Dhirendra Singh v. Dhanai — 1982 DIGILAW 460 (ALL)

JUDGMENT :- This appeal by the plaintiffs arises out of a suit filed under Sec.92 of the Civil P.C. On contest the suit was dismissed by the District Judge, Faizabad. 2. The allegations in the plaint are these; There existed an old public Math situate in village Agthara Narayanpur, Pargana Birhar, Tahsil Tanda district Faizabad. Within the Math there is a public temple in which are installed the "Deities" of Shri Sitaram Ji Maharaj and Hanuman Ji etc. For the upkeep of the Math and maintenance of the Seva, Puja, Utsav and Samaiya of the said deities, over and above the seasonal contributions of the produce of lands, immovable property comprising lands in the villages detailed in Schedules A to E attached to the plaint inclusive of groves detailed in the said Schedules were endowed by the ancestors of the plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 4 to the Math and the deities installed therein. Ever since the endowment which had taken place long before the British period the income and the produce of the said lands and property were used for the aforesaid purpose. Shri Rachpal Giri Virakt Chela of Shri Ram Ratan Giri who was impleaded as defendant No. 1 in the suit was said to have succeeded his Guru Shri Ram Ratan Giri in 1925 A.D. Due to the extreme weakness and infirmity of old age he became incapable of properly managing the property and its income and was completely in the hands of his Mukhtar and nephew Dhanai and his wife and children for whom he has built a new house mentioned in Schedule A. In order to secure cash sums as much as possible by the transfer and collusive decrees of landed property of the Math Dhanai got several transfer deeds executed by the defendant No. 1 in his favour and others. The defendant No.1 also executed a sale-deed dated 26-6-1959 in favour of the defendants Nos. 2 to 4 for a consideration of Rs. 5,000.00 with respect to the land of village Agathara mentioned in Schedule B of the plaint though there was no justification for the same. The defendant No. 1 also parted with immoveable property of village Rampur district Azamgarh mentioned in Schedule A by entering into collusive decrees. He was thus out to waste the entire property; hence it became necessary to file the suit for the reliefs mentioned in the plaint. The defendant No. 1 also parted with immoveable property of village Rampur district Azamgarh mentioned in Schedule A by entering into collusive decrees. He was thus out to waste the entire property; hence it became necessary to file the suit for the reliefs mentioned in the plaint. The suit was contested by the defendants. The defendant No.1 filed his written statement denying the various allegations made against him in the plaint. He asserted that the property is not a public trust nor did it belong to any math. He also stated that he was a Gosain and his ancestors house was situate outside the Abadi area of the village where there was no temple or Thakurdwars. There was only one Kachcha house of defendant No. 1 which was not a Math nor it could be said, to be a public Math. He denied that the idols of the deities Thakur Ji and Hanuman Ji were installed in any temple as alleged. Further he stated that the entire land in dispute was personally acquired by his ancestor Bhakhtawar Giri Gosain and he was the absolute owner thereof in personal capacity. No part of the disputed property was ever the property of a Math or a public Math. The suit was said to be not maintainable under Section 92 of the Civil P.C. He also contended that for the last several decades the plaintiffs had been making effort to deprive him of his properties but had failed to do so. He referred to various cases which had been filed in that connection and denied that any of the properties in dispute ever belonged to the ancestors of the plaintiffs or to the plaintiffs themselves. The defendants Nos. 2 to 4 also contested the suit and filed a separate written statement repudiating various allegations made in the plaint. Replications were thereafter filed by the plaintiffs. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed by the learned District Judge :- 1. Whether the plaintiffs have a right of suit? 2. Whether there is any public Math in village Agthara Narainpur and the properties detailed in list b are properties endowed to the said Math? 3. Whether the defendant No.1 is the Mahant of the Math aforesaid, and whether he held the properties detailed in Lists A to E of the plaint in his capacity of Mahant of the said Math? 4. 3. Whether the defendant No.1 is the Mahant of the Math aforesaid, and whether he held the properties detailed in Lists A to E of the plaint in his capacity of Mahant of the said Math? 4. Whether the defendant No.1 is unfit and incapable of continuing as a Mahant of the Math and is he guilty of mis-management and acts detrimental to the interest of the Math? 5. Whether it is necessary to have a scheme of management for the Math If so, what should be the details thereof? 6. Whether there was any school attached to the Math and is it necessary to include any direction regarding it in the scheme for the management of the Math sought by the plaintiffs? 7. Whether the properties detailed in List B of the plaint were personal properties of the defendant No. 1? 8. Are the plaintiffs not entitled to the relief for possession in respect of the properties of the defendant No.1? 9. Are the plaintiffs not entitled to the relief for cancellation of the sale deed in the present suit? 10. Whether the defendants 2 to 4 are Sirdars of any of the plots detailed in List b of the plaint? If so, to what effect? 11. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled? 3. Considering the evidence adduced in the case the learned District Judge held that there was no public Math in village Agthara Narainpur and the properties detailed in List B are not the properties endowed to the alleged Math. He also held that the properties detailed in Lists A" to E of the plaint were not held by the defendant No.1 in the capacity of Mahant of the alleged Math. Rather the properties detailed in List B of the plaint were personal properties of the defendant No.1 The learned District Judge also found that the plaintiffs had no right to bring a suit under Sec.92, C.P.C. and as no public trust was proved the suit was liable to be dismissed. The suit was accordingly dismissed. 4. For the appellants it was submitted that the learned District Judge had erred in holding that it was not proved that there was a public trust as alleged in the plaint and that the suit was not maintainable under Section 92, C.P.C. 5. The suit was accordingly dismissed. 4. For the appellants it was submitted that the learned District Judge had erred in holding that it was not proved that there was a public trust as alleged in the plaint and that the suit was not maintainable under Section 92, C.P.C. 5. The suit was admittedly filed under Section 92, C.P.C., on 4-1-1962 which at the material time read as follows :- "92. (1) In the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary of the administration of any such trust, the Advocate-General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the consent in writing of the Advocate-General, may institute a suit, whether contentions or not, in the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in any other Court empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate, to obtain a decree :- (a) removing any trustee; (b) appointing a new trustee; (bb) for delivery of possession of any trust property against a person who has ceased to be trustee or has been removed; (c) vesting any property in a trustee; (cc) directing a trustee who has been removed or a person who has ceased to be a trustee, to deliver possession of any trust property in his possession to the person entitled to the possession of such property; (d) directing accounts and inquiries; (e) declaring what proportion of the trust-property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust; (f) authorising the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged; (g) settling a scheme; or (h) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require. (2) Save as provided by the Religious Endowments Act, 1863, or by any corresponding law in force in the territories which immediately before the 1st November, 1956 were comprised in Part B States, no suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in sub-section (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with the provisions of that sub-section." 6. In the case of Swami Parmatmanant Saraswati v. Ramji Tripathi ( AIR 1974 SC 2141 ) the Supreme Court observed as follows (at p. 2144) :- "A suit under Sec.92 is a suit of a special nature which presupposes the existence of a public trust of a religious or charitable character. Such a suit can proceed only on the allegation that there was a breach of such trust or that the direction of the Court is necessary for the administration of the trust and the plaintiff must pray for one or more of the reliefs that are mentioned in the section." 7. In order to maintain a suit under Section 92, C.P.C., it must therefore, be shown that there exists a trust for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature; that there is a breach of such trust or that the direction of the Court is necessary for the administration of the trust and the reliefs claimed in the suit must be one or more of the relief that are mentioned in the section. Where any one of these conditions is absent Section 92 would have no application to the suit. If the suit does not relate to a public trust but relates to private properties owned by an individual or to a private trust, Section 92, C. P. C., would not apply. 8. The distinction between a private and a public trust is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific individual, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. While in the former the beneficiaries are persons who are ascertained or capable of being ascertained, in the latter they constitute a body which is incapable of ascertainment. A religious endowment must, therefore, be held to be private or public according as the beneficiaries thereunder are specific persons or the general public or sections thereof (see Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar, AIR 1957 SC 133 ). The same distinction was noticed in Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji v. S.P. Sahi ( AIR 1959 SC 951 ). 9. So, to attract the provisions of S.92, C.P.C. it must be established that the beneficial interest is vested in an uncertain and fluctuating body of individual and the trust is of a permanent character. Sec.92, C.P.C., will not be attracted if there is no trust express or constructive for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature. 9. So, to attract the provisions of S.92, C.P.C. it must be established that the beneficial interest is vested in an uncertain and fluctuating body of individual and the trust is of a permanent character. Sec.92, C.P.C., will not be attracted if there is no trust express or constructive for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature. All the conditions enumerated in sub-sec.(1) of Section 92, C.P.C. must co-exist for maintaining a suit under it. If any one of those conditions is missing the suit will not come within the mischief of that section. A private trust is outside the operation of that section (see AIR 1973 All 238 , Kailash Chand v. Bhupal Nath). 10. The existence of a trust express or constructive for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature is the foundational fact for the Advocate General to institute a suit on any alleged breach thereof or where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust. The existence of the same foundational fact will be necessary before the Advocate General can grant consent in writing to two or more persons having interest in the trust. The consent has to be granted for instituting a suit for obtaining a decree for the matters set out in Clauses (a) to (h) of that section. The plaintiff in a suit under Section 92, Civil P.C., cannot claim relief which do not find mention in the Section granted by the Advocate General (see Uma Shankar v. Salig Ram, AIR 1975 All 36 ) (FB). 11. The plaintiff-appellants filed the suit, which has given rise to this appeal, under Section 92, C.P.C., after obtaining the consent of the dvocate General of Uttar Pradesh. The consent of the Advocate General is paper No. 5/Ga-2. The Advocate General granted the consent to the institution of a suit under Section 92, C.P.C., by the plaintiffs against the defendants for the following reliefs :- 1. For the removal of defendant No.1 from the office of Mahant. 2. For settling the scheme for the management of the trust property. 3. For the appointment of new trustee. 4. For rendition of accounts of the trust property. 5. For any other and further relief as the nature of the case may require. 12. For the removal of defendant No.1 from the office of Mahant. 2. For settling the scheme for the management of the trust property. 3. For the appointment of new trustee. 4. For rendition of accounts of the trust property. 5. For any other and further relief as the nature of the case may require. 12. The plaintiffs alleged in the plaint that there existed an old public Math in village Agthara Narainpur, Pargana Birhar, Tahasil Tanda district Faizabad and within the Math there is a public temple in which are installed the deities of Shri Sitaram Ji Maharaj and Hanuman Ji etc. The plaintiffs further alleged in paragraph 3 of the plaint that the properties which are mentioned in Schedules A to E of the plaint were endowed by the ancestors of the plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 4 to the Math and the deities installed therein. The endowment had taken place long before the British period. The income and the produce of the land and properties were used for the upkeep of the Math and maintenance of the Seva, Puja, Utsav and Samaiya of the said deities. The defendants have denied the existence of a public Math and also of the alleged endowment to the Math. They have also stated that there is no public temple as alleged and the deities of Thakur Ji and Hanuman Ji are not installed therein as alleged. Both the parties adduced oral and documentary evidence in the case. As would be presently seen the plaintiffs have failed to prove the existence of a public Math and the endowment to the public Math, as pleaded in paragraphs 1 to 4 of the plaint. 13. The plaintiffs filed a document in Persian script to show the nature of the trust. It bears the date Aghan Badi 13 Sambat, 1870. Its transliteration in Hindi as certified by the counsel for the plaintiffs has been included in the Paper Book. It appears to be an application signed by certain persons requesting the members of the public to support the claim of Mahant Bramha Giri who claimed to be a Gaddinashin disciple of Mahant Bakhtawar Giri. It has not been proved that the said document came from proper custody. Presumption under Sec.90 of the Evidence Act applies with regard to original documents and not their copies. It has not been proved that the said document came from proper custody. Presumption under Sec.90 of the Evidence Act applies with regard to original documents and not their copies. No presumption of genuineness of the original can be drawn on the basis of certified copy of a petition more than 30 years old (see 1969 UJ (SC) 400, Lallan Singh v. State of Bihar) and 1956 SCR 1 , Harihar Prasad Singh v. Mst. of Munshi Nath Prasad. The due execution of the original cannot also be presumed on the mere production of a copy of a document (see AIR 1954 SC 606 , Sital Das v. Sant Ram). It is, therefore, difficult to place reliance on the said document. Anyhow, that document does not support the case of the plaintiffs as set out in the plaint. It seems that certain plots of land were given to Bakhtawar Giri as Mafi. On the demise of Bakhtawar Giri, Bramha Giri asserted his title to those plots of land as his Gaddinashin disciple and stated that he had been holding the same as Mafidar. It is not borne out from the said document that the said plots of land were endowed to the deities Sita Ram Ji and Hanuman Ji or to any public temple or public Math or that the said plots of land had been endowed for the purpose of upkeep and maintenance of the Math and for the Seva, Puja, Utsav and Samaiya of the deities". Shri Sitaram Ji Maharaj and Hanuman Ji etc., "installed therein". The other documents on the record also do not prove the said allegations of the plaintiffs, Ex.1 is a copy of the plaint filed before the Settlement Officer dated 8-2-1872. Ganga Giri and Durga Giri had maintained in the plaint that 97 Bigha 14 Biswas of land was granted by the ancestors of the Zamindars to Bakhtawar Giri who was their ancestor and that the Mafi was given as "Khairat Fakirana or as charity to Fakir. The case was taken up by the Settlement Officer on 30-4-1872 and the statements of Ganga Giri, Durga Giri and Ram Het Singh, who was a defendant in that case, were recorded. A copy of the statement of Ganga Giri is Ex.2. He had deposed that 97 Bigha 14 Biswa Mafi land had been in his possession for a long time. A copy of the statement of Ganga Giri is Ex.2. He had deposed that 97 Bigha 14 Biswa Mafi land had been in his possession for a long time. Even the Taluqedars allowed the Mafi land to be held as such. Nawab Sadat Ali also allowed the land to remain in Mifi and rent for the same was being paid from 1274F. It was also claimed that Ganga Giri may be allowed to retain the land as Mafi land. A copy of the statement of Durga Giri in that suit is Ex.3. He also maintained that the land was Mafi land. Ex.39 is the copy of the statement of Ram Het Singh. Incidentally he also stated that the land had been granted as Mafi by his ancestor to the ancestor of Ganga Giri as Gurudakchhina and that Ganga Giri had become its owner by succession. He admitted that Gaddi was of Sanyasis and Ganga Giri may get the Mafi land. That case was compromised. Ex.40 is the certified copy of the compromise petition. It was signed by Ganga Giri and two under-proprietors Ram Het Singh and Prithipal Singh who were the defendants in that case. It was stated in the compromise petition that out of 97 Bigha 14 Biswa of land in dispute. 47 Bigha 6 Biswa cultivated land, 2 Bigha 12 Biswa grove and 1 Bigha 10 Biswa Abadi also would continue to remain in the possession of Ganga Giri as Mafi with no right of transfer and he would pay according to Parta the under-proprietary rent payable by the under-proprietors to the Taluqedar and also pay 12% of the pay of the Chaukidar and the Patwari. The case was decided in terms of the compromise vide Ex.B-8 which is a copy of the order of the Settlement Officer. Ex.27 is the extract from Khetauni No. 2 of village Agthara Narainpur of the first settlement. It shows that Mafi plots were recorded in the name of Ganga Giri. Exs.37 and 38 are respectively extracts from Khasra and map of the Abadi from the settlement record of 1873 which indicate that Ganga Giri had been in possession of certain plots in the Abadi as well. It is quite manifest from these documents that certain plots of land of village Agthara Narainpur were Mafi land which had been given to the ancestor of Ganga Giri Gosain as Khairat Fakirana. It is quite manifest from these documents that certain plots of land of village Agthara Narainpur were Mafi land which had been given to the ancestor of Ganga Giri Gosain as Khairat Fakirana. Ram Het Singh said that they were given as Gurudakshina. So in either view no public trust of religious or charitable nature was created nor any endowment was made in favour of any Math or the deities installed therein. Rather the properties were given to Bakhtawar Giri as Mafi land by way of charity to a Fakir and if the statement of Ram Het Singh is to be taken as correct then they were given as Gurudakchhina. The ownership of these properties passed on by succession from Guru to Chela and in course of time they became the properties of Rachhpal Giri who was Chela of Ram Ratan Giri. The fact that the properties devolved from Guru to Chela will not make the properties to be trust properties. A Sanyasi could acquire property which would on his demise devolve by succession on his Chela. 14. It was held by the Privy Council in Pandit Parma Nand v. Nihal Chand (AIR 1938 PC 195) that "the fact that properties have descended from guru (religious preceptor) to chela (religious disciple) does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a property, when acquired by a mahant, loses its secular character and partakes of religious character. When a person enters the Udasi order, he severs his connexion with the members of his natural family. It follows that neither he nor his natural relative can succeed to the property held by the other. There is however no reason for holding that an Udasi cannot acquire private property with his own money or by his own exertions, If he does acquire private property it cannot be inherited by his natural relatives, but passes on his death to his spiritual heir in- cluding his chela who is recognized as his spiritual Son. There is however no reason for holding that an Udasi cannot acquire private property with his own money or by his own exertions, If he does acquire private property it cannot be inherited by his natural relatives, but passes on his death to his spiritual heir in- cluding his chela who is recognized as his spiritual Son. The descent of the property from a guru to his chela does not warrant the presumption that it is religious property." In the case of Goshain Sheo Ghulam Puri v. Shiam Lal Bhagat (AIR 1928 All 257) it was held that the mere circumstance that the devolution of certain properties has for several generations been in the spiritual lines does not prove that the properties were trust property where according to the tenets of a Muth even the private property which a Mahant of the order might acquire descends to his spiritual chelas. 15. It has not been shown in the instant case trial the properties were given for the maintenance of the Math or the deities. The said plots of land were held by the ancestors of the defendant No.1, now deceased, as also by the defendant No.1 in their own name. The entries in the revenue papers prima facie established that the said plots of land belonged to them and not to the alleged Math. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Biseshwar Das ( AIR 1971 SC 2057 ) laid down that if the property was originally acquired by a mahant, merely because it descended from guru to chela would not mean that the property lost its secular nature, and that merely members of the public are allowed during the celebration of festivals, does not make a temple public, because Hindu sentiment would not tolerate the turning away of any one who comes to worship or have darshan. Further it was held that Mutts can be public or private. If it is dedicated to the public generally, it is public, but if it is for maintaining a particular family and for performance of ceremonies for the spiritual welfare of the founder of the family, the Muth is not a public one. If some ascetics are fed or given shelter in a private Mutt, it does not become a Charity in which the public has an interest. If some ascetics are fed or given shelter in a private Mutt, it does not become a Charity in which the public has an interest. The learned counsel for the appellants, however, laid much stress on a compromise petition filed in a suit instituted in the year 1936 by Sheo Prasad Singh and 11 others against Rachhpal Goshain, defendant No.1. Ex.4 is a copy of the plaint in that suit. Ex. 5 is the copy of the written statement, and Ex.6 is copy of the decree. Sheo Prasad Singh and others had alleged in that suit that as under-proprietors of the Mohal in which the Mafi plots of Agthara Narainpur held by Rachhpal Giri were situate, they were entitled to recover possession there of because the original grant was given to Ganga Giri for his lifetime. Rachhpal Giri contended in trial suit that he was the Mafi holder of those plots. That suit was decided in terms of a compromise entered into between the parties. According to the compromise the plots were to be held as owned by Math Agthara Narainpur in accordance with the terms of the settlement decree dated 30-4-1872. The said compromise in our view also does not establish that the properties in question were endowed to any public trust of religious and charitable nature. The settlement decree dated 30-4-1872 provided that 47 Bigha 6 Biswa cultivated land, 2 Bigha 12 Biswa grove and 1 Bigha 10 Biswa Abadi land detailed therein would remain in possession of Ganga Giri as Mafi with no right of transfer. That decree did not say that the property was endowed property having character and nature of a public trust. Moreover, as indicated earlier the properties in question had, however, been given as Gurudakshhina or as charity to Fakir. They were obviously not endowed to any Public Math or to the deities. The compromise entered into in the suit of 1936 could not, therefore, confer the characteristic of a public trust on the properties in question. The plots in question had been standing in the name of Rachhpal Giri or his ancestor personally. They were never mutated in the name of Math or deities. The compromise entered into in the suit of 1936 could not, therefore, confer the characteristic of a public trust on the properties in question. The plots in question had been standing in the name of Rachhpal Giri or his ancestor personally. They were never mutated in the name of Math or deities. The oral evidence adduced by the plaintiffs also does not lead to the conclusion that there existed any public Math or that the endowment was made in favour of any Math or deity or that the properties in question were public trust. Lal Behari Singh (P.W. 1) admitted that all the plots of land in question stood mutated in the name of Rachhpal Giri. He could not say as to what amount of Math was spent in running a Pathshala though he admitted that the Pathshala was being run with the aid of the District Board. The teachers of the Pathshala were employees of the District Board. No religious lectures or training was imparted in the Pathshala. He admitted that the Pathshala had been closed 17 or 18 years ago. He also could not say as to what amount was spent in the construction of the a house in dispute nor could he say as to when and for what amount the plots were sold. He was not present when the sale deed was executed nor was he present when the money was said to have been passed on by Rachhpal Giri to Dhanai. Lal Behari Singh who is plaintiff No. 2 appellant could not prove that the properties were endowed in favour of the deities "Shri Sita Ram Ji and Hanuman Ji". His testimony is of an interested person. Ram Rooch Pandey (P.W.2) stated that the idols of the deities were kept under a Khaprail verandah of a Kachaha house on a Pucca Chabutra made of bricks which was not even plastered by cement. This can hardly be said to be a temple. Jagannath Singh (P.W. 3) deposed that the building of the Math had fallen down and that the idols of Ram, Janki, Hanuman Ji and small idols of Sita Ram were kept in a temple. He conceded that the Math was of the same type as other houses were and that Rachhpal Giri lived therein. He calls that house as Math because Rachhpal Giri who was a Mahant lived therein. This statement is hardly convincing. He conceded that the Math was of the same type as other houses were and that Rachhpal Giri lived therein. He calls that house as Math because Rachhpal Giri who was a Mahant lived therein. This statement is hardly convincing. He admitted that whatever was presented as offerings in the Math belonged to Baba Ji and that Baba Ji of his own need to feed the Fakirs, ascetics and guests and also performed Utsava. His evidence also falls short of proving the existence of a Public trust or the endowment of the properties in favour of the deities or any Math. On the other hand the evidence of Bunnar Pandey (D.W. 1), Muneshwar (D.W. 2) and Anant Prasad (D.W. 3) goes to prove that the house in which Rachhpal Giri resided did not contain any Math or temple nor any Utsav was performed on the occasion of Janmasthmi, Holi or Nag Panchmi nor any member of the public visited the place. It was also denied that any Pathshala was run by the alleged Math. Rather the Pathshala was run for some time by the District Board which was ultimately closed by the Board. Even if it is found that the public visited the residence of Rachhpal Giri on important festivals it would not mean that the house had become a public Math or that if any deity was being worshipped by Rachhpal Giri or his ancestors the place was intended for the worship by the public. The land was held by the ancestors of the defendant No. 1, now deceased, as Mafidar. The true beneficiaries were specific persons and the property descended from guru to chela. It did not, therefore lose its secular nature. The properties were not dedicated to the public generally. The fact that some ascetics were fed on festivals or otherwise would not mean that the properties were held in public trust in which public had an interest. It was competent for the ancestors of the defendant No. 1, now deceased, to acquire and own personal properties. The plots of land in question were acquired by the ancestors of the defendant No. 1 as Mafidar. It has not been proved that those properties were dedicated to deities or given for the maintenance of the deities. It was competent for the ancestors of the defendant No. 1, now deceased, to acquire and own personal properties. The plots of land in question were acquired by the ancestors of the defendant No. 1 as Mafidar. It has not been proved that those properties were dedicated to deities or given for the maintenance of the deities. No public trust of charitable and religious nature has thus been proved to exist and I am hence in agreement with the finding reached by the learned District Judge on the issues Nos. 2, 3 and 7. 16. The suit under Section 92, C.P.C., was, therefore rightly held to be not maintainable. 17. Further the suit for relief (A) reading as under was also in any view of the matter not maintainable. "(A) That the illegal transfer of the Math and Temple property, made by the defendant 1 or his Mukhtar may be cancelled and declared ineffective in law and not binding on the Math, temple and deity installed and a decree for possession in respect of property mentioned in Schedule B be passed in favour of the Math, temple and deity installed." The Advocate General had not granted his consent to file the suit for the said relief. As held in Uma Shanker v. Salig Ram ( AIR 1975 All 36 (FB)) by the Full Bench the plaintiff in a suit under Section 92. C.P.C. cannot claim any relief which did not find mention in the sanction granted by the Advocate General. The relief (A) in the instant suit does not find mention in the sanction granted by the Advocate General. Moreover, the relief by way of declaration that the property is endowed property so as to bind a stranger to the trust cannot be granted (see Uma Shanker v. Salig Ram (supra). In this view also relief (A) sought for was not tenable. 18. The other reliefs sought for were also not available to the plaintiffs-appellants inasmuch as the plaintiffs have failed to prove the existence of a public trust of a religious or charitable Nature. 19. In the circumstances the suit was rightly dismissed. 20. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.