decree granting a mandatory in-junction or order of any civil Court. Article 136 of the Limitation Act is as under:- 136. for the execution of Twelve years any decree order than a decree granting a mandatory in-junction or order of any civil Court. when the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any, 'subsequent order', directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or recurring periods, when default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place: Provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of it decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation. 7. A perusal of column three of Art 136 would show that where any "sub- sequent order" directs any payment of money or delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, the limitation would run when default takes place. The normal period of limitation is 12 years, when a decree or order becomes enforceable. and that may be enforceable from the date of the decree or the date of the order. Where any subsequent order is passed directing any payment of money or delivery of any property to be made at a certain date and if on that date compliance of-the direction is not made, then from the date of default the period of 12 years would run. So the whole question is as to whether the order recorded on 14 2.1970, falls within the expression "subsequent order" within the meaning of Art. 136 of the Limitation Act. 8. Mr. G. R. Singhvi, learned counsel for the jedgment-debtor-Petitioner submitted that the word --order" has been defined under clause (14) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. "Order" means the formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree. Resides that, he urged that there should be an order by the Court directing any payment of money or delivery of any property to be made at a certain date 'flue order dated 14-2-1970 neither falls within the expression "order" as defined in Section 2 (14) of the Code of Civil Procedure. nor it falls within the expression "subsequent order" as contemplated under Article 136 of the Limitation Act. nor it falls within the expression "subsequent order" as contemplated under Article 136 of the Limitation Act. The order dated 14.2.1970 is not a "subsequent order'', as by that order, no direction for Payment of money has been made by a particular date. The court below erred in law in holding that the order dated 14.2.1970 is a "subsequent order", as contemplated tinder Article 136 of the Limitation Act. In order to support his contention Mr. Singhvi placed reliance on some case law. He cited some cases, in which there were clear orders directing payment of money by a certain date and he also referred to some cases where compromise was placed on record and execution applications were consigned to record in pursuance of the compromise, but it has been held that placing of compromise on record and consignment of execution application on that basis, does not amount to a "subsequent order" within the meaning of Article 136 of the Limitation Act. 9. He referred to it decision of the Lahore High Court in(1) Haji Zaheer-ud- Deen v. Mst. Aktur Rasheed d/o Abdul Bari and another (AIR 1944 Lahore 106) . In that case in an application for execution compromise was entered into between the parties. The judgment-debtor agreed to pay the decretal amount by instalments and furnished security. The court passed an order on the date of compromise in the following words : "SAMUJAB BAYANAT FARICAIN BARU-I-RAZINANA MISAL IJRA DAKHIL DAFTAR HO."Thereafter various applications of execution were presented by tire decree-holder. When last application was presented, an objection was taken that the application was made after the expiration of 12 years from the date of the decree. Abdur Rehman, J., speaking for the Division Bench, observed that in the absence of any direction by the Court to the parties to receive and pay the money in accordance with fresh contract arrived at between the parties, the order passed on 12th December, 1972 cannot be construed so as to contain a direction in regard to the payment of money at any date different from what was provided by the decree. The objection of the judgment-debtor was upheld and the application for execution was held to be barred by time under Section 48 (1)(b)C.P.C. 10. It may be pointed out that the facts of that care do not indicate as to whether the compromise was recorded by the Court. The objection of the judgment-debtor was upheld and the application for execution was held to be barred by time under Section 48 (1)(b)C.P.C. 10. It may be pointed out that the facts of that care do not indicate as to whether the compromise was recorded by the Court. It is true that in that case a compromise was arrived at, and that was filed in the Court and in pursuance of the compromise, the execution application was consigned to record. That case does not deal with the question as to what is the effect of the recording of the compromise and that authority does not deal with the question whether recording of compromise can he treated to be a ''subsequent order." 11. Reliance has next been placed by Shri Singhvi on a decision of the Travacore-Cochin High Court in Pylee Kuriakko v. Kurian pylee (AIR 1953 Tra. Co. 394) . The facts of that case are on all fours with the facts of the present case. That case lays down that mere recording of a compromise does not satisfy the condition provided in Section 48 (I) (b). C P. C.. that is the order must be one which directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property, to be made at a certain date or at recurring intervals. In that case as well the prayer in the application for compromise was only to the effect that the petition may be recorded and that was done and the matter stopped there. So it was observed that it cannot be said that there was any order imposing on either party any fresh obligation capable of enforcement by that Court. As such, it was held that the decree-holder is not entitled to claim the benefit of Section 48 (1) (b), C.P.C. It may be stated that that authority is no more good law in view of a later Division Bench decision of the Kerala High Court, on which reliance was placed by Shri J. R. Tatia, learned counsel for the decree-holder-non- petitioner. That decision is Edapally valia Raja v. Chacko (AIR 1959 Kerala 83) . In that case all that the execution court did with respect to compromise petition, was to pass the order "recorded" on it. That decision is Edapally valia Raja v. Chacko (AIR 1959 Kerala 83) . In that case all that the execution court did with respect to compromise petition, was to pass the order "recorded" on it. After referring to the above mentioned Travencore-Cochin High Court's decision K. T. Koshi, C.J., observed,- "We are however of the opinion that the view taken by Shakaran J., is rather too strict or narrow. The effect of the order recorded' on the compromise petition is that the court accepts the compromise arrangement and gives its imprimature to it. To all intents and purposes the terms of the compromise form part of the Court's order." Reliance was placed in that decision on the decision of a Calcutta High Court in , Jatindra Nath Roy Chowdbury v. Heramba Chandra Roy Chowdhary (AIR 1945 Cal. 154) . In that case also the execution court passed the order ,recorded' on the compromise petition filed by the parties, and a Division Court gave that order the sense, which was given by the Division Bench in the above Kerala case. In the Calcutta case the compromise was recorded in the execution proceedings and the execution case was dismissed. Further reliance was placed on a Allahabad High Court decision in Chhatra Pati Pertab Bahadur Sahi v. Hari Ram Marwari (AIR 1940 Allahabad 423) , and, on a decision in Kesava Pillai v. Krishnan (1949 Trav. L.R. 185) . 12. The next case, on which reliance was placed by Shri G. R. Singhvi is a Single Bench decision of Gujarat High Court in Prafullavadan Dinkerray Saiyed v. Chokshi Bhuderbhai Mathurbhai (AIR 1964 Gujarat 100) . This case supports the contention of Mr. Singhvi. The Court recorded the compromise below the decree. v. B. Raju, J., observed,-. "There is also no subsequent order of the Court directing the payment of money in instalments. The Court's order that the adjustment should be recorded does not amount to an order directing the payment of money in instalments. To do so would be to amend the decree and the Court has no power to do so. In fact, there is no subsequent order of the Court directing the payment of money by instalments. Section 48 (1) 1 b) of the Civil Procedure Code has therefore no application Limitation would run from the date of the decree i. e. 20.9.48. In fact, there is no subsequent order of the Court directing the payment of money by instalments. Section 48 (1) 1 b) of the Civil Procedure Code has therefore no application Limitation would run from the date of the decree i. e. 20.9.48. The Darkhast would, therefore, clearly be time barred." 13. The other cases, on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Singhvi are Laxmilal v. Onkarlal (1951 R.L.W. 493) ; Vasamma and others v. S.K. Jayadeviah (AIR 1974 Mysore 4); Gopal Chand Bhalla s/o Mira Lal v. Govind Sarup S/o L. Ram Chand and another (AIR 1959 Punjab 193) and Karankkodan Gowda Swarawsatha Brahman Samajam v. Manikka Pai (AIR 1959 Kerala 384) . All those cases are the cases where clear directions were made by the Court after passing of the decree to stake payment of the decretal amount in instalments. In view of the clear directions, applications for execution were held to he within time under Section 48 (1) (b), C.P.C., or Article 136 of the Limitation Act, although it has been observed in those cases that there should be a lawful order passed by all executing court directing payment of money or the delivery if any property to be made at recurring periods and such lawful order would be covered within the expression subsequent order" tinder Section 48 (1) (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The observations have been made in the context of the facts of those cases and those cases do not consider the effect of recording of the compromise and they do not deal with the question as to whether recording of compromise would amount to a "subsequent order" directing any payment of moray at recurring periods. I may here refer to an another decision of this Court in (12) Mohd. Ahmed v. Pannalal (1954 R.L W. 715) In that case a compromise was made between the parties and the decretal amount was agreed to be paid in instalments. Some instalments were paid, but the balance amount remained unpaid for which the decree-holder moved an application for execution and an objection was raised by the judgment-debtor that the application is barred by time. The question of limitation was decided against the judgment-debtor by the two courts .Thereupon, the judgment-debtor came in second appeal before this Court. Some instalments were paid, but the balance amount remained unpaid for which the decree-holder moved an application for execution and an objection was raised by the judgment-debtor that the application is barred by time. The question of limitation was decided against the judgment-debtor by the two courts .Thereupon, the judgment-debtor came in second appeal before this Court. Sharnia, J., referred to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Jatindra Nath Roy Chowdhury v. Heramba Chandra Roy Chowdhury (supra) and approved of the view taken in that case, although the extract quoted in that decision could not be located, but still the Calcutta view was approved and it was observed that the words -subsequent order" would include any order passed during execution proceedings on the compromise of the parties recorded in Court. This would mean that even an order whereby compromise has been recorded and if execution has been consigned to record in pursuance of the compromise, then such an order would fall within the expression '-subsequent order", although from the report of that case it is not clear as to whether any direction was given for payment of money in terms of compromise or not, but it is cleat from the facts that compromise made between the parties was recorded in Court. As the facts go as reported in the judgment, it can be taken that where compromise has been recorded the order recording the compromise would constitute "subsequent order" within the meaning of Article 136 of the Limitation. 14. In the Division Bench Case of the Allahabad High Court in Chhatra Pati Pertap Bahadur Sahi v. Hari Ram Marwari (supra), relying on a Privy Council decision in Oudh Commercial Bank Ltd., Fyzabad v. Sind Basni Kuer (A.I.R. 1939 P.C. 80 , it was observed that there can therefore be no doubt that the compromise width was entered into between the parties was enforceable in execution proceedings. The period of twelve years will, accordingly, be computed front the date of the default and, therefore, the application is within time and is not barred by time by Section 18. Civil Procedure Code" 15. Mr. Tatia. learned counsel for the decree-holder non-petitioner also cited , decision of the Allahabad High Court in Mitthan Lal v. Smt. Parwati and others (AIR 1977 Allahabad 236) . Civil Procedure Code" 15. Mr. Tatia. learned counsel for the decree-holder non-petitioner also cited , decision of the Allahabad High Court in Mitthan Lal v. Smt. Parwati and others (AIR 1977 Allahabad 236) . In that case the executing court Passed all order dated 28-5-1957 on the basis of the compromise arrived at during execution. It Was to the effect that the execution was struck off in part satisfaction in terms of the compromise. It was held that the order passed by the executing court on the basis of it compromise can be deemed to be subsequent order under Section 48. sub-section (1) (b), C.P.C. and reliance was placed on the above decisions of the Kerala High Court and a decisions of the Punjab High Court in Gopal Chand Bhalla v. Gobind Sarup and another (AIR 1963 Punjab 363) . 16. From the above discussion, it would appear that this court and the Calcutta, Kerala, Allahabad High Courts have taken the view that recording of the compromise amounts to a subsequent order within the meaning of Section 48 (1) (b), C.P.C, or Article 136 of the Limitation Act, whereas the Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court has taken a contrary view. 17. I may state that when it compromise is submitted and the same is verified and recorded, it would imply that the court would give effect to the compromise. It is true that a prayer could have been made that in terms of the compromise an order directing payment may be passed, but even in the absence of such it prayer and even in the absence of such a direction by the court in terms of the compromise, it can be taken that the obligation, which has been cast on the judgment-debtor to snake payment in terms of the compromise, is an obligation cast by the court, when the compromise has been recorded by the court. Had the compromise been not recorded and simply it would have been filed and the execution had been consigned to record in pursuance of the compromise, the position would be different. Had the compromise been not recorded and simply it would have been filed and the execution had been consigned to record in pursuance of the compromise, the position would be different. But where the compromise is recorded and after recording the compromise the parties expressed not to proceed with the execution and the execution is consigned to record in view of the compromise, then the recording of the compromise would be sufficient to mean that the court has given a direction for payment of the decretal amount in terms of the compromise else the recording of the compromise would be rendered meaningless and would be a superfluous formality and would be of no effect and consequence. The very act of recording of the compromise by the Court, would amount to putting a seal on the terms of the compromise and the parties are required to discharge their obligations in accordance with the terms of the compromise. With all respect to the learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court, I am unable to agree with the view taken by the learned, Judge. I, therefore, hold that in the present case the- order passed in the order-sheet on 14.2.1970 constitutes a ''subsequent order" within the meaning of Article 136 of the Limitation Act and the' period of limitation would run from the date of default and admittedly from the date of default, the application for execution presented on 19-11-1980 is within limitation. In that view of the matter I concur with the view taken by the learned Additional District Judge on the question of limitation. 18. It was next urged by Mr.G.R. Singhvi that the learned Additional District judge erred in observing that no objections were raised and consequently he erred in rejecting all the objections raised under Order 21, Rule 22, C.P.C. He stated at the Bar that lie reserved his right to argue the other objections and he simply argued the question of' limitation and he expressed before the learned Additional District judge that it will not be necessary to argue the other objections in case the question of limitation is decided in favour of the judgment-debtor. This statement made at the Bar by Mr. G R. Singhvi, has not been refuted by the learned counsel for the decree-holder-non-petitioner. In view of the unrefuted statement of Mr. This statement made at the Bar by Mr. G R. Singhvi, has not been refuted by the learned counsel for the decree-holder-non-petitioner. In view of the unrefuted statement of Mr. G. R. Singhvi, it would be proper that the petitioner may be given an opportunity to raise objections, other than the objection of limitation made by him under Order 21, Rule 22, C.P.C. 19. I, therefore, partly allow this revision petition, I uphold the finding of the learned Additional District judge on the question of limitation, but set aside the order of the learned Additional District judge dismissing the objections in toto and it is directed that the learned Additional District judge shall hear the parties on the other objections raised by the judgment-debtor in his objection petition under Order 21, Rule 22, C.P.C. In the circumstances of the case I leave the parties to bear their own costs. *******