JUDGMENT 1. - This criminal miscellaneous petition under Section 482, Cr. PC 1973 is seeking to quash the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alwar dated 1-9-1982, by which he has summoned the accused petitioner for an offence under Section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act. 2. The facts given rise to the present petition, briefly stated, are as follows : Jagdish Prasad Sharma, Enforcement Officer, Alwar submitted a complaint in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alwar, alleging that on 30-3-1976, Snri Shiv Charan Lal Sharma, the then Enforcement Officer inspected the firm M/s Shri Kishan Radhey Shyam & found that on various dates the balance of 'bajara' in stock had been more than 10 qtls. and entries in the stock register were not made though, 'bajara' had been purchased by the firm during the month of December 1974, January 1976 and February 1976 and, thus, there was violation of the orders issued under the Essential Commodities Act and the three partners namely, Mohanlal, Yashoda Devi and Shanti Devi should be punished under Section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act. The complaint was filed in the Court on 22 6-1976. All the three accused persons have been described as partners of the firm M/s Shri Kishan Radhey Shyam. The license is also in the name of the firm. Charges against the accused persons were framed on 13-2-1979. Thereafter the witnesses were examined and some were further cross-examined and then the case was fixed for recording the remaining evidence of the prosecution. The prosecution took several adjournments for producing their witnesses. Thereafter they moved an application on 2-8-1982, praying that the summons may also be issued against the firm M/s. Shri Kishan Radhey Shyam. A reply was also filed the said application. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate after hearing the counsel for the parties accepted the application of the prosecution and took cognizance against the firm as well, as there was a prima facie evidence against the firm for an offence tinder Section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act and summoned the firm as well. The said order has been challenged by this miscellaneous petition. 3. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner-firm is that the impugned order is absolutely illegal and without jurisdiction. The said order has been challenged by this miscellaneous petition. 3. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner-firm is that the impugned order is absolutely illegal and without jurisdiction. The offence under Sec 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act is punishable for one year and, therefore, under section 468, Cr.P.C. no Court can take cognizance of such an offence after one year since the complaint was filed on 22-6-1976, for the offence alleged to have been committed in December 1976, January 1976, February 76 and March 1976 and the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance against the three partners of the firm and then the charges have been framed against 'he three partners on 13-3-1979. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of said offence against the firm after such a long time under Section 468, Cr.P.C. it is barred by time. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also argued that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate could not have invoked Sec 473, Cr.P.C. as there was no application by the prosecution under Section 473, Cr.P.C. for extension of period of limitation, nor there was even a prayer in the application dated 2-8-1982, requesting for extending the period of limitation and that the learned Magistrate has not assigned any reason whatsoever for extending the period of limitation except saying that this is an anti-social offence, which is no reason in the eye of law. Under Section 473, Cr PC the court had jurisdiction to extend the period of limitation only if he is satisfied on the facts and circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice. The prosecution in its application dated 2-8-1982, did not place any facts or circumstances explaining the delay which may be thought sufficient by the Court for extending the period of limitation Moreover, since all the partners of the firm were already accused and cognizance had already been taken against them, it could not be said that it was in the interest of justice to extend the period of limitation. The scope of Section 473, Cr.P.C. is not meant to condone the mistake, or laches of the prosecution. He has placed reliance on State of Karnataka v. Vedavati, 1978 Cr. The scope of Section 473, Cr.P.C. is not meant to condone the mistake, or laches of the prosecution. He has placed reliance on State of Karnataka v. Vedavati, 1978 Cr. LJ 1375 , wherein the Karnataka High Court has observed that the delay could not be condoned as a matter of course. The discretion under Section 473, Cr. PC can be exercised only if sufficient cause has been shown, or it is in the interest of justice and the Court would be required to exercise its judicial discretion in the matter like an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. A valuable right is accrued to the accused which cannot be lightly interfered with while exercising discretion under Section 473, Cr.P.C. 5. He has also placed reliance on Prakash Chandra v. Kaushal Kishore (1980 Cr, LJ 578) , wherein the Allahabad High Court ha, also taken the same view and has observed that it is the duty of the prosecution to file an application for condonation of delay under Section 473, Cr.P.C. giving reasons, facts and circumstances explaining the delay. Section 468, Cr.P.C. bars the taking of cognizance by a court with respect to an offence for which the complaint is filed after the expiry of period of limitation. The bar of limitation is an absolute bar and goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the Court. It provides amnesty to the accused from prosecution. He has a right not to be prosecuted for the offence after a period of limitation has elapsed. 6. The learned Public Prosecutor has relied on Mohan Wahi v. State (CBI), New Delhi (1982 Cr. LJ 2040) and has argued that under Section 319. Cr.P.C. the Court can suo motu or on an application by any one direct that the persons other than the accused be also tried along with the accused and the discretion lies entirely with the Court. This authority is of no avail and does not help us in deciding the punishment. 7. Cr.P.C. the Court can suo motu or on an application by any one direct that the persons other than the accused be also tried along with the accused and the discretion lies entirely with the Court. This authority is of no avail and does not help us in deciding the punishment. 7. I have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and, in my opinion, it is a fit case in which the High Court should interfere in its extraordinary lowers given under Section 482, Cr.P.C. in nutting a bar of limitation on prosecution to prevent the parties from filing cases after a long time and also to prevent the abuse of the process of the court in containing belated prosecution long after the date of offence. The object teat statute seeks to subserve is clearly in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that any prosecution whether by the State or a private complainant must abide by letter of law, or take risk of being dismissed on the ground of limitation. The above view is based on State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh ( AIR 1981 SC 1054 ) . The scope of Section 473, Cr.P.C. is also very restricted. There should be an application giving facts and circumstance.. explaining the delay and then the Court should be satisfied as in the case while considering the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act before extending the period of limitation. In the present case, there was neither an application, nor there were any facts and circumstances explaining the delay brought before the learned Magistrate, nor even a prayer in the application submitted by the prosecution for taking cognizance in issuing summons against the petitioner firm, and therefore, the learned Magistrate could not have exercised his discretion under Section 473, Cr.P.C. in extending the time and, prosecution against the firm was barred by time as provided under See. 468, Cr.P.C. and no cognizance could have been taken against the firm at such a belated stage. As such, I am inclined to accept the present application and quash the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate dated 1-9-1982. 8. The application is accepted as indicated above. The trial will proceed further according to law.Application accepted. *******