JUDGMENT R.S. Singh, J. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the Board of Revenue dated 30.12.1974. 2. The facts of the case in brief are that a suit under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was filed on behalf of the petitioner for declaration of right on the land in dispute. The suit was decreed ex-parte by orders of the trial court dated 3.12.1968. An application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as CPC) for setting aside the ex-parte decree filed on behalf of the defendant respondent no. 4 on 9.12.1968. This application was opposed by the plaintiff on the ground that it was not filed on behalf of the defendant as it was not signed by him but was signed by Bhola as Pairokar and Sri Bhrigunath as counsel. As a matter of fact, neither Bhola was Pairokar nor Sri Bhrigunath was his counsel. Another application was filed by the defendant on the ground that by mistake, the Vakalatnama executed on his behalf in favour of Sri Bhrigunath, counsel could not be signed and he may be allowed to sign the same. The trial Court disallowed this application. Thereafter the defendant moved another application on 18.8.1969 to the effect that Sri Bhrigunath was his counsel and the restoration application was signed by him at his instance. It was further prayed that he may be allowed to sign the application. This application was again opposed by the petitioner. The trial court, by order dated 4.2.1972 rejected this application and also dismissed the restoration application. The defendant preferred an appeal against the order of the trial Court which was allowed with the finding that the application was maintainable and the case was remanded for disposal of the restoration application. The petitioner, feeling aggrieved by the order of the Addl. Commissioner preferred a a revision. But in May, 1974 an application was moved on her behalf for converting the revision into second appeal. This was opposed by the defendants. The Board of Revenue by his order dated 30.12.1974 rejected the application and refused to convert the revision into a second appeal. The petitioner has challenged the aforesaid orders before this court in the present writ petition. 3. This was opposed by the defendants. The Board of Revenue by his order dated 30.12.1974 rejected the application and refused to convert the revision into a second appeal. The petitioner has challenged the aforesaid orders before this court in the present writ petition. 3. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Board of Revenue has committed an error in rejecting her (petitioner's) application on the ground that the Second appeal was maintainable and if it is allowed to be converted into second appeal, it will be time barred as the application for conversion was moved in May 1974. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner it was the finding of the Board of Revenue that the Second Appeal was maintainable, therefore, it should have been treated as second appeal as no revision was maintainable. The learned counsel contended that this view of the Board of Revenue that if the Second appeal is allowed then it will be time barred, is also wrong. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the order passed by the Addl. Commissioner was not revisable. Therefore, even though it was filed as a revision it should have been converted into a second appeal. He made reference to Section 115 of the C.P.C. to show that revision lies against the order where no appeal lies thereto. No appeal lies in this section means either first appeal before the Distt. Judge or the Second appeal before the High Court. In this connection he placed reliance on Radha Mohan Dutt Silk Merchant v. Abbas Ali Biswas and others, A.I.R. 1931 Allahabad 294. and Major S.S. Khanna v. Sri F.G. Dillon, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 497. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner in appeal larger remedy is available as held in Smt. Vidya Devi v. Smt. Devi Das, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 397. Therefore, where no appeal lies either before the District Judge or before the High Court, that order is revisable by the High Court. In support of his contention that second appeal was maintainable against the order of remand he placed reliance on Mahendra Kumar v. Board of Revenue and others, 1972 A.W.R. 323 wherein it has been held that the order of remand is the final order as nothing remains pending before the Addl. Commissioner. In support of his contention that second appeal was maintainable against the order of remand he placed reliance on Mahendra Kumar v. Board of Revenue and others, 1972 A.W.R. 323 wherein it has been held that the order of remand is the final order as nothing remains pending before the Addl. Commissioner. Therefore, second appeal lies against the order of remand before the Board of Revenue. According to learned counsel, the view of the Board of Revenue that in case the revision filed on 10.1.73 be converted into second appeal application for it made in May 1974, will be time barred, is wrong. In fact it will be deemed to have been filed on the date the revision itself was filed and not on the date when the application for conversion was made. 4. In reply to the above, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the order passed by the Addl. Commissioner does not decide the title of the parties and it is a simple case of remand. Therefore, against such an order, no second appeal lies as it is not a final order or decree against which second appeal is provided under Section 331(4) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. According to him against the remand order, appeal can be filed only when some rights of the parties are decided. In this case as no right was decided, the appeal was not maintainable. He placed reliance on M/s. Tarapore and Co., Madras v. M/s V/O Tractors Export Moscow and another, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1168 and Prakash Chandra Agarwal and others v. M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd., A.I.R. 1917 S.C. 2319 wherein it has been held that where no title is decided, the order cannot be said to be a final order and only when the rights and title of the parties are decided, the order can be called to be a final order. 5. The main controversy in this case is whether the second appeal was maintainable before the Board of Revenue against the remand order passed by the Addl. Commissioner and whether the revision filed can be converted into a second appeal. The provision for filing the second appeal is contemplated under Section 331 sub-section 4 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and the provision for filing first appeal is contained in sub-section 3 of Section 331, which are as under. Commissioner and whether the revision filed can be converted into a second appeal. The provision for filing the second appeal is contemplated under Section 331 sub-section 4 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and the provision for filing first appeal is contained in sub-section 3 of Section 331, which are as under. 331(3). "An appeal shall lie from any decree or from an order passed under section 47 or an order of the nature mentioned in Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (V of 1908) or in order 43, rule I of the First Schedule to that Code passed by a court mentioned in column no. 4 of Schedule II to this Act in proceedings mentioned in column no. 3 thereof to the court or authority mentioned in column no. 5 thereof." 331(4). "A second appeal shall lie on any of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) from the final order or decree passed in any appeal under sub-section (3) to the authority, if any, mentioned against it in column no. 6 of the schedule aforesaid." 6. In view of these provisions, the first appeal lies against an order of the nature mentioned in order 43 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. Here in the instant case, the suit was decreed ex parte. Application under Order 9, Rule 13 C.P.C. was filed, which was rejected. Against this order appeal was filed before the Addl. Commissioner which was allowed by the Addl. Commissioner. An appeal against such an order is contemplated under sub-section 4 of Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. According to this section second appeal lies against the final order of decree passed in the appeal under sub-section 3 of this section. The order of remand passed by the Addl. Commissioner was appealable as held in Mahendra Kumar v. Board of Revenue and others (supra). Therefore, in this case, against the order of the Addl. Commissioner second appeal was maintainable before the Board of Revenue. 7. Now we have to consider about the provision for revision as contained in C.P.C. and in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Commissioner was appealable as held in Mahendra Kumar v. Board of Revenue and others (supra). Therefore, in this case, against the order of the Addl. Commissioner second appeal was maintainable before the Board of Revenue. 7. Now we have to consider about the provision for revision as contained in C.P.C. and in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Provisions for revision in the C.P.C. are contained in Section 115, the relevant portion of which runs as under :- "Revision-(1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any court subordinate to such High Court in which no appeal lies thereto and if such subordinate court appears- (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested ; or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit." 8. According to these provisions a revision lies only where no appeal lies against the order passed by the subordinate court. The provision for filing revision before the revenue court is contained in Section 333 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act which runs as follows :- "Power of Board to call for cases.-The Board may call for the record of any suit or proceeding decided by any subordinate Court in which no appeal lies or where an appeal lies but has not been preferred, and if such subordinate court appears- (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it in law ; or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested ; or (c) to have acted in the exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity the Board may pass such order in the case as it thinks fit." 9. On the comparison of the above two sections there appears to be clear departure in Section 333 which provides filing of revision on second ground as well where appeal lies and has not been filed. On the comparison of the above two sections there appears to be clear departure in Section 333 which provides filing of revision on second ground as well where appeal lies and has not been filed. It may be pointed out that before the enactment of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act there was a provision in the U.P. Tenancy Act for revision contained in Section 275, which was similar to Section 116 of the C.P.C. The legislature was fully aware of the existing provisions of the revision. In spite of that in Section 333 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act a clear departure has been made by providing an additional ground. It appears, it was enacted with the clear object that where one could not file appeal within the time prescribed for one reason or the other, he may still challenge the order by way of revision if the grounds contained in Section 333 U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act exist. This had been made presumably with the idea that for a revision the limitation is larger than the Second Appeal and for some reason or the other if the limitation for Second Appeal has run out and the aggrieved party considers that he can still challenge the order on the ground under Section 333 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act he can avail the remedy by filing the revision. It is clear from the plain reading of Section 333 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act that revision is contemplated in two situations namely where no appeal lies or where appeal lies but has not been preferred. There is no dispute about the fact that before the revision was filed on behalf of the petitioner on 101.1973, no appeal had been filed. Therefore, on the date when the revision was filed, it was maintainable in other words, the petitioner had two remedies, against the order of the Addl. Commissioner one by way of filing second appeal before the Board of Revenue and the other by filing a revision. It was his choice and for one reason or the other, he considered that he can get effective relief by filing revision and the same was filed. Later on he changed his mind and moved an application for converting the revision into second appeal. It was his choice and for one reason or the other, he considered that he can get effective relief by filing revision and the same was filed. Later on he changed his mind and moved an application for converting the revision into second appeal. Presumably with the idea that in the Second Appeal, the petitioner can avail larger remedy whereas in case of revision, he can challenge only question of jurisdiction on the grounds mentioned in Section 333 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. These grounds were already available to him when the revision itself was filed and if he chose to file revision then according to Section 333 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the revision was maintainable in absence of the fact that Second Appeal, though maintainable was not filed. The Board of Revenue in the circumstances of the present case did not consider it a fit case for converting the revision into Second Appeal. On the consideration of the full facts of the case, I am also not inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that it is a fit case for interference in writ petition. Therefore, the Board of Revenue has not committed any error in refusing to convert the revision into second appeal. The writ petition is devoid of force and is liable to be dismissed. 10. In the result, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.