ORDER.- Sri Maheswari Commercial Finance Corporation, Tiruvannamalai, is a registered partnership firm in which one Visalakshi Ammal, mother of Muthukrishnan, was a partner. Muthukrishnan, along with his mother Visalakshi Ammal was stated to have executed a promissory note in favour of a Chit Fund for the money owned by Muthukrishnan to that Chit Fund in the sum of Rs. 3,213 with further interest thereon. The Chit Fund filed a suit O. S. No. 26 of 1977 ia the District Munsif Court, Tiruvannamalai against Muthukrishnan and his mother Visalakshiammal. The plaintiff-chit fund also filed an application for attachment before judgment of Rs. 4,000, which, according to the plaintiff chit fund, was stated to be in deposit in Sri Maheswari Commercial Finance Corporation to the credit of Visalakshi Ammal. In that application, Sri Maheswari Commercial Finance Corporation was impleaded as a garnishee. On notice of the application for attachment, the garnishee Corporation entered appearance and filed an affidavit disputing the allegation that Visalakshiammal was still a partner of the Corporation and that any money due to her was still in deposit with that Corporation. It was stated that Visalakshiammal retired from the partnership by giving notice to the other partners on 22nd January, 1977 and her retirement was accepted on 23rd January, 1977 at the meeting of the partnership firm and her retirement took effect from 24th January, 1977, It was also stated in the affidavit of the garnishee Corporation that the accounts of Visalakshiammal in the partnership were settled even on 24th January, 1977. It was stated that by the time the Garnishee notice was served on them, the garnishee Corporation having settled the partnership accounts owed nothing to the retiring partner Visalakshiammal. 2. At the enquiry, the learned District Munsif found that the notice of retirement of Visalakshiammal from the garnishee Corporation was registered by the District Registrar only on 27th January, 1977. The learned District Munsif found that the interim garnishee attachment was made by order of the Court even on 25th January, 1977 and therefore, the subsequent retirement of Visalakshiammal with effect from 27th January, 1977 cannot be pleaded by the garnishee Corporation as an answer to the garnishee notice. In this view, the learned District Munsif overruled the objection of the garnishee Corporation to the attachment of Rs. 4,000. He accordingly made the attach ment absolute. 3. In this view, the learned District Munsif overruled the objection of the garnishee Corporation to the attachment of Rs. 4,000. He accordingly made the attach ment absolute. 3. The appeal by the garnishee Corporation against the decision of the District Munsif filed before the Sub-Court. Tiruvannamalai, was dismissed. Aggrieved by the findings and the conclusion of the Sub-Court in appeal, the garnishee Corporation has filed this petition under section 115 of the Code. 4. In the revision, the learned counsel for the garnishee Corporation submitted that the issue of the prohibitary order against the garnishee Corporation was without jurisdiction, or at any rate, was in irregular exercise of its jurisdiction. The learned counsel submitted that the Courts below have misunderstood the nature of the entry made by the Registrar of Firms in Form-A kept by the Registrar of Firms. It might be that Registrar of firms had entered the retirement of Visalakshi-ammal from the partnership on 27th January, 1977. But according to the learned counsel, this entry merely registers in the remarks column of the registry the factum of retirement. The retirement was undoubtedly on 23rd January, 1977, when the resolution of the partner was passed accepting the offer of retirement by Visalakshiammal from the partnership. It was therefore urged by the learned counsel that the whole basis of the order of the Courts below was founded on a misconception. 5. I think, I must accept the submissions made by the learned counsel for the garnishee-firm as well founded. Rule 5 of the Tamil Nadu Partnership (Registration of Firms) Rules, 1951 provides that the register of firms shall be in Form A wherein the name of the firm and the particulars relating to the firm shall be entered. Rule 6 provides that when an entry made in the Register of Firms is to be amended, that amendment shall be shown by means of a suitable note in the remarks column provided for in the Register of Firms. These rules however say nothing about when the entry or the amended entry takes effect, whether it is on the date when the entry is made or whether it is on the date with respect to which the entry is made. 6. These rules however say nothing about when the entry or the amended entry takes effect, whether it is on the date when the entry is made or whether it is on the date with respect to which the entry is made. 6. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-Chit Fund submitted that the retirement of Visalakshiammal must be held to take effect only on the date when the amendment entry was passed by the Registrar of Firms in the Registry. He stated that publication was necessary to protect the interest of the creditors. The learned counsel referred to section 63 (1) and section 72 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 and submitted that when a change occurs in the constitution of a registered firm by retirement of a partner, the retiring partner must give notice to the Registrar, on the basis of which the Registrar will make a record of the notice in the entry relating to the firm in the register of firms. Notice of retirement, learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out, must be given not only to the Registrar of Firms under section 63 of the Act, but also by publication in the official gazette and also in one vernacular newspaper circulating in the concerned district in which the firm has its principal place of business. Learned counsel referred to the findings of the Courts below that Visalakshammal did not give any public notice by publication in the District Gazette or in a vernacular newspaper as enjoined by section 72 of the Act. In any case, according to learned counsel, the retirement must be regarded as having taken place only on 27th January, 1977, when the Registrar, of Firms made the entry as to the retirement of Visalakshiammal from the garnishee Corporation. Learned counsel also referred to section 45 of the Indian Partnership Act and said that even assuming that by the time the prohibitary order was received by the garnishee firm, the partner Visalakshiammal had already retired from the firm yet, she cannot be exonerated from the liability to third parties even after retirement and hence the firm has to comply with the terms of the Garnishee notice irrespective of the date of retirement of the partner. 7. I must say that the reference to the statutory provisions made by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-chit fund, have no bearing on the controversy in the present case. 7. I must say that the reference to the statutory provisions made by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-chit fund, have no bearing on the controversy in the present case. Filing of notice of retirement of a partner to the Registrar of Firms and the requirement as to publicity to be given for that retirement in the Gazette as well as in the local vernacular newspaper, have significance only so far as the firm's creditors are concerned. They have no significance as respects the private creditors of individual partners of the firm. Likewise, when section 45 of the Indian Partnership Act speaks of the continuing liability of a partner in the dissolved firm, the reference obviously is to the partner's liability to creditors in their character as partner of the firm. The reference is not to any personal creditors of the individual partner concerned. This is quite clear from the words of section 45 of the Act which are to the effect that the partners in a dissolved firm continue to be liable as such to third parties “for any act done by any of them which would have been an act of the firm if done before the dissolution”. This section therefore cannot be applied to the case of a debt owed by a partner in his or her individual capacity to his or her own creditors as distinct from the firm's liability to the creditors of the firm. 8. The appellate Court in its order had referred to section 49 of the Indian Partnership Act and observed that even if the retirement of Visalakshiammal relates back to 25th January, 1977, still the plaintiff-chit fund was entitled to ask for a prohibitory order against the garnishee firm considering that the assets of the firm must be applied for payment of the partner's personal debt on the retirement of the partner and on accounts being taken on retirement. These reasonings of the Court below are based on the supposition that there has been a dissolution of the firm, an assumption for which, there is no support in the records. The plaintiff-chit fund did not claim that the garnishee-firm had gone into a dissolution or winding up. The only material available on the subject of retirement of Visalakshiammal from the partnership, is to be found in the counter affidavit filed by the garnishee firm. The plaintiff-chit fund did not claim that the garnishee-firm had gone into a dissolution or winding up. The only material available on the subject of retirement of Visalakshiammal from the partnership, is to be found in the counter affidavit filed by the garnishee firm. In that affidavit all that is stated is that Visalakshiammal expressed her desire to retire from the partnership and her written notice was responded to by the rest of the partners who sat in conference on 24th January, 1977. This un-contradicted statement of fact shown that the firm continued notwithstanding the retirement of Visalakshiammal as a partner of the firm. It is no doubt stated in the affidavit of the garnishee firm that Visalakshiammal's accounts, as an outgoing partner, were completely settled. Having regard to the fact that the continuing partners continued the firm, this settlement of accounts must have been effected without putting the firm to a dissolution without its business being wound up. In these circumstances, it seems to me that section 45 of the Indian Partnership Act can hardly come into play. section 37 of the Indian Partnership Act implies that even without putting the firm to a dissolution or bringing its business to a winding up, a partner may retire and the other partners may continue the business of the firm either with or without any final settlement of accounts as between them. section 37 of the Act expressly states that where is no final settlement of accounts on the retirement of a partner and the continuing partners carry on the business of the firm, then the outgoing partner is entitled to his share of the profits made by the firm subsequent to the retirement or at his option to payment of interest at six per cent on the amount of his share in the subsequent profit. This provision in the Partnership Act clearly shows that in the case of simple retirement of a partner without affecting the integrity or continuity of the partnership would not amount to dissolution of the firm or winding up of business. It also shows that a retiring partner's accounts can be settled otherwise than by following the procedures prescribed under Chapter VI of the Partnership Act relating to dissolution of firms. 9. It also shows that a retiring partner's accounts can be settled otherwise than by following the procedures prescribed under Chapter VI of the Partnership Act relating to dissolution of firms. 9. I have so far dealt with the reasonings and findings of the Courts below and the contentions putforward by the parties before me in this revision. It however seems to me that the controversy in this case, has to be resolved not by asking the question whether the partner Visalakshiammal retired on 24th January, 1977, before the service of the garnishee notice on or 27th January, 1977, after the service of the garnishee notice on the firm. For, even on the basis of the findings of the Courts below that Visalakshiammal retired only on 27th January, 1977, the order passed by the Courts below cannot be sustained, on a proper understanding of the relationship between the partner on the one hand, and the money in the firm on the other. In Addanki Narayanappa and another v. Bhaskara Krishtappa and 13 others1, the Supreme Court has held that during the subsistence of a partnership, no partner can say that he is entitled to any specific asset of the firm or any share therein as his, nor can a partner even claim that he is entitled to any share of all the assets of the firm. According to the Supreme Court, all that the partner is entitled during the subsistence of partnership, is to obtain his share of the profits, every year. Even when the firm gets dissolved, the partner is not entitled to any specific asset of the firm, but, on the contrary, the business of the partnership has to be wound up in a dissolution and the sale proceeds of the assets will have to be first applied to the creditors of the firm, then to the personal creditors of the partners, then to the personal advances made by the partners to the firm and the surplus if any, alone has to be distributed to the partners in accordance with their shares. In this view of the relationship between a partner and the assets of the partnership, both during the subsistence of the firm and at the dissolution, it will not be lawful for a Court to attach any money in the partnership, as if it belongs exclusively to the partner, to answer for the private debts of a partner. A partner might very well desist from drawing his annual share of profits and allow them to be in deposit in the firm and to the extent that un-drawn profits are retained in the firm as the partner's deposits, the partner might be regarded as a creditor of the firm. Even so it is a moot question whether a third party, creditor of the partner concerned, can obtain a garnishee order and attach these monies without any further enquiry, for, it is quite likely that although the partner may have a big deposit of money in the firm, the firm itself may be indebted to its own creditors in such an amount that on winding up, nothing or very little may remain for payment to the partner towards his deposits in the firm. Since the partner's liability is based on the juridical doctrine of unlimited liability, merely because a partner's accounts with the firm is in credit, a third party creditor of the partner, cannot proceed against the amount to the partner's credit in the partnership as though there are no other overriding consideration or claims on that money. Both the Courts below and the plaintiff-chit fund had proceeded on the postulate that if a partner had a sum of money to his credit in the firm, then, that is the money which the firm owes to the partner so that, it can be the subject matter of garnishee proceedings by the partner's creditors. It is true, that the firm can be regarded as a debtor of the partner to a limited extent. But that debt is subject to the over-riding liability of the partnership to its own creditors. In this sense, a Court cannot rightly issue a garnishee order on the amounts standing to the credit of a partner merely at the instance of a personal creditor of an individual partner. 10. But that debt is subject to the over-riding liability of the partnership to its own creditors. In this sense, a Court cannot rightly issue a garnishee order on the amounts standing to the credit of a partner merely at the instance of a personal creditor of an individual partner. 10. In this case, the counter affidavit of the garnishee firm clearly mentions that the amount which was sought to be attached by the plaintiff-chit fund was part of the very capital contribution of the partner to the partnership. The allegation is not contradicted by the plaintiff-chit fund, and this makes the present case an a fortiori case, Capital contributions of the partners can only be returned to them after all the creditors of the firm are paid off, and not before. In this sense, therefore, there cannot be the slightest legal basis for a valid attachment of any money standing to the credit of a partner's capital account. 11. The provisions of Order 21 , rule 46 (A) (read so far as the present case is concerned with Order 38 rule 5 ) of the Code speaks of a garnishee's liability to pay the debt to the judgment debtor. Where there is a balance to the credit of a partner in his accounts with the firm, that credit balance can be regarded as a debt owed by the firm to the partner concerned, only in a manner of speaking. From the accountant's point of view it can be regarded as a debt by the firm to the partner. That is to say by investing the firm with a separate personality of its own as distinct from the partner's composing the firm. But, if regard is to be paid, as it must be, to the circumstance that law does not fully recognise the separate personality of a firm as distinct from its partners and further, if regard is to be paid to the nature of the liability of the partners as unlimited liability towards the creditors of the firm, then the mere book entries showing the firm as the debtor of the partner cannot justify invoking the provisions of Order 21 , rule 46 (A) of the Code in favour of a personal creditor of a partner. 12. 12. In the application filed by the plaintiff-chit fund for a garnishee order, it was alleged that Visalakshiammal had no assets excepting her interest in the firm of Shri Maheswari Commercial Finance Corporation. This part of the plaintiff's pleadings shows that Visalakshiammal's interest as a partner in the firm alone could be looked to for realisation of any decree that might be passed in the suit. Even on this footing, it seems to me that the only appropriate remedy for the plaintiff-chit fund is not to proceed under Order 21 , rule 46 (A) read with Order 38 of the Code, but to have applied, for an order under Order 21 , rule 49(A) Civil Procedure Code. This provision is specially meant for the holder of a decree against a partner as such to proceed against the interest of the partner in his partnership firm. According to the procedure prescribed in this rule, the creditor has got to apply to the Court for passing of what is called, a charging order under which the partner's interest in the firm is charged for payment towards the decree. This is usually done by the Court either by appointment of receiver or otherwise. There is no other appropriate remedy open for a creditor of a partner to proceed against the partner's interest in the assets of the partnership. 13. For the reasons I have stated above, the orders passed by the Court of the first instance and confirmed by the appellate Court are wholly illegal and without jurisdiction and the orders are accordingly set aside and the application filed by the plaintiffi-chit fund is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. R.S. ----- Petition allowed.