JUDGMENT : Nagendra Prasad Singh, J. The petitioners in different writ applications had been engaged as casual labourers in the project for conversion of Metre Guage line into Broad Guage in the North Eastern Railway, on or after 1st July, 1980. By the impugned orders they have been retrenched on the grounds that the work has been completed and the sanction accorded for the same had also expired. According to the petitioners their retrenchment not being in accordance with law, they continue to be casual labourers and entitled for remuneration payable to them. Common questions of law and fact are involved in all the writ applications, and, as such, they were heard together and are being disposed by a common judgment. C.W.J.C. No. 4568 of 1981 was heard first and the counsel appearing in other writ applications adopted the submissions made in that writ application. As such, I first propose to consider the questions raised in C.W.J.C. no. 4568 of 1981. 2. It is the Case of the petitioners in C.W.J.C. no. 4568 of 1981 that they had joined the Broad Guage construction work, i.e., conversion of the Metre Guage into Broad Guage in the North Eastern Rail way under the Union Government at Chapra, Dighwara and Sonepur under the Executive Engineer (construction), Chapra On diffenent dates in the year 1980. According to them, the said project is under a separate department of the North Eastern Railway under a separate Chief Engineer designated as Chief Engineer (construction) having his headquarters at Gorakhpur. It is their case that on 15.11.1981 these petitioners received notice separately from the office of the Executive Engineer (Construction), Chapra terminating their services from 16.12.1981. A sample copy of the said notice is annexed as Annexure-1. In that very notice it has been mentioned that the persons named there in would be paid compensation by the office of the Executive Engineer (construction), Chapra on 5.12.1981. According to the petitioners, as their retrenchment was not in accordance with section 25F, of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) and rule, 76 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 (herein after to be referred to as the Rules), their services have not been terminated. 3. Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents refuting the allegations made on behalf of the petitioners. 3. Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents refuting the allegations made on behalf of the petitioners. According to the respondents, as the Metre Guage line between Samastipur to Banmankhi was converted into Broad Guage by June, 1981, the scope of work on this project has been reduced tremendously as such there was no option but to retrench the petitioners. It was stated on their behalf that while retrenching the petitioners there has been full compliance of the requirement of law. 4. I t is not in dispute that the petitioners have protection of section 25F of the Act and the retrenchment had to be in accordance with the requirement of the said Section. Section 25F prescribes conditions precedent to the retrenchment of a workmen. Even an employer cannot retrench his workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year until (i) the workman concerned has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for the retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the work-man has been paid in lieu of such notice wages for the period of notice, (ii) the work man has been paid at the time of retrenchment compensation as required by clause (b) of section 25F (iii) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified. In view of a series of decisions of the Supreme Court it is almost settled that before an order of retrenchment takes into effect the conditions mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of section 25F have to be fulfilled as they are mandatory in nature. In one of the leading cases. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, where the Scope of clause (b) was considered by Gajandragadkar, J. (as he then was) it was pointed out that the requirement prescribed by clause (b) was a condition precedent for retrenchment of a workman. The same view was reiterated in the case of Bombay Union of Journalists and others Vs. The state of Bombay and anothers. Again, in the case of The State Bank of India, Vs. Shri N. Sundara Money, it was observed :- “Without further ado we reach the conclusion that if the workman swims into the harbour of sec. The same view was reiterated in the case of Bombay Union of Journalists and others Vs. The state of Bombay and anothers. Again, in the case of The State Bank of India, Vs. Shri N. Sundara Money, it was observed :- “Without further ado we reach the conclusion that if the workman swims into the harbour of sec. 25F, he cannot be retrenched without payment, at the time of retrenchment, compensation computed as prescribed therein read with section 25 B(2)." In the case of M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd, Vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour court, Orissa and others the same view was reiterated. In the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co-Ltd Vs. Shambhu nath Mukherji and others, it was observed:- "Striking of the name of the workman from the rolls by the management is termination of his service. Such termination of service is retrenchment within the meaning of the Act. There is nothing to show that the provisions of S. 25F(a) and (b) were complied with by the management in this case. The provisions of S. 25F(a), the proviso apart, and (b) are mandatory and any order of retrenchment. In violation of these two premptory conditions precedent, is invalid" 5. It was first urged that the Executive Engineer (construction), Chapra, who has purported to retrench the petitioners by the impugned notice (annexure-l) will not be deemed to be the employer of the petitioners within the meaning of section 25F of the Act. Section 2 (g)(i) of the Act defines 'employer' to mean" in relation to an industry carried On by or under the authority of any department of (the Central Government or a State Government) the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where authority is prescribed, "the head of the department." Rule 2(g)(ii)(c) prescribes the district officer incharge or the Divisional personnel officer or the personnel officer" to "be the employer in respect of casual labourer employed on a Zonal Railway." According to the respondents, the Executive Engineer (construction) Chapra was the District officer, and, as such, he will be deemed to be the employer of the petitioners. In paragraph 15 of the counter-affidavit it has been stated that the North Eastern Railway, Broad Guage constuction organization is a project under the Chief Engineer (construction) and the name is divided into separate units under the charge of District officers. In paragraph 15 of the counter-affidavit it has been stated that the North Eastern Railway, Broad Guage constuction organization is a project under the Chief Engineer (construction) and the name is divided into separate units under the charge of District officers. namely, executive Engineers (construction) and the Executive Engineer (construction), respondent No. 5, was the District officer of the construction division in which the petitioners had been engaged. In paragraphs 9, 14 and 23 of the counter-affidavit it has been stated that the unit in which these petitioners had been engaged was directly under the executive charge of the District officer, and as such, he could pass an order of retrenchment against the petitioners. A reply has been filed on behalf of the petitioners to the counter-affidavit aforesaid. There is no specific denial of the statements made in the aforesaid paragraphs of the counter-affidavit except merely saying that the statements made in paragraphs 9, 14 and 23 and denied. In view of the clear and unambiguous statements made on affidavit sworn by an officer on behalf of the respondents saying that the whole project had been divided into different units and respondent No.3, the Executive Engineer was incharge of the unit in question, and as such, will be deemed to be District officer, has to be accepted. In my opinion the orders of retrenchment cannot be held to be invalid on that account. 6. It was then submitted that there has been infraction of clause (a) of section 25F of the Act because the grounds for retrenchment have not been specifically stated in the notice (Annexure-l ). In the notice of retrenchment the reasons given are :- “due to expiry of sanction work/completion of work/reduction in work/work load” In the counter-affidavit it was stated that due to the completion of the work, the work load was reduced and even the sanction for the work in question had expired. As such, all the three grounds mentioned in the notice were collectively the grounds for retrenchment. No doubt, it would have been much better if the grounds for retrenchment had been stated in a specific manner, but considering the notice in its proper context it cannot be urged that the grounds for retrenchment has not been mentioned therein. So far as the other part of clause (a), i.e., giving one month's notice in writing is concerned, no grievance was made. So far as the other part of clause (a), i.e., giving one month's notice in writing is concerned, no grievance was made. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to hold that the orders of retrenchment have been vitiated being In contravention of the requirement of clause(a) of section 25F of the Act. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners also urged that as the compensation provided by clause (b) of section 25F of the Act was not paid to the petitioners, the orders of retrenchment cannot be upheld. I have already mentioned above that in the notice itself the petitioners were asked to receive the compensation on 5.12.1981 from the office of the respondent no 3. The Order of retrenchment was to take effect after one month from 15.11.1981, as such, the petitioners had been offered compensation much before that date. In paragraph 10 of the writ application it is admitted that the petitioners did receive those notices separately. There is no allegation in the writ application that the petitioners went to collect the compensation on 5.12.1981 and it was not paid to them. They have simply stated that "the petitioners have not drawn compensation money." A belated attempt was made by filing affidavits of 5 persons during the course of the hearing, saying that they went in the office on 5.12.1981 but no compensation money or arrears was tendered to them. Supplementary affidavits were filed on behalf of the petitioners earlier and affidavits were also filed in connection with vacating the order of stay, but at no earlier occasion it was asserted that they went to collect the compensation, but it was not paid to them. In that view of the matter, I am not inclined to accept 'the statement made during the hearing of the writ application, especially when the respondents have been saying since very beginning that the compensation amount had been tendered to the petitioners. In such a situation, it cannot be held that there has been noncompliance of clause(b) of section 25F of the Act 8. In such a situation, it cannot be held that there has been noncompliance of clause(b) of section 25F of the Act 8. It was then submitted that as notice in the prescribed manner was not served on the appropriate Government and the authorities prescribed under rule 76 of the Rules, there has been contravention of requirement of clause (c) of section 25F of the Act which shall render the orders of retrenchment illegal it may be pointed out at the outset that no such objection has been taken in the main application. As such, there was no occasion for the respondents to make statement in their counter affidavit giving details of the compliance of clause (c) of section 25F or to produce materials on that question. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, however, submitted that once the orders have been challenged on the ground of non-compliance of section 25F of the Act it was incumbent on the respondent to satisfy the court that all conditions mentioned therein have been fulfilled. In support of the contention that requirement of clause (C) of section 25F was mandatory in nature reliance was placed an a Bench decision of this court in the case of Om Prakash alias Om Prakash Rajak and others v. Officer on Special Duty, Ganga Bridge, and others. In my opinion, a proper pleading in respect of non-compliance of clause (c) of section 25F was essential. However, even assuming that, that objection can be taken at the time of hearing in view of the judgment of the Supreme court in the case of Bombay Union of journalists and others v. The State of Bombay and another (Supra) any non-compliance of clause (c) shall not vitiate the order of retrenchment. In the aforesaid judgment it was pointed out by Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was):- "But a closer examination of the section shows that cl. (c) of S. 25F can not receive the same construction as cls. (a) and (b) of S. 25F ... … … Therefore, it seems that cl. (c) cannot be held to be a condition precedent even though it has been included under S. 25F along with cls. (a) and (b) which prescribe conditions precedent," It was further observed:- "Clause (c) is not intended to protect the interests of the workman as such. (a) and (b) of S. 25F ... … … Therefore, it seems that cl. (c) cannot be held to be a condition precedent even though it has been included under S. 25F along with cls. (a) and (b) which prescribe conditions precedent," It was further observed:- "Clause (c) is not intended to protect the interests of the workman as such. It is only intended to give intimation to the appropriate government about the retrenchment and that only helps the government to keep itself informed about the conditions of employment in the different industries within its region. There does not appear to be present any compelling consideration which would justify the making of the provision prescribed by clause (c) a condition precedent as in the case of clauses (a) and (b)." Unfortunately, the attention of the learned judges who decided the aforesaid case Om Prakash alias Om Prakash Rajak and others v. Officer on special Duty, Ganga Bridge, and others (supra) was not drawn to the aforesaid Supreme court judgment. In my view, in absence of material on record, it is difficult to hold that there has been non-compliance of clause (c) of section 25F of the Act read with rule 76 of the Rules which prescribe the authorities and the period within which the notice has to be issued by the employer. Apart from that, as has been pointed out by the Supreme court any such non-compliance of clause (c) or section 25F shall not vitiate the orders of retrenchment as it is not the condition precedent. 9. No doubt, the orders issued to different petitioners who had been engaged as casual labourers in the project on or after the 1st July, 1980 and had worked as casual labourers for about 11 years are bound to affect them as now they have been thrown on the street, but when such orders are permissible in law and the conditions imposed by the Legislature have been complied with, it is not possible for the court to declare them null and void merely on the ground that they have jeopardised the future of the petitioners. As was pointed out by the Supreme Court in connection with scope of section 25F of the Act in the case of M/s Parry and Col. Ltd., v. P.C. Pal, Judge of the second Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta and others. As was pointed out by the Supreme Court in connection with scope of section 25F of the Act in the case of M/s Parry and Col. Ltd., v. P.C. Pal, Judge of the second Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta and others. "It is well established that it is within the managerial discretion of an employer to organise and arrange his business in the manner he considers best ... ... if a scheme for such reorganization result in surplusage of employees no employer is expected to carry the burden of such economic deadweight and retrenchment has to be accepted as inevitable, however unfortunate it is." 10. On behalf of the respondents in the counter-affidavit it has been stated that notice had been issued accidently to petitioner Nos.59, 60, 82 and 83, but those notices in respect of these petitioners have since been recalled. These petitioners had been engaged prior to 1st July, 1980. The other petitioners had been engaged on or after 1st July, 1980. It has been stated that while retrenching the principle of last come first go has been complied. 11. This writ application fails and it is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case. there shall be no order as to costs. Before I part with the Judgment I must observe that effort should be made to absorb the casual labourers if they are required in connection with some other Project in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual where there is a separate Chapter containing provisions in respect of casual labourers. 12. So far as the other writ applications, i.e. C.W.J.C. No. 4532, 4504, 4649 and 4608 of 1981 are concerned, no separate argument was advanced on behalf of the petitioners except that this court should issue a mandamus to absorb the petitioners of these writ applications in accordance with the Indian Railway Establishment Manual aforesaid. Without knowing the circumstances, in my opinion, it is not possible to issue a writ of mandamus for the absorption of the petitioners who have been retrenched. I have already observed that the respondent authorities should make effort to absorb the petitioners or some of them after screening in accordance with the pro visions of the aforesaid Manual. These writ applications also fail and they are dismissed, but there shall be no order as to costs. I agree. Applications dismissed.