JUDGMENT V.K. Khanna, J. - The present writ petition has been filed by Committee of Management of an Inter Girls College and its Manager Sri Vikram Singh challenging the order of the Joint Director of Education (Women) dated 26-10-1981 and of the Regional Inspectress of Girls School dated 5th June, 1979. 2. According to the petitioner the opposite-party no. 3 Shrimati Kusum Dhawan wars working as Principal in the later College and on 13th February, 1978 she was suspended pending enquiry by the Managing Committee of the College. The Managing Committee also appointed an Enquiry Committee of which Vikram Singh was made the Chairman. The Enquiry Committee was , also authorised to serve a charge-sheet on her The Enquiry Committee held its meeting on 5-4-1979 but opposite-party no. 3 according to the petitioners, deliberately preferred to remain absent and the Enquiry Committee, therefore, had no option but to give its recommendation dated 5th April, 1979 on the basis of the facts found by it and submitted the same to the Committee of Management. On receipt of the report the Committee of Management held a meeting on 18th April, 1979 bus the opposite-party no. 3 despite notice did not appear before the Enquiry Committee and the Committee of Management after considering the report agreed with the Enquiry Committee that the charge against opposite-party no. 3 were focnd proved and passed a resolution imposing punishment of terminating her services. The aforesaid resolution of the Committee of Management was sent to the Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools Varanasi as required by Section 16-G (J) (a) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act (hereinafter described as the Act). On 5th June, 1979 the Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools refused to grant approval. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the Management preferred an appeal before the opposite-party no. I which was allowed on 31st July, 1979. The opposite-party no. 3 filed a writ petition (Writ Petition no. 6147 of 1979) in this Court and the writ Petition was allowed on 5-9-1979. The opposite-party no. 1 in pursuance of the judgment of the High Court in the writ petition again heard the matter and dismissed the appeal filed by the Management on 26-10-1981. The appeal was mainly allowed on the ground that Shri Vikram Singh the Manager was biased against the opposite-party no. The opposite-party no. 1 in pursuance of the judgment of the High Court in the writ petition again heard the matter and dismissed the appeal filed by the Management on 26-10-1981. The appeal was mainly allowed on the ground that Shri Vikram Singh the Manager was biased against the opposite-party no. 3 ami should not have conducted the enquiry and that the meeting of the Managing Committee he d on 13-2-1978 and 4-4 1979 were not properly convened. In the appeal it was also held that the principles of natural justice had been contravened inasmuch no opportunity was given to opposite-party no. 3 to place her case before the Enquiry Committee and the Managing Committee. 3. In the present writ petition the learned counsel for the petitioners has challenged the findings recorded by opposite-party no. 1. besides urging one fresh point. The points urged are as fallow: 1. The decision given by the opposite-party no. 1 is against the order of remand passed by the High Court in the writ petition. 2. The finding recorded by the opposite-party no. 1 that Vikram Singh was biased is bad in law and in any view of the matter could not affect the decision of the Managing Committee. 3. The finding recorded by the opposite-party no. 1 that the principles of natural justice were violated is based on no evidence inasmuch as full opportunity was given to the opposite-party no. as contemplated by Regulations framed under the Act. 4. The finding recorded by the opposite-party no. 1 on the validity of the meetings dated 13-2-1978 and 4-4-1979 is preverse and based on no evidence. 5. Provisions of Section 16-G (3) of the Act are arbitrary and are thus ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as they provide no guideline for the exercise of the powers by the concerned authority. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the order of opposite-party no. 1 firstly on the ground that it is against the order of remand passed by the High Court writ petition no. 6147 of 1979. It has been urged that before the High Court it had only been urged that two points had been urged on behalf of Shrimati Kusum Dhawan on which no decision had been given. 1 firstly on the ground that it is against the order of remand passed by the High Court writ petition no. 6147 of 1979. It has been urged that before the High Court it had only been urged that two points had been urged on behalf of Shrimati Kusum Dhawan on which no decision had been given. A bare perusal of the judgment given in the writ petition which is Annexure 17 to the writ petition would show that the petitioner in that writ petition viz. Shrimati Kusum Dhawan had urged that even though the petitioner had challenged the validity of the charges and had asserted that the enquiry was vitiated on. account of violation of the principles of natural justice and that the finding of the Enquiry Committee was based on no evidence. Yet the Joint Director of Education has not considered these aspects-of the matter. The Bench found that the aforesaid two points were pressed before the Joint Director of Education and since those two points had not been considered by the Joint Director of Education in the impugned order the said order could not be sustained. The operative part of the order passed by the "Bench quashes the impugned order of the Joint Director of Education, (Mahila) U.P. Allahabad dated 30th July, 1979 and she was directed to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law after hearing both the parties within three months from the date of the passing of the order. In my opinion, the argument raised by the learned counsel -for the petitioner can not be accepted on two grounds. Firstly, the impugned order of the Deputy Director of Education having been quashed and the case having been sent back for decision afresh in accordance with law, it was open to the authority to allow Smt. Kusum Dhawan to urge even fresh points at the time of hearing as the order of the High Court has not directed the authority to confine itself while deciding the appeal only to those two very points. Secondly the two points which had been urged by Smt. Kusum Dhawan covers the points which have now been decided by respondent no. 1 under the impugned order. In the impugned order respondent no. Secondly the two points which had been urged by Smt. Kusum Dhawan covers the points which have now been decided by respondent no. 1 under the impugned order. In the impugned order respondent no. 1 has held the order of termination of services of Smt. Kusum Dhawan to be bad on account of the bias of the Enquiry Officer and so on the ground that principles of natural justice were violated in holding the enquiry. These two grounds will squarely be covered by point no. 2 which was said to have been urged before the respondent no. 1 on the earlier occasion. The point raised, therefore, has no merit. 5. Let me then take up the point of bias raised by the learned counsel at the first instance inasmuch in case it is held that Vikram Singh who formed part of the Enquiry Committee was a person who was biased against opposite-party no. 3 and the entire proceedings taken against opposite-party no. 3 on that account have become vitiated the findings on the other questions may become material inasmuch as the decision of the Managing Committee itself would become bad and the petitioner would in that case not be entitled to any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. 6. The opposite-party no. 1 in the impugned order held that from the proceedings of the meeting of the Managing Committee dated 13-2-1978 it was clear that Vikram Singh had levelled serious charges against opposite-party no. 3 and that it was undisputed that Vikram Singhs position was that of a complainant and thus the objection of Shrimati Kusum Dhawan that from the point of view of the impartial justice Vikram Singh should not have associated with the Enquiry Committee is correct and the entire proceedings of the Enquiry Committee had become vitiated. The learned counsel for the petitioner had urged that merely the fact that Vikram Singh had made complaints against Shrimati Kusum Dhawan would not make him of person biased. It has also been urged that in view of the Regulation 35 of the Regulations framed under the Act, the Manager was entitled to become a part of the Enquiry Committee and the opposite-party no. 1 has erred in law in holding that the entire proceedings of the Enquiry Committee have become vitiated be case of the presence of Vikram Singh. 1 has erred in law in holding that the entire proceedings of the Enquiry Committee have become vitiated be case of the presence of Vikram Singh. the learned counsel for the petitioner has also urged in the alternative trial in case it is held that Vikram Singh was a person who was biased against opposite-party no. 3 the resolution of the Managing Committee imposing punishment of termination of her services would not become bad as the Managing Committee in such circumstances could not be held to be biased. The argument in fact, proceeds on the basis that Vikram Singh was not the authority who could inflict the punishment and thus even though he may have taken part as Chairman of the. Enquiry Committee the resolution of the Managing Committee would not be vitiated. The learned Counsel tor the respondent has countered the aforesaid argument, firstly on the ground that from the material on the record before the opposite-party no. 1 and which has also been placed on the record of this writ petition it was clear that Vikram Singh was a person who was biased and the entire enquiry proceedings were vitiated and thus the resolution of the Managing Committee pas ed on the report of such an Enquiry Committee was also vitiated. It has also been urged that Vikram Singh took part in the meeting of the Managing Committee and thus on this account also the decision of the Managing Committee was vitiated. 7. It may be noticed that the learned counsel for the petitioners has strongly urged that the order of the opposite-party no. 1 should only be judged on the ground which she has given in her order and other material may not be seen for the purpose of finding out as to whether Vikram Singh was a person was biased or not. So far as this argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, in my opinion the same is without any force. The petitioner is invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and for getting a relief from this Court it will have to satisfy the court that in fact Vikram Singh was not a biased person. 8. The charge-sheet which had been served on opposite-party no. 3 mainly consists of charges in the nature of embezzlement of the money belonging to the Institution. 8. The charge-sheet which had been served on opposite-party no. 3 mainly consists of charges in the nature of embezzlement of the money belonging to the Institution. Annexure I to the Supplementary Counter-Affidavit dated 29-10-1978 is a letter sent by Shrimati Kusum Dhawan to Che Enquiry Officer. At the very out set in the aforesaid tetter she has stated that in the year 1973-74 at the time of admission subscriptions were taken from the guardians but according to the orders of the Education Department a restriction was placed on collection of donation at the time of admission. According to her Sri Vikram Singh was collecting the donations even after the aforesaid restriction placed by the Education Department which was got entered in a register and which was exclusively kept by Vikram Singh in his possession. Later on it has been stated that Vikram Singh has embezzled about Rs. 38,577 as fees for membership. Regarding some of the charges it was stated that the amount was realised by one Sri Madan Mohan Chatterji Sahayak Lipik from the girls students but on the asking of opposite-party no. 3. He has told her that the accounts be taken from the Manager. The aforesaid reply also indicates that Vikram Singh according to her, was using a part of the Girl College building where undesirable elements were assembling and for that reason all sections of the College were terrified and because of that fear Vikram Singh was getting all what he wanted and on any opposition being offered by any one the person was terrorised. Attends it was requested that all the documents be allowed to be inspected by her so that she may prove that Vikram Singh had embezzled huge amount of the College. Annexure SA 2 to the supplementary counter-affidavit is a letter written by Srimati Kusum Dhawan to Sri Vikram Singh on July 19, 1978. In paragraph 5 she has mentioned that Vikram Singh had been causing undue influence in the smooth running of the Institution and had been trying to create mischief and had been perusing illegal activities regarding which several reports had been lodged with the police and the Education Department. In paragraph 5 she has mentioned that Vikram Singh had been causing undue influence in the smooth running of the Institution and had been trying to create mischief and had been perusing illegal activities regarding which several reports had been lodged with the police and the Education Department. In para 6 she has clearly stated that being on inimical terms with her and being absolutely biased how could he be the Chairman of the Enquiry Committee even if he was the elected Manager of the duly constituted Managing Committee. Annexure 4 is a copy of a letter written by Srimati Kusum Dhawan to the police intimating that Vikram Singh alongwith undesirable elements armed with weapons were collecting outside the College for the purpose of taking possession of the College illegally. In the aforesaid letter she had requested for police help. Thereis another letter dated 29-3-1979 (Annexure 3 to the counter-affidavit) written by opposite-party no. 3 to Chairman Enquiry Committee in which it has been stated that on 8-3-1979 before the Sub-divisional Officer Vikram Singh had misbehaved with her and her brother-in-law and that her brother-in-law has informed her that or. 8-1-1979 he was assaulted by Vikram Singh at the police station, Mughalsarai in connection with which a case was going on. It may be noticed that the authenticity of these documents have not been denied before me. 9. The first question which therefore, arises for consideration on the basis of these materials which admittedly were present before the opposite-party no. 1, as to whether Vikram Singh was a person who was biased against opposite-party no. 3. Here is a case where a Lady Principal of a Girls College in reply to the charge-sheet which had been served on her has submitted a reply that it is the Manager who has embezzled large amount of the college and that she has not embezzled any amount. She has also written in reply to the charge-sheet that the Manager Vikram Singh was illegally living in a part of the Girls College anti that undesirable characters were assembling in that College who were terrorising every section of the College. As has been noticed above a criminal case is going on against Vikram Singh at the instance of the real brother in law of the Principal of the College. As has been noticed above a criminal case is going on against Vikram Singh at the instance of the real brother in law of the Principal of the College. By no stretch of imagination a person in the position of Vikram Singh can be said as not being biased against the opposite-party no 3. I am not expressing any opinion on the question as to whether the reply which has been given by opposite-party no. 3 is correct or not. However, here is a case where the charged person says that she has not done the embezzlement and the embezzlement of the College funds has been done by the Manager. In my opinion by no stretch of imagination it can be said that Manager, who is counter charged by the charged person can be a fit person hold enquiry into the charges. In case the Manager is allowed to enquire, result is obvious. The Manager is not going to find himself guilty. Here is a cast where lis has arisen between the Principal and the Manager regarding embezzlement of the College funds. How can an Enquiry Committee be constituted of which the Manager happened to be the Chairman. It appears that good had dawned to Vikram Singh later and it has been disclosed in the writ petition that later on he resigned from the Chairmanship of the Enquiry Committee. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner has not disputed that the resignation was alleged to have been accepted at a very later stage and practically the entire proceedings of the erculry hid been concluded under the Chairmanship of Vikram Singh. It may be noticed that Shrimati Kusum Dhawan had taken the objection regarding bias of Sri Vikram Singh at the earliest opportunity. This fact has not been disputed before me. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has invoked the principle of necessity by relying on the provisions of Regulations framed under the Act regarding the punishment, enquiry and suspension of the employees. It has been urged that under the statutory regulation Manager has to be the Enquiry Officer and thus even if bias of the Manager is proved that would not vitiate the proceedings. Reliance has been placed on decision of this Court reported in Laxmi Chand Agarwal v. The State of U.P., AIR 1962 Alld 117. 11. It has been urged that under the statutory regulation Manager has to be the Enquiry Officer and thus even if bias of the Manager is proved that would not vitiate the proceedings. Reliance has been placed on decision of this Court reported in Laxmi Chand Agarwal v. The State of U.P., AIR 1962 Alld 117. 11. There can not be any dispute that if an adjudicant who is subject to disqualification may be required to sit if there is no other competent. Tribunal or if a forum can net be formed without him, as here the doctrine of necessity is applied to prevent a failure of justice. (S.A. De Smith "Judicial Review of Administrative Action "Third Edition, 244) However, in the present case it has to be seen as to whether under the relevant regulations it is the Manager a one who had necessarily to be appointed as member of the Enquiry Body. Regulation 35 of Chapter III of the Regulations framed under the Act is relevant for this purpose which is as under 35. On receipt of a complaint or an adverse report of facts of a serious nature, the Committee may in the cases of teachers appoint the Head Master or Principal or Manager as the Enquiry Officer (or the Manager may himself set up the enquiry if such power has been delegated to him by the Committee under rules) and in the case of the Head Master or Principal a small subcommittee with instructions to submit the report as expeditiously as possible." (emphasis provided) From the Regulation 35 it is, therefore, clear that in case of Principal the Managing Committee is only required to form a small sub-committee as the enquiry body. It has nowhere prescribed that in the aforesaid sub-committee the Manager would necessarily feature. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is thus incorrect that the statutory regulation requires the Manager to be the part of the sub-committee which had to be appointed by the Committee of Management. The principle of necessity therefore, has no application to the present case. In this connection it may be noticed that Sri Vikram Singh ultimately resigned from the sub-committee and in his place another person was appointed. 12. The principle of necessity therefore, has no application to the present case. In this connection it may be noticed that Sri Vikram Singh ultimately resigned from the sub-committee and in his place another person was appointed. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioners then urged that even though Vikram Singh may be biased, the proceedings being domestic proceedings they would not be vitiated specially when there is no statutory provision excluding a person who is biased from holding the enquiry. Strong reliance has been placed on the decision of the Privy Council reported in Lennox Arthur Partick O' Reilly v. Cyril Cuttert Gitterns, AIR 1949 PC 313 . The Privy Council case, in my opinion is clearly distinguishable. In the aforesaid case the appellants were the stewards of the Trinidad Turf Club. In the aforesaid case the appellants had raised an argument regarding one of members of the Tribunal Mr. Liddelow as having not honestly applied mind to arriving at the proper conclusion on the evidence as he was a person biased. The Judge in the judgment who dealt with the case had used the phrase "a grave suspicion that he was not an impartial Judge". The Privy Council held that the use of the aforesaid phrase merely amounts that Mr. Liddelow started the proceedings with a dislike for the respondent and a consequent prejudice against him, but they did not understand the learned Judge as finding that Mr. Liddelow did not honestly try to arrive at the proper conclusion on the evidence. It was held "This being so, their lordships think that the appellants sitting as a tribunal, discharged the obligations which lay upon them to act honestly and in good faith. It may be that it would have been wiser, and in better taste, if Mr. Liddelow had refrained from sitting at the inquiry, Having regard to the previous relations between the respondent and hims- If, but their Lordships cannot find that his presence as one of the tribunal rendered its conclusions null and void In the present case the respondent, from the start of his career as a trainer and owner, submitted himself to the jurisdiction of certain individuals, namely, the Stewards for the time being of the Trinidad Truff Club. No doubt these Stewards would have some personal acquaintanceship with persons who owned and trained race horses in Trinidad and Tobago, and they would have been more than human if they had not been in more friendly relations with some trainers and owners than with others. Yet in submitting himself to the "rules of the Trinidad Truff Club for the tune being"the respondent agreed, in effect, that the appellants should be his judges in the circumstances which arose in 1944 He cannot now complain of their decision against him unless he can establish one of the grounds of objection stated in Maclean's case, (1929) 1 Ch.602 : 98 LJ Cn. 293; and this he has failed to do." In the decision itself the Maclean's case has been noticed and it has been held that according to the aforesaid case the test should be whether the presence of prejudiced persons inject such an element of bias into the tribunal as to give rise to a reasonable suspicision that the trial was not a fair one (emphasis provided). Thus from a careful scrutiny of the aforesaid case it would be clear that in cast, the presence of the biased person gives rise to a reasonable suspicion that the trial would not be fair one, his presence would vitiate the entire proceedings. 13. Learned counsel for both the parties have placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Dr. G. Parana v. University of Lucknow, AIR 1476 SC 2428. In the aforesaid case the Supreme Court held that principles of natural justice which are meant to prevent miscarriage of justice are also applicable to domestic enquiries and administrative proceedings, as one of the fundamental principles of natural justice is that in cost of quasi judicial proceedings, the authority empowered to decide the dispute between the opposing parties must be one without bias by which it is meant and operative prejudice, whether conscious or unconscious towards one side or the other in the dispute. 14. From the aforesaid case it is thus clear that it would not make any difference if the proceedings are in the nature of domestic proceedings. 14. From the aforesaid case it is thus clear that it would not make any difference if the proceedings are in the nature of domestic proceedings. he learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, relied upon the aforesaid for the purpose of showing that b.as should be of Cue authority who It is been empowered to decide the dispute and the bias of only an authority which form part of the enquiry committee would be immaterial. The argument proceeds on the ground that Sri Vikram Singh while Chairman of the enquiry sub-committee framed under Regulation 3b was only required to submit a report both Managing Committee all it is the Managing Committee which under Regulation 37 had to take a find decision after giving an opportunity to the charged employee. In my opinion this argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner deserves to be rejected or two grounds. Firstly in Dr. G. Saran's case (supra) the Supreme Court has approved the statement made at page 225 of Professor S.D. De Smiths (Treaties on Judicial Review of Administrative Action) Third Edition. The portion approved is reproduced below : - "The case law on the point is thin but on principle it would seem that where a report or determination lacking final effect may nevertheless have a seriously judicial effect on the legally protected interests of the individuals (e.g. when it is necessary prerequisite of a final order) the person making the report or preliminary decision must not be affected by interest or likelihood of bras. From the aforesaid it is thus clear that presuming that Manager Sri Vikram Singh as Chairman of the enquiry sub-committee was only to submit his enquiry report to the Managing Committee yet the functions which Sri Vikram Singh was performing was a statutory function of making enquiry under the statutory regulations which was a necessary pre-requisite before a final decision could be taken by the Managing Committee. From the statutory regulations framed it is clear that the entire proceedings beginning from the show-cause notice, framing of the charges and the conduct of the enquiry and ending with the report and then show-cause notice of punishment by the Managing Committee must conform to the procedure as prescribed under the Regulations. From the statutory regulations framed it is clear that the entire proceedings beginning from the show-cause notice, framing of the charges and the conduct of the enquiry and ending with the report and then show-cause notice of punishment by the Managing Committee must conform to the procedure as prescribed under the Regulations. Further it should also conform to certain well accepted principles of natural justice i.e. that the enquiry officer must be unbiased and should pre-judge the case and that the enquiry also must be fair and impartial by giving full opportunity to the delinquent to plead and establish the defence. 15. The Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Mohammad Noor, AIR 1958 SC 86 at page 91 held "If it shocks our notions of judicial propriety and fair play as indeed it does it was bound to make a deeper impression on the mind of the respondent as to the unreality and futility of the proceedings conducted in this fashion." It will not afford an answer to the allegations of bias that it was not alleged that punishing officer was not biased even though the conduct of the Enquiry Officer had given rise to such bias. The principles of natural justice would include within it impartiality of hearing process and the conducting of proceedings in good faith. In Dr. K. Subba Rao v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1957 AP 414 , Subba Rao, C.J. (as he then was) observed at page 417 :- "Doubtless the Government i.e. the authority entitled to punish the petitioner in this case can ordinarily delegate the holding of an enquiry to its subordinate officers before making final action against him. But it is a fundamental principle of natural justice that the officer selected to make an enquiry should be a person with an open mind and not one who is either biased against the person against whom action is sought to be taken or one who has pre-judged the issue." In my opinion in a case where bias or prejudice is obvious even before the enquiry commenced so as to raise a strong feeling in mind the person charged that she or he has no hope of a fair trial then the principle that justice should not only be done but seems to be done has its full impact upon the validity of the proceedings. Secondly it has come in evidence that Vikram Singh even sat in the meeting of the Managing Committee which had taken decision to terminate the services of Smt. Kusum Dhawan, so that Vikram Singh besides being Chairman of the enquiry sub-committee also sat in the meeting of the Managing Committee held to decide about the termination of the services of Smt. Kusum Dhawan. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a case of the Supreme Court reported in T. Govindaraja Mudaliar v. The State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1973 SC 974 in which it was held : - "The sub-Committee was only meant to advise the State Government how to implement the policy of nationalisation and that could not either expressly or by necessary implication involve a pre determination of the issue. The Minister therefore, could not be said to have any such bias as disqualified him from hearing objections under Chapter IV-A of the Act in which Section 68-D occurs." In my opinion, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case does not apply to the facts of the present case. Here as has been observed above, Sri Vikram Singh is a person who is clearly biased and the question which arises for consideration is as to whether he could become the Chairman of the sub-committee which are statutorily required to be formed for submitting the report under the Regulations framed under the Act. In my opinion, the entire necessary scheme and the Regulations clearly is to provide a fair opportunity to the employees both before enquiry officer who is supposed to conduct the enquiry into the charges levelled against him and also before the Managing Committee which is entitled to take a decision against the charged employee. By no stretch of imagination the principles of natural justice would be satisfied if a person like Vikram Singh who was clearly biased against the petitioner was allowed to conduct the enquiry and also take part in the deliberations of the Managing Committee as a member. The finding recorded by respondent no. 1 in the impugned order on the question of bias, in my opinion therefore, does not require any interference in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. 17. The learned counsel for the petitioner has then urged that the finding of the Respondent no. The finding recorded by respondent no. 1 in the impugned order on the question of bias, in my opinion therefore, does not require any interference in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. 17. The learned counsel for the petitioner has then urged that the finding of the Respondent no. 1 that the proceedings of the Enquiry Committee were vitiated b.cause of the violation of the principles of the natural justice is perverse and based on no evidence. A bare perusal of the impugned order would show that the Respondent no. 1 has held that there has been violation of principles of natural justice b.fore the Enquiry Committee inasmuch as the date of hearing had not been intimated to Shrimati Kusum Dhawan. Fact9 for deciding the question are admitted. Shrimati Kusum Dhawan had requested that she be allowed to inspect the record. On 26th March, 1977 Vikram Singh, Chairman of the Enquiry Committee allowed time till 31-3-1979 to Shrimati Kusuma Dhawan for the purpose of inspecting the record. In this very letter it was mentioned that the amended explanation be given by her by 4-4 1979 and that she should appear before the Enquiry Committee on 6-4-1979. Under the impugned order a finding of fact, which has not been challenged before me has been recorded that the aforesaid letter was received by Shrimati Kusum Dhawan on 30-3-1979. It may be noticed that besides sending letter the Chairman of the Enquiry Committee Sri Vikram Singh had also sent a telegram on 27-3-1979 intimating her that she could inspect the record by 31-3-1979. Under the impugned judgment, the finding of fact had been recorded on the aforesaid question that telegram was received by Shrimati Dhawan on 29-3-1979- This finding has not been challenged before me. It appears that Shrimati Kusum Dhawan by her letter dated 27-3-1979 asked the management to give at least 48 hours clear time getting the record inspected as in her letter she had indicated that her counsel would inspect the record. It is not disputed that before 6-4-1979 Shrimati Dhawan had not received any intimation regarding her request for granting clear 48 hours time for inspecting the documents. However it appears that a registered letter dated 3-4-1979 and a telegram dated 4-4-1979 was sent asking Shrimati Kusum Dhawan to appear before the enquiry Committee on 6 4-1979. It is not disputed that before 6-4-1979 Shrimati Dhawan had not received any intimation regarding her request for granting clear 48 hours time for inspecting the documents. However it appears that a registered letter dated 3-4-1979 and a telegram dated 4-4-1979 was sent asking Shrimati Kusum Dhawan to appear before the enquiry Committee on 6 4-1979. This telegram and letter, according to the finding of fart recorded under the impugned order by Respondent no. 1 has been received after the time of ti e meeting of the Enquiry Committee was over. The meeting of the Enquiry Committee was in the morning of 6-4-1979 and the telegram and the letter were received by Shrimati Dhawan in the afternoon. The learned counsel for the petitioner on the basis of these facts argued that admittedly Shrimati Dhawan had knowledge of the date of the holding of the meeting of the Enquiry Committee on 6-4-1979 as the same has been intimated to her by the Chairman of the Enquiry Committee in letter dated 26-3-1979 and there was no justification for Shrimati Dhawan to have not appeared before the Managing Committee on 6-4-1979. It has been urged that there has been no violation of the principles of natural justice as the date of hearing was in fact, intimated. In my opinion, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is without any force. Shrimati Dhawan clearly had requested for clear 48 hours from the telegram and the letter of the Managing Committee asking for the inspections of the record by 31st March, 1979 was received on 29th March, 1979. She wanted the record to be inspected by her counsel and had applied to the management for granting her 48 hours time and fixing another date. The aforesaid application of Shrimati Dhawan admittedly had been received by the management and the aforesaid application had to be disposed of first. Again, admittedly Shrimati Dhawan on 5-4-1979 had not received any decision of the Managing Committee and was thus rightly thinking that first the Managing Committee would intimate the decision regarding fixing of another date for inspection of documents and thereafter the enquiry would be held. That is how even the Enquiry Committee thought and that is why a registered letter dated 3-4-1979 and a telegram dated 4-4-1979 was sent asking Shrimati Dhawan to appear on 6-4-1979. The attitude ' of the Enquiry. That is how even the Enquiry Committee thought and that is why a registered letter dated 3-4-1979 and a telegram dated 4-4-1979 was sent asking Shrimati Dhawan to appear on 6-4-1979. The attitude ' of the Enquiry. Committee in not allowing inspection to Shrimati Kusum Dhawan through her counsel and fixing the same date for enquiry of which intimation was received after the time of the meeting had expired, in my opinion, clearly amounts to violation of principles of natural justice. The enquiry, in my opinion in such circumstances would be a farce. How could an employee reply to the various charges which have been levelled against her without getting the record inspected. I have seen the nature of charges which mainly relate to accounts and for answering those charges the request of the charged employee to see the documents can not be considered to be unnatural or unreasonable. The Aiding on the aforesaid question recorded by the responder no. 1 under the impugned order cannot be said to suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record requiring interference by this Hon'ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 18. The learned counsel for the petitioner has then challenged the finding of the respondent no. to insofar as it has held the meeting of the Managing Committee held on 13-2-1978 and 4-4-1979 were not properly convened. Regarding the meeting of 13-2-1978 the finding recorded under the impugned order is that under the approved scheme of management under Clause 9 (3) of the approved scheme of the management, the meeting of the Management Committee could not be called by giving only two days notice. It is not disputed that the meeting would not be in accordance with the provisions of Clause 9 (3) of the apposed statutory scheme of management of only two days notice is given the meeting held on 4-4-1979 under the impugned order has also been held invalid on the same ground. Along with the petition the petitioners have annexed Annexures IV and V to show that the notice was given in accordance with the provisions of Clause 9 (3) of the approved scheme of management. Along with the petition the petitioners have annexed Annexures IV and V to show that the notice was given in accordance with the provisions of Clause 9 (3) of the approved scheme of management. In paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit it has been stated that no agenda was circulated on 8-2-1978 as has been shown in Annexure IV to the writ petition and that Annexure V the certificate of posting, has also been obtained in collusion with the post office. It has further been stated that in suit no. 92 of 1978 filed in the court of Munsif Hawaii Varanasi Shri Vikram Singh had filed Annexure The document. It has been annexed as Annexure CA-2 to the counter-affidavit. From that document it is apparent that the meeting was called on 11-2-1978 under the signature of Shri Vikram Singh. In paragraph 6 of the rejoinder affidavit a reply has been given to the averments made in paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit and it has been stated that the notice Annexures 2 to the counter-affidavit, was additional notice personally per information register to the members over and above the information seat to them by po9t on 8-2-78. There are two material things which have to be noticed in this connection The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to give any explanation as to why in the earlier suit before the Munsif, the notice which has now been filed as Annexure IV to the writ petition was not filed and what is being now called an Additional notice was only filed. Additional notice has not been issued so as to comply with the provisions of Clause 9 (3) of the approved statutory scheme of management. The other thing which also creates a doubt regarding the petitioners case about the authenticity of Annexures IV and V is the fact that a majority of the members reside at Mughalsarai, the place where the notice being issued, and only three members are residing at Varanasi. On the basis of the affidavits it is very difficult to decide the aforesaid question. On the basis of the affidavits it is very difficult to decide the aforesaid question. However, in my opinion the adjudication of the aforesaid questions becomes academic in View of the fact that I have also held that the entire proceedings are vitiated because of the bias of Vikram Singh and violation of the principles of natural justice in not affording an opportunity to appear and defend by not allowing Smt. Kusum Dhawan to inspect the records and not intimating the time, and date of holding the meeting of the enquiry Committee. 19. The last argument which has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that Section 16 G (3) of the Act is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as the aforesaid provision is arbitrary, having not provided the guide lines to the authority as to how the powers of approval are to be exercised. Learned counsel for the petitioners had relied on three cards Of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1981 SC 234 , AIR 1979 SC 52 and AIR 1974 SC 138. The learned counsel for the respondents has however, urged that the validity of Sections 16-A to 16-I have been upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of Katra Education Society v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1307 . The learned counsel for the petitioners has however, urged that the ground on which the provisions of Section 16 G(3) of the Act are being challenged in this writ petition were not considered in the case of Katra Education Society (supra). 20. The case of the Supreme Court which have been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners are not on U.P. Intermediate Education Act. The case of Katra Education Society precisely dealt with the validity of the provisions of Sections 16-A to 16-I on various grounds besides being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case has upheld the validity of the entire Amending Act by which these provisions, i.e., Sections 16-A to 16-I were added. The Supreme Court in the case of Ballabhadas Mathuradas Lakhani v. Municipal Committee Malkapur, AIR 1970 SC 1002 held:- "The first question is concluded by the judgment of this Court in Bharat Kala Bhandars case, 1965 (3) SCR 499 - AIR 1966 SC 249 . The Supreme Court in the case of Ballabhadas Mathuradas Lakhani v. Municipal Committee Malkapur, AIR 1970 SC 1002 held:- "The first question is concluded by the judgment of this Court in Bharat Kala Bhandars case, 1965 (3) SCR 499 - AIR 1966 SC 249 . That case arose under the C.P. & Berar Municipalities Act, 1922. The right of a Municipality governed by that Act to levy under Section 66(1) (b) a tax on bales of cotton ginned at the prescribed rate was challenged by a tax payer. This Court held that levy of tax on cotton ginned by the tax payer in excess of the amount prescribed by Article 276 of the Constitution was invalid, and since the Municipality had no authority to levy the tax in excess of the rate permitted by the Constitution the assessment proceedings levying tax in excess of the permissible limit were invalid and a suit for refund of tax in excess of the amount permitted by Article 276 was maintainable. The decision was binding on the High Court and the High Court could not ignore it because they thought that "relevant provisions were not brought to the notice o) the court." (emphasis provided) 21. A division Bench of our High Court in AIR 1968 All 100 , Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of U.P. held : - "A declaration of law made by the Supreme Court remains a binding declaration irrespective of the fact whether all the pros and cons of the matter to which it relate went put forward and argued before it. and this would be specially so when the law declared is in regard to the constitutionality of a statute or a rule, and in such a case the binding affect of the declaration cannot be measured by or limited to the points raised on behalf of the parties or to which express reference is made in the judgment " 22. It is thus clear that so long as the decision in the Katra Education Society stands, this Court cannot go against it upon the footing that a particular aspect was not considered by their lordships of the supreme Court in the said decision. It is thus clear that so long as the decision in the Katra Education Society stands, this Court cannot go against it upon the footing that a particular aspect was not considered by their lordships of the supreme Court in the said decision. A bare reading of the decision clearly shows that the entire Amending Act was held to be valid and the argument that it was unconstitutional on the ground of invalidity of Article 14 of Constitution was repelled. The petitioners thus cannot be permitted to attack the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Amending Act as the same have been held to be valid law by the Supreme Court and according to Article 141 of the Constitution the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on courts within the territory of India. The validity of Sections 16-A to 16-1 (which includes the provisions of Sections 16 G) having been upheld by the Supreme Court as a valid piece of law, the same is binding on all courts in the country. In this connection it may also be stated that the order of the termination of the services of Smt. Kusum Dhawan by the management was null and void because it has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice as the enquiry has been conducted by the person who was biased and further that the principles of natural justice were violated in not affording adequate opportunity to inspect the record and also in not intimating the date of enquiry to Smt. Kusum Dhawan this question also becomes academic. Even it it is held that such a provision is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution, the petitioners will not be entitled to get any relief in this writ petition as the action of the petitioners in terminating the services of Smt. Kusum Dnawan have been found to be null and void. 23. For the reasons stated above, the present writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs to respondent no. 3 who alone put in appearance before me and contested this writ petition.