JUDGMENT P. N. Bakshi, J. 1. THESE are two connected revisions. Criminal Revision No. 1635/1980 has been filed by Sachchidanand Pathak and 8 others. Out of these revisionists, Behari Thakur son of Bhuneshwar Thakur has since died. His revision abates. The other connected revision is Criminal Revision No. 1906 of 1980 filed by Arun Kumar. Both these revisions arise out of a conviction recorded by the trial court for offences under sections 147, 148, and 307/149 IPC and sentences of varying terms of imprisonment imposed there under. In appeal, the Sessios Judge, Allahabad has set aside the conviction of these accused-applicants for the offences under Secs.307/149 IPC, instead they have been convicted under Sec. 325/149 IPC and sentenced to 2 years' R. I., there under. The conviction of Sri Prakash Singh for the offence under Sec. 148 and the sentence of six month's R. I. imposed by the trial court has been maintained by the court of appeal. The conviction of the rest of the applicants under Sec. 147 IPC and a similar sentence of six months' R.I. has also been maintained by the lower appellate court. In these circumstances, both these revisions have been filed. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the impugned orders. I have also minutely examined the relevant record of the case. It is not necessary for me to go into the details of the prosecution story and the defence case and to examine the evidence which has been produced by the parties and relied- upon by the courts below. The bald finding of fact, which has to be accepted in the instant case, having been concurrently recorded by both the subordinate courts, is that on the exhortation of Lallan Rai, applicant no. 8, the other accused-persons caused injuries to the victim Lallan Singh at 6.30 A. M. in the morning on 16th October, 74, at Renuccot crossing. These injuries were 26 in number, Sri Prakash was armed with a knife which was struck on the victim, but the blow was warded off by Lallan Singh with his hand, thereby causing an abrasion on the middle former surface of the right: palm. The rest of the applicants were armed with dandas and rods. There are 25 other injuries on the person of the victim in nature of lacerated wounds, bruises and swellings. The rest of the applicants were armed with dandas and rods. There are 25 other injuries on the person of the victim in nature of lacerated wounds, bruises and swellings. These injuries have been proved in accordance with law by the production of the Doctor concerned. Counsel for the applicant has made a number of submissions. His first submission was that the order of the appellate court is not satisfactory inasmuch as he has not dealt properly with the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution and has based his findings mainly on the weakness of the defence. I have examined the submissions and have carefully gone through the impugned order, passed by the Sessions Judge. In my opinion, this criticism is not tenable. The impugned order may not be to the liking of the applicant, or may not be worded in the way he wants it to be worded, but we cannot say that prosecution evidence has not been considered independently and that the weakness of the defence is responsible for the conviction of the accused. Both the courts have concurrently considered the evidence on the record and have come to the conclusion that the offence has been satisfactorily established. I do not find any reason to interfere with these findings of fact, on the ground either of illegality or error. 3. APPLICANTS' counsel has next argued before me that the offence under Sec. 325/149 IPC has not been made out in view of the findings recorded by the Sessions Judge and the evidence on the record. In the instant case, the Sessions Judge has held the offence of Sec. 325/149 IPC proved, taking the help of clause (8) of Sec. 320 IPC. This clause runs as follows : "320 The following kinds of hurt only are designated as 'grievous.' Eighthly "any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits." This section has three sub-divisions. It deals with a situation where hurt endangers life. It also deals with a situation where the hurt causes to the sufferer severe bodily pain for a period of 20 days. It further envisages a situation where the sufferer is unable to follow his ordinary pursuits for 20 days. 4. It deals with a situation where hurt endangers life. It also deals with a situation where the hurt causes to the sufferer severe bodily pain for a period of 20 days. It further envisages a situation where the sufferer is unable to follow his ordinary pursuits for 20 days. 4. THE question for consideration is whether the circumstances of the case and the evidence on the record are sufficient to cover either of these three situations. So far as the first situation is concerned, it will be enough to quote from the impugned order, passed by the Sessions Judge to the following effect: - "In this case the doctor has said that he could not give a correct opinion, whether the cumulative effect of the injuries could result in the death of the injured Lallan Singh. He has waivered that death could have been caused and might not have been caused." In view of this finding, it cannot be said that the injuries which have been inflicted on Lallan Singh were such as to endanger his life. With regard to the second, situation, the evidence on the record of the injured Lallan Singh is that he remained in the hospital of the Factory for about 22 to 24 days, and even thereafter the: treatment was continued. This is the entire evidence in this connection. No doctor of the Factory has been produced to prove and to corroborate the statement off the injured Lallan Singh that he did in fact remain confined in the hospital as an indoor patient for 20 days. No bed-head ticket has been produced nor even a Nurse or attendant has come forward in evidence. Further the statement of Lallan Singh does not indicate that for the period of 20 days he was in severe bodily pain. As such it would be rather speculative to accept the uncorroborated statement of Lallan Singh that he remained in the Factory hospital for 22 to 24 days. In my opinion, the prosecution has failed totally to prove this fact by leading convincing and cogent oral and documentary evidence to corroborate the statement of the injured. In this position even the second situation is not applicable for the attraction of See. 320, IPC. 5. In my opinion, the prosecution has failed totally to prove this fact by leading convincing and cogent oral and documentary evidence to corroborate the statement of the injured. In this position even the second situation is not applicable for the attraction of See. 320, IPC. 5. WITH regard to the third situation, the position is that there is nothing in the statement of Lallan Singh to indicate that he was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits for a period of 20 days. An argument had been advanced by the counsel for the opposite party that Lallan Singh remained in hospital for 20 days meaning thereby that he was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. In the first place I have already repelled and discarded the statements of Lallan Singh that he did in fact remain in hospital for 20 days. In the second place merely even if we assume that he. remained in hospital for that period, it does necessarily follow that he was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits during that period. This aspect has to be proved by positive evidence as it constitutes an essential ingredient of the offence, as laid down in Sec. 320 (8) IPC. 6. IN this connection, I have been referred to two cases by the counsel for the applicant. The first case is reported in Queen Empress v. Vasta Chela, ILR Vol. 19 Bombay, 1895 p. 247. IN that case the accused was charged for the offence for causing grievous hurt. The Sessions Judge after relying upon the evidence produced in that case to the effect that the injured remained in hospital for the space of 20 days, drew an inference that during this period he was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. This view was specifically repelled by the High Court of Bombay in the above Division Bench case. Mr. Justice Jardine and Mr. Justice Ranade reversing the conviction held as follows ; "that in the absence of any evidence that the injured person was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits during the space of twenty days, such an inference could not legally be drawn. Mr. Justice Jardine and Mr. Justice Ranade reversing the conviction held as follows ; "that in the absence of any evidence that the injured person was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits during the space of twenty days, such an inference could not legally be drawn. Before a conviction can be passed for the offence of grievous hurt, one of the injuries defined in Sec. 320 of the INdian Penal Code must be strictly proved, and that the eighth clause is no exception to the general rule that a penal statute must be construed strictly. Proof of being in a hospital for the space of twenty days cannot be taken as equivalent to proof of grievous hurt." This view expressed by the Bombay High Court has been approved by the Gujrat High Court in State of Gujrat v. Samaj, 1969 CrLJ 1498 , which held thus: "What is required to be established under Sec. 320 (8) of the Penal Code is that there must be hurt caused to the person and that he was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits during the space of 20 days. Both the ingredients have got to be established by the prosecution and it would not be enough to say that he remained in the hospital for 20 days. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital would not be enough to conclude that he was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits during that period." No case of this court has been cited before me holding the contrary view. The view expressed by the Bombay and Gujrat Courts is a reasonable one and I am in full agreement with the same. In criminal prosecution each and every ingredient of offence must be strictly proved before the accused can be asked to suffer the pangs of conviction and sentence. No condition or ingredient can be presumed, and affirmative proof is necessary. In this view of the law, I am of the opinion that the Sessions Judge has erred in holding that the accused were guilty of offence under Sec. 325/149, IPC. I hereby set aside their conviction on the count. Instead I convict them for the offence under Sec. 354/149 IPC. The conviction of Sri Prakash Singh for the offence under Sec. 148, IPC is also upheld. The conviction of the rest of the applicants for the offence under Sec. 147, IPC is maintained. 7. I hereby set aside their conviction on the count. Instead I convict them for the offence under Sec. 354/149 IPC. The conviction of Sri Prakash Singh for the offence under Sec. 148, IPC is also upheld. The conviction of the rest of the applicants for the offence under Sec. 147, IPC is maintained. 7. THE question now is as to what is the appropriate sentence to be awarded. Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that there is nothing on the record of this case to indicate that the applicants are previous convicts. He has also after examining the record pointed out that She applicants have suffered terms of imprisonment varying between 1-1/2 to 3 months. He has also stated that if a fine is imposed upon the applicants in- Iieu of the unexpired portion of the sentence of imprisonment, he will not consider it as an enhancement of sentence. Having regard to all the circumstances, I hereby convict the applicants for the offence under Sec. 324/149, IPC, and reduce their sentences of imprisonment to the period already undergone. In addition, each one of the applicants are hereby fined a sum of Rs. 200/-for the offence under Sec. 32.4/149, IPC. I also uphold the conviction of Sri Prakash Singh u/Sec.148 IPC, and reduce his sentence of imprisonment on that count to the period already undergone. In addition he is directed to pay a fine of Rs. 50/- on this count. As for the rest of the applicants, I also uphold their conviction for the offence under Sec. 147' IPC and reduce their sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone. In addition each of the other applicants shall pay a fine of Rs. 50/- on this count. Thus apart from the sentence of imprisonment already undergone, each applicant shall pay a total fine of Rs. 250/- which shall be deposited with the trial court within 2 months from today. Out of the fine so deposited, an amount of Rs. 1500/- is awarded as compensation to the injured complainant Lallan Singh. In the event of default in payment of fine, the applicants shall suffer 3 months' R. I. for the offence under Sec. 324/149 IPC and in the event of default in payment of fine u/Sec.148 IPC, or Sec. 147 IPC, the applicants shall suffer a sentence of 1 month's R. L 8. BOTH these revision applications are partly allowed. In the event of default in payment of fine, the applicants shall suffer 3 months' R. I. for the offence under Sec. 324/149 IPC and in the event of default in payment of fine u/Sec.148 IPC, or Sec. 147 IPC, the applicants shall suffer a sentence of 1 month's R. L 8. BOTH these revision applications are partly allowed. The conviction of the applicants for the offence under Sec. 324/149 IPC is set aside. They are instead convicted under Secs.324/149 IPC, and also u/Sec.148 and 147 IPC in terms mentioned above. The applicants are on bail. They need not surrender. Their bail bonds are hereby discharged. Applications partly allowed.