JUDGMENT A. Banerji, J. 1. THESE two writ petitions raise common questions of law and facts and can be decided by a common judgment. The Appellate Authority decided the two appeals, out of which the present writ petitions arise, by a common decision dated 11-12-1979. Satyabir Singh moved an application under Sec. 26 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 for selling two plots measuring 3 bigha 4 biswa 14 biswansi in village Datal. The application was rejected on the ground that in the Master plan village Datala was shown as Krishi Hari Patti and Extractive Industries. 2. YASBIR Singh made a similar application under Section 26 for sale of a plot no. 80/2 measuring 3 bigha 4 biswa 14-1/2 biswansi situate in the same village. His application was also rejected on similar grounds. The learned District Judge who was the Appellate Authority, considered the questions raised before him. He referred that in the Master plan, village Datal has been shown as Krishi Hari Patti and Extractive Industries. The order shows that sufficient time was given to the District Government Counsel (Civil) to explain as to how much land of the village was meant for green belt and how much land was to be demarcated for extractive industries but no reply had been given. It is further stated that since data had not been given the plots in dispute could not be treated as vacant land within the definition of the said words as given in the Act. Consequently, there was no question of moving any application under Section 26 of the Act and these applications were held to be non-maintainable. Both the appeals were dismissed with the above observation. 3. AGGRIEVED by the aforesaid observation the State and the Competent Authority have filed the present writ petitions. I have not been able to follow how the Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Meerut becomes a party. The Competent Authority is to decide the matter and act as an Authority under the Act. It does not own the land or has no claim over the land. It is the State of U. P. which alone can file a writ petition. The impleadment of petitioner No. 2 the Competent Authority is in my opinion misconceived. 4. MR. The Competent Authority is to decide the matter and act as an Authority under the Act. It does not own the land or has no claim over the land. It is the State of U. P. which alone can file a writ petition. The impleadment of petitioner No. 2 the Competent Authority is in my opinion misconceived. 4. MR. J. N. Tiwari, learned counsel for the Respondent raised a contention that these writ petitions can only be heard by a Division Bench and the learned single Judge was not competent to hear any writ petition in respect of a matter which came under the purview of a Central Act. In support of his contention he relied on a Division Bench authority of this Court in the case of Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Dehra Dun v. L. J. Johnson, 1978 AWC 529 . The Division Bench held that Sec. 5 of the U. P. High Court (Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act (14 of 1962) as amended by U. P. Act 31 of 1975 made it clear that a Single Judge of the Court could hear and decide any matter arising out of the Central Act provided it had been amended by any U. P. Act. Since the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, which is a Central Act and which has not been amended by the U. P. Act, the learned Single Judge is not competent to hear such a writ petition. The view taken in the above case could hold the field if the U. P. High Court (Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act, No. 14 of 1962 had not been further amended. In the year 1981 the Uttar Pradesh High Court (Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) (Amendment) Act, 1981 (U. P. Act no. 12 of 1981) came into effect and Section 5 was substituted completely. The Section now reads as follows : "5. In the year 1981 the Uttar Pradesh High Court (Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) (Amendment) Act, 1981 (U. P. Act no. 12 of 1981) came into effect and Section 5 was substituted completely. The Section now reads as follows : "5. Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals in certain other cases.-(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of Her Majesty, dated March 17, 1860 read with Clauses 7 and 17 of the U. P. High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948, or in any other law, no appeal arising from an application or proceeding, instituted or commenced whether prior or subsequent to the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh High Court (Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) (Amendment) Act, 1981," shall lie to the High Court from a judgment or order of one judge of the High Court, made in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution, in respect of any judgment, order or award---(a) of a tribunal, court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or (b) of the Government or any Officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), all appeals of the nature referred to in that sub-section pending before the High Court immediately before the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh High Court (Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals Amendment) Act, 1981, shall be heard and disposed of as if that sub-section had not been enacted." This provision makes it clear that no special appeal would lie against the decision of a Single Judge of the Court in matters relating to the exercise of its power under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award of a Tribunal, Court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or of the Government or any officer or authority made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act. Prior to this amendment Section 5 provided that a Single Judge of the High Court could exercise his powers under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment or order or award made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction by a District Judge, Additional District Judge, Civil Judge or Additional Civil Judge under any Uttar Pradesh Act (including any Central Act as amended by an Uttar Pradesh Act). The provisions in the earlier Act referred to "any Central Act as amended by an Uttar Pradesh Act." This provision is no longer then in the amended Section 5 of the 1962 Act. The position now is that any judgment, order or award passed by the Government or any officer or authority, which is made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any Central or State Act would be entertained by a Single Judge of the Court. In this view of the matter the case cited by MR. Tiwari is not apt and is distinguishable. In this view of the matter the case cited by MR. Tiwari is not apt and is distinguishable. In the present case the impugned order has been passed by the Appellate Authority in exercise of the powers under Section 13 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and is cognizable by a single Judge of the High Court after the 1981 Amendment to the U. P. High Court (Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act. 5. COMING to the merits of the matter the Standing Counsel argued that the Appellate Authority was in error in holding that no application under Section 26 of the Act was necessary in the case and further that the land which was entered in the revenue records as agricultural land was to be treated as vacant land if it was shown in the Master plan for the purposes other than agriculture. 6. THE point has been considered by the Appellate Authority and it was held that in the Master plan the land utilisation is shown as Krishi Hari Patti and Extractive Industries. In other words, it is meant for green belt and extractive industries. THE Appellate Authority in its order has also indicated that inspite of sufficient time being granted to the State Government Counsel he has not been able to indicate as to how much land was to be kept for green belt and how much land was to be demarcated for extractive industries. Consequently, it was not shown as to how much land was demarcated for extractive industries. As a result the Appellate Authority held that the land in dispute could not be treated as vacant land. Section 2 (q) defines 'vacant land' to mean "land, not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an urban agglomeration". If the land is being mainly used for the purpose of agriculture it does not come within the definition of the words "vacant land". Reference may also be made to the expression "urban land" as used in Section 2 (o) of the Act. The definition makes it clear that the land which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture is not urban land. Reference may also be made to the expression "urban land" as used in Section 2 (o) of the Act. The definition makes it clear that the land which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture is not urban land. In the Explanation appended to Sec. 2 (o) which is also applicable to Sec. 2 (q) "agriculture" includes horticulture, but does not include (1) raising of grass, (2) dairy farming, (3) poultry farming, (4) breeding of live stock and (5) such cultivation or growing of such plant, as may be prescribed. There is no indication any way, in any of the affidavits filed in this case that the land in dispute is being used for any of these five items. Clause (B) to the Explanation makes it clear that the land shall not be deemed to be used mainly for the purpose of agriculture for such land is not entered in the revenue or land records before the appointed date as for the purpose of agriculture. In the present case the revenue entries show that the land was being used for the purpose of agriculture. It would, therefore, be obvious that the land in dispute in both the writ petitions were agricultural land and mainly used for the purpose of agriculture. Consequently, it would neither be urban land nor vacant land. 7. THE Appellate Authority has also observed that inspite of opportunity granted to the District Government Counsel (Civil) he had not been able to furnish particulars as to how much land was covered for extractive industries. A perusal of Annexure 2 to rejoinder affidavit shows that a letter dated 25th January, 1980 was written by the Joint Director, Town and Country Planning to all the Competent Authorities under the Land Ceiling Act that in the Masterplan of Meerut wherever the land has been shown for the purpose of Krishi Hari Patti evam Extractive Udyog it has been shown without any separate demarcation for the user of the land for the above two purposes. This makes it clear that there is no demarcation of the land for the use of extractive industries. THE Appellate Authority was, therefore, right in treating the entire land to be agricultural land and in holding that it could not be treated as vacant land for the purpose of taking permission under Section 26 of the Act. This makes it clear that there is no demarcation of the land for the use of extractive industries. THE Appellate Authority was, therefore, right in treating the entire land to be agricultural land and in holding that it could not be treated as vacant land for the purpose of taking permission under Section 26 of the Act. I am of the view that the Appellate Authority had taken a correct view of the law and his order does not batray any manifest error of law. 8. ANOTHER point was raised by the learned counsel for the respondent to say that the writ petition had become infructuous for the State Government has issued a directive under Section 20 of the Act. A copy thereof has been filed as Annexure 1 to the supplementary counter affidavit dated 23rd January, 1978. This Government order gives a clear direction as to how exemption under Section 20 is to be given for land which is actually being used for agricultural purposes and has been entered in the record of rights as being mainly used for agriculture, even if the land is specified in the Masterplan for a purpose which is not agriculture. Certain conditions have also been indicated which are to be effective in case the permission is granted. In view of the above Government Order, it is apparent that the land which is entered in the record of rights before the appointed date as being used mainly for agricultural purpose and is actually being used for the said purpose is entitled to the exemption under Section 20 of the Act. It has been stated on behalf of the learned counsel for the Respondent that an application under Section 20 of the Act had been moved before the State Government on 17-8-1979, and this was sent per registered post. The very fact that the Government has issued a Government Order for granting exemption to land which is not only entered in the record of rights as being used for agricultural purposes but is also actually being used as such, the land is liable to be exempted from the provisions of the Act. The contention of the learned counsel in this respect is sound, but his contention that the writ petition has become infructuous cannot be accepted until he is able to produce an order under Section 20 of the Act. The contention of the learned counsel in this respect is sound, but his contention that the writ petition has become infructuous cannot be accepted until he is able to produce an order under Section 20 of the Act. However, in view of what has been stated above, in regard to the order passed by the Appellate Authority I find no case has been made out for interference with that order and this writ petition must fail and is accordingly dismissed with costs. This order will govern the connected writ petition No. 2974 of 1980. Petition dismissed.