Research › Browse › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

1982 DIGILAW 457 (MAD)

K. M. Venkataraman Chettiar & Sons by Mg. partner v. N. G. Kutram Kasthuri Rangiah Chettiar Charity estate, Trichi, rep by its trustee

1982-11-26

MAHESWARAN

body1982
Judgment :- 1. The defendant against whom an order of eviction has been passed is the appellant in this second appeal. 2. The suit property, a building, of which the appellant was a tenant, belonged to the plaintiff-trust. A petition for eviction was filed in H.R.C O.P. 328 of 1973, on the file of the Rent Controller by the plaintiff-trust against the appellant on the ground that he is in arrears of rent and has also sublet a portion of the building. An order for eviction was passed. When the appeal was pending, G.O.Ms. No. 1998, dated 12th August, 1974, was passed exempting all buildings belonging to religious endowments from the operation of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The appeal was therefore, dismissed and later, the respondent filed the suit, after giving a valid notice to the defendant. 3. The suit was resisted by the defendant who inter alia, contended that the first plaintiff is not the trustee of the plaintiff-trust, that the plaintiff-trust is neither a religious trust nor a charitable institution, and that G.O.Ms. No. 1998, dated 20th August, 1974 will not apply. The trial court has observed that the plaintiff had admitted that it is a private trust and that the G.O. does not make a distinction between public and private trusts and therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to claim exemption from the provisions of the Rent Control Act and in the end decreed the suit. In appeal, the District Judge, without discussing the, question at issue, concurred with the finding of the trial court, and dismissed the appeal. The appellant challenges that judgment and decree in this second appeal. 4. At the time of admission of the second appeal, the High Court formulated the following substantial question of law:— “Is the suit maintainable in a civil court for eviction and whether G.O.Ms. No. 2000 dated 16th August, 1976 is applicable only to public trusts and not to private trusts as that of the plaintiff.” What is contended before me is that G.O.Ms. No. 2000 dated 16th August, 1976 is applicable only to public trusts and not to private trusts as that of the plaintiff.” What is contended before me is that G.O.Ms. 1998 Home dated 12th August, 1974, was superseded by G.O. No. 2000 Home dated 16th August, 1976 and that the later G.O. exempts all buildings owned by the Hindu, Christian and Muslim public trusts and public charities from the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, and there being an admission by P.W. 1 that this is a private trust the Civil Court will not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. As far as I could see there appears to be no such admission by P.W. 1, that it is a private trust. The appellate Judge has not given any finding as to whether the property is a public trust or a private trust. As there is no clinching finding as to whether the plaintiff-trust is a public trust or a private trust a finding has to be called for and the lower appellate Court will give a finding as whether the plaintiff-trust is a public trust or a private trust. The finding will be given within two months from the date of receipt of the records. (After the return of the finding, this appeal coming on for final disposal, the Court delivered the following judgment):— 5. The learned District Judge has rendered a finding that the plaintiff-trust is a public trust. If it is held to be a public trust, the suit for eviction of the defendant-appellant would be maintainable. The counsel for the appellant invited my attention to the objections filed by him and contended that P.W. 1 has clearly admitted that the plaintiff-trust is only a private trust and that the finding of the District Judge is contrary to the evidence and is unsustainable in law-Even in my order calling for a finding, I have clearly stated that there appears to be no such admission by P.W. 1 that the trust is a private trust. Even the District Judge has observed that on going through the oral evidence of P.W. 1, who is one of the trustees, he does not find any admission that the trust is a private trust. While so, it is rather strange that the appellant says that P.W. 1 has admitted that the trust is a private trust. Even the District Judge has observed that on going through the oral evidence of P.W. 1, who is one of the trustees, he does not find any admission that the trust is a private trust. While so, it is rather strange that the appellant says that P.W. 1 has admitted that the trust is a private trust. From Ex. A4 and from the evidence of P.W. 1 it is clear that a charity is conducted. P.W. 1s evidence would show that at Samayapuram temple on the day when the deity is taken out in procession on horse ‘vahanam’ they feed the members of Chettiar community. 6. In Radhakrishna Chettiar v. Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. 1 a Division Benth of this Court took the view that the charitable institution which fed Arya Vvsya Pilgrims at religious festivals upon stated occasions would be “a religious charity” even apart from the performance of pooja and neyvedyam. The learned Judges following Sri Venkatarama Devaru v. State of Mysoe 2 held that the word “public” includes in its ordinary acceptation any section of the public. In Ahmedabad Rana Caste Association v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat 3 the Supreme Court held that an object beneficial to a section of the public is an object of general public utility and to serve a charitable purpose, it is not necessary that the object should be to benefit the whole of mankind or all persons in a particular country or State and that it is sufficient if the intention to benefit a section of the Public as distinguished from a specified individual is present. D.W. 1, the only witness examined for the defendant has stated that he is not denying that the first plaintiff is the trsutee. He has further admitted that he has gone to the Chettiar Chatram at Samayapuram and has also taken food. Therefore, it is clear that feeding of the Chettiar community by the plaintiff-trust was carried on. 7. My attention was invited by the learned counsel for the appellant to the ruling in Trustees of Gordhandas Govindram Family Charity Trust v. C.I.T. Bombay 4. Therefore, it is clear that feeding of the Chettiar community by the plaintiff-trust was carried on. 7. My attention was invited by the learned counsel for the appellant to the ruling in Trustees of Gordhandas Govindram Family Charity Trust v. C.I.T. Bombay 4. That was a case where it was held that the trust concerned in that case was created primarily for the benefit of the members of the family of Gordhandas Govindram Seksaria and that fact is clear from the title given to the trust as well as from the various provisions of the trust deed and therefore the Supreme Court held that it is not possible to hold that the trust in question is a trust for any public purpose, and that it is purely a private trust. Such, how ever, is not the case here. The primary purpose of the settlor was not to benefit the members of his family. In the instantcase, the charity is to feed the members of Chettiar Community on certain occasions during the festival at Samayapuram. The finding by the District Judge that the trust in question is a public trust is accepted. The plaintiff-trust which is a public trust will be entitled to the benefits of exemption from the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act by virtue of G.O.Ms. 2000 Home, dated 16th August, 1976. The suit is therefore perfectly maintainable. 8. I have already extracted the substantial question of law formulated by one of the learned Judges of this Court at the time of admission of the Second Appeal. It has been found that the trust in question is a public trust. Therefore, the suit for eviction is perfectly maintainable in a civil Court. As regards the question whether G.O.Ms. No. 2005. Home dated 16th August 1976 is applicable only to public trusts and not to private trusts. I must at once point out that the G.O., itself which modifies the earlier G.O.GO.Ms. No. 1998, Home, dated 12th August, 1974, exempts all the buildings owned by the Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious public trusts and public charitable trusts from all the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. notification, dated 12th August, 1974. I must at once point out that the G.O., itself which modifies the earlier G.O.GO.Ms. No. 1998, Home, dated 12th August, 1974, exempts all the buildings owned by the Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious public trusts and public charitable trusts from all the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. notification, dated 12th August, 1974. The learned Judge was of the view that the notification dated 12th August, 1974 only refers to public religious trusts as the words “religious trusts” are preceded by the words “Hindu, Christian and Muslim,” and if the intention were to refer to private trusts, the reference to the three great religious denominations would have been quite unnecessary and likewise the expression “Charitable Institutions” will only refer to public charitable institutions and that the prior notification dated 12th August, 1974 while it referred to Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious trusts and charitable institutions, had in mind only public religious trusts and public charitable institutions and the subsequent notification dated 16th August, 1976 did not make for a departure in the Governments exemption policy, but only nude explicit what was made implicit in the earlier notification. This view of the learned Judge would show that both the notifications exempted only public trusts. The question whether the earlier notification is applicable to both the trusts is purely academical in view of the fact that it has now been superseded. But, I may point out, with respect to the learned Judge, that the earlier notification, in my view, would apply to both private and public trusts and not to public trusts alone. Or else, there was no reason for the Government to modify the orders in G.O.Ms. No. 1998 Home dated 12th August, 1974, so as to exclude private trusts from the exemption granted and to limit its application to public charitable trusts only, as seen from the notification. The mere fact that the words ‘Hindu, Christian, Muslim religious trusts and charitable institution’ occurring in the earlier notification are replaced by the words ‘Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious public trusts and public charitable trusts’ and the fact that the earlier notification is superseded by the later notification are clear indications that the earlier notification exempted both public and private religious trusts. There is no doubt that G.O.Ms. No. 2000. There is no doubt that G.O.Ms. No. 2000. Home, dated 16th August, 1976, exempts all buildings owned by Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious public trusts and public charitable trusts from the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. These points are found accordingly. 10. The result is, the second appeal is dismissed with costs throughout.