Judgment :- 1. A litigation - a nascent one-between two traders in two different States, one in far off South, the State of Kerala, and the other, very much in the North, the State of Haryana, has given rise to this Revision petition. It relates to an attachment before judgment ordered by the Sub Court, Calicut at the instance of the plaintiff-firm against the defendants-revision petitioners in respect of 8 waggons of rice in the railway yard of the Calicut Station. That such a hotly fought out litigation should not linger longer in the City of Calicut, with its legendary history of honesty and hospitality which had attracted many a trader, indigenous and international, centuries back, was keenly felt, even when the matter was vigorously argued. Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Revision petitioners and Advocate General appearing for the respondent-plaintiff, promptly responded to a suggestion from the court for endeavouring an amicable settlement The heart of the fight was perhaps so intense that conciliation efforts did not fructify. This Court has then necessarily to resolve the issue, as best as it can. 2. The facts of the litigation have to be stated as they are revealed from the pleadings of the plaintiff. I have eschewed the disputations of the pleadings by the defendants for the purpose of this Revision; for, I felt that the Advocate-General was correct in his submission that if any disputed question of fact is to be adjudicated, that would better be done by the court before whom the defendants would have an opportunity to plead fully their case and substantiate it with evidence in their possession. Thus, I have to consider whether the jurisdictional conditions for ordering such an attachment have been made out, proceeding entirely on the basis of the averments contained in the affidavit in support of the application for attachment. 3. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the respondent took a preliminary objection that the order is not revisable at all, as according to him, the order does not amount to a 'case decided' and consequently S.115 CPC. is not attracted. He, however, did not pursue the point, in the course of his arguments; nor did he elaborate the same or seek to support his submissions with reference to statutory provisions or judicial decisions. The order sought to be revised is one which involves serious adverse civil consequences as regards the defendant. is not attracted. He, however, did not pursue the point, in the course of his arguments; nor did he elaborate the same or seek to support his submissions with reference to statutory provisions or judicial decisions. The order sought to be revised is one which involves serious adverse civil consequences as regards the defendant. Such consequences will justify a conclusion that the order is a case decided within the meaning of S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, going by the principles gatherable in relation to the interpretation of that term. The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Y. Vijayalakshmamma v. Y. Lakshmaiah & Sons (AIR. 1980 A. P. 176), where the High Court interfered in revision in similar circumstances justifies my approach and conclusion on this aspect. I overrule the contention of the respondent that the order is unamenable to revisional correction for the alleged reason that it is not a'case decided' See also AIR 1972 Rajasthan 141. 4. Some facts are not disputed; and they are: There had been dealings between the plaintiff and the defendants, in the words of the plaintiff, "for the last few years". The plaintiff has admitted that "the defendant has influence and facility available on the locality from where the rice is to be removed and transported to Calicut for the plaintiff. 5. The Haryana State Co-operative Supply and Marketing Federation Ltd. called for tenders for the sale of rice. The plaintiff submitted the tenders. The tender dated 2-9-1981 was accepted. It related to the purchase of 1,800 metric tonnes of I. R.8 sella Rice from Pundri at the rate of Rs. 197.78 quintal godown. On the confirmation of the sale, the Haryana Society issued a sale order dated 4-9-1981 calling upon the plaintiff to pay further amounts on the basis of the accepted tender. According to the plaintiff "the Marketing Federation always insisted for a local party, the plaintiff being a dealer belonging to a different State". The defendants offered, and the plaintiff availed of, the services of the defendants for the fulfilment of the contract. An aggregate amount of Rs. 24,30,000 was received by the defendants, made up of payments by draft, by telegraphic transfers and collection through bundles for the purpose of meeting the cost price of rice. The defendants offered, and the plaintiff availed of, the services of the defendants for the fulfilment of the contract. An aggregate amount of Rs. 24,30,000 was received by the defendants, made up of payments by draft, by telegraphic transfers and collection through bundles for the purpose of meeting the cost price of rice. It, however, transpired that inclusive of the commission payable to the defendants the total amount payable to the defendants was only Rs. 21,15,656. According to the plaintiff, a sum of Rs. 3,14,344 thus remained as excess amount collected by the defendants. The discord and dispute seem to have originated from the lack of response from the defendants to the request of the plaintiff for the return of the amount. Though the defendants have a different version regarding the settlement of accounts between the parties, I have, as indicated earlier, refrained from considering the acceptability of that version even on a prima facie basis, for the reason indicated earlier. However, it may not be out of place to refer to the version of the defendants as revealed from the pleadings in the revision petition that under what is described as a final settlement dated 4-12-1981 between the plaintiff and Nellikkot Traders, Calicut described as a sister concern of the plaintiff on the one band, and the defendants, Bansal Industries and Jai Rajrang Rice and General Mills, the latter two termed as sister concerns of the defendant on the second part, the accounts up to that day between those parties were finally settled, the parties of the second part agreeing to pay the parties of the first part a sum of Rs. 1,30,000/-. It is also stated that this liability was being discharged by adjustments A photostat copy of this final settlement is produced, as Ext. Xi along with the reply affidavit dated 9-2-1981 filed on behalf of the revision petitioners. 6. It is agreed that whatever be the actual liability, that question being essentially a matter for adjudication in the full-fledged trial of the suit itself, the point to be considered is whether an attachment before judgment as has been done by the court below was within the jurisdiction of that court on the averments of the plaintiff. 7. The only relevant averments in support of the application for attachment are those contained in Para.7 of the affidavit. 7. The only relevant averments in support of the application for attachment are those contained in Para.7 of the affidavit. As the very decision is dependent upon the jurisdictional sufficiency of those averments, it is desirable to extract those averments in their entirety. The averments are very short indeed. And they read: "To the best of the knowledge of the plaintiff he had no immovable properties in the State of Kerala and it will be extremely difficult to realise the decree amount. 8 wagon load of rice covered as mentioned in the attachment schedule had arrived at Calicut Railway Station. The defendants will be making attempts to transfer the R. R. in the name of third parties and the goods will be sold to others also in which case the plaintiff will suffer loss and damage." 8. The suit had been filed on 15-1-1982. The application for attachment I.A. No. 250 of 1982 was filed and moved on that day. It is seen to have been heard in part on that day and to be posted for further hearing, at the request of the plaintiff to 16-1-1982 and thereafter adjourned to 18-1-1982, again at the instance of the plaintiff-petitioner. The court below noted that the plaint claim is Rs. 2,73,600/ and that the interlocutory application sought attachment of 8 waggon-loads of rice, then in the custody of the Southern Railway at the Goods Station, Kozhikode. The only operative portion which contains the discussion, reasoning, and the conclusion of the court below as contained in the order is as follows: 'The documents produced show that the aforesaid goods were consigned by the defendants and their sister concern to the consignee who is the plaintiff in this suit.' Hearing the learned advocates appearing for the parties and going through the documents now produced I am satisfied that the plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case for attaching the goods shown in the schedule from the Goods shed at Kozhikode." Thereafter, the court had given certain directions as to how delivery of the goods had to be effected, how the custody of the goods subsequent to the attachment had to be maintained, and as to how the risk and responsibility over the goods should be borne by the plaintiff. In the penultimate paragraph of that order, the court below made the following observation: "If there is any specific rule or provision which would entitle the officer of the Railway to refuse delivery, of the goods, despite the attachment, he will be at liberty to point out so and it shall be considered." This order was pronounced on 20-1-1982. The order concluded by a direction to issue emergent notice to the opposite side returnable by 30-1-1982. 9. The Court examiner seems to have pointed out the difficulties involved in implementing the order, which apparently the court could not have imagined about, at the time when it issued the order. A minimum of three amins and two process servers, it was pointed out, would have to be deputed for the purpose. The quantity of rice involved was 3736 bags Further orders were solicited in the matter and on 21-1-1982, the court ordered that necessary officers for the purpose may be deputed at the expense of the petitioner. 10. The revision petitioners complain that till the filing of the revision petition they had not been served with any notice of the plaint claim or any other process of the court. I need not examine that complaint in this revision petition, though, if the complaint be true, it is indicative of an unfortunate lapse. 11. Even after giving due allowance to the fact that an ex parte interim order may not require elaborate reasons in support of the order, I am constrained to observe that the order of the court below, apart from stating about a prima facie case, had not even briefly alluded to the prima facie satisfaction of facts furnishing jurisdiction on that court for ordering such a drastic action as attachment before judgment with disastrous consequence on the financial position and trade reputation of the defendants One would have thought that after nearly three-fourth of a century from the advent of the Code of Civil Procedure containing 0.38 R.S, the general and cardinal principles relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power thereunder are plain enough. Unfortunately, the necessary application of mind, and its reflection on the decision, are missing in this case. Even a cursory glance of any commentary or annotated version of the provision relating to attachment, would have alerted the court below about the rigorous requirements for ordering an attachment before judgment, particularly of movables. Unfortunately, the necessary application of mind, and its reflection on the decision, are missing in this case. Even a cursory glance of any commentary or annotated version of the provision relating to attachment, would have alerted the court below about the rigorous requirements for ordering an attachment before judgment, particularly of movables. I shall presently advert to some of those requirements with particular emphasis on the facts of the present case. 12. It is desirable that the courts of law should take note of the winds of change in every field including that of trade and commerce. Our Constitution, by Art.301 thereof, provides that trade and commerce shall be free throughout the territory of India Whether it be a rice dealer in Haryana finding his market in the State of Kerala, or a rubber dealer of Kerala soliciting consumers in the industrially developed Faridabad region of Haryana, it is necessary that unnecessary harassment is avoided against honest traders In an area rendered free by the Constitution, courts of law should not rush with spokes in the wheel, In a shrinking world with developed and developing trade channels, trade and commerce, intra state and interstate, and even international, have to depend largely on the good faith and reputation of those in the field. While punctilious observance in respect of contractual obligations is essential to generate mutual trust, the traders have certainly a moral and even legal duty to see that none of their acts, even if those acts be with the intervention of a court of law, shall tend to mar the trade reputation of another in the field. It may be argued, almost with the tongue in the cheek, that an attachment by itself does not much damnify a defendant, for, when cause is shown or security is furnished, the attachment could be lifted Such an argument is almost like the stock argument that suspension pending enquiry is no punishment. Quite often such drastic action with attendant publicity about it, may irretrievably spoil the reputation of a trader in the one case and of an official in the other. It is little consolation that after a protracted litigation, the defendant is able to vindicate his position. The victory for all practical purposes may prove to be a barren one. Quite often such drastic action with attendant publicity about it, may irretrievably spoil the reputation of a trader in the one case and of an official in the other. It is little consolation that after a protracted litigation, the defendant is able to vindicate his position. The victory for all practical purposes may prove to be a barren one. The potentialities of such drastic power have necessarily to be very carefully and anxiously considered by a court of law before it passes the order. Far-reaching as the effect of the order is, sparing should be its exercise. Quite often it happens that unaided by the arguments of the other side, and pressed with the stress and strain of the routine work, a court, with the persistence of a plaintiff's counsel, seeking an emergent order, is unable to devote as much time as is necessary to contemplate on the overall effect of its order and to mould its orders to the requirements of the situation. That, however, does not detract me from administering the caution to the courts about the solemn duty of the court to be extra careful and cautious in its approach, particularly in the absence of the adversary, before the drastic order is issued. A mere lip service to the principles, as for example, a mere statement that there was an anxious and careful consideration would not do duty for an incisive analysis of the pleadings in the case, the materials and evidence primafacie disclosed in support thereof and the possibilities of the order affecting the rights and status of the parties to the litigation. 13. Many years back Garth, C. J. warned "that the powers given to the courts under this section should be exercised sparingly and with the utmost caution. A Civil Court should be thoroughly satisfied before it proceeds under that section, that the deft, is really disposing of his property with intent to obstruct or delay the execution of any decree that may be passed against him", as otherwise this section "would become the instrument of the greatest oppression". See Shoshee Shekhoreswar Roy v. Haro Gobind Bose 13 C.L.R 356. See Shoshee Shekhoreswar Roy v. Haro Gobind Bose 13 C.L.R 356. The necessity for such caution was elucidated by Mookerjee, J. in the following words: "An attachment practically takes away the power of alienation and such a restriction on the exercise of the undoubted rights of ownership ought not to be imposed upon an individual except upon clear and convincing proof that the order is needed for the protection of the plff." See Jai Prakash Narain Singh v. Basanta Kumari Debi, 15 I.C. 604 Williams, J. stated that "the mere fact that a deft, has in the past mortgaged or disposed of his properties is not a sufficient ground for levying an attachment. There must be a present intention Moreover, the Court must be satisfied that interference is necessary to prevent injury which is irreparable, and that the mischief or inconvenience which is likely to arise in consequence of withholding the relief, will be greater than that from granting it. Finally, neither injunction nor attachment ought to be lightly granted. It would be a serious thing if persons in possession were restrained from making use of the property merely because a suit has been instituted about it. It is only where it is essential that property should be kept in its existing condition, that the Court should interfere" See Durgadas v. Nalinchandra, 38 C. W. N 771 McLeod, C. J. while considering the decision in Nowroji Pudumjee v. Deccan Bank Ltd.. AIR. 1921 Bombay 69, emphasised another aspect of the matter when he observed: "A man is not debarred from dealing with his property because a suit has been filed against him. Otherwise in every case in which a suit is brought against a man if during the pendency of the proceedings he sells some of his properties that would be at once a sufficient ground to satisfy the Court that he is disposing of his property with intent to defraud the plff. Clearly there must be additional circumstances before the Court can be satisfied that such an intention exists." (emphasis supplied) 14. There is a neat summary of the principles emerging from the authoritative decision of the Calcutta High Court in Premraj Mundra v. Md. Manack Gazi & Ors., A.I R.1951 Calcutta 156 at p. 160: "From a perusal of all the authorities, I think that the following guiding principles can be deduced: (1) That an order under 0.38. There is a neat summary of the principles emerging from the authoritative decision of the Calcutta High Court in Premraj Mundra v. Md. Manack Gazi & Ors., A.I R.1951 Calcutta 156 at p. 160: "From a perusal of all the authorities, I think that the following guiding principles can be deduced: (1) That an order under 0.38. R.5 & 6. can only be issued, if circumstances exist as are stated therein. (2) Whether such circumstances exist is a question of fact that must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court. (3) That the Court would not be justified in issuing an order for attachment before judgment, or for security, merely because it thinks that do harm would be done thereby or that the defts would not be prejudiced. (4) That the affidavits in support of the contentions of the applicant, must not be vague, & must be properly verified. Where it is affirmed true to knowledge or information or belief, it must be stated as to which portion is true to knowledge, the source of information should be disclosed, & the grounds for belief should be stated. (5) That a mere allegation that the deft, was selling off his properties is no sufficient Particulars must be stated. (6) There is no rule that transactions before suit cannot be taken into consideration, but the object of attachment before judgment must be to prevent future transfer or alienation. (7) Where only a small portion of the property belonging to the defendant is being disposed of, no inference can be drawn in the absence of other circumstances that the alienation is necessarily to defraud or delay the pltf's claim. (8) That the mere fact of transfer is not enough, since nobody can be prevented from dealing with his properties simply because a suit has been filed?. There must be additional circumstances to show that the transfer is with an intention to delay or defeat the pltf's. claim. It is open to the Court to look to the conduct of the parties immediately before suit, and to examine the surrounding circumstances, and to draw an inference as to whether the deft, is about to dispose of the property, and if so, with what intention. It is open to the Court to look to the conduct of the parties immediately before suit, and to examine the surrounding circumstances, and to draw an inference as to whether the deft, is about to dispose of the property, and if so, with what intention. The Court is entitled to consider the nature of the claim and the defence put forward (9) The fact that the deft, is in insolvent circumstances or in acute financial embarrassment, is a relevant circumstance but not by itself sufficient. (10) That in the case of running businesses, the strictest caution is necessary and the mere fact that a business has been closed, or that its turnover has diminished, is not enough. (11) Where however the deft, starts disposing of his properties one by one, immediately upon getting a notice of the pltfs' claim. &/or where be had transferred the major portion of his properties shortly prior to the institution of the suit, & was in an embarrassed financial condition, these were grounds from which an inference could be legitimately drawn that the object of the deft, was to delay and defeat the pltfs'. claim. (12) Mere removal of properties outside jurisdiction, is not enough, but where the deft, with notice of the pltf's. claim, suddenly begins removal of his properties outside the jurisdiction of the appropriate court, & without any other satisfactory reason, an adverse inference may be drawn against the deft. Where the removal is to a foreign country, the inference is greatly strengthened. (13) The deft, in a suit is under no liability to take any special care in administering his affairs, simply because there is a claim pending against him Mere neglect, or suffering execution by other creditors, is not a sufficient reason for an order under 0.38 of the Code. (14) The sale of properties at a gross undervalue, or benami transfers, are always good indications of an intention to defeat the pltf's. claim. The Court must however be very cautious about the evidence on these points & not rely on vague allegations." 15. Tyranny of space and time forces me to desist from incorporating extensive or exhaustive extracts from other judicial decisions. Sufficient to say that there are further elucidations of this statutory provision in a comparatively recent decision of the Madras High Court in V. K. Nataraja Gounder v. 5. A. Bangaru Reddiar, AIR. 1965 Madras 212. Tyranny of space and time forces me to desist from incorporating extensive or exhaustive extracts from other judicial decisions. Sufficient to say that there are further elucidations of this statutory provision in a comparatively recent decision of the Madras High Court in V. K. Nataraja Gounder v. 5. A. Bangaru Reddiar, AIR. 1965 Madras 212. The following observations are apposite in this connection: 'Vague and general allegations that the defendant is about to dispose of the property or remove it beyond the jurisdiction of the court, unsupported by particulars, would not be sufficient compliance with the rule. It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to state the grounds on which he entertains the belief or apprehension that the defendant would dispose of or remove the property, or, to give the source of his information and belief in the matter. This is really settled law on the subject A verbatim copy of the provisions of the Code in the affidavit in support of the application, or a mechanical repetition of the language of the Code without an iota or substratum of truth underlying the allegation, would be merely colourable and would, constitute an abuse of process of court. The court must insist upon strict proof of the said allegations. Any order of the court without a proper investigation whether the allegations are well-founded or not, would constitute a gross dereliction of duty." The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court referred to earlier (AIR-1980 Andhra Pradesh 176) emphasises in Para.9 and 11 the duties of the court is the exercise of the powers of the amended 0.38 R.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under clause (4) of that rule (introduced by the Amending Act 104 of 1976), an attachment not complying with sub-rule (1) is void. 16. It is perhaps unnecessary for the purpose of this case to consider the discussions on the scope for extension of the Mareva doctrine, whether the factor of "foreign defendants" or the consideration of 'jeopardy to plaintiff should be the dominant tenet for an injunction or attachment; nor is it necessary to advert to the development of the law in England on this subject as is indicated by Clause.37 of the Supreme Court bill there. There are particularly prescient passages on some of these aspects in the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in. Faith Panton Property v. Hodgetts (198f (1) All E. R.). There are particularly prescient passages on some of these aspects in the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in. Faith Panton Property v. Hodgetts (198f (1) All E. R.). 17. It will be evident from the extract of the affidavit referred to above that there is not even a formal averment that the defendants with intent to defeat or delay the payment due to the plaintiff are about to remove the goods from the jurisdiction of the court. The only averment is about the intention to transfer the property in the goods There is no allegation that the defendants had been notified about the plaintiff's claim and that that had motivated the defendants to transfer the property in the goods The goods which had been consigned from Haryana to Calicut have necessarily to be sold, and sold if possible at Calicut. A sale of that property will be a routine and ordinary transaction as far as the defendants are concerned, the plaintiff himself having admitted that the defendants are in this line of business "for very many years". If, according to the defendants, the plaintiff did not perform their obligation under the contract, they are justified in ensuring that the goods ate taken delivery of by other means. Such an attempt cannot be characterised at all as an attempt to remove the goods from the jurisdiction of the court with a mala fide intent. Even the totality of the averments of the plaintiff would not, therefore, make out a case to confer jurisdiction on a court to order attachment before judgment. It must also be emphasised that an evil intent cannot be easily inferred. If only the court pondered over the relationship between the parties, a relationship which concededly lasted for 'a few years', as also the important and telling circumstance that at one time the plaintiff had no difficulty whatever to entrust the defendant with as substantial a sum as about Rs. 25 lakhs, the court below would not have missed the point that the above circumstances do not justify an inference of an evil intent on the part of the defendants. Difference of opinion between traders and a litigate exercise following therefrom, do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that one party is entertaining an evil intention and is totally effacing itself from the commercial scene. Difference of opinion between traders and a litigate exercise following therefrom, do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that one party is entertaining an evil intention and is totally effacing itself from the commercial scene. To draw an inference of evil intent in these circumstances will be extremely perverse on the part of the court. 18. Added to these is a circumstance that the source of knowledge about the alleged attempt on the part of the defendants for the transfer of railway receipts and sale to others is not even shadowed though it is mandated by the law that such source of information should be clearly and fairly indicated in the affidavit. It is not a mere question of formality as far as this case is concerned. If after cordial relationship for over many years, and after a transaction in which nearly 21/2 million rupees had been entrusted with the defendants, the plaintiff honestly and genuinely apprehended an evil intent, that must have been based on substantial materials and supported by cogent particulars. These are conspicuous by a total absence, in the present case. In these circumstances I have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the court below acted without jurisdiction and without any justification in ordering attachment in the manner as it did. 19. If the court had cogitated over the matter it would have found that the goods are with common carriers, that the railway receipts were with the bankers and that in such circumstances, even without an actual seizure of over 3000 bags of rice and the removal and transportation to the plaintiff's places, it could have probably safeguarded the interest of the parties by appropriate direction to the bankers. Even the rights of the bankers on the basis of the railway receipts in respect of which hundies had been drawn, do not appear to have been adverted to by the court below. 20. Lastly the learned Advocate-General submitted that there has not been a failure of justice and consequently this court should not invoke the revisional jurisdiction, having regard to the emphasis on a failure of justice given by the Parliament in the amendment of S.115, CPC., as a condition for the exercise of the revisional power. Sitting in this court and hearing as I do now, revision petitions, I hear such submissions daily, repeatedly, (and I suppose patiently!). Sitting in this court and hearing as I do now, revision petitions, I hear such submissions daily, repeatedly, (and I suppose patiently!). Giving my utmost attention to such a submission, I feel that when a court has effected an attachment of the goods without any justification and jurisdiction, there is a failure of justice and consequently, curial correction in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction is eminently justified in this case. 21. Even while allowing the revision petition, I have felt it necessary to conserve the rights of the plaintiff, as best as they could be, in the circumstances of the case. Without expressing any view on the merits or demerits of the plaint claim, and at the same time having regard to the practicalities of the situation including the curb on advances by bankers in the light of the directives of the Reserve Bank of India of which the court may probably take judicial notice, and other attendant circumstances, I felt that to insist upon a cash security or even bank guarantee for the entire plaint claim would be unduly unjust and harsh on the defendants. In the course of the arguments, counsel for the revision petitioners submitted that the revision petitioners are possessed of substantial properties in the State of Haryana and that they could even deposit title deeds in respect of those properties, to secure the plaint claim and to allay the apprehension of the plaintiff in the matter. On a balancing of the various considerations, I feel that the interests of justice will be best served by directing the revision petitioners to furnish bank guarantee for a sum of Rs. one lakh and to execute bonds or other deeds offering security for the balance of the plaint claim to the satisfaction of the court below. The bonds should be supported by an affidavit with particulars of the documents of title which they deposit, and should be accompanied by a declaration that the properties covered by those title deeds will not be alienated or otherwise transferred or encumbered pending further orders in the matter. A valuation certificate from approved valuers in respect of such properties should also accompany the affidavit so as to enable the court to assure itself that the documents of title so deposited cover properties which would account for the balance of the plaint claim after reckoning the bank guarantee for one lakh of rupees. A valuation certificate from approved valuers in respect of such properties should also accompany the affidavit so as to enable the court to assure itself that the documents of title so deposited cover properties which would account for the balance of the plaint claim after reckoning the bank guarantee for one lakh of rupees. On complying with these directions, the revision petitioners will be entitled to take delivery of the attached goods, from the places from where they are now stored. It will be open to the revision petitioners to seek appropriate directions from the court below regarding the manner in which the goods are to be taken delivery of, and for the weighment of the goods and verification as regards the quality thereof. The revision petition is accordingly allowed in the manner indicated above and with costs. Allowed.