JUDGMENT: Ramachandra Rao, J.- On the 20th January, 1982, the Ranga Reddy, District Court was inaugurated by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, while the Hon’ble Sri Justice Madhava Reddy presided over the function. The petitioner herein, who is a member of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council and a practising Advocate of this Court has filed this ease under section 12 read with section 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act for taking action against the 1st respondent, the Chief Minister of the State, based on certain newspaper reports, that the speech made by the 1st respondent as Chief Guest on that occasion contained words, observations, appreciations and threats and advices amounting to criminal contempt. The following statements are alleged to have been made by the 1st respondent, according to the newspaper reports: (i) That the Courts which granting stay orders should take note of the Government's good intentions and consider the public cause, which the Government was serving. (The Hindu: dated 21st January, 1982.) (ii) That the 1st respondent requested the Judges to (a) consider before granting stays whenever a public cause was involved adding that if the judiciary helped to this extent, Government was prepared to allocate additional funds for Judges’ houses and other facilities; (b) the 1st respondent sought a more cooperative attitude in the matters of excise and income-tax cases as the State earns large revenues from them; (c) the 1st respondent said that the Government could not hold the Panchayat Elections earlier due to the stays granted by the Court then and that during his tenure as Chief Minister he had received full co-operation from the judiciary in several important matters like elections to the Panchayat Raj Bodies and reservations for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in these bodies; (d) the 1st respondent said that he was quite often pained to learn that Courts have set free anti-social elements on flimsy grounds and remarked that a notorious criminal detained under the N.S.A. was released by the High Court on the ground that the detention order was written in a language not understood by the detainee; (e) that even when the Courts delivered judgments against the Government the latter had always honoured them. (Indian Express and Andhra Prabha, dated 21st January, 1982. (Indian Express and Andhra Prabha, dated 21st January, 1982. (iii) (a) The 1st respondent is reported to have also appealed that Courts should not interfere frequently with Social Welfare programmes adding that due to orders of stay, and the like being issued by the Court, Government is unable to complete its developmental activities as speedily as desired; (b) that by releasing rowdies, there is every possibility of considerable danger to the Society and so Courts should not consider the language in which the detention order is written; (c) The 1st respondent also reportedly observed that he would take stern action against anybody standing in the way of developmental programmes (EENADU Telugu Daily dated 21st January, 1982). The petitioner filed an affidavit before the Advocate-General of Andhra Pradesh mentioning about the said speech and remarks of the 1st respondent and requesting permission under section 15 (1) of the Act for taking action against the 1st respondent for criminal contempt. The Advocate-General, impleaded as the 2nd respondent herein, by the letter D.N.O. No. 29 of 1982, dated 28th January, 1982, refused to accord permission to the petitioner to file a contempt case against the 1st respondent. The petitioner has thereupon filed this case for taking action against the 1st respondent for criminal contempt as already mentioned. The petitioner also challenged the constitutional validity of section 15 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, contending that the High Court can take action for contempt either suo motu or when such matters are brought to the notice of this Court by any fit person or any member of the Bar, and that section 15 (1) requiring permission from the Advocate-General is inconsistent with the inherent powers of the High Court to take action for contempt of the Court at the instance of a member of the Bar any person interested in the purity of administration of justice. 2. It is unnecessary for us to express any opinion on the second question as to the constitutional validity of the provisions of section 15 (1) as we have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the main question viz., whether the statements attributed to the 1st respondent assuming they were, in fact, made by him, as reported in the newspapers, would constitute criminal contempt within the meaning of section 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act. 3. 3. Section 2 (c) defines ‘criminal contempt’ as follows: “2. (c) ‘Criminal contempt’ means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of my matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which- (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any Court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner.” It is not the case of the petitioner that the aforesaid statements were made during the course of any judicial proceeding. Therefore, the provisions of section 2 (c) (ii) are not applicable. 4. The contention of Sri N. Chandramouli, the learned Counsel for the petitioner is, that the contents of the above speech give rise to an inference that the 1st respondent was treating the entire judiciary as a subordinate department. But, there is no merit in the contention as we do not find that any of the statements aforesaid give rise to any such inference. 3. The statement in para. (i) is a general statement stating that “the Courts while granting stay orders should take note of the Government's good intentions and consider the, public cause, winch the Government was serving,” we do not see how this statement interferes or tends to interfere with the administration of justice or tends to lower the authority of the Court. 6. The statements in paras. (ii) and (iii) amount to an expression of opinion of the difficulties faced by the Executive in the implementation of socio-econo:nic policies and collection of revenue on account of orders of stay, if liberally granted by the Courts. This statement further refers to the difficulties in the maintenance of law and order if rowdy elements and other detenus were released on untenable grounds. We do not think the aforesaid statements either taken individually or cumulatively, lowers or tends to lower the, authority of any Court, or interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner. The statements do not at all question the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary,and at best, it may amount to a fair criticism of the judicial administration. 7. The statements do not at all question the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary,and at best, it may amount to a fair criticism of the judicial administration. 7. In Legal Remembrancer v. Motilal Ghose1 his Lordships Chief Justice Jenkins observed that it was not enough that there should be a technical contempt of Court and that it must be shown that it was probable that the publication would substantially interfere with the due administration of justice. 8. In Ananta Lal Singh v. A.H. Watson2 Rankin, C.J., observed that: “A Court's jurisdiction in contempt is not to be invoked unless thereon is real prejudice which can be regarded as a substantial interference with the due course of justice. It is not every theoretical tendency that will attract the action of the Court in its very special jurisdiction. The purpose of the Court's action is a practical purpose and, it is reasonably clear on the authorities this Court will not exercise its jurisdiction upon a mere question of propriety where the tendency of a newspaper article to do harm is slight and the character and circumstances of a comment is otherwise such that it can properly be ignored.” The above observations were approved of by the Supreme Court in Rizwan-Ul-Hassan v. State of U.P.3. 9. In Andre Paul v. Attorney-General4 “Judges and Courts are alike open to criticism, and if reasonable argument or expostulation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or the public good, no Court could or would treat that as contempt of Court. In applying the law the Courts should not lose sight of local conditions. But whether the authority and position of an individual Judge or the due administration of justice is concerned, no wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticising in good faith in private or public, the public act done in the seat of justice. But whether the authority and position of an individual Judge or the due administration of justice is concerned, no wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticising in good faith in private or public, the public act done in the seat of justice. The path of criticism is a public way; the wrong headed are permitted to err therein; provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune.” In Emperor v. V.B. Kolte5 it was held as follows: “Interference with the administration of justice is one of the well-recognized heads of contempt. What has to be seen is whether the person sought to be proceeded for contempt did interfere or did intend to interfere with the administration of justice Courts, no doubt have to be jealous to guard against any interference with their functions, but on the other hand, they should not be too sensitive where no harm has been caused or was intended to be caused.” In Brahma Prakash v. State of U.P.6 it was observed by his Lordship B.K. Mukherjea, J., speaking for the Court as follows: “It admits of no dispute that the summary jurisdiction exercised by superior Courts in punishing contempt of their authority exists for the purpose of preventing interference with the course or justice and for maintaining the authority of law as is administered in the Courts. It would be only repeating what has been said so often by various judges that the object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection to Judges personally from imputations to which they may be exposed as individuals; it is intended to be a protection to the public whose interests would be very much affected if by the act or conduct of any party, the authority of the Court is lowered and the sense of confidence which people have in the administration of justice by it is weakened.” In another case reported in Hira Lal Dixit v. State of U.P.1 his Lordship S.R. Das, J., speaking for the Court cautioned that the power to punish for contempt of Court is an extraordinary power which must be sparingly exercised as the said jurisdiction exists for the purpose of preventing interference with the course of justice and for maintaining the authority of law as is administered in the Court and thereby affording protection to public interest in the purity of the administration of justice. 10. In Uma Dutt v. R.K. Sardana2 it was held by Dua, C.J., that: “Contempt of Court is a summary and a drastic process which the High Court is very slow to resort to, except in cases of gross affront to the dignity of the Court or in cases where the judicial process has been sought intentionally to be seriously interfered with illegally. It is resorted to only in the interest of the sanctity of the judicial process and the dignity and majesty of the Court of justice.” The same learned Chief Justice observed in A.N. Jindal v. Chhabra3 as follows: “Contempt of Court can be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and the administration of law into disrespect and disregard or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigants or their witnesses during the litigation. Proceedings by way of contempt being summary, and the Court being both the accuser and the Judge of the accusation, such proceedings have to he initiated in exceptional cases where there is a serious interference with the, proceedings of the Court. The jurisdiction for committing for contempt being practically arbitrary and unlimited, must be most jealously and carefully watched and exercised with the greatest reluctance and the greatest anxiety on the part of the Judges. The jurisdiction for committing for contempt being practically arbitrary and unlimited, must be most jealously and carefully watched and exercised with the greatest reluctance and the greatest anxiety on the part of the Judges. We are confining ourselves to the category of contempt of Court which unduly interferes with the judicial process because we are only concerned with such category in the case in hand. Administration of justice by an impartial and independent judiciary, which is trained to administer justice objectively, is the basis of our system of jurisprudence as it is thebasis of the jurisprudence of all the civilised societies. Any undue interference with pending proceedings is, therefore, looked at with disfavour and is treated as contempt of the Court. But at the same time, the concept of contempt does not imply that Courts should get unduly touchy and take action in respect of anything that may appear as ignoring their authority.” In In re Basant Chandra Ghosh4, it was observed that the High Court could never be so sensitive as to rule out fair comments about the administration of justice relating even to the affairs of that Court. But the main criterion was that the limits of fair comment should not be exceeded. The language used should be objective and dignified, and there should be no attempt at riticulating administration of justice by that Court by using language which was likely to shake the confidence of the public in the capacity impartiality and fairness of the procedure adopted by that Court in the disposal of matters which came up for its consideration. 11. Applying the principles laid down in the aforesaid cases to the facts of the present case, we hold that the words spoken or statements attributed to the 1st respondent as reported in the newspapers, have no tendency or effect of lowering the authority or the dignity of any Court, and have no tendency to interfere with the administration of justice. In this context, it is also appropriate to recall the, observations of his Lordship Hidayatullah, Chief Justice in Rustom Cawasjee v. Union of India1. “There is no doubt that the Court like any other institution does not enjoy immunity from fair criticism. This Court does not claim to be always right although it does not spare any effort to be right according to the best of the ability, knowledge and judgment of the Judges. “There is no doubt that the Court like any other institution does not enjoy immunity from fair criticism. This Court does not claim to be always right although it does not spare any effort to be right according to the best of the ability, knowledge and judgment of the Judges. They do not think themselves in possession of all truth or hold that wherever others differ from them, it is so far error. No one is more conscious of his limitations and fallibility than a Judge but because of his training and the assistance he gets from learned Counsel he is apt to avoid mistakes more than others………… We are constrained to say also that while fair and temperate criticism of this Court or any other Court even if strong, may not be actionable, attributing improper motives, or tending to bring Judges or Courts into hatred and contempt or obstructing directly or indirectly with the functioning of Courts is serious contempt of which notice must and will be taken. Respect is expected not only from those to whom the judgment of the Court is acceptable but also from those to whom it is. repugnant. Those who err in their criticism by indulging in vilification of the institution of Courts, administration of justice and the instruments through which the administration acts, should take heed for they will act at their own peril.” 12. On a consideration of all the, facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any grounds for taking action against the 1st respondent for contempt of Court and accordingly dismiss the contempt case. R.S.R. ----- Case dismissed.